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ABSTRACT
An analysis of the function of intelligence in crisis management:
Towards an understanding of the intelligence producer - consumer dichotomy.
This study is an analysis of the relationship between intelligence and policy, 
focusing specifically on the role of intelligence in crisis management. The 
conventional wisdom on intelligence and crisis management tends to examine each 
subject in isolation of the other. This study therefore provides an integrated 
approach to the theory of the intelligence process and the principles of crisis 
management, identifying those factors that influence the producer - consumer 
relationship. Past analyses of the intelligence producer - consumer relationship 
have revolved around the normative theory of the traditionalist and activist 
disciplines, as set forth in the Kent-Kendall debate. This study transcends that 
boundary. Building on the traditional concept of the intelligence cycle by examining 
the application of intelligence in crisis management, the study demonstrates how in 
practice the cycle is disregarded and circumvented. It provides new insight into the 
complexities of the traditionalist and activist approaches to intelligence, while 
demonstrating how intelligence can be used in support of crisis management and 
decision making.
Using terrorism as a crisis phenomenon, the study utilises as case studies 
the series of terrorist attacks against United States' interests and foreign policy 
objectives in Lebanon during the first Reagan Administration from 1983 to 1985. It 
analyses the reasons behind the intelligence failures in preventing the bombing of 
the two U.S. Embassies and the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut. It also reveals the 
consequences of the kidnapping of the CIA Chief of Station, William Buckley, and 
the implications of that event for American intelligence capabilities during the 
Lebanon crisis. The role of intelligence and the tension between the intelligence and 
the decision making communities, as well as the media, during the hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847, are also analysed. By examining each case study through a framework 
that combines the intelligence cycle and crisis management principles, the 
responses of the Reagan Administration to the above threats and incidents are 
analysed. The conficts between key decision making individuals in the Reagan 
Administration and their influence on the intelligence analysis process is also 
examined. The study reveals the interactive role and influence of the National 
Security Council Staff as the producer - consumer interface and the influence of the 
media and public interest on crisis decision making. It concludes with a presentation 
of an intelligence and crisis management paradigm, with suggestions for further 
academic endeavour in this field.
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Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
Just before dawn one winter's morning, New Year's Day or 
thereabouts, two real, full-grown, living men fell from a great 
height, twenty-nine thousand and two feet towards the 
English Channel, without benefit of parachutes or wings, out 
of a clear blue sky.1
Unless the precise truth pertaining to the explosion on board Pan 
Am 103 in the cold night air thirty thousand feet above the Scottish 
town of Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, becomes known, one can 
only speculate as to whether Salmon Rushdie's Satanic Verses was 
a prophesy or served as the inspiration for Islamic terrorists bent on 
revenge. The similarities between the opening lines of Rushdie's 
book and the circumstances surrounding those last fatal and tragic 
moments for the unfortunate passengers aboard the Maid of the Seas 
could be described by Islamisists as poetic justice for a western 
society who harboured the author who had aggrieved millions of 
Muslims and incurred the wrath of Iran.2 Pan-Am Flight 103 had a 
deeper significance than being just one more crisis for America. It 
was another major setback for US intelligence capabilities in 
Lebanon.3 It was once again a reminder to the world's Superpower
1 Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses. (London, Viking Books, 1988), p.3. The 
Satanic Verses was published in September 1988, three months before the bombing of 
Pan-AM Flight 103 on 21 December 1988.
2 In February 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a Fatwa against author Salman 
Rushdie in revenge for his sin of blasphemy against Islam. See Nikki R Keddie and Mark J 
Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West: Iran, The Soviet Union and The United States, (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p.31. See also Charles P Wallace and Dan Fisher, 
"Khomeini Says Author of 'Satanic Verses' Should Be Killed," Los Angeles Times, February 
15, 989. See also Youssef M Ibrahim, "Khomeini's Judgement: Iranian Leader's Instruction to 
Kill Writer May Reflect a Calculation Rooted in Politics," New York Times, February 16, 1989 
and Michael Ross, "Khomeini Renews Call for Death of Rushdie," Los Angeles Times, 
February 20, 1989
3 Among the passengers that were killed in the mid-air explosion were a number of 
U.S. intelligence agents who had been stationed in Beirut. See the statement delivered by Mr 
Billy Vincent to the U.S. House of Representatives, Sub-Committee On Government 
Operations on September 25-26, 1989 in Washington D.C. For an overview on the lessons of 
Lockerbie from a counter terrorist perspective, see Paul Wilkinson, "The Lessons of
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that despite its formidable power, it was incapable of comprehending 
and exercising its influence effectively in the Lebanon environment.4 
The principal reason behind this failure has been the 
disproportionate allocation of U.S. military and intelligence resources 
between its principal adversary, the former Soviet Union and Third 
World issues. Security, foreign policy and crisis management were 
influenced by and had always been conducted within the context of 
that Superpower relationship.5
Lockerbie," Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, RISCT, No.226, 
(December 1989). There have been numerous allegations that the bomb attack was linked to 
Operation 'Corea', which was a covert CIA operation. It was alleged that a Syrian drug dealer, 
Monzer al-Kassar, who was the son in law of Syrian Chief of Intelligence, General Ali Doubar, 
who had close ties with Abu al Abbas and Abu Nidal was being protected as an intelligence 
source by the CIA. See Richard Norton Taylor, "Bomb Was Carried by a CIA Drug Mule," 
Guardian, November 16, 1994. See the feature article in Mednews, Vol.3, No.15, May 14, 
1990 and Martin Walker and David Pallister, "CIA Accused of Drug Link to Lockerbie," 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 141, No. 19, December 11, 1989. According to Vincent 
Cannistraro, a former CIA counter terrorist officer, during an interview with the author on July 
21, 1995 in McLean Virginia, the bombing was perpetrated by two Libyan intelligence agents, 
Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah in revenge for the U.S. military raid on Tripoli. 
Cannistraro, however, does not believe that Libya is the sole perpetrator. Libya provided 
support for an operation that was ordered and paid for by Iran and carried out with the 
complicity of Syria. See also Michael Wines, "U.S. Inquiry Links Libyan Operatives to Pan Am 
Blast," New York Times. October 10, 1990 and David Black and Harvey Morris, "Libya 
Blamed for Lockerbie," Independent. December 14, 1990. See also David Gow and David 
Sharrock, "Libya Accused of Lockerbie Attack in Revenge for Tripoli Bombing," Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, July 7, 1991, p.9. Whatever the reasons, however, what is true is that there 
were a number of U.S. intelligence agents on the aircraft at the time. Among the passengers 
were the following intelligence officials: Beirut Deputy Chief of Station - Matthew Gannon; 
Agents Ronald Lariviere, Daniel O 'Connor, William Leyrer and Charles McKee, who was on 
secondment to the CIA from the DIA. See "CIA Station Chief in Beirut Was Killed in Pan Am 
Crash," New York Times, December 25, 198. According to Time Magazine, evidence 
suggests that Libya was responsible for sabotaging the plane. Syrian drug dealers helped to 
plant the bomb and that the real targets were CIA agents. For the most recent speculation on 
Lockerbie, see the cover story by Roy Rowan, Time, April, 27, 1992, pp. 26-32. Rowan draws 
similarities between the Lockerbie attack and another incident in Gander, Newfoundland in 
1985, in which it was later established during the 1989 Iran-Contra Affair, that the doomed 
aircraft belonging to Arrow Air which was one of the charter companies that had been used by 
Lt.Col. Oliver North for regular arms shipments. Among the many U.S. armed forces 
personnel on board that aircraft, were at least twenty Special Forces personnel, (Navy Seal 
Team 6) who specialised in counter terrorist operations. There was speculation that they were 
returning from a secret mission in Lebanon. Shortly after that aircraft crashed, a caller 
claiming to represent Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the crash. See also John 
Arlidge, "Lockerbie: an unsolved case of murder," Independent, January 25, 1995. Although 
speculative, it is not altogether implausible that Iran carried out a concerted strategy which 
targeted the CIA and U.S. intelligence throughout the Reagan era.
4 See Raymond Tanter, Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon, (Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, 1990) and Nikkie R Keddie and Mark J Gasiorowski, £1990), op.cit:, and 
Martin Indyke, "Reagan and the Middle East: Learning the Art of the Possible," SAIS Review, 
Vol.7, No.1, (1987).
5 See Roy Allison and Phil Williams, (eds.), Superpower Competition and Crisis 
Prevention in the Third World, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). Also Richard 
K Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1977), Chapter 10
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1.1 Research aims and objectives
This thesis which is a case-study analysis of the Reagan 
Administration's crisis management from the perspective of U.S. 
intelligence practice, is intent on contributing to the knowledge and 
understanding of those forces which influence crisis decision making 
and intelligence tasking and analysis in the American government. 
The theoretical background on this subject has centred around the 
doctrine of the producer-consumer relationship as embodied in the 
traditionalist and activist disciplines which is set forth in the 
Kent-Kendall debate.5 6 I will argue that these theoretical approaches 
have produced more questions than answers because they have 
failed to apply theory to practice. The solution, therefore, is to 
transcend the boundary of normative theory and to develop an 
alternative analytical paradigm by examining the relationship 
between intelligence and policy making during crises. The 
justification for using crisis management as a framework is based 
upon two arguments.
The first holds that governments tend to manage from crisis to 
crisis, despite trying to manage by objectives.7 Because governments 
do not act in a vacuum, their objectives are affected and, in some 
instances, determined by their external environment.8 However, 
knowledge of that environment is necessary if sound policy decisions 
are to be made and implemented. That knowledge is provided
5 For a comprehensive overview of the Kent-Kendall Debate see Jack Davis, "The 
Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," Studies in Intelligence. Vol.36, No.5, (1992), pp.91-104. For a 
more in-depth perspective of Sherman Kent's views and his role as the Chairman of the 
Board of National Estimates, (1952 - 1967), see Donald P Steury, (ed.), Sherman Kent and 
the Board of National Estimates; Collected Essays, (Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Springfield, VA, 1994) and Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E 
Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1989)
7 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert McNamara stated that "There is no longer any 
such thing as strategy, only crisis management", see Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A 
Study in Diplomatic Management, (London. Oxford University Press, 1971), p.2
8 See Herbert E Meyer, Real-World Intelligence, (New York, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1987), p.6
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through intelligence. This observation promotes the conceptualisation 
of current intelligence. It is the manner in which intelligence is 
requested and communicated during crisis situations which 
stimulates questions relating to the producer-consumer dichotomy. 
By analysing how intelligence analysts relate to policy makers who, in 
theory, direct the intelligence tasking process and how the policy 
makers respond to the analysts findings and recommendations 
during crisis situations, a greater understanding of the 
producer-consumer relationship can be achieved. Through focusing 
on the impact of a series of terrorist crises upon the Reagan 
Administration's foreign policy objectives in Lebanon, the dynamics 
which shape and influence crisis management and its supporting 
intelligence analysis are identified and analysed.
The second argument is based upon the fact that, in studying 
crisis management, a variety of influential factors and processes are 
exposed which shape and influence intelligence analysis and 
management process. These include power structures, values and 
interests, threat and risk perceptions, commitment, resolve and 
determination, bargaining and negotiations, communication, 
decision-making processes and support relationships. Included in the 
relationship category is the role and function of intelligence as a 
warning mechanism (strategic) and support (operational) service for 
decision making. The study of crises also facilitates a variety of 
processes and variables and allows for the application of different 
theoretical approaches. Crisis management and its influence upon 
intelligence presents an analytical challenge for the integration of 
theory and practice while arriving at a greater understanding of the 
function of intelligence and the producer - consumer relationship. By 
studying the empirical dynamics of crisis events and the interaction 
between the policy makers and the intelligence analysts and 
managers as those events unfold and then, by comparing the 
empirical evidence to the theory of the producer-consumer
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relationship, inconsistencies between theory and behaviour can be 
identified. Crisis situations are deemed to be more appropriate 
models for studying decision making behaviour than non-crises 
because they dominate a greater amount of energy and attention 
spent by policy makers.9 This is based upon the premise that crises 
threaten strategic interests and therefore demand immediate and 
high priority attention.10 11Crises remain at the forefront of policy 
making and therefore exert an even higher demand on intelligence 
than routine decision making processes.
In an effort to bridge the theoretical with the practical domains it is 
necessary to review the existing literature on intelligence and crisis 
management. To date, nothing substantial has been written on the 
subject with the exception of a chapter by Stan A Taylor and 
Theodore J Ralston in Alexander L George, Avoiding War: Problems 
of Crisis Management." Specifically there is little reference to the 
application of intelligence and crisis management in terrorism and its 
use has focused primarily on war avoidance.12 A brief comment on 
the phenomenon of crisis management and its intersection with 
intelligence is appropriate.
The Cold War, and indeed lessons learnt from the two great wars
and post-World War II regional conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and the
Middle East, has influenced the approach to the discipline of crisis
management.13 This is not surprising, given both the actual
destruction witnessed and the potential destructive capability of
9 See Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T Charles and Paul T Hart, Coping With Crises: The 
Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism, (Springfield, Illinois,Charles C Thomas, 
1989) p.7
J See Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit:
11 See Stanley A Taylor and Theodore Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis 
Management," in Alexander George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, (Oxford, 
Westview Press, 1991), pp.395-412
12 Whereas Uriel Rosenthal's Coping With Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots 
and Terrorism, is a seminal work on the phenomenon of crisis management and terrorism, he 
does not cover the linkage between intelligence and crisis management in this work.
13 See James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories of 
International Relations, (New York, Harper & Row, Second Edition, 1981), pp. 494-510
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nuclear war. Salmon argues that the gravity of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis provided the turning point in the post-war approach to crisis 
management and that the focus actually shifted from the mitigation of 
crises to crisis prevention.14 The Cuban Missile Crisis had a profound 
affect upon American foreign policy and the attitude towards crisis 
management.15 The successful management of that crisis created a 
belief that crises could be both managed and exploited. This 
confidence is reflected in much of the literature in the wake of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. One notable contribution is that of Thomas 
Schelling who wrote in a chapter titled ’The Manipulation of Risk' in 
Arms and Influence, that there are few choices between war and 
peace and that the questions that arise are ones that imply degrees 
of risk. Since risks exist, these should be utilised, but, properly 
managed.16 This implies that crises should not only be managed for 
the purpose of damage limitation, but for exploiting whatever 
opportunities exist, short of inadvertently pushing the situation over 
the threshold between political confrontation and the outbreak of war. 
Consequently the conventional wisdom on crisis management and 
indeed on intelligence, has shown the tendency to gravitate around 
the concept of war and surprise avoidance.17 While not attempting to 
detract nor minimise the importance of these concepts, this study 
attempts to examine the issues of intelligence and crisis management 
from a more practical perspective, aimed at creating a framework
14 Trevor Salmon and Raad Alkadari, "Crises, Crisis Management and Crisis 
Prevention," in R Carey, and Trevor Salmon, International Security in the Modern World, 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992), p.124
15 For an overview of the Kennedy Administration's approach to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the function of intelligence during that emergency, see Sherman Kent, "A Crucial 
Estimate Relived," Studies in Intelligence, Vol.36, No.5, (1992), pp.111-119. See also Klaus 
Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World 
Politics, XVl:3, (April 1964), pp.461-462. For other views on the management of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, see A and R Wohlstetter, "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," Adelphi Paper No. 17 
(London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1965). Also Arthur M Schlesinger Jr, A 
Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965)
15 See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (London. Yale University Press, 1966), 
p.7
17 Alexander L George, (1991), op.cit:. and Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit:
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according to which crisis management and intelligence as a support 
function can be analysed. This will be achieved through examining 
the role of intelligence during crises and how intelligence analysts 
have challenged the assumptions upon which crisis policy decisions 
have been based. It will also examine how policy makers have failed 
to task intelligence organisations effectively. The response of the 
Reagan Administration to those situations which presented a direct 
threat or opportunity to their policy in Lebanon will be examined. In 
addition, their relationship with the intelligence community,18 and the 
manner in which they responded to crises according to the theory of 
crisis management principles will also be considered. The use of 
crisis management theory provides a reference against which 
government behaviour can be evaluated in accordance with their 
conformity to policy and how these objectives are pursued with the 
assistance of intelligence analysis.
The main objective of crisis management is to achieve a 
satisfactory resolution of the situation in such a manner that the vital 
interests and values of the government are secured and protected. 
This includes existing policy and is achieved through a process of 
coercion and accommodation in order to achieve the maximum 
concession from the adversary while simultaneously maintaining 
one's own position relatively intact.19 It is precisely the manner in 
which the crisis situation is managed, i.e. the stratagem of using 
coercion and accommodation, and the influence of these methods 
upon the normal policy making process and objectives, which 
determine intelligence analysis and gives rise to the 
producer-consumer dichotomy.
The intelligence community is the term used to describe all of the government 
organisations that contribute towards the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence 
information to decision and policy makers.
Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, 
(New York, Wiley & Sons, 1972), p.30
19
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Crises can assume different forms and emanate from various 
developments - surprise attack, the outbreak of war, a coup, the 
collapse of a government, increasing possibility of an insurgency, 
rampant demonstrations, riots, assassination of an important political 
figure, massive economic failure, the downing of an aircraft, the 
sinking or seizure of a ship, the failure of nuclear energy installations 
and ecological disasters such as massive oil spills.20 It is therefore 
reasonable to say that the discipline of crisis management is 
extremely wide and ranges from war and its avoidance to the 
management of natural and man-made disasters.21 This makes the 
delimitation of crises essential in order to avoid the study from 
becoming unwieldy. The role of intelligence prior to a crisis is to 
eliminate surprise by alerting and warning of an impending 
development. Once the crisis has occurred, however, the role of 
intelligence is to keep the policy makers, the crisis managers and 
those agencies responsible for implementing policy and crisis 
decisions informed of events and circumstances as they unfold.22
For the purposes of this research, the crisis phenomenon that has 
been selected is terrorism and the manner in which it was applied 
against the United States and its foreign policy interests in Lebanon. 
As a foremost democratic nation and the world's superpower, the 
USA affords scholars greater advantages in studying political science 
phenomena in comparison to closed societies. Open societies offer 
the scholar of intelligence greater recourse to research material and 
data. More research has been done and written on US intelligence 
than any other nation.
See Uriel Rosenthal (et.al.), (1989), op.cit:, p.8
21 See Gerald C Meyers and John Holusha, Managing Crises: A Positive Approach, 
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p.4
22 _See Charles C Cogan, "Intelligence and Crisis Management: The Importance of the 
Pre-Crisis," Intelligence and National Security, Vol.9, No.4, pp.633-650
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The reason why the American intelligence model and the Reagan 
Administration's foreign policy initiatives in Lebanon have been 
selected for this study is the fact that the memoirs of the key 
individuals who were involved, notably, Ronald Reagan, Caspar 
Weinberger, George Schultz, William Casey, Howard Teicher, 
Geoffrey Kemp and Robert McFarlane and Michael Ledeen are 
available.23 Another important consideration is the fact that these 
individuals are no longer serving officials and are therefore at greater 
liberty to participate in interviews. In addition to these first-hand 
accounts, there is a seminal work on U.S. foreign policy in Lebanon 
written by John Walcott and David Martin.24 Supplementary material 
is to be found in the works of leading journalists who covered the 
events in Lebanon during the period in question.25 All of these 
publications shed light on the Lebanon crisis, albeit from their 
individual perspectives, they nevertheless provide the scholar with 
valuable source material and variations in their interpretation of the 
events.
The selection of terrorism as a crisis phenomenon is attributed to 
the fact that outside the threat of war, terrorism must be considered 
as a direct and major threat against state interests and public safety. 
Not only does terrorism pose a threat to the state's security, however,
23 See Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (London, Hutchinson, 1990), p.477.See also 
George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretart of State, (New York, Macmillan, 
1993). See Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace, (New York, Warner Books, 1991) See 
Howard Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East, 
(New York, William Morrow & Company Inc, 1993) For an account of William Casey, see 
Joseph E Persico, Casey. (New York, Viking, 1990). For McFarlane see R.G. Hoxie (ed.), The 
Presidency and National Security Policy, (New York Center for the Study of the Presidency, 
1984), chapter 15 by Robert McFarlane, titled, "The National Security Council: Organistion for 
Policy Making." See also Geoffrey Kemp, Forever Enemies? American Policy and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. (Washington D.C, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994) 
Finally see Michael Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft, (New York, Macmillan, 1988)
24 See David Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's 
Secret War Against Terrorism, (New York, Harper & Row, 1988)
See Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982 - February 1984, 
(London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), pp.77-83 and Thomas L Friedman, From Beirut 
to Jerusalem, (New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989), p.198. See also Robert Fisk, Pity the 
Nation: Lebanon at War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992) See Jane Mayer and Doyle 
McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
1988)
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but it raises additional issues such as the role of intelligence, the 
media, and the relationship between law and civil liberties.
Counter-terrorism requires support in the form of current 
intelligence. Current and warning intelligence provides advance 
notification of impending terrorist attacks and plays a supportive role 
in pre-emptive counter terrorist operations. In circumstances where 
such warning has failed either as a result of an intelligence failure or 
because the consumer has failed to realise the implications thereof, a 
crisis situation may arise. Current intelligence is also of significant 
importance as information which is immediately or potentially useful 
to para-military forces or the police in the planning and the execution 
of their operations.26 During counter-terrorist operations, intelligence 
supports law enforcement and the investigative and surveillance 
functions of the authorities.27 Accordingly intelligence may be utilised 
to locate and rescue hostages, gather information on the 
whereabouts, movements and logistics of terrorists, or lead to their 
arrest and be used as evidence in their prosecution.28 Whereas 
policy makers expect warning intelligence to forewarn them of an 
impending crisis, current intelligence is imperative in the planning 
and implementation of crisis response, such as a counter-terrorist 
operation. During crises, decision makers are able to draw upon 
intelligence in order to give them the necessary background, current 
objectives and modus operandi of their adversary.
Whereas a crisis is an event of short duration, the protracted 
nature of the Iranian hostage crisis predominated US foreign policy 
during the Carter Administration. This propelled terrorism as a crisis
26 Bruce Watson, Susan Watson and Gerald Hopple, (eds.), United States Intelligence. 
An Encyclopaedia. (New York, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), p.421
27 This professional opinion was expressed by Robert Grace, FBI Special Agent in 
Charge of Counter terrorism and crisis management, during an interview with the author on 
July 13, 1995 at the FBI Academy, Quantico Bay, Virginia, USA.
2 8 For an example of how intelligence is used in combating terrorism, see Perry's 
account of the CIA campaign against the Abu Nidal Organisation in the early 1980s. Since 
1981, the CIA had been conducting an extensive intelligence gathering operation against 
ANO: See Mark Perry, (1992), op.cit: pp. 191-194
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phenomenon to the forefront of US foreign policy during the Reagan 
Administration, climaxing in the Iran-Contra Affair. Terrorism exerts a 
detrimental and obstructive influence upon policy implementation.29 In 
1985, the hijacking of Flight TWA 847 demonstrated the vulnerability 
of the US to terrorism. Commenting upon that incident as well as the 
general frustration of the Reagan Administration in dealing with 
terrorism in the Middle East at the time, a senior US intelligence 
official observed: "We just weren't able to conduct foreign policy as 
long as we had to deal with terrorism on an everyday level."30
An essential function of the intelligence community is to monitor 
the effects of and reaction to the implementation of government 
policy upon the environment and to provide the policy maker with 
feedback on the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of 
government policy. In the case of providing feedback on the domestic 
environment's response to policy initiatives, the FBI remains 
responsible for this function. Providing feedback from the external or 
international environment is the responsibility of the CIA and the 
State Department. This responsibility introduces an additional 
dimension to the producer-consumer dichotomy and any attempt to 
examine that relationship would therefore be incomplete without 
consideration of the role and impact of the media and public opinion 
on crisis management decision making and response initiatives.
See Alex P Schmidt and Ronald D Crelinsten, (eds.), "Western Responses To 
Terrorism." Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4, (Winter 1992), pp. 14-25
See Mark Perry, (1992), op.cit:. p. 190. This sentiment was also confirmed by Noel 
Koch, former Pentagon counter terrorist officer during the Reagan Administration in a 
telephone interview with the author on February 21, 1996
30
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1.2 Questions and assumptions
The problems that arise when considering the function of 
intelligence in crisis management originate from the conventional 
perception of intelligence production and management. The 
processes of warning, tasking, collection, analysis and distribution 
are in most instances too cumbersome to provide swift and context 
relevant information available for ready use by the crisis managers. 
Reaction to this dilemma is two-fold. One is the tendency of decision 
makers to analyse raw information on their own. The other is to 
search for alternative sources of information. Therefore, the natural 
questions that emanate from this problem and which this study will 
attempt to answer are the following:
1. What is the function of intelligence in the political system and in 
particular, with regard to crisis management? During a crisis situation 
who is, and who should be, responsible for intelligence analysis? 
Does the locality of analysis shift from the domain of the intelligence 
community to that of the crisis manager?
2. Following the above argument, how can the traditional 
concept of the intelligence cycle be adapted to demonstrate the 
dynamics at work during crises decision making? Is the intelligence 
cycle an adequate model for understanding and explaining the 
dynamics within the producer-consumer relationship? If not, how can 
a more appropriate and demonstrative paradigm be designed?
3. During a crisis situation, how does the policy maker's response 
influence intelligence tasking, analysis, management and the 
producer-consumer relationship? If the policy maker acts as his own 
analyst, what are the implications for the producer - consumer 
relationship and which laws or discipline should then govern that 
relationship?
4. In responding to a crisis situation, does the crisis management 
team formulate a concerted strategy in line with the broader strategic
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objectives of the national interest and is that strategy based upon 
intelligence? Is the strategy subjected to a critical overview, not just 
at the onset, but as circumstances unfold, i.e. resulting in periodic 
review? Furthermore, how is the linkage between estimative and 
current intelligence managed? Is the information that is received 
treated simply as information or is it converted into intelligence 
through an analytical process? If so, what is that process and how 
does it differ, if in any way, from conventional analytical methods? Is 
the tasking of intelligence subverted through deference to immediate 
tactical and operational requirements which supersede those of the 
broader strategic objectives?
Essentially this study must endeavour to produce an alternative 
paradigm, one that reflects the linkage between the intelligence 
process, crisis management principles and those external forces 
which shape and influence intelligence analysis and crisis response. 
Every theory is based upon a preconceived premise. The essence of 
this hypothetical bias is the belief that crisis management and 
response cannot be conducted without due regard for intelligence. 
The timely production of objective analysis and its effective utilisation 
by policy makers is crucial to the successful handling of a crisis 
situation.31 There are unfortunately a number of obstacles and 
barriers which often result in intelligence and policy failures. Betts 
has commented that:
...most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by 
collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals 
who produce finished analyses, but most often by decision 
makers who consume the product of intelligence services. 
Policy premises constrict perception and administrative 
workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political 
and psychological more than organisational.32
See Charles C Cogan, op.cit:, pp.633-650
32 Richard Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are 
Inevitable," World Politics, XXXI, (October 1978), pp. 61-89
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It follows that intelligence tasking and analysis are influenced by 
the circumstances generated during crises. It is further contended 
that crisis management requirements not only distort objective 
analysis but that they induce a shift in the location of the 
responsibility for analysis from the domain of the intelligence 
community to that of the policy maker. One of the objectives of this 
hypothesis is to test that assumption.
Towards that objective, specific questions and assumptions with 
regard to the functioning of the crisis management team must be 
examined. The first assumption holds that, in responding to a crisis 
situation, the Crisis Management Team (CMT) embarks upon a 
logical sequence of actions in the formulation of a response strategy. 
These steps are deemed to be:
1) The evaluation of all available intelligence and information 
pertaining to the crisis situation.
2) Threat perception - where the nature of the crisis and its impact 
upon the government's values, objectives and policies are 
determined.
3) Risk analysis - where the options for responding to a crisis are 
considered and the cost in terms of compromise to the government's 
policies, objectives and legitimacy, as well as the response of the 
environment to the crisis strategy, are evaluated.
4) Strategy selection - where the course of action is decided upon 
and authorised.
5) Crisis response - where the strategy selected is implemented, 
monitored and systematically adjusted as the situation unfolds.
The second assumption holds that: during a crisis situation, the 
constraints placed upon the CMT, i.e. the lack of time and sensitivity 
of the issue, effectively cause a transfer in the location of analysis 
from the intelligence community to that of the CMT. It follows that the 
adequacy of the traditional concept of the intelligence cycle as it
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stands, must be questioned as a theoretical model for understanding 
the intelligence process.
The third basic assumption contends that: in a terrorist-type crisis 
situation, the demand for intelligence challenges the protection of 
assets and methods. A final assumption holds that: Whereas crises 
generate confusion and therefore interfere with the structured and 
normal bureaucratic decision making pattern of government, crisis 
decision making is deemed to be different and therefore the normal 
channels of command, communication, control, and intelligence (C3I) 
are distorted. The language in the social sciences is generally, and in 
crisis management and intelligence in particular, often used in 
everyday social interaction. Therefore before we can continue the 
key concept of crisis management, which is central to this study must 
be clarified and defined.
1.3 Defining Crisis Management
The manner in which concepts are used often implies underlying 
assumptions. It is essential, therefore, to explain and define crisis 
management. Crisis is generally used as a pervasive term to 
describe disruption and disorder. Within the discipline of international 
politics, crisis has become synonymous with conflict phenomena 
ranging from diplomacy to war.33 Crises occur at the macro and micro 
levels of human behaviour. At the macro level, crises involve conflict 
between nation-states. At the micro level, crises constitute conflict 
between groups or individual actors. The distinguishing features of a 
crisis are the combination of its composite three elements, namely, 
threat or opportunity, shortage of time, and stress.34 A crisis is
33 For further explanation of the concept of crisis, see Daniel Frei, (ed.), International 
Crisis and Crisis Management, (London, Saxon House, 1978), pp.101-117 and Oran Young, 
The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, (New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1968), p.10.
34 For the characteristics of crisis, see Alastair Buchan, Crisis Management: The New 
Diplomacy, (Boulogne-sur-Seine, Atlantic Institute, 1966), p.21 and Alexander L George,
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perceived once a threat to values, norms or objectives is identified. 
Conversely, it is not always the identification of a threat, but the 
recognition of an opportunity to be exploited within a short space of 
time during extraordinary circumstances, which may trigger the 
stimuli for crisis recognition.
The limited availability of time in which to respond to the 
perceived threat or in which to exploit the opportunity, combined with 
a perceived threat to values and objectives, induces anxiety and 
stress.35 Stress is described by Holsti and George as:
[tjhe reaction to disturbances in physiological, social and 
psychological systems induced by fear and anxiety when an 
individual perceives a threat to one or more values.36
Similarly, Janis and Mann observe that:
Psychological stress is a generic term designating 
unpleasant emotional states evoked by threatening 
environmental events or stimuli. A "stressful" event is any 
change in the environment that typically induces a high 
degree of unpleasant emotion (such as anxiety, guilt or 
shame) and affects normal patterns of information 
processing.37
Stress can therefore be described as a state of mind experienced 
by decision makers and induced by environmental challenges 
requiring a response within a limited time. The underlying factor 
which has contributed to the myriad of definitions of crisis, stems not 
only from the methodological approaches adopted, but also from the
£1991), op.cit:. pp.23-25. For an overview of the literature of crisis management, see Michael 
Haas, "Research on International Crisis: Obsolescence of an Approach?", International 
Interactions, Vol.13, No.1, (1986), pp.23-58
35 See James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaitzgraff, Jr, (1981), op.cit:, pp.499-500 
and Wilbert S Ray, "Mild Stress and Problem Solving," American Journal of Psychology, 
LXXVIII, (1965), pp.227-234.
36 See O. Hoslti (ed.), "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy 
Makers," Political Science Annual, Vol.6, (1975), p.257
37 See Irvin Janis (ed.), Decision-Making, (New York, The Free Press, 1977), p.50
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actual context within which crises occur.38 Irrespective of their 
methodological approaches and the context within which the term 
crisis is applied, regular recurrent factors are identified. These are 
the presence of both danger and opportunity, the issue of vital goals 
and objectives and the question of limited time for action. Within the 
context of this study a suitable definition of the term crisis must 
correspond to the methodology applied. This implies a definition of 
crisis which adheres to the concept of crisis situations created by 
non-territorial groups against territorial entities such as state actors 
and non-territorial entities such as multinational corporations. The 
most appropriate definition in the literature that corresponds to this 
objective is that of Charles Hermann who defines crisis as:
A crisis situation threatens high-priority goals of the 
decision making unit, restricts the amount of time available 
for response before the decision is transformed and 
surprises the members of the decision making unit by its 
occurrence.39
Crisis management is the term attributed to the response to crisis 
situations. It includes general normative principles of crisis 
management as advocated by Alexander.40 The first principle being 
the limitation of objectives by the crisis management authority. By 
maintaining a curb on ambitions, the crisis management team is able 
to operate within realistic parameters and prevent undue escalation 
between the adversarial parties. The second principle is the limitation 
of excessive means to achieve the objectives thereby consciously 
preventing any undue escalation in the conflict. The third principle, 
upon which the analytical focus of this thesis is based, is the
38 For an overview of various approaches, see Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of 
International Crisis Behaviour," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21, (March 1977), 
pp.39-40
3 9 See Charles F Hermann (ed.), International Crises: Insights from Behavioural 
Research, (New York, The Free Press, 1972), p.13
40 See Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:, pp.23-24
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necessity for intelligence.41 Establishing and maintaining a line of 
communication between the adversarial parties involved is the basis 
of the fourth principle. The fifth requirement is the creation of and 
access to crisis management capabilities, which may facilitate the 
effective implementation of crisis management instruments and 
techniques towards damage limitation.42 The sixth principle is the 
search for and acquisition of legitimacy - a platform of support and 
endorsement for the crisis response strategy. The last principle, is 
the avoidance of responding in a manner which may establish a 
precedent for future crises and expected response actions. These 
principles are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
1.4 Methodology
Because there is no single methodological approach that is 
perfect, studies in international politics must identify those analytical 
tools, which despite their shortcomings, are best suited to offer a 
framework towards analysis. In many instances it is not one 
approach, but a combination of two or more that have the potential to 
offer the basics which can be adapted as a research tool. This study 
is no exception. The method used in this thesis is an evaluation of 
the empirical data from the case studies against the generic 
principles of crisis management in conjunction with the processes 
described in the intelligence cycle. By comparing the response to the 
terrorist events in Lebanon against the principles of crisis 
management and the behaviour of the intelligence community from 
the perspective of the intelligence cycle's components, crisis 
management and the relationship between decision making and
41 See Theodore Taylor and Stanley Ralston who provide a useful overview of the 
necessity for intelligence during crisis situations in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. 
pp.29-30
42 For an overview of instruments and techniques in crisis situations, see Coral Bell, 
(1971), op.cit:. pp.73-98
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intelligence by the Reagan Administration in that specific theatre is 
evaluated. The U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Lebanon, during the 
first Reagan Administration provides the geographic and temporal 
setting for this study. It focuses on a series of crises, notably the 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassies in Beirut, the Marine 
Barracks, the kidnapping of CIA Chief Of Station, William Buckley 
and finally the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. These incidents are 
examined in relation to the principles of crisis management and the 
function of intelligence in support of those principles. The 
case-studies provide empirical data for the primary analysis of the 
relationship between the intelligence community and the policy 
makers in the Reagan Administration thus providing an insight into 
the producer - consumer relationship. The case studies selected can 
be justified on the basis that they represent the most complex 
intelligence study because of the involvement of state and sub-state 
actors in a civil war environment which placed unique demands upon 
American intelligence capabilities.43
The Lebanese environment was part of a much broader regional 
theatre, namely, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where U.S. 
intelligence capabilities were inferior to the task.44 The case studies 
are among the best recent examples of the effects of terrorism and 
the media on U.S. foreign policy objectives as well as an assault 
against U.S. intelligence capabilities. The studies reveal how the 
Lebanon crisis posed context specific problems for U.S. intelligence 
capabilities that can be related to other terrorist cases. They also 
reveal the objectives and ambitions of individuals within the Reagan 
Administration which provides the key themes according to which the
43 These observations were made by former DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner during an 
interview with the author in McLean, Virginia on July 23, 1995. This view was also confirmed 
by Noel Koch, a former counter-terrorist expert and planner at the Pentagon during the 
Reagan Administration, in a telephone interview, with the author on February 21, 1996.
44 See Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:. and Nikki R Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, 
(1990), op.cit. This opinion was also expressed by John Walcott, editor of U.S. News & World 
Report in an interview, with the author in Washington DC, July 17, 1995
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principles of crisis management and the intelligence process can be 
analysed.
Another reason why the above criteria has been selected for this 
study is the fact that sufficient time has elapsed since the occurrence 
of these events which has allowed for the release of primary source 
material and the publication of the memoirs of former serving 
officials.45
Research data was acquired from primary source material such 
as the Congressional Hearings on the Performance of the 
Intelligence Community Prior to the Embassy Bombings in Beirut 
(1983). Secondary sources were obtained from the memoirs of the 
key Reagan Administration officials who served in the intelligence 
community, the defence community and the NSC staff. After an 
examination of the primary and secondary source material, a list of 
interviewees was compiled.
A standard questionnaire was used in the interview process in 
order to provide the possibility for verification of the answers and 
facts between all the respondents.46 All the questions were based 
within the context of the generic principles of crisis management and 
the intelligence process. While questioning as many of the key 
participants as possible has its merits, their subjectivity and personal 
agendas must be considered. As far as possible, subjectivity of the 
respondents has been eliminated by the author. The research 
included interviews with the following key former Reagan 
Administration members:
In addition, seminal works on Beirut, such as Eric Hammel's The Root, Thomas 
Friedman's From Jerusalem to Beirut and the memoirs of many of the key individuals 
concerned, such as Ronald Reagan, Caspar Weinberger, George Schultz, Robert McFarlane, 
Geoffrey Kemp, Raymond Tanter and Howard Teicher have been published in the latter half 
of the past decade.
46 See the Appendix (Page 329) for the questionnaire used during the interview 
process.
Page 20
Page 21
Ambassador Paul Bremmer - State Department responsible for
International Terrorism
Mr Vincent Cannistraro - former CIA officer responsible for 
counter terrorism
Mr Graham Fuller - former NIO and NSC staff member
Mr Geoffrey Kemp Senior Director - NSC staff
Mr Noel Koch - former counter terrorist officer at the Pentagon
Mr Howard Teicher NSC staff member responsible for Middle
East security policy
Two respondents still serving within the Pentagon and the State
Department requested anonymity.
The following individuals who were not Reagan Administration 
officials, but who nevertheless served in government or were in a 
position to comment from their professional standing were 
interviewed:
Mr James Adams - Sunday Times Washington Bureau Chief
Lt.Cmdr. William Beck - former naval intelligence officer
Dr John Bondonella - Senior Researcher Rand Corporation
Professor John L Esposito - Islamic specialist - Georgetown
University
Dr Daniel B Fox - Senior Operations Research Analyst Rand
Corporation
Special Agent Robert Grace - FBI Crisis Management Unit
Mr David Martin - Chief Correspondent CBS
Brigadier Andrew Massey - former Commanding Officer British
SAS
Admiral Stansfield Turner - former DCI
Mr Martin Walcott - Assistant Managing Editor - U.S. News &
World Report
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Requests for interviews from the following individuals were 
declined who all referred the author to their memoirs:
Mr Robert McFarlane 
Mr George Schultz 
Mr Caspar Weinberger
The author found that in general greater validity could be 
attributed to the former Reagan Administration officials on issues of 
substance. In other words, what happened and when, as opposed to 
judgmental issues of efficiency and effectiveness relating to the 
decision making and intelligence communities. This tendency should 
be understood from the point of view that the respondents were 
motivated by their objective to protect their reputations. Those 
interviewees who were not Administration officials were more 
judgmental to the point of being critical. Notwithstanding the fact that 
they were not directly involved their opinions and comments made a 
valuable contribution towards placing events into perspective. To the 
credit of Admiral Stansfield Turner, however, the author found that 
his comments were modest and straightforward. This despite the fact 
that he is one official who has reason to pass critical judgement 
against the Reagan Administration and the activities of William 
Casey. On the whole, the author found that the testimony of the 
journalists who covered the events proved to be more objective than 
those of the officials interviewed. Greater consistency was evident 
between the publications of the journalists and their replies to the 
questions that were put to them by the author during the interview 
process. The individuals interviewed are a reflection of the 
institutional interests that were involved, i.e. the NSC staff, the 
intelligence community and the media. The answers and opinions of 
the respondents were integrated with the analysis of the case studies 
that are explained below.
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1.5 Methodological approach to the case studies
Chapter two of this study is an attempt to integrate the theory of 
intelligence with that of crisis management. In this regard the study is 
different from conventional approaches which tend to discuss each 
concept separately and then endeavour a comparative analysis. It 
approaches the theories of crisis management, intelligence and the 
producer - consumer dichotomy on the basis of three concentric 
circles, in the same order, interrelated and linked to one another 
through the function of communication. Beginning with the theory and 
principles of crisis management, the third principle which is the 
intelligence imperative, provides a platform from which the function of 
intelligence, as a subsystem of the decision making system, is 
examined. Using the intelligence cycle as a framework, the loci of 
intelligence analysis during crisis situations is examined towards 
determining the changes in the cycle and the intelligence production 
process. The presence of intelligence as an essential support 
instrument throughout the crisis management process is explained. In 
analysing the function of intelligence, the third theoretical domain, the 
producer - consumer relationship which embodies the traditionalist 
and activist approaches is discussed. The definition and function of 
intelligence, the intelligence cycle paradigm, the analysis process, 
the politicisation of intelligence - which includes a discussion of the 
traditionalist and activist approaches - embodying opportunity 
analysis, are examined. This forms the background to the 
relationship between intelligence analysts, National Intelligence 
Officers, and decision makers. Understanding this relationship is 
fundamental towards comprehending the institutional dynamics which 
are omni-present throughout the case studies which are discussed in 
the following three chapters.
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The third chapter examines two incidents, notably the terrorist 
attacks against the U.S. Embassy and the Marine Battalion Landing 
Team Barracks in Beirut by Hizb'allah. Whereas the study will 
attempt to identify the reasons why the administration and 
intelligence community failed to detect or deter these attacks, the 
primary objective is to examine the manner in which the Reagan 
Administration responded to these crises when evaluated against the 
integrated theory of intelligence and the principles of crisis 
management. The study analyses the interaction of the intelligence 
community in the process, as well as the factors and constraints 
which influenced U.S. policy initiatives in Lebanon. Furthermore, the 
operational capabilities of the intelligence community in the 
Lebanese environment and the ethos that prevailed among the 
intelligence community and between it and key cabinet members of 
the administration are analysed. An attempt is made to identify the 
crisis management style and the intelligence management discipline 
which influenced the relationship during the crises.
In chapter four the analysis focuses upon the impact and 
consequences of another bombing attack by Hizb'allah against U.S. 
interests and the kidnapping of the CIA Chief of Station, William 
Buckley. The case study will attempt to provide an insight into the 
manner in which the administration conducted its threat perception in 
relation to its adversaries, notably Hizb'allah, Syria and Iran. This 
chapter examines the impact of Hizb'allah's strategy of bombing and 
kidnapping upon the administration and the latter's capacity to 
respond effectively to terrorism. While it maintains the focus on the 
relationships between the intelligence community and the policy 
makers, the chapter examines the role and influence of the behaviour 
of the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security 
Advisor on the producer - consumer relationship. It looks at how 
intelligence is used as a support mechanism in the application of the 
principles of crisis management in relation to Hizb'allah's sustained
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assault against the administration's objectives in Lebanon. The study 
concentrates upon how intelligence tasking and analysis was 
influenced by its consumers.
Chapter five analyses the crisis management performance of the 
Reagan Administration in relation to the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
and the linkage between this crisis and the overarching hostage 
crisis in Lebanon. The philosophy of terrorism and government 
response is examined. The chapter will explore the inherent tensions 
that exist between supporting the authorities counter terrorist 
initiatives and protecting intelligence assets and methods. The 
influence of the media which exposes tensions between government 
response and civil liberties is examined and the relationship between 
the media and the intelligence community will also be analysed. The 
media's behaviour during the hijacking of flight TWA 847 will be 
examined to determine which extraneous factors influence 
intelligence and crisis management.
Chapter six draws conclusions from the preceding evaluation of 
the Lebanon crises. The chapter will endeavour to contribute toward 
a more appropriate and practical theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the intelligence producer - consumer relationship. Finally, 
this study will make recommendations for further academic 
endeavour in relation to crisis management and the function of 
intelligence. Before analysing the case studies, however, it is 
important to arrive at an understanding of how the concept of 
intelligence and the producer - consumer relationship relates to crisis 
management. This is the essence of the following chapter.
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Chapter 2
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The scholarly relevance of crisis analysis can best be 
considered in methodological terms. The analysis of crisis 
management and crisis decision making gives analysts the 
rare opportunity of bridging two different yet related gaps 
that continually plague the social sciences: the gap 
between theoretical and research perspectives of various 
disciplines (e.g. psychology, political science, organization 
theory), and the gap between real-life settings.1
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework 
that will enable the reader to relate the empirical evidence from the 
case studies to the basic principles of crisis management and the 
intelligence process. Conventional approaches towards the theories 
of crisis management and intelligence have focused on each 
discipline in their unidimensional perspectives. No prior attempt has 
been made to integrate the two disciplines into a cogent theory. 
Similar to the concept of Russian 'Matryoshka Dolls', the contents of 
this chapter can be described as three conical circles of theory which 
attempt to explain how the principles of crisis management and 
intelligence analysis are interrelated and the role that communication 
plays in linking these concepts together. Starting with the outer 
theoretical cone which explains the principles of crisis management, 
the third principle, the intelligence imperative, leads us into the next 
cone which examines the function of intelligence during crises. The 
use of intelligence and its communication leads us into the realm of 
the producer-consumer relationship which takes the reader deeper 
and deeper until the kernel, the traditionalist - activist dichotomy, 
which is the core theoretical basis for this thesis, is exposed.
1 See Uriel Rosenthal (et.al.), (1989), op.cit, p.6
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Whereas most of the above principles of crisis management are 
relatively straightforward, and discussed on a linear basis throughout 
this chapter, the intelligence imperative, is more complex and 
necessitates a deeper and more explorative discussion because it is 
prevalent in each of the principles of crisis management. Intelligence 
production and its management is a time consuming process that is 
juxtaposed to the basic tenet of crisis management which is to 
achieve a speedy solution. This creates an inherent tension between 
intelligence and crisis management. While the intelligence cycle is 
generally accepted by intelligence practitioners in the United States' 
civilian intelligence organisations such as the CIA and the military as 
the best theoretical representation of the intelligence process, 
academics differ over the utility of this approach.2 The purpose of 
using the cycle in this thesis, however, is to provide a point of 
departure and a structured approach in explaining the intelligence 
process. By exploring the factors that influence the intelligence 
process and decision making dynamics such as, tasking and 
collection, interpretation and evaluation, politicisation, 
communication, bureaucratic and individual behaviour, as well as the 
dilemma that terrorism creates for intelligence, the relationship 
between the producer and consumer can be evaluated and 
understood. This creates a theoretical framework against which 
empirical data can be analysed towards understanding how the 
theory of the producer - consumer relationship, relates to reality.
2 See A C Maurer, M D Tunstall and J M Keagle, (eds.), Intelligence, Policy and 
Process, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985), and See Abram N Shulsky, £1991) 
op.cit:, and Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security, (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 132-142 and Arthur S Hulnick, "The 
Intelligence Producer - Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach," Intelligence and 
National Security, (May 1986)
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2.1 Introduction
A crisis situation threatens high-priority goals of the 
decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available 
for response before the decision is transformed and 
surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its 
occurrence.3
This thesis departs from the conventional wisdom in that it 
attempts to transcend the narrow focus of crises as advocated by 
Bell, Alexander, Hermann and Lagadec. These conventional theorists 
have limited their focus to the study of military and political crises.4 
They regard the ultimate objective in crisis management as war 
avoidance. Rosenthal, however, has made a more diversified 
contribution to the subject by examining a wide range of case studies 
on crisis management during natural and man-made disasters.5 
Although the contemporary literature on crisis management focuses 
upon decision making pathologies and the problems of decentralised 
as opposed to centralised management, scant attention has been 
focused upon the role of intelligence, apart from acknowledging it is a 
prerequisite in decision making.6 The literature, however, reflects a 
preoccupation with diplomacy and war psychosis, influenced by the 
Cold War era and international conflict management.7 As such it falls 
far short of contributing to contemporary crises of low intensity
3 Charles F. Hermann, (1972), op.cit:. p.13
4 See Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit:. and Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:. and Charles F. 
Hermann (1972), op.cit:. and Patrick Lagadec.Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies For 
Prevention, Control and Damage Limitation, (London, McGraw-Hill, 1993), op.cit
5 Uriel Rosenthal, (et.al), (1989). op.cit:
6 For a brief discussion on intelligence in crisis management, see Stan A Taylor and 
Theodore J Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management," in Alexander L George, 
(1991). op.cit:. pp.395-409
7 For a comprehensive overview of the literature and academic debates on crisis 
management and decision making theory, see James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaitzgraff, 
Jr. (1981), op.cit:. pp. 468-503. For a wider perspective on the various approaches to crises, 
see Michael Brecher, "Towards a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour," International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol.21, (March 1977), pp.39-40
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conflict and terrorism. This is a significant shortcoming because the 
latter exceed those crisis situations which could lead to all out war.8 
The situations that are being alluded to in this thesis focus upon 
crises that have been precipitated by acts of terrorism, namely, 
bombings, kidnapping, hijacking, hostage taking and barricades. 
These are incidents that have affected foreign policy initiatives and 
the intelligence capabilities of the United States of America. They 
have been short duration, high impact, emergency situations. These 
are crises which tend to dominate the attention and resources of 
most governments compelling them to respond on an hour by hour 
and day to day basis. In order to understand how these situations 
exert pressure upon government, security and intelligence 
organisations, it is necessary to examine the constituent elements of 
a crisis.
An emergency situation is described as a crisis by the affected 
party who experiences or perceives a set of circumstances where the 
impact or potential impact of that situation is deemed to have a major 
and threatening effect upon core values and interests.9 The outcome 
has the potential to exert a tremendous (usually negative) impact on 
the lives of those affected. The advent of the situation disrupts the 
routine activities and functioning of the organisation or individuals 
concerned.
Crises are situations which invoke the need for an immediate 
response and for the dedication of extraordinary resources.10 Crises
According to Professor Yonah Alexander, there have been a total of 64, 319 
recorded incidents of domestic and international terrorist incidents between 1970 and July 
1995. See the testimony by Yonah Alexander, "Algerian Terrorism: Some National, Regional 
and Global Perspectives," prepared statement before the House Committee on Interantional 
Relations, Sub-committee on Africa. (Federal News Service, October 11, 1995). The Rand / 
St Andrews Data Base on recorded incidents of international terrorism, lists a total of 8,339 
international incidents between 1970 and 1994.
9 For an overview of the generic characteristics of a crisis, see Charles F Hermann, 
"International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in James N Rosenau, (ed.), International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, revised edition, (New York, The Free Press, 1969), pp.43-44 and 
Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour," International Studies 
Quarterly, No.21, (March 1977), pp.43-44
10 These comments pertaining to the characteristics of crises were made by Robert 
Grace, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis Management Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico
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precipitate a convergence of events which produce new and 
unknown circumstances. This generates a climate of uncertainty and 
subsequent feeling that control over events and circumstances has 
diminished.11 For bureaucracies and management structures, a crisis 
introduces the need for critical decision-making under the adverse 
conditions of limited time, incomplete intelligence and general 
uncertainty.12 An awareness that a crisis situation exists usually leads 
to an immediate response by the bureaucracy. This generally results 
in the rapid ad-hoc construction of extraordinary organisational 
structures, the task-force phenomenon, to deal with the situation.13 
Because crises are usually unexpected, context specific intelligence 
is in short supply. This is because in most instances the relevant 
information is not readily available in neatly parcelled packages 
which are tailored to suit the crisis characteristics.14 To achieve this 
the information must be identified, assimilated and then re-interpreted 
and presented within the context of the situation and its 
circumstances. The unavailability of analytical expertise at short 
notice presents problems. The reason for this can be attributed to the 
fact that in most crisis situations, the pressure of time inhibits the 
appointment of an intelligence analyst to the crisis management 
team. The absence of an intelligence representative within the 
decision making apparatus detracts from communication between the
Bay, Maryland, in an interview with the author on July 13, 1995
11 For an account of the impact of stress upon decision makers, see Jerrold Post, "The 
Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers," in Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. 
pp.471-496
12 See Uriel Rosenthal, (et.al.), "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management," Public 
Administration, Vol. 69, (Summer 1991), p.212
13 For an account of the composition of crisis task forces within the US State 
Department, see Howard H, Lentner, "The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United States 
Department of State," in International Crises, and Charles F.Hermann, (ed.), (1972), op.cit:, 
pp.113-115
14 Observation made by Admiral Stansfield Turner (retired), former Director of Central 
Intelligence in an interview with the author in McLean Virginia, July 23, 1995 and Noel Koch, 
a former Pentagon Counter-Terrorist Officer during the Reagan Administration, in a 
telephone interview, with the author on March, 7, 1996.
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intelligence producer and consumer. The composition of such 
organisational anomalies can have a direct and detrimental effect on 
tasking, analysis and communication of intelligence during 
emergencies, often with adverse consequences.15
The anxiety is exacerbated by the inadequate availability of 
information and introduces increased stress,16 together with latent 
and new tensions among the key actors as they attempt to 
comprehend and adjust to the dynamics of the situation and regain 
control.17 All this usually takes place against limited time.18 Affected 
organisations and individuals experience some or all of the above 
characteristics while under pressure to recover from the situation with 
all, or as many as possible, of their interests intact. The fundamental 
objective behind crisis management is to preserve one's interests as 
far as possible through the application of coercion and conciliation in 
such a manner as to elicit the maximum concessions from the 
adversary.19
The term crisis management is much of a misnomer. It creates the 
perception that crises can be managed and even manipulated to 
one's advantage under favourable circumstances.20 This approach to
15 This observation has been made by Ray Adams, Director Risk Management, Kroll 
Associates, Savile Row, London, during an interview with the author on May 5, 1995. The 
same sentiments were expressed by Brigadier Andrew Massey, Director Defence Systems 
Limited, Buckingham Gate, London, during an interview with the author on May 5, 1995. 
This was also confirmed by Eric M Westropp, Director, Control Risks, London, in an 
interview with the author on May 5, 1995
16 For the effects of stress and executive fatigue see Theodore H White, "Weinberger 
on the Ramparts," The New York Times Magazine, February 6, 1983, p.24
17 See the explanation given by Anthony Wiener and Herman Kahn in Charles F 
Hermann, (ed.), (1972), op.cit:. p.21
18 See the testimony of Joseph S Nye Jr, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 
19, 1996
19 See Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear 
Age, (New York, Wiley, 1972), p.30
20 Coral Bell argues that the term crisis management implies a rational, dispassionate, 
calculated and well considered activity which is conducted with judgement, even perhaps, at a 
leisurely pace, which includes consideration of short and long term interests. In fact crisis 
response is not like that at all. It is usually improvised action using extraordinary resources 
and conducted under immense pressure and constraints of time and in a fog of ambiguity and 
insecurity. See Coral Bell, "Decision Making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel
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crises originated during the Cold War and from the American 
perspective, the concept grew that coercive bargaining between 
adversaries, short of all out war, was possible under managed 
conditions. This belief was reinforced by the negotiated outcome of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and was reflected in the well-known 
statement made by Robert McNamara at that time: "...[T]here is no 
longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management".21
During the Cold War era, this concept of crisis management as a 
means of conflict resolution became entrenched and dominated the 
literature and academic approaches to the subject.22 It was reinforced 
by events where the combination of diplomacy, military posturing and 
economic incentives succeeded in resolving potential conflict 
situations between the superpowers and their allies, such as the Yorn 
Kippur War and the success of Henry Kissinger's shuttle-diplomacy.23 
This perception grew stronger with the passage of time. Negotiation, 
mediation and arbitration, combined with economic and trade 
incentives, as well as the sale of military equipment all contributed to 
the peace accord signed between Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 
1979.24 This reinforced the popular perception that crises could be 
successfully managed and was a major factor which motivated the 
Reagan Administration's political objectives in the Middle East.25
Frei, (ed.), £1978), op.cit:. p.51
21 See Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit:. p.2
22 For an overview and critique of the academic literature on crisis management see 
Raymond Tanter, "Crisis Management: A Critical Review of the Academic Literature," 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, (Fall 1975), pp.71-101
23 See Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1979)
George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, Mv Years As Secretary Of State, (New York, 
Macmillan, 1993), p.85
25 Ibid.
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2. Crisis management principles
Because crisis management implies crisis response, it is implicit 
that a formal structured approach and strategy must be adopted 
towards controlling an emergency or threatening situation.26 The 
following principles of crisis management used in this theory provide 
that structure and are widely recognised by leading academics and 
experts in the field.27 While the author does not make the claim that 
these principles are consciously applied by decision makers in the 
U.S. or any other government for that matter to crisis situations, they 
nevertheless provide a standard format of expected behaviour 
against which the response of the Reagan Administration to the 
crises in Lebanon can be evaluated.
2.1 The limitation of objectives.
The first principle holds that in order to avoid an unnecessary 
escalation in the crisis and to maximise one's chances for achieving a 
successful outcome of the situation, the parties involved in the crisis 
must limit their objectives. 28 This rule is naturally governed by the 
fact that any increase in the intensity of the pursuit of political 
objectives at the expense of an adversary will be proportional to the 
increased will and determination of the adversary to resist.29
See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1960) and Paul Diesing, Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and 
Their Social Conditions, (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962) and Robert A Young, 
"Perspectives on International Crisis," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21..(March 1977), 
p.8 and Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Boston, 
Little Brown, 1971), p.245
27 See Alexander L George (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. also Coral Bell, £1971), op.cit:. and 
Charles F. Hermann, (ed.), (1972), op.cit:, and Patrick Lagadec, Preventing Chaos in a 
Crisis, (London, McGraw Hill, 1993)
2 R Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. pp.23-26
29 Oran Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crisis, 
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968), pp.6-15
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Adopting this attitude is necessary in order to arrive at a realistic 
settlement to the crisis. In the pursuit of this objective, however, 
knowledge of the determination of the adversary is essential towards 
measuring resistance. Intelligence therefore plays a vital role towards 
obtaining information concerning the adversary's capabilities and 
intentions. Determining an enemy's capabilities is usually easier than 
ascertaining his intentions. Whereas capabilities are normally 
quantifiable data such as military and economic power, the 
measurement of intentions is much harder and is essentially an 
intellectual exercise that is fraught with the calculation of 
intangibles.30 The need for intelligence becomes apparent as early as 
this first principle. Intelligence is instrumental in carrying out an 
appraisal of the resistance to one's objectives. This introduces the 
norm that decision making should be based upon a reflection of 
reality.31 Therefore policy making should be based upon the sum of 
one's capabilities, constraints and limitations compared to the same 
criteria of the adversary that intelligence reveals. The averse side of 
this argument is the notion that intelligence serves as a product that 
can be used to support preconceived policy objectives and initiatives. 
Unfortunately in reality, it is the latter part of this intelligence-policy 
dichotomy that tends to be practised.
See A C Maurer, M D Tunstall and J M Keagle, (1985), op.cit:, pp.43-56, also A 
Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," 
World Politics, Vol.28, No.3, (April 1976), pp.349 & 350. Also Christopher Andrew, 
"Washington and the Intelligence Services," International Affairs, Vol.53, No.3, July 1977, 
pp.395. See also Mark W Lowenthal, "The Burdensome Concept of Failure," in Maurer, 
Tunstall & Keagel, (1985), op.cit:, p.30
31 See James E Dougherty, Robert L Pfaitzgraff, Jr. (1981), op.cit:, pp.468-480 and 
Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American 
Political Science Review, LXVI, (September 1972), pp.751-785. See also Joseph Frankel, The 
Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p.4 For a classical appraisal, see Harold Lasswell, The Decision Process: 
Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, (College Park, University of Maryland Press, 1956).
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2-2.2 Limiting the means in pursuit of objectives
Diplomats, on the other hand, will look for the line in the 
sand that leaves all sides least dissatisfied. They are likely 
to see force - or its threat - as a means for achieving a 
precise negotiating purpose, and will want to calibrate its 
use.32
The second principle maintains that in order to prevent any 
escalation in the crisis tension level, the parties concerned must 
exercise restraint in the application of instruments of force and 
coercion.33 Linked to the principle of limiting one's objectives, is the 
rule that the means employed to secure those objectives should not 
exceed the minimum amount that is required.34 In those situations 
where force is required to achieve an objective, the means employed 
in the pursuit of that objective should be limited to the least amount of 
force that is necessary. This is based on the premise that there is 
always a cost versus benefit ratio where the use of unnecessary 
force can undermine the legitimacy and moral standing of the actor 
who applies force. The rationale behind this argument is that 
excessive force encourages greater resistance from the adversary. 
This may result in progressive increments in force with the inherent 
danger that excessive use thereof undermines legitimacy and may 
invoke public and international condemnation.35 This rule recognises 
the age old principle of conflict advocated by Sun Tzu. He wrote that
32 Extract from the text of a speech made by the USUN Ambassador Madeline Albright 
to the NATO Conference, Tuesday, April, 30, 1996, as distributed by the United States 
Information Service, Embassy of the United States of America, London (April 30, 1996) p.4
33 See Magnus Ranstorp, Radical Shi'ism In Lebanon: Western Governments Crisis 
Management Techniques In Dealing With Hostage Incidents, 1982 - 1992, (Ph.D. Thesis, St 
Andrews, University of St Andrews, 1994), p.31
34 See Brian M Jenkins, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma," TV I 
Journal. (1985), p.34 and Stephen G Walker, "Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining: 
Confrontation, Coercion and Reciprocity," Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol.26, No.4, 
(December 1982), pp.571-91 and Alexander George, "Strategies for Crisis Management," in 
Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. pp.377-394
35 See Thomas C Shelling, Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare, (London, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper No. 19, June 1965) and Alexander 
George, (1991), op.cit:, p,24
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it is crucial in any conflict situation to provide one's adversary with a 
means of dignified retreat without losing face, so that the resolution 
of the crisis can be achieved without excessive cost.36
This principle, however, can take on an inverse dimension. In 
some instances, the means available to an actor to pursue its 
objectives are severely limited. Where there is an absence of 
non-military instruments of statecraft as an alternative method of 
coercion, adherence to this principle becomes extremely difficult. The 
situation is also rendered much more complex for the following 
reasons. From a unilateral (single state actor) perspective competing 
individual and bureaucratic interests can complicate the 
synchronisation of instruments and techniques as executive 
authorities argue over policy, jurisdiction, legitimacy and finite 
resources. Applying this principle becomes even more difficult, 
however, when more than one state actor is involved as competing 
national interests are introduced.37
The implications of this principle for the function of intelligence 
are to be found in the role that intelligence is expected to play. As a 
support mechanism, intelligence assists in the objective of limiting 
force by communicating an appraisal of the dynamics of the 
environment and the vulnerability of the adversary to the levels of 
force and coercion that are being applied. Intelligence feedback 
enables crisis managers to evaluate the effects that the application of 
instruments of coercion have had on the adversary and to ascertain 
whether those levels of force have been successful, inadequate or 
excessive. According to Robertson: "It [intelligence] can assist in the 
management of crisis situations, the equivalent of battlefield as 
opposed to estimative intelligence38 Not only does intelligence
36 See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Translated by 
Samuel Griffith, 1971), pp. 109-110
37 This problem is examined and dealt with in the case study on the hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847 in Chapter 5
38 See Ken Robertson, "Intelligence Terrorism and Civil Liberties," in Paul Wilkinson 
and Alasdair Stewart, (eds.), £1989), op.cit:. pp.555
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support the use of force, but it is essential for making decisions over 
when to use force.
Exercising restraint in the use of force necessitates an 
appreciation of the decision maker's policy objectives and the 
expected response of the public to the use of force by the intelligence 
producer. This calls for a closer relationship between decision 
makers and intelligence producers, which is achieved when 
intelligence producers play a more active role and stay attuned to the 
political objectives of the decision makers. Although the media 
provide a barometer on the authorities standing in relation to public 
opinion, intelligence acts as a source of information in this regard by 
providing feedback. As Robertson argues: "Information can guide 
decisions concerning the political reforms which may isolate or 
discourage the terrorist."39 This aspect is explained in greater detail 
in the intelligence imperative below.
2-2.3 The intelligence imperative
The third principle makes the case for the use of intelligence as a 
support mechanism that increases the actors' abilities to comprehend 
the complexities of the situation and to make decisions. The 
fundamental objective in crisis management is to exercise damage 
limitation thereby preserving one's interests intact.40 This implies that 
the party on the defensive seeks to restore the situation to the status 
ante. This is logical given the fact that a crisis would normally only be 
declared once the status ante has been disturbed. A secondary goal 
is to convert a potentially dangerous and detrimental situation into an
See Ian Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis
Management, (New York, The Free Press, 1989) and Clive C Aston, A Contemporary Crisis: 
Political Hostage-Taking and the Experience of Western Europe, (London, Greenwood 
Press, 1982), p.137
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advantage.41 It is precisely this approach, however, which gives rise 
to the producer - consumer dichotomy and raises the question over 
exactly how the intelligence analyst/manager should present the facts 
to the consumer and play a part in emphasising opportunities that 
may exist without directly influencing policy decisions. This 
relationship, however, is largely dependent upon communication 
between the producer and consumer. It is the function of intelligence 
to assist the decision maker by presenting a range of options in 
support of policy predilection. These options, however, must be 
based on plausible possibilities given the reflection of reality and 
according to the constraints posed by the environment. It is the 
responsibility of the intelligence community to conduct an analysis of 
that environment and integrate its findings with the proposed policy 
and then to communicate this to the decision makers. Although 
intelligence has been identified as one of the generic crisis 
management principles, it cannot be discussed in isolation. The 
intelligence process is a principle that is applicable throughout the 
crisis management effort which becomes evident as we examine its 
function in relation to the remaining principles of crisis management 
below.
2.2.4 Contingency planning and capabilities
The fourth principle is the establishment of an adequate crisis 
management capability and includes the necessity for contingency 
planning.42 This principle encourages actors to create crisis 
contingency capabilities towards eliminating routine problems within
See William L Waugh Jr., "Integrating the Policy Models of Terrorism and 
Emergency Management," Policy Studies Review. Vol.6, No.1, (August 1986), pp.287-301 
and Uriel Rosenthal and B Pijnenburg, (eds.), "Special Issue on Multiple Scenarios for Crisis 
Management and Decision Making," International Journal of Contemporary Crises, Vol. 14, 
No.4, (December 1990).
42 See Uriel Rosenthal, (et.al.), (1989), op.cit:. pp.3-33
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the bureaucracy thereby decreasing the time required for the 
transition from normal to crisis mode and as an essential step in 
conducting scenario forecasting and the identification of potential 
crisis situations. Standard FBI crisis management doctrine holds that 
the key to successful crisis management lies in the ability of the crisis 
manager to enable the response units to make the transition from 
normal operating conditions to crisis mode, where the authorities are 
equipped and in position to cope with all the requirements that the 
situation may demand. A speedy transition from normal to crisis state 
enables the crisis manager to focus on the unique aspects of the 
situation instead of wasting time dealing with routine organisation 
problems.43 As an integral part of creating a response mechanism to 
deal with envisaged situations, contingency planning is useful at the 
strategic policy making and implementation levels of government as 
well as at the tactical response levels of the executive. At the 
strategic level, contingency planning which involves war-game theory 
and scenario forecasting and planning, can help to provide 
institutional memory and preparedness for those decision makers 
who participate.44 At the tactical response level, the creation of crisis 
response capabilities can reveal and introduce institutional tensions 
and problems of cross-compatibility between organisations that may 
be tasked with providing support and logistics.45 Contingency
This was explained by Robert Grace, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis 
Management Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico Bay, Maryland, during an interview, with the 
author on July 13, 1995
44 For an insight into the use of war games as an aid to contingency planning see 
James Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (1981), op.cit:. pp.531-536. See also Anatol 
Rapoport, "The Role of Game Theory in Uncovering Non-Strategic Principles of Decision," in 
Andre Mensch, Theory of Games: Techniques and Applications, (London, St Paul's House, 
English Universities Press Ltd., 1966), pp.410-431 and Jeffrey S Banks, "Crisis Bargaining," in 
Banks, Signalling Games in Political Science, (London, Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1991), pp.71-85 and Martin Shubik, "The Uses of Game Theory," in James C Charlesworth, 
(ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, (New York, The Free Press, 1967), pp.247-249. See 
also Harvey Averch and M Lavin, Simulation of Decisionmaking in Crises: Three Manual 
Gaming Experiments. (Santa Monica, Rand Report, RM-4202-PR, August 1964). Also Melvin 
Dresler, Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications. (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1967) and 
Norman C Dalkey, "Simulation," in E S Quade and W I Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy 
Planning: Applications in Defence. (New York, Elsevier, 1977), pp.241-254
45 Observations made by Robert Grace, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis 
Management Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico Bay, Maryland, during an interview, with the
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planning provides an opportunity to identify potential practical 
problems that may arise between security organisations in 
communication, command and control arrangements and with 
equipment incompatibility.46 It helps towards identifying those routine 
issues that contribute towards most crisis complexities and with 
bureaucratic and turf problems which can be identified and resolved 
beforehand. One of the most important contributions of this principle, 
however, is towards intelligence tasking. Speculation pertaining to 
possible crisis scenarios helps to identify those circumstances and 
areas where there may be intelligence shortcomings.47 Intelligence 
requirements and inputs can be identified and fed into the 
intelligence cycle beforehand. This can ensure that basic intelligence 
is available on specific topics, organisations or individuals, which 
may compliment current intelligence during actual crisis situations.48
According to Taylor and Ralston, most governments look to their 
intelligence services to provide them with pre-crisis information on 
the activities of friends and enemies.49 Whereas the importance of 
intelligence participation in scenario planning may be recognised, in 
a world of diminishing resources and budgets very little is done to 
include intelligence analysts or officers in contingency planning. 
Where such participation does occur, however, contingency planning 
encourages closer communication between decision makers and the
author on July 13, 1995
46 Ibid.
47 These comments were made by Brigadier Andrew Massey, former SAS Commander 
in an interview, with the author on May 5, 1995, Buckingham Gate, London.
48 For an overview of preferences, knowledge and crisis response decision making in 
game theory, see Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International 
Relations, (Aldershot, England, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1994), pp.97-121. See also J 
Harsanyi, "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian Players," Management 
Science. (1967), Vol.14. Also Avenhaus, Rudnianski and Karkar (eds.), Decision Making 
Analytical Support and Crisis Management. (Heidelberg, Springer Verlag, 1991)
49 See Stan A Taylor and Theodore J Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis 
Management," in Alexander L George, (1991), op.cit:. p.396 and Charles C Cogan, 
"Intelligence and Crisis Management: The Importance of the Pre-Crisis," Intelligence and 
National Security, Vol.9, No.4, (October 1994), pp.633-650
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intelligence community. Communication is necessary for the efficient 
distribution of intelligence between the intelligence community and 
decision makers during crises.50 Not only is communication essential 
towards building a closer relationship between intelligence producer 
and consumers, it is also vitally important to ensure that intentions 
are clearly understood by the adversary, the public and one's allies 
during a crisis.
2.2.5 Communication
The fifth principle emphasises the importance of communication in 
crisis management. Crisis management style and the nature of the 
producer - consumer relationship plays an important role in 
determining how communication is managed. The conventional 
wisdom holds that there are two fundamental approaches to crisis 
management. These are the monocentrist and the polycentrist 
approaches and are embodied in the study of bureaucracies.51 They 
represent conflicting arguments towards the understanding of the 
bureaucratic dynamics of political administrations when involved in 
crisis management.
The monocentrist approach is based on the argument that the 
management and response to crisis situations is concentrated in the 
hands of a central authority. This is deemed necessary in order to 
ensure a unified and coordinated response, communication and the 
effective utilisation of resources. It dictates that during crises, the 
management structure that is responsible for responding will be 
unaffected by parochial interests and that the existence of a common 
threat will serve as a cohesive factor, creating a unified approach, by
50 Refer to the diagram of the intelligence cycle further on in the chapter.
51 For more details see Uriel Rosenthal, (et al.), "The Bureau-Politics of Crisis 
Management," Public Administration, The Royal Institute for Public Administration, London, 
Vol.69, (Summer 1991), p.212
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the individuals and organisations involved. Between the individual 
and the organisation as a whole, there are teams, who play a critical 
role in crisis management. Groups contribute towards crisis 
management through their wider diversity of skills and experience 
and do not become entrapped by the perceptions, bias and emotional 
responses of a single individual. Despite these advantages, however, 
it is nevertheless important to examine the pitfalls that are inherent in 
the manner in which they function. The opposite risk to the 
shortcomings in the individual approach is the potential for the group 
to become pathologically close-minded. This tendency in which 
groups strive for unanimity and cohesiveness was identified and 
called groupthink by Irving Janis.52
The monocentrist approach holds that during crises power is 
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, namely the crisis 
management team. Where the crisis management team is a closed 
group displaying monocentrist characteristics, the danger of acute 
group cohesiveness may result in groupthink. Janis argues that this 
tendency is likely to occur among high-ranking officials who form a 
cohesive unit.53 When the group is faced with a crisis situation they 
are influenced by the heightened sense of responsibility, mutual 
confidence, and intra-group support which reinforces their perception 
of belonging to an elite in-group.54 The crisis generates a sense of 
isolation and the group develops a characteristic of its own. Janis 
suggests that this cohesive metamorphosis leads to a deterioration of 
both cognitive powers and moral sensibility. These same tendencies 
prevalent in the monocentrist approach undermines the importance 
attached to the role of intelligence in crises. The group ego operates
52 For an overview on the concept of groupthink see Irvin Janis, Groupthink - 
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1982), 
p.13
For an explanation of this tendency and its effects in government environments, see 
Paul Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, (Leiden,
University of Leiden, The Netherlands, 1990)
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at the exclusion of the out-groups and intelligence analysis 
undergoes a fundamental shift from the domain of the intelligence 
community to that of the crisis management team. This can be a 
precarious situation when none of the CMT are competent analysts 
or experts in the field which dominates the crisis context.
The crucial aspect of communicating intelligence is to get the 
consumer to not only listen to what the intelligence community is 
reporting, but to act in accordance with the facts and information.55 
The effectiveness of intelligence analysis is measured by: "...the 
standard with which it provides explicitly actionable analysis without 
prescribing general policy guidelines."56 This is the basis of the 
activist approach to the producer - consumer relationship and is 
grounded in the argument that good intelligence does not necessarily 
guarantee sound decisions.57 In order to ensure that the maximum 
advantage is obtained from intelligence, the producer must influence 
the consumer to embark upon a course of action that is evident 
based on the analysis. Hulnick argues that the most effective way to 
ensure that the consumer not only comprehends the intelligence 
content but also acts upon it is through personal contact.58 This 
implies that preferably the analyst, or a senior intelligence officer,
See Arthur S Hulnick and Deborah Brammer, "The Impact of Intelligence on the 
Policy Review and Decision Process: Part One, Findings," Intelligence Monograph 
(Washington D.C., Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, January 1980) and Ariel Levite, 
Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1987) See also 
Robert S Sinclair, Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Science and the Directorate of Intelligence, 
(Washington D.C., Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1984) Also Loch K Johnson, 
"Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective," International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, Vol.3, No.3, p.303
56 See Jack Davis, "The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis," Intelligence Monograph, 
(Washington D.C., Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, July 1992), p.7 And Wilmoore 
Kendall, "Strategic Intelligence," World Politics. Vol.1, No.4, (July 1949) Kendall sees the 
intelligence function as helping the policy maker 'influence' the course of events by helping 
them to understand the operative factors which can have an impact.
See Robert David Steele, "A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligence 
Capabilities," IJIC, Vol.6, No.2, pp. 183-191 and Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch, Military 
Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. (New York, The Free Press, 1990), pp. 128-131. 
See also Michael I Handel, Leaders and Intelligence, (London, Frank Cass and Co., 1989), 
pp.26-27
58 See Arthur S Hulnick, (May 1986), op.cit:. p.228
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should be present when the analysis is delivered or conveyed to the 
policy maker. It does not imply that the intelligence officer or analyst 
should actively participate in the policy debate, but simply that he or 
she is on hand to place the intelligence product into perspective and 
to explain any ambiguities that may be arise through faulty 
interpretation by the consumer.
In crisis situations where the monocentrist approach prevails, 
communicating intelligence and applying an activist approach will 
only succeed if the analysis reflects the thinking of the individual or 
members of the decision making team. In circumstances where the 
analyst or intelligence manager is not included in the inner circle, the 
likelihood of analysis influencing the decision making process is 
weaker than in a polycentrist environment where the decision making 
team is more receptive to external input.
In contrast, the Polycentrist approach recognises the interaction 
of competing and conflicting actors within government bureaucracies 
and encourages competition as a means of ensuring a healthy check 
and balance against the potential concentration of decision making 
power. This approach reduces the dangers of groupthink. For the 
intelligence community, however, this aspect increases competition 
and makes the activist approach harder to implement. The negative 
aspects of the polycentrist approach, however, is the danger that 
where conflicting opinions prevail, consensus may not be reached. 
Consequently decisions may be delayed or this may result in 
incohesive policy. Communication may become fragmented with the 
result that all of this may be reflected by contradictory statements. 
This can undermine the government's credibility in the eyes of its 
public and allies and may disclose its vulnerabilities and result in 
confusion on the part of the adversary. Finally, communication is a 
necessary element to convey the authorities' policy and response to 
their adversary, public and allies and is crucial towards maintaining 
its credibility and establishing legitimacy for its actions. The Reagan
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Administration reflected the characteristics of both the monocentrist 
and polycentrist approaches. Accordingly the case studies are 
relevant to this study because they contribute towards understanding 
the role and significance that communication plays in crisis 
management and the intelligence relationship.
2.2.6 Legitimacy
Directly related to the above principle is the need to acquire and 
maintain legitimacy for crisis response initiatives. This rule holds that 
in responding to all crisis situations, the authorities must endeavour 
to acquire support and understanding for their actions and response 
strategies from the public59 and the international community.60 The 
political support of allies is crucial for the co-ordination and 
implementation of any course of action so that tension and 
cross-purpose activities can be avoided.61 The principle of legitimacy 
is interrelated with the principle of limiting the means of force that is 
necessary to secure an objective. By limiting force to the minimum 
amount that is necessary, the levels of political and psychological 
costs involved can be reduced which has a positive effect upon 
popular support and legitimacy. According to Secretary of Defence 
Caspar Weinberger, "...the use of force must be timely, appropriate, 
have public support, a high probability of success and should only be 
used as a last resort."62 Weinberger's opinion was in conflict with
59 See Ronald D Crelinsten and Alex P Schmidt, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A 
Twenty - Five Year Balance Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4, (Winter 
1992), pp.322-330
60 See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons from the Past," in Daniel Frei, (ed.), (1978), op.cit:, pp.8-9
61 See Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to 
Terrorism," in Wilkinson, (ed.), British Perspectives on Terrorism. (London, Allen & Unwin, 
1981).
62 See Brian Jenkins, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma," TVI 
Journal, (1985), p.34
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George Schultz, who was a firm believer in the use of force to back 
up diplomacy. This disagreement even extended to the 
implementation of NSDD. 138. According to Stansfield Turner,
This strong disagreement between two Cabinet officers 
revealed how deeply divided the Reagan Administration 
was on this issue. The President tried to waffle when first 
asked whether he agreed with Schultz on the occasional 
necessity for killing innocents, but ended up directly 
contradicting his Secretary of State. During a campaign 
debate with Walter Mondale he said, "We want to retaliate, 
but only if we can put our finger on the people responsible 
and not endanger the lives of innocent civilians."63
Adhering to this principle cannot be achieved in the absence of a 
thorough understanding and appreciation of the target population's 
values and interests. Intelligence contributes towards gathering and 
evaluating this information for the policy maker. This is where the 
concepts of communication and feedback between the intelligence 
community and the consumer, in this instance the crisis management 
team, are vital. Nowhere is this more crucial than in the response of 
the authorities to terrorism and the problem of collateral damage.
2.2.6.1 The dilemma of terrorism for intelligence and crisis 
management
Terrorism revolves around the struggle for legitimacy. It is the 
quest for recognition, approval and support of the terrorist 
organisation in the eyes of the target population as an opponent 
against an "illegitimate government". Conversely it is a struggle by 
the incumbent authority against an "illegitimate organisation", that 
uses unlawful, selective and indiscriminate violence to achieve its 
objectives. Adams states that, "...legitimacy is the Holy Grail of
63 Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. pp. 178-179
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terrorism."64 Within democracies, the inability of the government to 
provide total security for its inhabitants without infringing upon the 
freedom that its citizens enjoy, challenges its legitimacy.65 The 
underlying objective of terrorism, irrespective of the tactics involved, 
is similar to that of guerrilla warfare in that the aim is to alienate the 
government from its electorate.66 Thus terrorism strives to drive a 
wedge between the incumbent authority and the target population so 
that its perpetrators can influence the target to do their will.67 The 
following definition by James and Goldstaub explains this concept as 
follows:
Terrorism is the systematic threat or use of violence by a 
state or a non-state actor, with the intention of inspiring 
fear, influencing government or corporate policy, 
undermining public confidence, or promoting unrest, as a 
part of a plan to impose the perspectives held by the 
terrorists on society.68
Terrorism should also be understood and appreciated as a form of 
political communication employed as a means of gaining and 
influencing political behaviour and political outcomes by groups that 
consider themselves to be otherwise powerless or disenfranchised.69
See James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London, New English Library, 1986),
p.172
See J Goldberg, "The Terrorist Threat to Corporations", in George Roukis, (eds.), 
(1990), op.cit:. p.183
66 See Yehezkei Dror, "Challenge to the Democratic Capacity to Govern," in Martha 
Crenshaw, (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. (Middletown, Connecticut, Wesleyen 
University Press, 1983).
67 Guerrilla Warfare is defined as, "...a method of waging internal war by unorthodox 
methods for the control of authority over the population by breaking the link between the 
incumbent administration and the people at large." See Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1974) and Sam Sarkesian, Revolutionary 
Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago, Precedent Publishing, 1975), pp.4-5
68 Paul James, and J Goldstaub, "Terrorism and the Breakdown of International Order: 
The Corporate Dimension", Conflict Quarterly, Summer 1988, p71
69 See Ted Gurr, "The Objectives of Political Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, (ed.), The 
Politics of Terrorism, (New York, Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979), pp.36-45 and Lawrence 
Freedman, Terrorism and International Order, (London, Routledge and Kegan Park, 1986), 
Chapter 5: "Terrorism and Strategy," pp.56-76
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Their political objectives range from changing policy to changing the 
polity.70 It can be argued therefore that terrorism is the continuation of 
politics by other, albeit violent, means. Goldberg argues that although 
terrorism has not been the cause of the loss of large numbers of 
lives,71 it is the use of premeditated violence coupled with the 
sensationalism of the act itself - indiscriminate violence - that 
elevates counter-terrorism to high priority and captures international 
attention.72 Similarly, James and Goldstaub argue that whereas 
terrorism has been accountable for a smaller number of deaths than 
natural and man-made accidents and disasters, it is the exaggerated 
impact and high level of publicity that generates an unprecedented 
level of attention and fear among the target population, thereby 
empowering its perpetrators.73 The above theory is applicable to 
international terrorism. The terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
embassies, the Marine barracks and the hostage crisis in Beirut all 
succeeded in exposing the Reagan Administration's vulnerability. Not 
only did these attacks succeed in alienating the government from 
Congress and the American public by undermining confidence in the 
administration, but they revealed the deep divisions that existed 
within the cabinet and drove a wedge between the incumbent 
authority and the population at large over the administration's foreign 
policy in Lebanon. Despite having threatened large segments of 
democratic populations in some instances, no terrorist incident has 
yet posed a threat to any nation's national security.74 In order to
70 See M Kelly, "The Seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa: Managing Terrorism 
and the Media", in Uriel Rosenthal, (eds.), (1989), op.cit:. p.117
71 Goldberg reports that according to the US State Department's annual report,
Patterns of Global Terrorism, in 1988, 658 deaths were attributed to acts of terrorism. In 
contrast, more Americans died as a result of accidents. See Goldberg, "The Terrorist Threat 
to Corporations," in George Roukis, (eds.), Global Corporate Security, (London, Quorum 
Books, 1990), pp. 178-179
73 Paul James, and J Goldstaub, "Terrorism and the Breakdown of International Order: 
The Corporate Dimension," Conflict Quarterly, (Summer 1988), p.72
74 The recent attacks against the US World Trade Centre and the gas attacks on Tokyo 
underground in March and April 1995, illustrate the potential of terrorist organisation for
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achieve this, terrorist organisations need to be in possession of 
weapons of mass destruction or of some capability that could 
threaten the whole population simultaneously.
Although terrorist tactics and methods could include weapons of 
mass destruction in the future and should not be discounted, (recall 
the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Sect attacks on the Tokyo underground 
in 1995)7S, a terrorist threat to a country's entire population at any one 
time remains a remote possibility.76 This argument does not ignore 
the potential for terrorist groups to threaten large sectors of a 
country's population, such as major city, or to frustrate policy 
objectives, as Hizb'allah succeeded in doing to U.S. interests in 
Lebanon. In this instance, however, Hizb'allah did not threaten U.S. 
national security but its national interests in Lebanon.
A balanced perspective should be maintained between threats of 
a large magnitude and threats against the entire nation. Between the 
end of the Reagan Administration and the bombing of the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the Alfred P Murrah building in 
Oklahoma, successive US governments have not considered 
terrorism as a major threat to their national security.77 Prior to the 
Oklahoma bombing incident in April 1995, the CIA's annual budget 
for covert action, which includes propaganda support for
threatening large population concentrations. According to Dr Bruce Hoffman, terrorist tactical 
trends are changing and terrorists will begin to resort to methods or weapons that have the 
potential to inflict greater numbers of casualties and devastation, resulting in more 
sensationalism as they compete for audiences. See Bruce Hoffman, "Responding to 
Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.6, No.3, 
(Autumn 1994), pp.366-384
75 See David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult At The End Of The World, 
(London, Hutchinson, 1996) and William Dawkins, "From Mantra to Murder." Financial Times, 
June 16, 1996, p.XV
75 See Ronald D Crelinsten, "Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Democracy: The 
Assessment of National Security Threats," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.1, No.2, 
(April 1989), pp.242-269
77 According to senior FBI sources; "...while the US has considered terrorism as a 
major threat to their interests abroad, for example their embassies, diplomats and military 
personnel, prior to the World Trade Centre incident, however, more pertinently the Oklahoma 
bombing, they have not recognised terrorism as a serious threat to domestic security." Robert 
Grace and Robin Montgommery, FBI Special Agents in Charge of the Crisis Management 
Centre at the FBI Academy, interviews at Quantico Bay, on July 13, 1995
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counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, amounted to less than one 
per cent of its total budget.78 This is a reflection of the real degree of 
concern and priority which the U.S. governments have displayed 
towards terrorism.79
In crises, the traditional strategy in dealing with terrorism has 
focused upon the goals of striking a balance between prevention and 
response.80 While these are important elements in crisis 
management, both are governed by the media and the public's 
perception of the legitimacy of the government's actions. Beyond its 
violent characteristics, terrorism is a demonstration of intolerance 
towards official policy. This can usually evident in the terrorist's 
rhetoric and resistance against one or more aspects of the 
government's political or socio-economic policies. It is not surprising 
therefore that counter-terrorism strategies extend beyond the 
immediate requirements of incident containment and include political 
and socio-economic programs and reforms.81 These are aimed at 
undermining the rationale behind the terrorist organisations' demands 
and claims. For example, the British government succeeded with this 
strategy in Malaya and so has Spain against the activities of ETA, 
albeit with varying degrees of success.82 Essential as they are
7 8 David Gries, "A New Look For Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, 
(London, Frank Cass, January 1995), Vol.10, No.1, p.181
79 See James B Motley, "International Terrorism: A Challenge for U.S. Intelligence," 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, (Spring 1986)
80 For an interesting perspective of maintaining the balance between prevention and 
response, see A J Behm, Prevention / Response: How to get the Mix Right, A seminar paper 
delivered at the Terrorism and 2000 Olympics Conference, Australian Defence Force 
Academy, December?, 1995
81 See Paul Wilkinson, and Alasdair M Stewart, £1989), op.cit:, "Pathways Out of 
Terrorism for Democratic Societies," in particular p.461, sub-section (d) "The fourth 
scenario..."
82 For the British experience in Malaysia see Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M Taw, 
Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict. The Development of Britain's "Small Wars"
Doctrine During the 1950s. (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report R-4015-A, 1991) and R 
W Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report R-957-ARPA, February 
1972). See also Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency 
1948-1969, (New York, Weybright and Talley, 1971). See also Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict 
and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983, (Boulder, California, Westview Press, 
1985). See also Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, (London, Faber & Faber,
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towards eradicating the legitimacy of terrorists, comprehensive 
counter terrorist strategies are time consuming and necessitate the 
co-ordination and the co-operation of a large proportion, if not all, of 
the bureaucracy.83 Crisis situations, however, do not allow for this as 
they demand an effective and immediately visible response.
In the struggle for legitimacy the media can become an asset or a 
liability and governments which implement crisis contingency 
capabilities, need to ensure that they are equipped to manage the 
media to their advantage.84 The Reagan Administration was 
unprepared and subsequently unable to do this in the aftermath of 
the above attacks and during the hostage crisis. This situation 
deteriorated to such an extent that they lost the initiative and the 
media became part of the problem during the hijacking of Flight TWA 
847.85 However, to be in the position to recover effectively from 
one-sided media portrayal, the authorities must resort to utilising the 
information and knowledge that has been placed at their disposal by 
the intelligence community. This produces tension between the 
necessity for legitimacy and the need for maintaining operational 
secrecy and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Legitimacy is not only measured against moral judgements 
pertaining to the use of force. Past and current policy statements 
provide a benchmark against which crisis responses are measured. It 
is important therefore to ensure that response measures reflect 
existing policies. Responding to terrorist crises presents one of the 
biggest problems with regard to counter terrorist policy and
Ltd., 1967). For an overview of terrorism in Spain, see Fernando Reinares, "The Dynamics of 
Terrorism During the Transition to Democracy in Spain," in Wilkinson and Stewart, (1989), 
op.cit:. pp.121-129 and John Llewelyn Hollyman, "Basque Revolutionary Separatism: ETA," 
in Paul Preston, (ed.), Spain in Crisis, (London, Harvester Press, 1976), pp.212-233
83 See Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report N-3506-DOS, 
1992), pp.1-28 and 77-119
84 See S Gladis, "The Hostage I Terrorist Situation and the Media," in FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin. 1979, Vol.48, No.9, pp.11-15
85 This aspect is dealt with in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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legitimacy. This problem is made more complex, however, by the 
manner in which terrorist organisations, their actions and the actions 
of the incumbent government are portrayed by the media. In the 
struggle to establish and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
and one's allies, the 'management' of the media is crucial.85 6 The key 
lies in using the media as part of the solution, while not allowing them 
to become part of the problem. Alexander George has observed that, 
"...through excessive media coverage, establishment communications 
channels willingly or unwillingly become tools in the terrorist 
strategy."87 The dilemma for the authorities created by media 
coverage of terrorist crises, is in the questionable ability of the 
government to respond in a legitimate manner while simultaneously 
maintaining the balance between infringing upon the freedom of the 
press and in facilitating their (terrorists') dependency upon press 
coverage for the success of their operations.88 Jenkins argues that 
the solution to this problem is not press censorship.89 While media 
coverage of terrorist hijackings can assist the terrorists with an "initial 
tactical advantage” the objective for the government and security 
authorities is to gain the moral high-ground and seize the initiative by 
securing favourable media coverage of response initiatives. This 
facilitates adherence to the principle of maintaining legitimacy in the 
eyes of the media and the public.90 In pursuing legitimacy the
85 See Patrick Lagadec, (1993), op.cit:, pp.103 & 289, and Gerald C Meyers, and John
Holusha, Managing Crises: A Positive Approach, (London, Unwin, 1986). Also D Stephenson, 
"Are You Making the Best of Your Crisis?" in Emergency Planning Digest, (October, 1984), 
pp.2-4. See also George H Quester, "The Intelligence Community and the News Media," in 
Gerald Hopple and Bruce Watson, (1986), op.cit:, pp.249-250
87 See Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism the Media and the Police," Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol.32 (Spring 1978), pp.101-113
88 See Philip Revzin, "A Reporter Looks at the Media Role on Terror Threats," Wall 
Street Journal, March 14, 1977
89 Brian Jenkins, U.S. News & World Report. (October 21, 1985), op.cit:, p.27
90 See Joseph Scanlon, "The Hostage Taker, the Terrorist, the Media: Partners in 
Public Crime," in Lynne Walters, Lee Wilkins and Tim Walters, (eds.), Bad Tidings. 
Communication and Catastrophe, (Ottawa, Lawrence Earlbaum Associates Publishers, 
1989), pp. 115-130
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authorities should exercise caution against creating policy and action 
precedents. This last generic principle is discussed below.
2.2.7 Avoiding precedents
Apart from ensuring the legality of measures adopted in 
accordance with domestic and international law, the course of action 
implemented in crisis response should not be contrary to other 
agreements entered into between the affected organisation or 
individual and with any other party.91 This is an important issue aimed 
at preventing the inadvertent undermining of the credibility of 
contracts entered into with other parties or allies, or the actions of 
other states confronted with similar crises. This principle holds that in 
implementing response actions, crisis response strategies should be 
developed and implemented in such a manner so as to prevent the 
encouragement of repetitive incidents.92 These may encourage 
further action by an adversary and could undermine existing 
agreements or preventative measures either on a unilateral basis or 
between allies. In seeking international approval and support, it is 
necessary to communicate effectively and constantly with other 
states and allies towards ensuring coordination and to prevent any 
potential conflict of interests, and to avoid any course of action that 
may precipitate tension as a result of cross-purpose activity.93 This 
principle does not imply that precedents should not exist or that they 
do not exert any influence on state behaviour. Legislation and 
international law are precedents which influence states and their 
crisis response strategies.94 This introduces the tension between
q-i
See Paul Wilkinson, £1977), op.cit:, p.129
92 — -See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons from the Past," in Daniel Frei, (ed.), op.cit:. pp.8 -14
93 Paul Wilkinson, £1977), op.cit:. p.129
94 For a classical overview of why states should adhere to international law, see L 
Oppenheim, International Law, (London, Longmans Green and Company, 1920). More recent 
arguments are contained in Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
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ideology and the rule of law that is omni-present in terrorist type crisis 
situations.
Whereas terrorist groups are judged according to their ideological 
beliefs and the cause for which they claim to uphold, government 
responses are judged against the rule of law and the extent to which 
their counter-measures infringe upon civil liberties.95 Democratic 
principles place faithful governments at a disadvantage when 
responding to terrorist type crises.96 This has an affect on the function 
of intelligence when it is used for providing evidence for the 
prosecution of terrorists rather than for its knowledge worth.97 It 
generates tension between the principles of legitimacy, the 
avoidance of precedents and the protection of intelligence methods 
and sources. In order to avoid this problem, policy statements should 
be structured in a manner that will avoid creating precedents which 
inhibit crisis response options and produce behaviour expectations 
which dictate rules of engagement.
Consequently the importance of managing communication not 
only with the adversary during crises, but between allies, and in 
relation to the public and the media, is vital towards preventing third 
parties from creating or forcing a precedent upon the government. 
Managing any crisis situation within the above parameters, as set out 
in the principles of crisis management, necessitates insight into the 
environment, the objectives and values of allies and adversaries. 
Accordingly, intelligence plays a key role in this objective.
Power and Peace. Revised Brief Edition by Kenneth W Thompson, (New York, McGraw Hill, 
1993) and Rosaling Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1994). In relation to terrorism see Grant Wardlaw, "The 
Legal Regulation of Terrorism: international and National Issues," in idem, Political Terrorism: 
Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures, (Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition, 1989), 
pp. 103-105
95 Grant Wardlaw, "The Rule of Law," in idem, (1989), op.cit:, p.69
96 See Richard Clutterbuck, (1994), op.cit:, p.219 and Paul Wilkinson, (1977), op.cit:,
p.121
97 See the testimony of William Barr, former Attorney General of the U.S. during the 
Bush Administration, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United 
States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 19, 1996
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2.3. The theory of intelligence
Intelligence is information gathered for policymakers which 
illuminates the range of choices available to them and 
enables them to exercise judgement. Good intelligence will 
not necessarily lead to wise policy choices. But without 
sound intelligence, national policy decisions and actions 
cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect 
the best national interests or adequately protect national 
security.98 99
An examination of the function of intelligence must be related to 
the goals that it is intended to serve. A prerequisite, however, is an 
understanding of the concept of intelligence and how that process 
works. This section attempts to achieve that by looking at the 
definition and function of intelligence, the intelligence cycle, the 
origins of the producer - consumer dichotomy, the politicisation of 
intelligence and an examination of how intelligence is affected by 
communication. The case studies have been selected because not 
only do they contain examples of the significance of terrorism as 
crises for the U.S. government, but they illustrate the impact of 
terrorism as a crisis phenomenon on the intelligence process and 
include examples of politicisation.
2.3.1 The intelligence cycle
When handling any crisis it is important to take one's 
distance and to ask questions before taking action - and to 
work to maintain this critical distance throughout the 
episode."
See the Rockefeller Commission Report to the President on CIA Activities within the 
United States, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p.53
99 Patrick Lagadec, (1993), op.cit:. p.xxxv
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Following on the above discussion, it is important to place the 
intelligence process into proper perspective. Intelligence production 
is generally presented in the literature as a sequential process and is 
explained in terms of the intelligence cycle.100 The cycle is the 
process by which information that is required is identified as relevant, 
collected, converted into an intelligence product, and disseminated to 
the consumer.101 This concept implies that there is a point in the 
process where intelligence requirements are initiated and to which 
intelligence reports are rendered.102 At this point intelligence 
managers are responsible for interpreting the information 
requirements of the consumer and for allocation of production 
priorities, i.e. tasking.103 Because intelligence should only consist of 
information that is relevant to the security and prosperity of the state, 
it is at this stage in the tasking and planning process that managers 
have to exercise their political judgement with the inherent potential 
of individual and institutional bias encroaching upon and influencing 
their objectivity.104
"Consumers" are analysts, decision makers or those officials 
responsible for executing policy decisions such as commanding
See Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American 
National Security, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989) and the CIA 
Factbook on Intelligence, (Washington, D.C., Central Intelligence Agency 1994), p.16. Also 
Jeffrey T Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger 
Publishing Co.,1989), p.3
101 See Loch K Johnson, "Making the Intelligence Cycle Work," International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.1, No.4, (Winter 1986-87), p.16 and Jeffrey T 
Richeslon, (1989), op.cit:, pp.3-4
102 See David Brinckley and Andrew Hull, £1979), op.cit:, and John Von Hoene, 
Intelligence User's Guide, (Washington D.C., Defence Intelligence Agency, 1983)
103 For an overview of intelligence tasking see Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets, 
(New York, Basic Books, 1985) and Roy Godson, Intelligence Problems for the 1980s. 
Number One: Elements of Intelligence, Revised Ed., (Washington D.C., National Strategy 
Information Centre, 1983) and G.J.A. O'Toole, The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence 
and Espionage, (Oxford, Facts on File, Inc., 1988), pp.241-242
104 See Thomas L Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and 
Intelligence - Making. (New York, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No.233, 
December 1976) and Roy Godson, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s," Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 12., No.1, (Winter 1989), p.48 and Willmoore Kendall, "The Functions of 
Intelligence," World Politics, Vol.1, No.4, (July 1949), pp.542-552
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officers in the military, security, law enforcement and other executive 
organisations of the government or corporations. "Decision makers" 
are in many instances elected individuals who are responsible for 
articulating policy initiatives and their implementation. They are the 
primary source of demand and support requirements that are fed into 
the intelligence system for subsequent tasking, collection, analysis, 
production and dissemination to the consumer. In acknowledging that 
the intelligence process comprises tasking and direction, collection 
and analysis, production, dissemination and feedback, a note of 
caution is required.
Whereas the functions as described usually follow one another in 
sequence, the function of communication is omni-present and takes 
place continuously throughout the process. Communication is the 
lubricant of the cycle. It not only links the components of the 
intelligence system to one another, thereby enabling these to 
interact, but it also provides that essential link between the 
intelligence community and its external environment. It conveys 
intelligence requirements from the consumer to the intelligence 
community. After the production process the intelligence products are 
disseminated back to the consumer. Communication also provides 
the decision maker with information on the impact of their policy 
initiatives on the external environment.105 Without communication no 
cyclical connection could exist, goals would be ill defined, threat 
perception would be difficult to conduct and responsive adaptation to 
the dynamics of the environment would be dysfunctional. 
Communication can therefore be described as the axle upon which 
the intelligence cycle rotates.106 The management of communication 
between the analytical branch of the intelligence organisation and the 
decision makers, however, is one of the most contentious issues that 
prevails within the philosophy of intelligence. This controversy has
105 See Willem Steenkamp, (1992), op.cit:, p,43
106 Refer to the diagram of the intelligence cycle
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come to be known as the intelligence producer - consumer 
dichotomy. While the intelligence cycle is generally accepted as an 
adequate conceptual tool towards understanding the dynamics of the 
intelligence process, this model has inherent shortcomings when 
trying to explain the process during crises. The reason is rooted in 
the nature of crises and the extraordinary demands that crisis 
managers make upon the intelligence community during emergency 
situations which disturbs the routine analytical process.107 A graphical 
representation of the intelligence cycle is presented below:108
Figure 1: The intelligence cycle
See Richard Betts, "Intelligence for Policymaking," in G. Hopple , Steve J Andriole 
and Amos Freedy, (eds.), National Security Crisis: Forecasting and Management, (Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press, 1984)
108 For examples of the intelligence cycle see The CIA Factbook on Intelligence as well 
as Amas A. Jordan and William J Taylor, American National Security Policy and Process, 
(Baltimore and London,The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981)
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As it stands this model is not capable of explaining nor able to 
accommodate the dynamics of crisis management and the 
relationship between intelligence analysis and crisis decision making. 
No recognition of the transfer of the intelligence analysis function 
from the intelligence bureaucracy to that of the crisis management 
team is apparent. More significantly, this model does not reflect the 
presence of external sources of input such as the media and public 
opinion on the decision making process. During crises the shortage 
of time to make decisions complicates the element of proximity in the 
producer-consumer relationship. This restraint exercises a direct 
influence over the volume of information which can be presented and 
absorbed as well as the effectivity of communications.109 One of the 
objectives of this thesis to develop a paradigm that can explain this 
relationship during crises.110
With reference to the conceptual definition of intelligence and by 
analysing its constituent components, it is clear that the role of 
intelligence is to support the persistence and prosperity of the 
state.111 In expanding upon this basic premise and applying 
intelligence to crisis management, three primary functions of 
intelligence are identified. These are: (i) indicators & warning 
intelligence, (ii) the feedback of events and circumstances as a crisis 
situation develops and (iii) the identification and notification of 
opportunities that may arise from within the crisis.112 The last function
109 See Steve Malloy and Charles Schwenk, "The Effects of Information Technology on 
Strategic Decision Making," Journal of Management Studies, Vol.32, No.3, May 1995, p.283
110 See the conclusion, Chapter 6.
111 Refer to back to page 19 for the conceptual definition of intelligence.
112 See Gerald W Hopple et.al. (eds.), National Security Crisis, Forecasting and 
Management, (Bowker, Essex, Westview Press, 1984). For an overview of warning and 
intelligence, see Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision, (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1962) and Michael J Handel, Perception, Deception, Surprise: The 
Case of the Yorn Kippur War, (Jerusalem, Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, 
Jerusalem paper No. 19., 1876) and Amos Perlsmutter, "Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: 
Political and Military Misperceptions," Qrbis, No.xix, (Summer 1975). For an overview of the 
role of intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crises see Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National 
Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics, No.xvi, (April 1964), 
pp.455, 465-466. See also Harry Howe Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy," 
World Politics, No.xxvii, (October 1974)
Page 59
Page 60
leads directly to the debate over the producer - consumer 
relationship. The debate over the systemic relationship in the 
producer - consumer linkage is one which has traditionally 
concentrated on the element of proximity between the two. The 
theoretical concern focuses on the degree to which intelligence 
producers and consumers should interact.113 The examination of the 
producer - consumer linkage must be initiated from the vantage of the 
consumer's objectives which is the starting point of the intelligence 
tasking, collection and analysis process. Intelligence is information 
which has been carefully evaluated as to its accuracy and its 
significance with regard to strategic interests or an issue which is of 
significant importance to its user.114 This implies that intelligence is 
knowledge that deals with unique and secret information that is 
related to threats, opportunities and planning.115 Because decision 
making does not occur in a vacuum, decision makers require 
information concerned with threats and opportunities relevant to their 
objectives that can assist them in their decision making. Intelligence, 
therefore, must be timely, reliable, yet comprehensive and suitably 
presented.
See Jack Davis, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," CIA: Studies in Intelligence, 
Vol.36. No.5, (1992), pp.91-103. For an example of the bureaucratic wrangling over how 
much influence analysts should have in relation to the prime intelligence consumer, the 
President of the United States, see Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: Mv Three 
Decades with the Agency, (Washington, D.C., Pergammon Brassey's, 1989), pp.32-34. This 
example describes an argument between Smith who was then responsible for the contents of 
the Presidential Daily News Brief (PDB), and Willmoore Kendall.
114 See Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises. (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1987), pp.135-172 and Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E Goodman, (1989), 
op.cit:, pp. 3-29 and Richard Schultz, Roy Godson and Ted Greenwood, (eds.), Security 
Studies for the 1990s, (New York, Brassey's (US), 1993) and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Intelligence: 
Conceptual Approaches," in Robert Pfaltzgraff, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg, Robert L 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg, Intelligence Policy & National Security, 
(London, Macmillan Press, 1981), pp.35-37 and Donald Mclahlan, "Intelligence the Common 
Denominator," in Michael Elliot-Bateman, (ed.), The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1970), pp.52-67 and Christopher Andrew and 
David Dilks, The Missing Dimension: Government and Intelligence Communities in the 
Twentieth Century, (London, Macmillan, 1984), pp.1-16. See also John Bruce Lockhart, Some 
Observations on the Intelligence Spectrum, (St. Andrews University, Department of 
Economics, 1982), pp.1-9
115 See Roy Godson, "What is Intelligence," in Ken G Robertson, (ed.), British and 
American Approaches to Intelligence, (London, Macmillan Press, 1986)
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It is the decision maker's need for information that initiates the 
intelligence conversion process. This is the terminology used to 
describe the transformation of unprocessed information into finished 
intelligence, i.e., analysis. Analysis constitutes two essential steps. 
The first is evaluation whereby information received is verified to 
determine its source and authenticity. This stage of the process 
involves grading the material according to standardised scales of 
reliability.116 The integration and aggregation of intelligence 
information have as objective the creation of a coherent factual 
picture of a situation or development that is considered to be relevant 
to the interests of the consumer. Once verified, it is aggregated into 
factual components for the second stage in the conversion process, 
which is interpretation. Interpretation is aimed at satisfying the 
intelligence requirements of the consumer and is the function of 
intelligence managers during the tasking and review processes.117 
The objective is to provide expert and objective opinion on the 
implications of the reported facts, and to assist the consumer in 
decision making, who may not necessarily be an expert in all fields of 
human endeavour. Interpretation places the facts into contextual 
perspective with the strategic objectives and interests of the 
consumer.118
116 See Willem Steenkamp, (1992), op.cit:, p.79
See Abram N Shulsky, (1991), op.cit. and A C Maurer, M D Tunstall and J M 
Keagle, (eds.), (1985), op.cit:. and Bruce D Berkowitz and Allan E Goodman, (1989), op.cit:, 
pp. 85-109
118 See Ytzhak Katz and Ygal Vardi, "Strategies for Data Gathering and Evaluation in 
the Intelligence Community," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
Vol.5, No.3, pp.313-327
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2.3.2 The definition and function of intelligence
The failure of intelligence to provide timely, reliable 
information about the onset of a crisis and its development, 
and the failure of policy makers to make use of available 
intelligence are among the major generic problems that can 
undermine efforts at crisis avoidance and crisis 
management.119
Contemporary literature abounds with definitions of intelligence.120 
Common wisdom, however, upholds certain fundamental principles 
with regards to intelligence. These aver that intelligence must reflect 
the truth, be as objective as possible, unambiguous, relevant to the 
needs of the consumer and it must be conveyed in good time.121 
Godson contends that intelligence can be defined within two broader 
concepts. The first holds that intelligence is information relevant to 
the national security of the state, i.e. the territorial sovereignty and 
safety of its inhabitants. The alternative concept embodies 
intelligence as that information which is sought by the state with 
regard to the secrets, capabilities and intentions of its adversaries.122
Alexander L George, (1991), op.cit:. p.554
120 For the definitions of intelligence as advocated by Kent and Kendall, upon which the 
traditionalist - activist dichotomy is based, see Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for 
American World Policy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), p.3 and Willmoore 
Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics, Vol.1, No.4., July 1949. For an 
interesting, albeit, over-simplified and different perspective, see Thomas Troy, "The Correct 
Definition of Intelligence," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.3, 
No.4, pp.345-451. See also Harry Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1970), p.8 and S T Thomas, The U.S, Intelligence 
Community, (London, University Press of America, 1983), p.3 and Herbert E Meyer, 
Real-World Intelligence. (New York, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.6 and Stephen J 
Cimbala, Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Dobbs Ferry, New 
York, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987), p.224
121 For an overview of the characteristics of intelligence, see Glenn Hastedt, 
"Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: How to Measure Success," International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol.5, No.1,pp.49-61 and Douglas C Bernhardt, "I want it 
fast, factual, actionable - Tailoring Competitive Intelligence to Executives' Needs," Journal of 
Long Range Planning, Vol.27, No.1, p.21. See also Herbert E Meyer,(1987), op.cit:. and 
Robert Jervis, "What's Wrong With the Intelligence Process?" International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol.1, (Spring 1986), pp.28-30
122 Roy Godson in a statement made before the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives on March 17, 1992
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Using Godson's first concept of intelligence as a point of 
departure, this hypothesis contends that it is not limited to serving the 
national security interests of the state. The concept should be 
extended beyond that traditional boundary to include the potential of 
the state to exploit strategic opportunities towards its persistence and 
growth.123 For the purposes of this thesis the following definition of 
intelligence is used:
Intelligence is information which has been identified as 
relevant, collected, verified, interpreted within the context of 
specific objectives, analysed, classified and distributed to 
the policy maker who utilises it towards the persistence and 
prosperity of the state.
The relevance of this definition to the thesis is to be found in the 
significance of the term the persistence and prosperity of the state. 
While the term persistence of the state implies that intelligence is 
information that is primarily aimed at protecting the state from threats 
to its existence,124 the inclusion of the word prosperity implies that 
intelligence as an information product, includes analysis that is aimed 
at identifying opportunities that can be exploited by the consumer to 
his advantage. Within the intelligence profession this concept is 
referred to as Opportunity Analysis.125 It is appropriate to mention at 
this point that the Chinese ideogram for crisis denotes both danger 
and opportunity. From the theoretical perspective of this thesis, this is 
where the link between the activist approach within the producer - 
consumer relationship, opportunity analysis and crisis management 
occurs.
See Barry Buzan, £1991), op.cit. pp.6, 19 & 70-71
124 See Ken Robertson, "Intelligence Terrorism and Civil Liberties," in Paul Wilkinson 
and Alasdair M Stewart, (eds.), £1989), op.cit:. p.553
125 For an overview of Opportunity Analysis by its main proponent, see Jack Davis, "The 
Challenge of Opportunity Analysis," Centre for the Study of Intelligence, An Intelligence 
Monograph. (Washington D.C., CSI 92-003U, July 1992) See also Roy Godson, Intelligence 
Reguirements for the 1990s, (Washington D.C., National Strategy Information Centre, 1989), 
pp.4-11 and Robert A Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall Inc., 1965)
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2-3.3 The Kent - Kendall debate: Origins of the traditionalist and
activist approaches in the producer - consumer dichotomy
If we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they 
would be to know everything, to be believed when we 
spoke, and in such a way to exercise an influence to the 
good in the matter of policy. But absent the Good Fairy, we 
sometimes get the order of our unarticulated wishes mixed. 
Often we feel the desire to influence policy and perhaps just 
stop wishing there. This is too bad, because to wish simply 
for influence can, and upon occasion does, get intelligence 
to the place where it can have no influence whatever. By 
striving too hard in this direction, intelligence may seem just 
another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that.
Sherman Kent.126
The producer - consumer dichotomy is governed by two 
fundamental points of view, the traditionalist and the activist 
approaches. The traditionalist approach is based upon the 
intelligence doctrine of Sherman Kent.127 This view contends that 
there is a definite boundary between the domain of the intelligence 
producer and the consumer, the policy maker. It argues that it is not 
the place of the intelligence producer to become actively involved in 
policy decisions, and that policy makers and intelligence producers 
must keep their distance, or suffer the fate of subjectivity.128 In 
Sherman Kent's own words:
Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans and 
operations to provide the greatest amount of guidance and 
must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity 
of judgement.129
126 Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," Foreign Service Journal, Vol.46, (April 
1969)
1 97 See Sherman Kent, (1949), op.cit.
128 See Hans Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships," in Alfred Maurer, Marion D 
Tunstall and James Keagle, (eds.), (1985), op.cit. pp.57-66
129 See Jack Davis, (1992), op.cit:. pp.92-93. And G Murphy Donovan, "Intelligence 
Rams and Policy Lions," Studies in Intelligence, (Fall 1986), pp.63-74. Also Stansfield Turner, 
(198), op.cit:
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The traditionalists view the policy process as a prescribed 
sequence of events into which the intelligence community feeds 
sterile facts arrived at through deductive analysis and surreptitiously 
obtained secrets while having no part in the application of those facts 
to the objectives.130 From a normative perspective, the traditionalist 
approach upholds the principle of subservience by the intelligence 
community to the legislature and the principles of democracy. From a 
realist point of view, however, this principle is totally idealistic. It 
ignores factors such as the nature of the individual, ambition, egoism 
and bias. It also makes no provision for the complex dynamics in 
inter-personal relationships. In close working environments it is 
sometimes inevitable for close bonds to be formed or major rifts to 
occur when individuals are thrown together in extremely stressful 
situations such as crises. Another fundamental flaw in this approach 
is the fact that consumers do not only consist of decision makers. 
Executive departments of government, organisations and policy 
implementation services such as law enforcement agencies, national 
industries and the defence community are also consumers of 
intelligence. TheJntelligence community itself is often a consumer of 
its own product. This occurs when the community carries out 
operational tasks or covert actions. Before embarking on such 
operations, it will request and consult the available intelligence for 
planning purposes.
The activist philosophy is based on the principle of intelligence 
performing more than just a timely presentation of the facts to the 
consumer.131 The remit of the intelligence function in this context is to 
play an active role in influencing the decision making process by 
presenting the decision maker with facts which, if acted upon, in a
See Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, (Glencoe, Illinois, 
The Free Press, 1956) and Arthur Hulnick, (1986), op.cit:. p.214
131 -See Deborah Brammer and Arthur S Hulnick, "Intelligence and Policy - The 
On-Going Debate," CIA Document Approved For Release by the CIA Historical Review 
Program. (McLean Virginia), pp.12-14
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timely manner can enable the consumer to seize the initiative.132 This 
approach implies a symbiotic relationship between intelligence and 
policy, with intelligence producers more actively disposed towards 
policy objectives and action based upon perceived opportunities.133 
This dichotomy will remain a contentious issue for as long as 
scholars focus upon the normative and theoretical aspects of the 
relationship and fail to consider the function of intelligence in real-life 
situations and in particular, crises.
The origins of the Kent - Kendall debate go back to 1949 when 
Sherman Kent published Strategic Intelligence for American World 
Policy. In his review of Kent's work, Kendall published The Function 
of Intelligence. While they differed over the nature of the relationship 
between intelligence analysts and policy makers, their doctrines were 
not mutually exclusive and have a fundamental point in common. This 
point of convergence was on the importance of getting the 
relationship between analysts and decision makers right. Both 
realised the importance of communication and interaction between 
producers and consumers, albeit for different reasons. Kent's ideal 
was of bureaucratic scholars processing information in order to 
understand the world for bureaucratic policy planners and to present 
those facts to the consumer but to avoid any undue interference in 
the decision making process itself. In Strategic Intelligence, Kent 
described the function of intelligence as:
Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives...drafter of 
policy... maker of plans...carrier out of operations. 
Intelligence is ancillary to these; it performs a service 
function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well 
informed - to analyse alternative courses of action without 
indicating choice.
See Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics, Vol.1, No.4, 
July 1949) and Jack Davis, (1992), op.cit: p.95
See P Laurer, "Ethics and Intelligence," in Alfred Maurer, Marion D Tunstall and 
James Keagle (eds.), (1985), op.cit:. pp.69-87 and Stafford Thomas, "Intelligence Production 
and Consumption," in Alfred Maurer, Marion D Tunstall and James Keagle, (eds.), (1985), 
op.cit:. pp. 125-156
133
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As the head of ONE 1952-1967, Kent was mostly involved in 
intelligence estimates. His expertise was rooted in strategic 
intelligence and estimates and not in current intelligence. While Kent 
originally believed in the importance of guidance from the policy 
makers he subsequently became alienated from this view and 
advocated analysis in support of the truth as opposed to intelligence 
in support of power. It later took Ray Cline and Chester Cooper to 
reverse this process and to promote closer interaction between 
analysts and consumers for the purpose of seeking tasking and 
feedback.
Kendall rejected the above ideal and believed that producers 
responsibility was to bring to the attention of consumers those 
elements of an issue that were susceptible to US influence. In so 
doing, the role of the analyst was to influence policy as far as 
possible. He charged Kent and the intelligence leaders with a 
compulsive preoccupation with wartime analysis and with intelligence 
prediction and of wanting to eliminate surprise. He believed that 
Kent's approach undermined alternative and lateral thinking and that 
alternative policies other than those in efect would never be 
considered as a result. He advocated the intelligence community 
serving the policymaking needs of congressional leaders as opposed 
to primarily the President. Kendall was an antagonist of the "imperial 
presidency." One important difference between them was that they 
saw intelligence serving different levels of decision makers. Kent 
regarded the presidency as the ultimate consumer, while Kendall 
regarded politically responsible laymen in Congress as the ultimate 
consumers.
The policy and intelligence processes are different but not 
separate. Intelligence is defined through analysis, i.e. the 
transformation of un-processed information into evaluated 
information and interpreted within the context of specific objectives, 
i.e. policy. The validity of intelligence is judged by its ability in
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building an intellectual platform upon which decisions can be made. 
Policy, however, is measured by the acceptance or resistance 
associated with its implementation, in other words, support. New 
policy initiatives help to focus intelligence collection, tasking and 
analysis. Intelligence and feedback may influence policy decisions 
and alter objectives. This relationship is therefore dynamic and 
invariably interactive, however, not necessarily sequential. This 
process of interaction is not always harmonious and is often 
conducted within an atmosphere of latent tension. In coming to terms 
with the nature of the producer - consumer problem, the bureaucratic, 
philosophic and human elements which prevail in the relationship 
need closer analysis.
It is natural to assume that two closely related tribes who speak 
the same language and who work towards a common objective, 
co-exist in harmony. The reality, when viewed from either 
perspective, however, suggests otherwise. Many policy makers 
depart from the assumption that they can expect total support from 
the intelligence community, for their policy initiatives.134 This view 
reinforces the activist philosophy. The former DCI, William Casey, 
was an avid activist who tried to manage the CIA according to activist 
principles.135 Policy makers' expectations of support by the 
intelligence community implies a shared and active interest and if 
necessary, advocacy of their policies. This has certainly occurred 
throughout more than one American administration.136 According to 
former DCI Stansfield Turner, President Carter actively sought his 
recommendations and advocacy with regards to the Iran crisis and
134 See Mark M Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence 
Producers," CIA Document approved for release by the CIA Historical Review Program, 
(Copyright by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 1992), pp.13
I OR
See editorial, "Casey's CIA: New Clout, New Danger," US News & World Report, 
June 16, 1986, pp.24-27
136 See Christopher Andrew, "American Presidents and Their Intelligence Communities," 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No.4, (October 1995), pp.95-112
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possible strategies in dealing with the hostage situation and the 
Ayatollah. He explains that, "Once an intelligence chief begins to 
recommend policy, it becomes very difficult for him not to want his 
intelligence to support that policy."137
Another example of this phenomenon was the interference by 
Turner's successor, William Casey, when he had a serious 
disagreement with the CIA's analysis on Mexico. Supplied with a draft 
intelligence estimate on Mexico prematurely, Casey disagreed 
vehemently with the analyst in charge, John Horton, when he tried to 
place the faulty estimate into perspective. Horton pointed out that 
much of the estimate had been based on rumour, hearsay and 
unsubstantiated evidence. Casey objected to Horton's qualified view 
when it became apparent that a more conservative estimate on the 
instability of Mexico would not support Casey's disdain for the 
president of Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid, who was an obstacle to the 
CIA's objectives in Nicaragua and Mexico.138 The above examples 
reinforce the erroneous assumption that the role of intelligence is to 
support preconceived policy, rather than building political objectives 
and policy initiatives based on solid intelligence. This premise runs 
contrary to the traditionalist principle that intelligence analysts should 
not advocate policy. Institutional behaviour, however, tends towards 
creating barriers between the producers and consumers. The 
intelligence community, with the exception of the political appointees 
in the upper echelons, consists of permanent career officials. Like the 
rest of the government bureaucracy, they adopt a "we/they" view of 
the producer - consumer relationship. The policy makers are 
regarded as political transients and analysts often have the view that 
as temporary policy officials, policy makers do not have sufficient 
grasp of the long-term crucial issues. This attitude influences
137 Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:, p.50
138 For the full account of this incident and its background, see Bob Woodward, £1988), 
op.cit:, pp.413-423 and Joseph Persico, (1990), op.cit:, pp.364-365. See also John Gentry, 
£1993), op.cit:, pp.32, 65 and 75
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producers to hold back and refrain from direct personal commitment 
to fluctuating policy initiatives. This, however, is contrary to the 
consumers' expectations of unquestionable support from the 
bureaucracy for their policies.
Compounding this tension in the producer - consumer relationship 
is the fact that consumers frequently advocate and implement policy 
initiatives that are in total contradiction with the facts presented by 
the intelligence community and their subsequent beliefs.139 The 
tension between the intelligence community and policy makers is 
reinforced by additional factors. Policy makers are often frustrated by 
the fact that intelligence input often tends to expand rather than
139 •This problem was evident in Lebanon during the Reagan Administration. The US 
foreign policy in the Middle East was moulded and reinforced by their strategic and 
ideological preoccupation with Soviet containment. Secretary of State, George Schultz, 
insisted that the United States' foreign policy objectives in the region should be based on a 
negotiated withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon and the restoration of the 
Christian militia government under Bashir Gemayel. This policy was in line with their 
overarching strategy of preventing a potential flashpoint between American and Soviet allies 
which could have led to a Superpower confrontation. (George Schultz's objectives were 
confirmed by Geoffrey Kemp, former Director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the 
NSC Staff and Special Advisor to Presdient Reagan for National Security Affairs, in an 
interview with the author in Washington DC, July 19, 1995. This was also pointed out in an 
interview with journalist, John Walcott on July 17, 1995 in Washington DC). Schultz’s views 
on US support for the Gemayel government, however, ran contrary to the conviction and 
advice of the intelligence community at the time The CIA believed that the Gemayel 
government lacked sufficient popular support and that Israel was pursuing an agenda in 
Lebanon that was in conflict with US interests. Not only did the intelligence community differ 
with Schultz, but the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
also disagreed with Schultz's assessment. Furthermore, Weinberger and the military had a 
fundamental disagreement with Schultz over the use of force in support of diplomacy in 
Lebanon. Once again this difference in opinion between Schultz and Weinberger reflected the 
deep divisions that prevailed in the Reagan cabinet. President Reagan's reluctance to support 
one or the other compounded the Lebanon crisis and resulted in indecisiveness. Not only did 
the President's management style create incohesion, but it opened up opportunities for 
activists, like William Casey and the NSA Robert McFarlane to exploit this vacuum. The 
consequences led directly to the Iran-Contra Affair. For more details see Malcolm 
Mackintosh, "The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on Super-power Relations," in Gregory 
Treverton, Crisis Management and the Super-powers in the Middle East, (Hampshire, 
England, Gower Publishing, 1981), pp.4-12. See also Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:. 
pp.30-31. David kennedy and Richard Haass, The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, 
1982-84, (Georgetown, Washington DC, The Institute fo the Study of Diplomacy, School of 
Foreign Service, Pew Case Study No.358, 1993) Also David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta, 
Lebanon and the Intelligence Community, (Harvard, Harvard University, Kennedy School of 
Government, Case Study, 1988), p.8. For details of the disagreement between Schultz and 
Weinberger, see Caspar Weinberger, (1991). op.cit:. pp.158-167. Also Jane Mayer and Doyle 
McManus, (1988), op.cit:, pp.49-61 and John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the 
National Security Council from Truman to Bush, (New York, William Morrow and Company, 
Inc., 1991), pp.462-474. For the consequences of crisis induced stress on decision makers, 
see Patrick Lagadec, (1993), op.cit:, p.161 and Jerold M Post, "The Impact of Crisis-Induced 
Stress on PolicyMakers," in Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:, pp.473 & 483. Post reveals 
that criticism levelled against crisis managers from within the ranks of their own management 
group is a major source of stress during crises.
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reduce their level of uncertainty.140 Intelligence illuminates alternative 
possibilities and factors that are often overlooked or neglected by 
policy makers. The ignorance of some policy makers regarding 
intelligence methodology can further erode the intelligence 
community's integrity and increase the policy maker's frustration 
when the use of information is limited because of its classification.141 
This is exacerbated when the intelligence community competes for 
the attention of the policy maker who has numerous sources of 
information.142 The intelligence community does not produce and 
disseminate information for policy makers in isolation. Traditionalist 
doctrine demands that intelligence officers are expected to be 
impartial, non-partisan and non-ideological.143 As professional and 
career officials, they are expected to serve each administration 
regardless of its political persuasion.
The distance between the intelligence community and the policy 
makers tends to erect a barrier between the producers and the scope 
of the policy objectives that they are expected to serve.144 In many
140 For an overview of the problems of information overload, signals, noise and 
ambiguity, see Roberta Wohlstetter, (1962), op.cit: also Thomas L Hughes, "The Power to 
Speak and the Power to Listen: Reflections on Bureaucratic Politics and a Recommendation 
on Information Flows," in Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, (eds.), Secrecy and Foreign 
Policy, (New York, New York University Press, 1974). See also Mark Lowenthal, (1992), 
op.cit:. p.15 and Uriel Rosenthal, (et.al), (1989) op.cit:. see the section on "Information and 
Comm unication. Upward and Downward Communication: From Explosion to Shortage," 
pp.463-466. For information overload and intelligence, Richard K Betts, Surprise Attack: 
Lessons for Defence Planning, (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute, 1982). See also G 
Murphy Donovan, (1986), op.cit:. pp.65-67 and Hans Heymann, "When Intelligence Fails to 
Reduce Uncertainty," in Alfred Maurer, (et.al), (1985), op.cit:. pp.324-325
141 See Jeremy J Stone, "Secrecy and Covert Intelligence Collection and Operations," in 
Morton H Halperin, National Security Policy-Making. (Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington 
Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1975), pp165-173. See also Thomas L Hughes, (1974), 
op.cit:. p.18 and Hans Heymann, "When Intelligence Restricts Options," in Alfred Maurer, 
(et.al), (1985), op.cit:. pp.325-328. Also Samuel Halpern, "Clandestine Collection," in Roy 
Godson, (1983), op.cit:. p.37
142 See George H Quester, "The Intelligence Community and the News Media," in G 
Hopple and B Watson, (1986), op.cit:. pp.249-250 and Robert Cecil, "The Assessment and 
Acceptance of Intelligence: A Case Study," in Ken G Robertson, British and American 
Approaches to Intelligence, (London, Macmillan Press, Ltd., RUSI, 1987), pp. 166-182 and 
Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, (Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, 1980)
143 See Sherman Kent, (1969), op.cit, p.167
144 Deborah Brammer and Arthur S Hulnick, Intelligence and Policy - The On-Going 
Debate, (no date available), op.cit:. p.11. And Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence -
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instances, questions asked by policy makers are inappropriate for 
intelligence judgements and tend towards policy prescriptions. At 
worst, entrenched and faulty assumptions on the part of the policy 
makers dictates intelligence questions and priorities.145 Intelligence 
seeks accuracy, and should strive to maintain a distinction between 
facts and judgements. Where there is a lack of adequate facts in the 
conversion process, however, ambiguity may lead to speculation that 
carries with it the negative potential for mirror-imaging and therefore 
bias which undermines the accuracy and integrity of intelligence.146 
This methodological distinction is not always appreciated by policy
Policymaker Tangle." Jerusalem Quarterly. (Winter 1984), pp.123-131
145 This was certainly the case prior to the fall of the Shah of Iran when the prevalent 
mind-set of the Carter Administration officials was that the Shah's Regime was stable. This 
flawed perspective was reinforced by the Shah's monopoly over the armed forces and 
exacerbated by the lask of insight by the intelligence community into the domestic 
socio-political dynamics of Iran at the time. This inflexible attitude failed to stimulate 
alternative intelligence and policy questions. See the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978, 96th 
Congress, 1st session, 1979, (Washington D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979). Also Nikki 
R Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, (1990), op.cit:. pp. 145-165 and Michael Ledeen and William 
Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran, (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1981) Also for an 
overview of faulty American perspectives with regard to Iran and the Shah's position prior to 
the fall, see Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1980), pp. 180-208. See Gregory F Treverton and James Klocke, The Fall of the Shah of Iran, 
(Georgetown, Washington,D.C., The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign 
Service, Georgetown University, Pew Case Study No.311, 1994), p.5. Also see Amir Taheri, 
Nest of Spies, (London, Hutchinson), pp.77-91. See also Zachary Karabell, "Inside the U.S. 
Espionage Den: The U.S. Embassy and the Fall of the Shah," Intelligence and National 
Security, Vol.8, No.1, (January 1993), pp.44-59. See the U.S. Congress House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Staff Report: Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence
Performance Prior to November 1978. (1979), pp.1-8. See the comments made by former 
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski in Power and Principle. (New York: N.Y.: 
Farrar, 1985), p.359. Also Zachary Karabell, (January 1993), op.cit:. pp.44-59. See Also 
Gary Sick, All Fall Down, (New York, I.B.Taurus,1986), pp.438-440
146 Mirror imaging is the phenomenon where analysts superimpose their own thought 
processes over those of an adversary. They attempt to ascertain how they would react to a 
given situation if they were in the shoes of the adversary. This is a fundamental mistake 
because in the process they fail to realise that the other party might not think in exactly the 
same manner and that values preferences that the analyst might hold, may differ 
substantially from those of the adversary. For further explanation of this concept, see Leo D 
Carl, The International Dictionary of Intelligence, (McLean, Virginia, International Defence 
Consultant Services, Inc, 1990), p.240: "Mirror-imaging: the projection on, or ascription, to a 
hostile intelligence service or government the same behaviour or motivations in a given set of 
circumstances as those of the observer. (2) the conscious or unwitting adoption by an 
intelligence service of the modus operandi in particular situations as that of a hostile service." 
For an in-depth overview of this phenomenon see, Robert B Bathurst, Intelligence and the 
Mirror, (London, Sage Publications, 1993). This is the same concept as Graham T Allison's 
theory of the Rational Actor Model. See Graham T Allison, (1971), op.cit:, pp.4-5 and 10-11 
and Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Nonrationality in Models of the 
International System," in James N Rosenau, (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, 
Revised Edition, (New York, The Free Press, 1969), p.231
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makers. To facilitate the dissemination of intelligence - especially in a 
multiple consumer environment - producers package intelligence 
according to standardised formats towards achieving recognition and 
cost-effectiveness. Standardisation does not always suit the 
individual needs of all the consumers which often results in the 
product being ignored altogether.147 The complexities involved in 
transforming raw and unevaluated information into a product that has 
been analysed and interpreted in line with specific objectives is time 
consuming.148 This often frustrates the consumers as intelligence 
does not always succeed in delivering its product on cue when it is 
most needed. Intelligence that is delivered on issues that are not 
relevant to the immediate concern of the consumer - particularly 
during a crisis - tends to be ignored by the policy maker.149 In their 
endeavours to remain in office, policy makers use intelligence 
selectively in order to maximise their personal positions first, their 
institutional position second and the security of the nation thereafter.
2.3.4 Opportunity Analysis
Despite the fact that the Kent-Kendall debate was formulated in 
1949, it has nevertheless remained at the heart of the 
producer-consumer dichotomy. However, this doctrine could not have 
anticipated the challenges that contemporary crises - such as 
terrorism - present to current national security decision making. In the 
late 40s and subsequent 50s, 60s and even 70s, crises were 
synonymous with war avoidance, not terrorism. This argument does 
not intend to refute the doctrine. Rather it seeks to illustrate the
147 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995. See also Anne 
Armstrong, (1989), op.cit:. pp.23-33
148 See also John Gentry, £1993), op.cit:, pp.12, & 211-213
149 Observation made by Admiral Stansfield Turner (retired), former Director of Central 
Intelligence during an interview with the author at Mclean Virginia, on July 23, 1995
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difficulty of reconciling this theory derived in the late 40s with current 
dynamics of national security decision making.
Attempts to modify the doctrine in line with contemporary policy 
making emphasise the importance of opportunity analysis. The 
origins of this approach can be traced back to 1986 when Kenneth de 
Graffenreid refered to opportunity analysis as "...analysis [that] 
illuminates for the policymaker opportunities for advancing US 
objectives and interests through diplomacy, military and economic 
moves, cultural activities and other poloitical action."150 During the 
mid-1980s, de Graffenreid served as the Senior Director for 
Intelligence programs on the National Security Council Staff. At that 
time opportunity analysis was a function that the NSC staff conducted 
for the President and the National Security Advisor. Contemporary 
proponents of this approach who are trying to promote this concept 
among the intelligence analysis community are Roy Godson and 
Jack Davis, from the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.151 
According to Davis, opportunity analysis is best described as:
...an intelligence assessment thay directly relates the 
production unit's substantive expertise to the 
implementation of national security policy - in effect by 
pointing to opportunities and vulnerabilities the United 
States can exploit to advance a policy as well as to the 
dangers that could undermine policy. The standard is to 
provide explicitly actionable analysis without prescribing 
general policy guidelines.152
150 See Kenneth de Graffenreid, "Intelligence and the Oval Office," in Roy Godson, 
(ed.), Intelligence and Policy, (Washington D.C., National Strategy Information Centre, 
1987), p.28
151 For an in-depth article on opportunity analysis see Jack Davis, "The Challenge of 
Opportunity Analysis," Intelligence Monograph, (Washington D.C., Centre for the Study of 
Intelligence, CSI 92-003U, July 1992) See also Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for 
the 1990s, (Washington D.C., National Strategy Information Centre, 1989), pp.4-11 and 
Robert A Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hail Inc., 
1965)
See Jack Davis, (July 1992), op.cit:, p.7
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This concept can also be -applied to crisis situations. Although 
crises tend to highlight only imminent and serious threats to the 
interests of the consumer, instances do arise where a proper and well 
thought out strategy can be used to not only recover from the crisis 
situation with one's interests intact, but where the tables can be 
turned upon an adversary and his potential weaknesses exploited to 
one's own advantage.153
in many instances it is ignorance of the intelligence process itself 
as well as a lack of appreciation of the capabilities of the intelligence 
community that produce intelligence failures during crises. The 
inherent danger associated with opportunity analysis, however, is the 
potential for individual and institutional interests to predominate and 
influence the integrity of the analysis which can result in the 
politicisation of intelligence.154 This phenomenon is explained below.
2.3.5 The politicisation of intelligence
Politicisation can manifest itself in many ways, but in each 
case it boils down to the same essential elements: Almost 
all will agree that it involves the deliberate distortion of 
analysis or judgements to favour a preferred line of thinking 
irrespective of the evidence.155
153 See David Brinckiey and Andrew Hull, Estimative Intelligence: A Textbook on the 
History, Products, Uses and Writing of Intelligence Estimates, (Colombus, Ohio, Battelle, 
1979) and Arie Ofri, "Crisis and Opportunity Forecasting," in Orbis, No.26, (Winter 1983), 
p.822 and Robert Mandel, "Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises," World 
Politics, No.29, (July 1977), p.622
154 The politicisation of intelligence will be demonstrated in the following case studies, 
for an overview of intelligence and politicisation, see Robert Gates, Guarding Against 
Politicisation, Extract from a speech on the subject delivered by Gates to CIA Analysts in the 
CIA Auditorium on March 16, 1992. See also Robert Gates, "The Use of Intelligence at the 
White House," Washington Quarterly, Vol.12, No.1, (Winter 1989), pp.35-43. See also 
Kenneth de Graffenreid, "Intelligence and the Oval Office," in Roy Godson, (eds.), (1986), 
op.cit:, pp.8-18
155 Statement made by former DCI Robert Gates in a speech to the CIA at Langley, 
Virginia on March 16, 1992
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Politicisation - essentially policy-driven bias, arises when there is 
a lack of understanding of the basic normative principles governing 
the role and function of intelligence and where intelligence is 
regarded as either a product in support of preconceived policy 
objectives, or as a product that is in search of a policy to support.156 
From the perspective of the policy maker and the consumer, this 
phenomenon is more likely to occur under the former 
misunderstanding. Policy makers are intimately involved in their 
policy objectives and actively seek out information that reinforces 
their beliefs and which can be used to substantiate their course of 
actions.157 According to Richard Haass:
The danger of politicisation, the potential for the intelligence 
community to distort information or judgement in order to 
please the political authorities of the day, is real, and 
obviously can never be eliminated if intelligence officials are 
involved, as they must be in the policy process. The 
challenge, though is to develop reasonable safeguards 
while permitting intelligence producers and consumers to 
interact. Guarding against political pressure, guarding 
against parochialism is a powerful argument for maintaining 
a strong centralised capability, and not leaving decisions 
affecting important intelligence-related questions solely to 
the policy making departments.158
During the Reagan Administration, former National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane and some members of the NSC staff are 
alleged to have altered the text of intelligence analyses pertaining to 
National Security Staff Directive (NSSD5-84) which reported that the
156 See Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence, (New York, St Martin's 
Press, 1972), pp. 140-143
1-7 See Mark M Lowenthal, (1992), op.cit:. p.15 and Richard K Betts, "American 
Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction," in Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Uri 
Ra'anan and Warren H Milberg, Intelligence Policy & National Security, (London, Macmillan 
Press, 1981), pp.256-260. See also House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978, 96th Congress, 1st 
session, 1979, (Washington D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979)
*'8 See the testimony of Richard Haass, former senior director of the NSC staff, Hearing 
of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence
Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 19, 1996
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US had little prospects of success in establishing ties with moderate 
elements within the Iranian government. They updated and 
paraphrased the intelligence estimates to support their policy bias 
which was based on the belief that the key to rapprochement with 
Iran and to the release of the western hostages in Lebanon, could be 
achieved through establishing contact with the Iranian moderates.159
Consumers - who are policy makers - are prone to cognitive bias, 
a tendency to display mental intransigence, and when presented with 
evidence that is in conflict with their ambitions - their comfort zones - 
they tend towards cognitive dissonance.160 The latter can be 
described as a state of mind where there is a conflict between reality 
and a preconceived idea. The difference creates tension in the mind 
of the beholder, who follows a subsequent course of action or 
decision making which concurs with his or her preferred line of 
thinking.161
Festinger argues that dissonance exists between two cognitions 
which are inconsistent with each other.162 A cognition may be a fact, a 
belief or an opinion about anything, including one's own behaviour. 
Any two cognitions can be consonant - that is, consistent with one 
another, or dissonant - inconsistent, or irrelevant, where the
159 This allegation is made by former Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, (1991), 
op.cit: p.362
160 For a useful discussion on the problem of cognitive dissonance see Norman F Dixon, 
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1976). In this seminal 
work Dixon provides numerous examples of military failures as a result of cognitive 
dissonance. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 
(Princeton University Press, 1976) and for cognitive dissonance and intelligence, see Richard 
J Heuer, Jr, "Cognitive Biases in the Evaluation of Intelligence Estimates," Proceedings, 
Tenth Annual Convention of American Institute for Decision Sciences, (St. Louis, Montana, 
Oct.30-Nov. 1, 1978), p.1. Also Jack Davis, "Combating Mind-Set," Studies in Intelligence 
Vol.36, No.5, 1992
151 For further academic explanations of this phenomenon see Roun Harre' and Roger 
Lamb, (eds.), The Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Psychology, cognitive dissonance, (London, 
Blackwell, 1983), p.93, and N Chapanis and A Chapanis, "Cognitive Dissonance: Five Years 
Later," Psychological Bulletin. Vol.61, pp.1-22. See also C Osgood and P Tannenbaum, "The 
Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological Review, Vol.62, 
(1955), pp.42-55
16- See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1957)
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existence of one implies nothing about the other. According to 
Festinger, any person who behaves in the above manner, and who 
displays an inconsistency with his own attitude, suffers from cognitive 
dissonance.163
An example of this phenomenon was the unshakeable belief of 
the former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, DCI William Casey and 
President Reagan, who based their opinions on terrorism and 
counter-terrorist policies on their perceptions that the former Soviet 
Union was the orchestrating arm behind international terrorism.164 It is 
interesting to note that Haig requested the intelligence community to 
produce a National Intelligence Estimate of the Soviets' role in 
terrorism after he had stated it as a fact in a cabinet meeting.165 This 
is a classic example of how the consumer, by tasking the intelligence 
community, can either inadvertently or quite deliberately influence the 
analysis requested by making policy statements. This can induce the 
intelligence community to provide substantiating evidence in support 
of existing policy bias.166 It is an easy trap for intelligence analysts in 
their attempts to support the consumer, to succumb to 
presuppositions and to either search for specific corroborating 
evidence, or to skew their analysis by placing a slant or special 
emphasis on specific factors which may or could result in a 
predetermined interpretation of the evidence.
The challenge for analysts lies in their ability and integrity to be 
able to produce intelligence that objectively assesses relevant policy 
issues - irrespective of whether it supports or undermines current 
consumer beliefs.167 Under these circumstances, the least that can be
163 ibid.
lo4 The background to Alexander Haig's and the intelligence communities' opinions are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3
165 Martin & Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.51
166 See the testimony by Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl before the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence in September 1991, titled: CIA Politicisation, dated September 30, 1991
‘‘ This point and subsequent argument is attributed to the author's personal 
experiences as an intelligence officer from 1975-1985
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hoped for is to facilitate a wider understanding of the realities of a 
particular situation and the potential implications should the policy 
maker insist in implementing his policy initiatives. Where it is known 
that the consumer holds a divergent view to that of the intelligence 
community, the analysis should at least include the consumer's 
opinion but in such a manner that it reflects both the strengths and 
weaknesses of his belief. These should be contrasted against the 
evidence and reasoning of the argument which substantiates the 
conclusions of the analyst.168 By highlighting those specific areas 
where the producer and the consumer's policy preferences are based 
upon speculation, hearsay and untested assumptions, one can hope 
that reason will prevail and that the consumer will at least be 
prompted to review his opinions. The root of the problem of 
convergence between the producer and consumer is to be found in 
the dilemma over the linkage between the two and the traditionalist - 
activist debate. This very issue of communication between the 
intelligence analyst/manager and the policy maker during the 
decision making process is the centre of the producer-consumer 
dichotomy and is explained below.
2.3.6 Communication and the producer - consumer interface
Just how close or how far a distance should be maintained 
between the intelligence community and the policy maker and what 
laws should govern their relationship remains the crux of the 
problem.169 In trying to analyse that relationship, however, the 
mistake is often made whereby the producer - consumer relationship
Statement made by former DCI Robert Gates in a speech to the CIA at Langley, 
Virginia on March 16, 1992
169 See William J Barnds, "Intelligence Functions," The Murphy Commission on the 
Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Vol.7, (June 1975), p.14
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is personified by the concept of the intelligence community as the
producer, and the government administration as the consumer. While
it is natural to view the producer - consumer relationship in terms of
two mutually exclusive spheres, this approach is misleading. In most
political systems an operational interface exists. In the United States,
this is the National Security Council staff, which are entrusted with
the responsibility of implementing national security policy
decisions,170 the DCI and intelligence managers. In keeping with
1 0 The National Security Council was established under President Truman two years 
after the end of the Second World War with the promulgation of the National Security Act on 
July 26, 1947. This legislation provided the formal and statutory machinery to deal with 
America's involvement in international politics. The term "national security" implies the 
inclusion of those related concepts such as diplomacy, defence, intelligence and economic 
activity which are components of a greater whole, namely, the national interest. Each reflects 
a distinct, yet interrelated aspect of America's relationship with the rest of the world. The latter 
is integrated into a broader framework subsumed under the umbrella concept of national 
security. This notion of a national security body reflects an awareness that a broader 
perspective on global affairs, which is defined and co-ordinated as a national policy, is only 
realisable under the high-profile leadership of the President. As the primary institution tasked 
with the responsibility for national security management, and as the advisor to the President 
on national security affairs, the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security 
Advisor (NSA) are prime intelligence consumers after the President of the United States.The 
National Security Council has two statutory functions. Foremost is the formulation of security 
policy. This is carried out by the statutory members of the NSC as identified below. The 
preparation of policy options for presentation to the key NSC members, however, is the 
responsibility of the NSC staff. They are full-time officials seconded to the NSC by the 
respective security and intelligence organisations. The National Security Advisor is the head 
of the NSC staff as well as the NSC Planning Group These staff members are responsible for 
the co-ordination of, and assistance to, the other executive departments in government tasked 
with the implementation of NSC decisions and policy.The NSC's secondary function is 
planning for the implementation and execution of national security policy. The NSC staff's 
function, however, does not imply that national security policy is made at that level, but rather 
that it assists with policy options which are presented to the President and the cabinet for 
selection and approval. In terms of its relationship with the President, the NSC staff fulfils an 
activist role. Once approved by the President, the staff will assist the government 
departments responsible for implementation and execution of the policy by way of 
consultation and coordination. In terms of the 1947 amended statute, the NSC is comprised 
of the President, Vice President, the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of State and any 
other officials who may be required to serve at the invitation of the President. Examples of 
these almost permanent ad-hoc members are the Director of Central Intelligence, who is the 
head of the CIA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSC is therefore a 
decision making body with a subordinate staff who make up the Planning Group and the 
Co-ordinating Committee. As an institution, the NSC is located within the White House. The 
NSC staff has an important institutional role in planning for crises. For comprehensive 
overviews of the history, structure and development of the NSC and the NSC staff, see 
Christopher Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1991). Also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Mid-Life Crisis," Foreign Policy, No.69, 
(Winter 1987-88) See the Tower Board-NSC Function Hearing, US Congress, Joint Hearing 
of the Investigations Subcomittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives 100th Congress, April 30, 1987, p.4. See John Allen Williams, "The National 
Security Establishment: Institutional Framework for Policymaking," in Stephen J Cimbala, 
(ed.), National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits. (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984), 
p.326 and Ernest R May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United 
States," in Kari F Inderfurth and Loch K Johnson, (eds.), (1988), op.cit:. p.9 See also the 
U.S. Government Executive Order No. 12333 of December 4, 1981, Parti.2: "The National 
Security Council, (a) Purpose." See also Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security 
Council, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1988), p.358. See also Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989),
Page 80
Page 81
traditionalist principles, the above function as middle-men and 
cut-outs between analysts and decision makers. At the highest level, 
the DCI functions as the interface between the President of the U.S. 
and the intelligence community.* 171 It is the responsibility of the 
intelligence managers to communicate requirements for intelligence 
tasking and collection. To be able to do this effectively, managers 
must be in constant touch with the decision makers in order to have a 
clear grasp of consumer requirements. It is also their duty to transmit 
finished intelligence products to the decision maker.172 The activist 
approach holds that in doing so, managers must provide decision 
makers with judgements and the implications of their judgements on 
their environment.173 Despite tensions and friction in the relationship, 
Barnds, argues that policy makers must keep the appropriate sectors 
of the intelligence community appraised of significant policy matters 
for consideration.
Policy makers must also learn to ask the right questions of the 
right people. This, Barnds points out, requires continual 
communication on a formal and informal level between the producers 
and consumers.174 Between the White House and the intelligence 
community, the NSC and its staff serves as that interface between 
intelligence and the decision making body.175
op.cit:. pp.432-437
171 See Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eves Only: Secret Intelligence and the 
American Presidency from Washington to Bush, (London, Harper Collins, 1995), pp.169-170. 
See also Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989), op.cit:. pp.432-437
172 See Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989), op.cit:. pp.432-437 and Christopher Shoemaker, 
(1991), op.cit.
173 See Roger Hilsman, (1956), op.cit:, p.118 and Benno Wasserman, (1960), op.cit:. 
p.161
174 See William J Barnds, "Intelligence Functions," The Commission on the 
Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Vol.7, (June 1975), p.14
175 See Christopher Shoemaker, The NSC Staff, (1991). Under Henry Kissinger and 
Nixon, the Washington Special Action Group functioned within the NSC as the crisis 
management team and under President Reagan, the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) 
within the NSC staff, functioned as the crisis management team. See John Prados, (1991), 
op.cit:, pp.295 and 481-500
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The corrupting factor of the normative principles that govern this 
relationship are to be found in the nature of the rapport that is 
established between the analyst and the policy maker. However, in 
many instances and in countries with large intelligence bureaucracies 
such as the United States, there is seldom a direct personal link 
between the de facto analyst and the policy maker. Instead there are 
intelligence managers176 and in some instances national intelligence 
officers, (NIO) who provide the communication link between the two 
on issues of primary importance such as the Middle East, the former 
Soviet Union and terrorism.177
During the Reagan Administration, National Intelligence Officer 
Robert Ames, was highly regarded in cabinet circles and was a 
crucial link between and Secretary of State George Schultz and the 
CIA. Ames, who was the Agency's foremost Middle East intelligence 
officer was killed alongside 17 other Americans and 33 State 
Department employees in the Embassy Explosion in Beirut on April 
18, 1983. His death reinforced Schultz's perceptions of the Middle 
East and his view that U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon had to be backed 
up with military force.178 The concept of National Intelligence Officers 
(NIO) was initiated during the Ford administration. NIOs are 
specifically responsible for ensuring that the intelligence community 
remains responsive to the policy makers' needs.179 This introduces 
greater complexity into the relationship as there is an additional actor 
whose personal integrity, characteristics, ambitions and prejudices all 
have to be taken into account. Within the context of a traditionalist
176 For an overview of the intelligence analyst/manager relationship, see John Gentry, 
"Intelligence Analyst / Manager Relations at the CIA," Intelligence and National Security. 
Vol. 10, No.4, (October 1995), pp. 133-148
17' For explanations of the functions and responsibilities of National Intelligence 
Officers, see George Schultz, (.1993), op.cit. pp. 48-49 and John Ranelagh, (.1988), op.cit, 
p.688
This opinion was expressed by John Walcott, interview, Washington DC, on July 
17, 1995 and also by Geoffrey Kemp, interview, Washington D.C., on July 19, 1995
‘ ' Kennedy and Brunetta, (1988), op.cit. p.5
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producer - consumer relationship, national intelligence officers have 
a positive role to play in that they provide a much needed link 
between intelligence analysts and decision makers.
Intelligence managers play an important role in the producer - 
consumer linkage. As branch or subject chiefs, they are ultimate 
arbiters in any analytical disagreements. They have a responsibility 
to challenge analysis and to ensure its soundness, logical validity 
and clarity. They are primarily responsible for ensuring that 
communication between the producers and consumers is effectively 
managed.180 The responsibilities commensurate with this position 
demand that the manager or national intelligence officer is an expert 
in his field, a good editor and a skilled bureaucrat. The relationship 
between the analyst and the manager or NIO is susceptible to 
break-down in the absence of regular interpersonal contact and 
discussion between them,181 particularly when the manager makes 
cryptic or offensive comments on draft reports or is reluctant to inform 
the analyst that his paper is below standard or irrelevant to a policy 
issue.182 In dealing with uncertainty, neither producers or consumers 
like intelligence gaps. Nevertheless, they are a reality and are often 
responsible for uncertainties in estimates and analysis. Where such 
uncertainties are identified any reluctance or inability of analysts to 
adequately convey the cause and nature of these uncertainties may 
alienate their consumers and could result in the policy maker 
assuming the role as his own analyst.
The role of intelligence managers was explained to the author by Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, (retired), former Director of Central Intelligence in an interview with the author in 
Mclean Virginia, July 23, 1995
181 For a professional overview of the policy maker's attitude towards the producer - 
consumer relationship and the function of analysis, see Jack Davis, "A Policymaker's 
Perspective On Intelligence Analysis," Studies in Intelligence, (Internet document) This article 
features an in-depth interview with U.S. Ambassador Robert D Blackwill, a former NSC Staff 
Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs and lecturer at Harvard 
University's John F Kennedy School of Government on the relationship between intelligence 
analysts and decision makers.
182 Comments by Robert Gates, former Director of Central Intelligence during an 
address to the CIA, McLean Virginia, March16, 1992
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Decision makers are usually self-confident individuals who 
believe that they have achieved their positions in government 
through what they perceive to be their superior decision making 
abilities and sound judgement. Decision makers therefore look to 
intelligence to enhance their decision making skills and to produce a 
value-added commodity in its analysis and estimates.183 Therefore 
only that which is useful, insightful and new is generally absorbed by 
the policy maker. Where intelligence fails to contribute on that level, 
it is disregarded by the consumer and only serves to reinforce the 
policy makers' disdain for intelligence and his opinion that he remains 
his own best analyst. During crisis situations, when the demand for 
raw intelligence is acute, erroneous assumptions often emerge. 
Some consumers believe that professional analysts get in the way, 
slow the process down and distort incoming information.184 The result 
is a tendency for the consumer to disregard the professional analyst 
in favour of his own decision making during a crisis, particularly in 
those cases where the consumer is a member or former member of 
the intelligence community.185 It is nevertheless at this precise 
moment when the consumer is least likely to function well as his own 
analyst. Crisis managers' inability to conduct objective assessments 
and make dispassionate judgements is usually inverse to the 
importance of the issue, its intensity and the time that they have at 
their disposal for dealing with it.186
See Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, (New 
York, Basic Books, Inc., 1985), pp.93-95 and Thomas Hughes, (1976), op.cit:. p.42
184 Brigadier Andy Massey (OBE), Former Commander of the SAS during the Gulf War 
and currently the Director of Defence Systems Limited, in an interview, with the author at 
Buckingham Gate, London, on May 5, 1995
185 Evidence suggests that former DCI and then President George Bush adopted this 
strategy. See Andrew Rosenthal, "White House Plans to Sharpen Role in Panama Plots," 
New York Times, October 13, 1989, p.8 and Maureen Dowd, "2-Summit Plan Reflects Bush 
Style: Intense (Relaxed) Personal Diplomacy." New York Times, November 6, 1989, p.14
186 See Mark Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence 
Producers," (1992), op.cit:. p.16
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Another factor in the politicisation of intelligence and the producer 
- consumer linkage, is the tendency for the relationship to deteriorate 
with time. This is characterised by an initial period of convergence 
followed by increasing alienation.187
The traditionalist approach reinforces the notion amongst those 
policy makers who, when they find themselves at loggerheads with 
the facts as presented by the intelligence community, distance 
themselves from that source of dissention. Not only is this bad policy 
making practice, however, but ostracising the intelligence community 
can produce aberrant behaviour on the part of the producer. Under 
these circumstances producers who succumb to a growing feeling of 
isolation may be guilty of producing intelligence in search of policy to 
support. This problem becomes more acute in circumstances where 
the consumer consistently adopts and displays an attitude of 
antagonism towards the producer when presented with dissenting or 
discouraging intelligence. Unfortunately this tendency to "shoot the 
messenger" often prevails and has a negative effect upon the 
producer - consumer relationship. Where the activist approach 
promotes greater interaction between the producer and consumer 
this interpersonal contact can serve to promote solidarity. A negative 
implication of this effect, however, is the potential for solidarity to 
encourage politicisation as the producer develops strong ties with the 
consumer and identifies increasingly with the consumers' objectives.
Another factor that influences the producer - consumer 
relationship and politicisation, is the struggle for political control and 
public accountability of the security and intelligence community by
187 According to a senior long-serving NSC staffer the NSC staff follow a very 
predictable pattern from administration to administration in their relationship with CIA 
analysts: "You go through a honeymoon period, and then distancing....In the early days [of 
the administration] they're sort of dazzled by all the sources that the CIA has to offer. All the 
classification and secretiveness is very appealing to them, and so they go through an early 
stage when they're inclined to solicit the views of the intelligence agency. You can almost 
chart when you've passed between a year to a year and a half. At that point, no matter what 
their background, they become very confident in their own judgement. Their relationship with 
CIA analysts is superb when they share the same view. When they don't have the same view, 
increasingly the CIA guys will get cut out of the picture. Will not even know what's going on." 
See Kennedy and Brunetta, (1988), op.cit:. p.4
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the executive and the legislative bodies of government.188 In the 
United States this takes place between the Executive (White House) 
and Congress. Traditionally congressional oversight is conducted by 
the House and the Senate intelligence committees on a separate 
basis, although there have been occasions where a joint 
House-Senate committee has taken place.189 From the perspective of 
the presidential administration and the intelligence community, 
Congress is generally regarded as an interfering body which not only 
imposes operational limitations upon policy initiatives, but which 
cannot be trusted with classified intelligence, particularly prior to the 
implementation of covert operations. There have been many 
accusations laid at Congress' door by the CIA and the White House 
that leaks of sensitive information to the press have originated from 
Capitol Hill.190 This was certainly the case during the Reagan 
Administration when not only was information withheld from Congress 
by the President, and the NSC, but William Casey was accused of 
lying to Congress by Senator Barry Goldwater. Casey lied to 
Congress about the covert operation to mine Nicaraguan waters 
because he, in turn, distrusted Congress with sensitive information.191 
It can be argued that the executive would prefer congressional efforts
See Harry Howe Ransom, "The Politicisation of Intelligence," in Stephen J Cimbala, 
(1987), op.cit:, pp.25-33. Also Loch K Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence 
Investigation, (Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, 1985) and Thomas K 
Latimer, "United States Intelligence Activities: The Role of Congress," in Robert L Pfaitzgraff, 
Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg, (eds.), (1981), op.cit:. pp.279-286. See also Stansfield 
Turner and George Thibault, "Intelligence: The Right Rules," Foreign Policy, No.48, (Fall 
1982), p.126
189 An example of such a joint hearing is the US Congress, Tower Board-NSC Function 
Hearing, Joint Hearing of the Investigations Subcomittee of the Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, April 30, 1987
190 See John T Elliff, "Congress and the Intelligence Community," in Lawrence C Dodd 
and Bruce I Oppenheimer, (eds.), Congress Reconsidered, (New York, Praeger, 1977), 
pp. 196-198 and Morris S Ogul, Congress Overseas the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative 
Supervision. (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p.218 and Loch K Johnson, 
(1989), op.cit:. pp.229-231
191 See Peter Kornbluh, "The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Post-mortem," World Policy 
Journal, (Winter 1987-88), pp. 129-150. Also the editorial by Tom Teepen, Atlanta 
Constitution, November 22, 1985. See David B Ottoway and Patrick E Tyler, "New Era of 
Mistrust Marks Congress' Role," Washington Post, May 19, 1986, pp.1 & 10. See also Bob 
Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. pp.386-412
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to fail and that past Presidents have remained suspicious of 
intelligence oversight and mistrusted its ability to handle intelligence 
responsibly.192
The environment within which crisis management operates can 
also be affected by congressional oversight. Congress has often 
accused the CIA and the White House of withholding notification of 
presidential findings and covert operations.193 In analysing the 
relationship between Congress, the Executive and the American 
intelligence community, Smist contends that despite Congress having 
initially antagonised the intelligence community during the 
Rockefeller, Church, Pike and Boland Committees,194 that this
192 Richard Valcourt, "Congress and Intelligence Policy," International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.5, No.2, (1991), p.231. Also David B Ottoway and 
Patrick E Tyler, "New Era of Mistrust Marks Congress' Role."
193 For examples of the conflict between the intelligence community, Congress and the 
Executive, refer to the Church and Pike Committees. See also Frank J Smist, Jr, Congress 
Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1947-1989, (Knoxville, The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990) and Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By 
Congress, Chapter 5, "Congress Tames The Intelligence Community," (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp. 115-134. Also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA & American 
Democracy, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), pp.229-247
194 Following in the wake of the Watergate Scandal, the Rockefeller Commission report 
was published on June 6, 1975. This investigation examined the activities of the CIA in 
relation to illegal activities which violated the rights of private citizens. In a bid to protect the 
CIA from what he perceived to be partisan interests of the White House and Congress, the 
then DCI, William Colby, lifted the lid off of the CIA's covert operations including Operation 
Phoenix, which aroused American public concern over the involvement of the CIA in 
assassinations. This led to subsequent investigations by both the Senate and the House 
which undertook reviews of the activities of the intelligence community. With 1976 an election 
year, both Senators Frank Church and Otis Pike attempted to use their respective committees 
as a political platform. The Church Committee which published its report in April 1976 
examined the role of the intelligence community in domestic activities during the 1960s and 
1970s. This committee also examined the CIA's role in covert activity and assassinations and 
the focus of Congressional oversight switched from monitoring the quality of intelligence 
products to intelligence activity and the. sensational aspects of intelligence. One of the 
operations that it examined was the CIA's involvement in Operation Phoenix in Vietnam - run 
by the late former DCI William Colby. Its sister investigatory committee, the Pike Committee, 
focused on intelligence management and organisation and the quality of intelligence 
products. This Committee's impact was undermined, however, when excerpts of the report 
that was published on January 29, 1976, were released in advance to the Village Voice by 
CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr. In 1983, the Boland Committee which investigated the 
involvement of the CIA in Central America, resulted in the Boland Ammendment, an 
attachment to the 1983 Intelligence Appropriations Bill that prohibited the CIA and the 
Defence Intelligence Community from providing any financial assistance for equipment, 
training or any other support activity to the Nicaraguan Contras. See John Ranelagh, £1988), 
op.cit;, pp.585-599. See also Bruce Watson, Susan Watson and Gerald Hopple (eds.), United 
States Intelligence. An Encyclopaedia, (New York, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), pp.48, 87 
& 441. See also U.S. Congress. Senate Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Report 94-755, (Washington 
D.C., Government Printing Office, 1976) and Scott D Breckinridge, The CIA and the U.S. 
Intelligence System, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1986) and Mark M Lowenthal, U.S.
Page 87
Page 88
relationship has stabilised and serves as an effective oversight 
mechanism and devil's advocacy of intelligence and foreign policy 
issues.195 196In reality, however, the motives behind Congressional 
oversight committees have done little to dispel fears on the part of 
the intelligence community that individual U.S. Senators, such as 
Frank Church and Otis Pike. Where a political party is privy to 
sensitive information which can be used to frustrate and embarrass 
the opposition, the organisation which is the source of such "political 
ammunition", will be coveted, manipulated and thus inevitably 
politicised. In the absence of any clear-cut understanding on the role 
and function of intelligence by the players involved, intelligence may 
be used as the proverbial political football. According to Angelo 
Codevilla: "clearly the question of what the United States expects of 
its intelligence services has not been answered with intellectual 
authority by those who have the political authority to do so."166 
Codevilla's observation implies that political entities have focused 
upon exacting the maximum partisan political leverage out of 
intelligence oversight instead of resolving the issue over the function 
of intelligence. The relationship is less problematical in the case 
where the consumer is not a policy maker, but an active user of 
intelligence such as military and law enforcement officers who use 
intelligence for operational purposes. In this instance the relationship 
between the producer and consumer is much closer because the 
consumer is dependent upon intelligence for the successful outcome 
of an operation. In many instances, military or law enforcement 
operations are initiated and carried out as a direct result of
Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy. (New York, Praeger, 1984) and William Corson, The 
Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire, (New York, Dial Press, 
1977)
195 Frank J Smist, Jr, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 
1947-1989, (Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 1990) and Ernest Lefever and Roy 
Godson, The CIA and the American Ethic: An Unfinished Debate, (Washington D.C., Ethics 
and Public Policy Centre, Georgetown University, 1979)
196 See Angelo Codevilla, Washington Quarterly, as cited in Richard Valcourt, (1991), 
op.cit:, p.224
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intelligence that has come to light. This is particularly true with 
regards to counter terrorism, counter insurgency and narcotics.197
It can be argued that during crisis situations as the intelligence 
community provides raw intelligence in support of the crisis 
management team, the opportunities for politicisation are reduced. 
This can be attributed to the lack of time available for evaluation, 
interpretation and the opportunity for institutional bias to prevail. The 
danger lies in the use of estimative intelligence where those 
estimates have been pre-ordained and politicised to support a 
particular slant or promote a specific policy line. A worst case 
scenario is when the consumer deliberately shuts the producer out of 
the decision making loop, effectively cutting the intelligence 
community off from the executive and its objectives. The result is the 
inevitable dysfunction in policy implementation that reflects the 
dangers inherent when the traditionalist approach is applied to 
intelligence and crisis management.
2.4 Conclusion
Like the Matryoshka Doll approach each of the case studies 
illustrate different yet complimentary facets of the producer - 
consumer relationship at various levels In the Reagan Administration. 
They reveal the key factors which affected adherence to the 
principles of crisis management and the intelligence process by the 
administration in Lebanon. The case studies demonstrate how the 
political system responded to the demands placed on it by a series of 
terrorist attacks which affected the ability of the administration to 
respond in a structured fashion and how the intelligence process
197 For pertinent examples of where tactical intelligence played a vital role in military 
operations see Bruce Hoffman, (et.al.), Lessons for Contemporary Insurgencies: The 
Rhodesian Experience, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report, R-3998-A, 1991), pp.28-37 
and 91
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malfunctioned. They provide an insight into the consequences of the 
traditionalist and activist approaches when applied to intelligence 
management and the producer - consumer relationship.
This chapter has shown how intelligence interacts with all the 
principles of crisis management and is a necessary activity that is 
prevalent throughout the crisis management process. Not only is it an 
essential element reflected in all the other management principles, 
but intelligence is a fundamental necessity that provides information 
upon which policy decisions should be based. It is therefore an 
essential tool in decision making. It is an instrument that can be used 
by decision makers to gauge the expected resistance to policy 
objectives and the success of initiatives that have been implemented. 
Furthermore, intelligence is an aid in the use of force against an 
adversary in that it provides information on the amount of force that is 
required and where it should be applied to achieve an objective.
While it is accepted that the function of intelligence is to provide 
vital information to facilitate decisions towards the security and 
prosperity of the state, it must be recognised that although 
intelligence is but one source of decision making input available to 
policy makers, it is nevertheless the most important. What sets it 
apart from other sources of information is that intelligence derives its 
strength and importance from the fact that it is usually based on 
secret information acquired by the intelligence services from well 
placed sources and that it is presented in context of the consumer's 
objectives. Intelligence is necessary in determining which objectives 
are possible and in limiting those objectives to the critical few. In 
order to apply the minimum amount of force against an adversary, 
intelligence supports tactical initiatives and provides feedback on 
their success or failure against the adversary.
The tension between intelligence and crisis management occurs 
when intelligence is used in support of counter terrorism. In this 
instance the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is
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juxtaposed with the need to provide evidence for prosecution 
purposes. Towards creating contingency capabilities, intelligence is 
indispensible in game theory and scenario forecasting. Contingency 
planning helps decision makers to identify where there are specific 
intelligence shortcomings and to task the intelligence community 
more effectively in advance of foreseeable crises. Just as intelligence 
is the prerequisite for decision making, communication is essential for 
the effective distribution of intelligence. Intelligence and its swift 
communication is essential and is the lynch-pin of crisis 
management. The communication of ideas and objectives is 
necessary between allies and adversaries during crises in order to 
avoid any misunderstanding. In this regard, intelligence is an aid in 
the evaluation of communication and information that is received from 
third parties. As a source of institutional knowledge, background and 
analysis, intelligence assists decision makers from implementing 
decisions that are liable to create precedents or situations that can 
undermine or invalidate existing agreements between actors. This 
chapter has also explained why there is an inherent tension between 
intelligence and the media. The media which is often a source of 
overt information for intelligence analysts and decision makers, is a 
competitor for the attention of the decision maker. This places greater 
pressure on the intelligence community to acquire better placed 
sources and to surpass the media in its importance by providing the 
decision maker with secret information on the adversary's capabilities 
and intentions and to place media reports into policy perspectives. In 
his testimony before the U.S. Commission on the roles and 
capabilities of the intelligence community, Joseph S Nye Jr, argued 
that:
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I think the challenge for Current intelligence is to ask what's 
our value-added that CNN doesn't do? And the challenge 
for Estimative intelligence is what's out value added that the 
economist or the financial times doesn't do? ...one thing that 
the intelligence analysis can do, estimated intelligence 
analysis, is distill this information in ways that are relevant 
to the policymaker, bring it to the point that the policymaker 
needs.198
The case study that examines the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
explores the tension between the media, intelligence and crisis 
management. Unlike the media who serve the public interest, 
intelligence serves the policy maker. Where the media usually 
decides what is in the public interest, however, the intelligence 
services are tasked by the decision makers to collect and report on 
specific issues. This can render the intelligence community 
vulnerable to manipulation or politicisation which is done by steering 
it towards a specific subject or phrasing the intelligence questions in 
such a manner as to shape the answers and analysis. This is 
demonstrated in the case studies that follow.
198 See the testimony of Joseph S Nye Jr, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 
19,1996 ~~ ............................. ~
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Chapter 3
THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY ON APRIL 18, 1983 AND
THE MARINE BARRACKS ON OCTOBER 23, 1983
Whereas "war is a continuation of politics by other means," 
terrorism is a method of waging war by other means.1
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the Reagan Administration's 
response to two terrorist incidents which resulted in crises for the 
administration during their foreign policy initiatives in Lebanon. 
These incidents are the suicide truck-bomb attacks against the U.S. 
embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 and the U.S. Marine Battalion 
Landing Team (BLT) barracks, at Beirut international airport on 
October 23, 1983. Starting with the third crisis management principle, 
the intelligence imperative, the study demonstrates why these events 
presented the U.S. government with a dilemma. It shows how the 
Reagan Administration failed to implement any of the crisis 
management principles in its response to these acts of aggression 
which were carried out in opposition to its objectives in Lebanon. By 
examining the manner in which intelligence was used prior to and 
after these events, the study examines the relationship between the 
intelligence community and its consumers and how intelligence 
affects decision making during crises. The section on the intelligence 
imperative, incorporates the discussion of the crisis management 
principles of limiting objectives and limiting the means in the pursuit 
of those objectives. The chapter then examines the remaining crisis
1 This comment was made by Martin and Walcott and is an adaptation from the 
well-known statement by Clausewitz. See Andreas Rapoport, Clausewitz: On War, (London, 
Penguin, 1994), p. 119 and David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.109
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management principles and the role of intelligence in relation to 
these principles and the case studies.
3.1.1 Background to the Lebanon problem
During the Cold War, we took a look at regional disputes. 
The main aim was to prevent them from escalating into 
great power confrontations. Sure, we looked at 
nonproliferation issues, but those were overshadowed by 
the threat of nuclear Armageddon. Even terrorism had an 
ideological content to it.2
Under President Reagan, Secretary of State George Schultz 
sought to maintain the momentum of the Israeli-Egypt peace 
agreement by restoring peace between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. 
The security objectives of Israel and Syria in Lebanon, however, 
became a major problem for the Reagan Administration as they 
demonstrated that policy initiatives cannot be implemented in 
isolation of other actors.3 Whereas Syria regarded Lebanon as a 
greater part of its territory,4 Israel was also involved in Lebanon as it 
habitually carried out reprisal attacks against the PLO and Hizb'allah 
terrorists who often launched attacks across Israel's northern border.5
2 See the testimony of Frank Carlucci, former NSA and Secretary of Defence, Hearing 
of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence
Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 19, 1996
3 See George Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis of Israel's Invasion of 
Lebanon and the Implications for U.S.- Israeli Relations, (Washington, D.C., The Foundation 
for Middle East Peace, 1984) and Julian S Peck, The Reagan Administration and the 
Palestinian Question, (Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984) and Michael 
Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon, (Boston, Mass., South End Press, 
1983)
4 See Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, (Boston, Massachusetts, South End 
Press, 1983) and Adeed Dawisha, "The Motives of Syria's Involvement in Lebanon," Middle 
East Journal, Vol.38, (Spring 1984), pp.228-236 and R Neumann, "Asad and the Future of the 
Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol.62, (Winter 1983), pp.237-266
5 For the reasons behind the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 see Ariel Sharon, 
"Israel's Strategic Problems in the Eighties," An address by the Israeli Defence Minister Ariel 
Sharon for delivery at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, December 14,
1981. See also Ze'ev Schiff, "Green Light, Lebanon," Foreign Policy, (Spring 1983) and Ze'ev 
Schiff, and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1984)
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This often brought Israeli and-Syrian forces into contact in Lebanon 
and resulted in increasing tension between the two countries. 
Lebanon was caught in the middle and matters were made worse by 
the warring factions that comprised its population, many of whom 
were proxy forces of Syria, Israel and later of Iran.6 The U.S. were 
concerned that the on-going tension would lead to war between 
Israel and Syria which would inevitably involve America and the 
Soviet Union.7 This fear grew when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, 
which resulted in the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut and in 
clashes between Israeli and Syrian forces in and around Beirut. The 
U.S. became involved as its Middle East envoy, Phillip Habib, 
attempted to broker a ceasefire.8 It also resulted in American forces 
being deployed in Beirut to guarantee the safety of the PLO as it 
withdrew. Later, the U.S. was forced to re-deploy the Marines to 
Beirut following the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, as part of a larger 
multi-national peacekeeping force.9 When the Israeli forces withdrew 
from Beirut, the U.S. found itself faced with the daunting task of trying 
to restore the Lebanese government while the different factions 
fought for control over the high ground, the Shouf mountains, that 
had been occupied by the Israeli forces.10 The Israeli withdrawal
6 See Naomi Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Operations in Lebanon," Middle East 
Journal, Vol.37, (Summer 1983), pp.341-369 and Lewis W Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: 
Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics," Middle East Journal, Vol.38, (Winter, 1984), 
pp.1-33
7 U.S. Congress. U.S. Policy Towards Lebanon and Rehabilitation Assistance. 
Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, June 22 and July 13, and 15,
1982. See also U.S. Congress. Committee on Foreign Relatins. An Overview of the Middle 
East Situation. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Congress, 2nd 
Session, September 10, 1982
0 See Robert H Gromoll, Negoriations on Troop Withdrawals from Lebanon: The May 
1983 Accord, (Georgetown, Washington D.C., The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Pew Case Study No.310, 1992) and Barry Rubin and laura Blum, The 
May 1983 Agreement Over Lebanon, (Georgetown, Washington D.C., The Institute for the 
Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Pew Case Study No.312, 1992)
9 U.S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services. The Use of U.S. Military Personnel in 
Lebanon and Consideration of Report from September 24-25 of Committee Delegation from
Lebanon. Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, 1st Session, September 27 and 28, 
1983 and U.S. Congress. Authorisation for U.S. Marines in Lebanon. Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1983
Page 95
Page 96
created a power vacuum which precipitated another civil war and set 
the scene for the Reagan Administration's involvement in the 
Lebanese crisis.10 1
While trying to resolve the crisis, however, a number of terrorist 
incidents exacerbated the situation for the U.S. These attacks 
frustrated the administration while exposing its vulnerability and 
inability to deal effectively with crisis situations in the third world.12 
The environment in the Middle East projected the U.S. out of its 
conventional orbit of crisis management and war avoidance with its 
primary adversary, the Soviet Union, and forced the administration to 
deal with an unconventional threat where terrorism was used as a 
means to wage war by proxy.13
Terrorism had a major impact upon the Reagan Administration 
and on Alexander Haig as a result of his personal experience when 
he survived an assassination attempt against him by the Red Army 
Faction in Belgium. Ronald Reagan, Haig and William Casey were 
also heavily influenced by the work of journalist Claire Stirling whose 
book, The Terror Network convinced them that international terrorism 
was being orchestrated by the Soviet Union as part of their strategy 
of destabilisation and Soviet imperialism.14 For the Reagan
10 See Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1992)
11 For an overview of the background to the Reagan Administration's involvement in 
Lebanon, see Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York, Farrar Straus 
Giroux, 1989)
12 See Raymond Tanter, £1990), op.cit:, p.50 and "A New War - And New Risks," US 
News & World Report, April 28, 1986, pp.20-21. See also Ambassador Bruce Laingen, "U.S. 
Options to Combat International Terrorism," Policy Forum, Vol.Ill, No.4, (May 1986), pp.1-4
13 For an overview of the turmoil caused by terrorism during the First Reagan 
Administration in the Middle East see the following: David Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid 
Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism, (New York, Harper & Row, 1988) 
and Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982 - February 1984, (New York, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985) and John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, 
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1989) and Thomas Friedman, £1989), op.cit:. and Stansfield Turner, 
Terrorism and Democracy, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1991)
14 See Alexander Haig, Caveat, Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, (London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984) and Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (London, Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1981) and Herbert Romerstein, Soviet Support for International Terrorism, 
(Washington D.C., The Foundation for Democratic Education, Inc., 1981) This aspect is dealt 
with in greater detail in the first case study.
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Administration, preventing international terrorism was tantamount to 
containing the Soviet Union. However, this created an inherent 
tension between counter-terrorism and foreign policy. By 
approaching the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of 
state-sponsorship the administration tended to overlook the fact that 
terrorist organisations, and certainly those that operated in Lebanon, 
were sub-state actors who exercised a will of their own.15 
Consequently the Reagan Administration's response was based on 
retaliating against those states that were perceived to be sponsors of 
terrorism.16 This brought the administration's counter-terrorist policy 
into direct conflict with its foreign policy objectives of seeking 
rapprochement with those states, such as Syria and Iran, that it 
believed held the key to unlocking U.S. strategic objectives in the 
region.17
The phenomenon of terrorism combined with the almost 
instantaneous media coverage necessitated a total revision of crisis 
response strategy. Direct transmission of terrorist events to millions 
of viewers across the world exerts pressure on crisis managers to 
exercise greater caution in their response initiatives. This has a direct 
bearing on the second and fifth principles of crisis management It 
reinforces the norms that restraint must be exercised in the use of
15 See Brett A McCrea, "U.S. Counter-Terrorist Policy: A Proposed Strategy for a 
Non-traditional Threat." Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol.3, No3, (Winter 1994). 
See also Iran's Use of International Terrorism, Special Report No, 170, United States 
Department of State, (Washington D.C., Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987) and Richard W 
Cottam, "U.S. and Soviet Responses to Islamic Political Militancy," in Nikki R Keddie and 
Mark Gasiorowski, (eds.), £1990), op.cit:. pp.265-268 and David Martin and John Walcott, 
(1989), op.cit:. p.46 Also Charles G Cogan, "The Response of the Strong to the Weak: The 
American Raid on Libya, 1986," Intelligence and National Security, Vol.6, No.3, (1991), 
pp.608-620
16 This appraisal of the U.S. government's response to terrorism and its focus on State 
Actors, was provided by Noel Koch a former NSC official and Pentagon counter-terrorism 
expert during the Reagan Administration, in a telephone interview with the author on 
February 21, 1996. The same sentiments were expressed by Geoffrey Kemp, a former senior 
member of the NSC staff during the Reagan Administration, in an interview with the author 
on July 19, 1995 in Washington D.C.
17 See Howard Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the 
Middle East, (New York, William Morrow & Company Inc, 1993)
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force and that actors must strive to maintain legitimacy for their 
actions. This places a tremendous responsibility on the shoulders of 
those organisations and individuals who carry out counter-terrorist 
policy and operations. Because the transmission of events and the 
response to them takes place almost instantaneously, the officers at 
the scene are therefore in a position to either bring discredit to the 
government or to portray it in a positive light. In the words of Col. 
Robert Leicht, "The CNN effect means that individual actions can 
result in international repercussions which places greater pressure 
on military officers and men on the ground."18 Whereas U.S. military 
doctrine was geared towards fighting conventional warfare, the 
Lebanon crisis compelled policy makers and military commanders to 
deal with the use of military instruments of statecraft in circumstances 
other than war.19 The nature of terrorism places greater demands on 
the intelligence organisations involved. As former U.S. Attorney 
William Barr observes:
Terrorism I think is going to continue to be a greater, 
because again, technology enables mass murder, and 
weapons of mass destruction, to be developed and used by 
small zealot groups. Keeping track of them is very hard, and 
dealing with them is very, very difficult, so that's why I said 
at the outset I think the intelligence challenge today is, 
paradoxically, more difficult in many ways than it was at the 
height of the Cold War. It's a lot easier to keep track of 
missiles and silos.20
For an explanation of the CNN effect see Tom Rosenstiel, "The Myth of CNN," The 
New Republic, Supplement, August 22, 1994, pp.23-27. This explanation of the effects of 
televised media coverage of international events and U.S. military response was made by 
Col. Robert Leicht, aide to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(US-SOC), during a seminar presentation at the University of St Andrews on May 17, 1996. 
For additional insight see Steve Molloy and Charles R Schwenk, "The Effects of Information 
Technology on Strategic Decision Making," Journal of Management Science, Vol.23, No.3, 
(May 1995), pp.283-311 and Yoel Cohen, Media Diplomacy: The Foreign Office in the Mass 
Communications Age, (London, Frank Cass, 1989), pp.118-125
19 For an in-depth overview on the implications of non-conventional military operations 
on U.S. armed forces, see Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "Operations Other 
Than War," in Paul Davis, (ed.), New Challenges. For Defense Planning, (Santa Monica, 
California, Rand, 1994), pp.223-248
20 See the testimony of William Barr, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., Friday January 
19, 1996
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During the Reagan Administration, however, this concept was not 
fully understood or supported, least of all by one of the most crucial 
individuals, the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger. The quest 
for legitimacy was one of the fundamental reasons behind the 
bureaucratic crisis in the Reagan Administration. Weinberger and the 
Joint Chief of Staff were adamant that they did not want to commit 
U.S. military forces to support diplomacy in the Middle East without 
the approval and support of the American public and Congress.21 
Emerging from the humiliation of the Vietnam era, and the failure of 
the military rescue mission in Iran,22 Weinberger and the Pentagon 
were struggling to restore public faith and confidence in the U.S. 
military establishment. Consequently, Weinberger was loathe to 
involve or commit U.S. armed forces to any objective that could 
undermine public faith in the military, other than an all out war. This 
was the source of the institutional conflict that created disagreements 
over howto implement policy and that prevailed between Weinberger 
and the military on the one hand, and George Schultz and the State 
Department on the other.
Inspired by Henry Kissinger, as well as by the momentum of the 
Carter administration's success at Camp David and the peace accord 
between Israel and Egypt, the Reagan Administration pursued 
ambitious objectives with regards to expanding the peace process in 
the Middle East.23 This was especially the case with regard to 
Lebanon. It believed that conflict between Israel, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Syria posed a threat to Middle 
East peace and would provide an excuse for Soviet intervention.24
Page 99 . 5
21 See Caspar Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, 
(New York, Warner Books, 1991), p.454
22 For an overview of the failure of the U.S. rescue mission to Teheran, see John Martin 
and David Walcott, (1988) op.cit:. pp.6-42 and Stansfield Turner, (.1991), op.cit:. pp. 132-145
23 See the comments by Henry Kissinger, "My Lebanon Solution," Middle East Focus, 
No.5, (July 1982), p.3
24 See Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict: Beyond Crisis 
Management? (New York, Praeger, 1991), pp.83-84 and Raymond Tanter, Who's At The
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When the U. S. committed their Marines to Beirut in September 1982, 
it was intent upon ending the civil war, banishing the Syrian and 
Israeli armies of occupation and re-establishing the Lebanese 
government under Christian leadership.25 The objective behind the 
deployment of the Marines in Beirut was the U.S. contribution 
towards the Multi-National Force (MNF) that comprised of American, 
French, British and Italian forces to oversee the evacuation from 
Beirut of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).26 For 
President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was not their central issue of concern in the 
Middle East, but was part of their broader strategic objective which 
was to prevent Soviet penetration of the economically and 
strategically vital oil-rich Persian Gulf.27 Iran which was in a 
post-revolutionary upheaval arguably presented the Soviets with 
another opportunity (like Afghanistan) for military intervention in the 
region.28 Understandably the U.S. sought to consolidate its supply of 
Middle East oil,29 extend its influence and demonstrate its capacity for
Helm, Lessons of Lebanon, (Oxford, Westview Press, 1990), p.45, and William B Quandt, 
Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1976, (Los Angeles, 
University of California Press.1993), pp.335-350 and "Defense Chief Weinberger on Peace 
Prospects Now," U.S. News & World Report, September 27, 1982, pp.26-28 and Nimrod 
Nivok, Encounter with Reality: Reagan and the Middle East (The First Term). (Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press for the Jaffee Cntre for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp.86-88
25 The Reagan Administration De-classified National Security Council Document in 
terms of the Freedom of Information Act, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 
Number 103, September 10, 1983 Strategy for Lebanon, which reaffirms the Reagan 
Administration's Lebanon policy. See also Dan Tschirgi, The American Search For Middle 
East Peace, (New York, Praeger, 1989), p.159. Also Martin Indyke, "Reagan and the Middle 
East: Learning the Art of the Impossible," SAIS Review, The Johns Hopkins University, 
(Winter-Spring 1987), Vol.7, No.1, pp. 121-122
26 See George Schultz, £1993), op.cit:, p.43 and David Martin and John Walcott,
(1988), op.cit:. p.88
27 William Zartman, "The Power of American Purposes," Middle East Journal, 
Vol.XXXV, 1981, pp. 163-165
28 See Dan Tschirgi, The American Search for Mideast Peace, (New York, Praeger, 
1989), pp. 146-147 and see George Schultz's statement read before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on September 10, 1982 "Middle East Peace Initiative," published in the 
Department of State Bulletin. Vol.82, No 2067 (October 1982), pp.5-7. See also the New York 
Times. March 8, 1981 and April 9, 1981
29 For an overview of U.S. interests in Middle East oil supplies, see Melvin A Conant, 
The Oil Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1980-1990. (Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington 
Books, 1982) and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "U.S. Economic Interests in the Middle East," in Steven
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taking forceful and resolute action internationally.30 It also wanted to 
eradicate the "Vietnam Syndrome" which had stifled foreign policy 
initiative, while at the same time containing Soviet influence in the 
region.31 This syndrome is a term used to describe the general state 
of mind and lack of confidence on the part of the public and 
bureaucracy in U.S. military and political capabilities following 
America's involvement in the protracted war in Vietnam.32 The U.S. 
emerged from that war with its confidence badly shaken.33 This had a 
direct impact upon the Carter administration and America's military 
credibility34 which was further undermined by the unsuccessful rescue 
attempt of the U.S. hostages in Iran.35 From America's vantage point, 
protecting the Persian Gulf against Soviet penetration entailed
Spiegel, Mark Heller and Jacob Goldberg (eds.), The Soviet-American Competition in the 
Middle East, (Los Angeles, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of 
Clifornia, 1988), pp.203-219
See Brian Crozier, "Reagan and Israel," National Review, No.34, p.1268, (October 
15, 1982) and David Ignatius, "How to Rebuild Lebanon," Foreign Affairs No.61, Summer 
1983, pp.1140-1156 and Robert G Neumann, "U.S. Middle East Policy," Washington 
Quarterly, No.6, (Spring 1983), pp. 199-208
31 See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, p.43, also Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, 
pp192-196 and Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London, IB 
Taurus & Co. Ltd, 1988), pp.401-402
The Vietnam Syndrome is the term used to describe the reason for reluctance on the 
part of American administrations to embark upon any foreign policy or military initiatives 
without the whole-hearted support of the American people and Congress. The absence of this 
support has been attributed as one of the primary causes for the American defeat in Vietnam. 
After Vietnam, this syndrome extended beyond the Pentagon and affected the intelligence 
community with the controversy over Operation Phoenix and thereafter the disclosures made 
by William Colby with regard to CIA covert operations. The CIA emerged from the Vietnam 
era with its integrity tarnished and a great reluctance to become involved in covert operations 
against insurgencies and terrorism. These obesrvations were made by Noel Koch, during a 
telephone interview with the author on February 21, 1996.
33 See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (New York, Bantam 
Books, 1982), pp.18, 120, 125 & 143.
34 For an overview of the effects of the Vietnam War and the subsequent split in the 
U.S. domestic opinion over foreign policy, see Kenneth A Oye, "The Domain of Choice: 
International Constraints and the Carter Administration Foreign Policy," in Kenneth A Oye, 
Donald Rothchild and Robert J Lieber, (eds.), Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a 
Complex World, (New York, Longman, 1979), pp.5-7 and pp.20-32. See also Michael 
Mandelbaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalisms: Public Opinion and 
American Foreign Policy," in Kenneth A Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J Lieber, (eds.), 
£1979), op.cit:. pp.34-86
3 5 For an overview of the U.S. failure and Operation Desert One, see Stansfield Turner, 
Terrorism & Democracy, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp.115-125 and David Martin and 
John Walcott, £1988), op.cit:. p.8-42 and Jimmy Carter, (1982), op.cit:. pp:503-522
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several requirements: propagating U.S. interests in the Middle East 
so that they would be evident to the Soviets and its allies; convincing 
Arab states of America's commitment to their security; and ensuring 
that U.S. opposition and resolve towards radical forces in the region 
would not be doubted. These objectives produced two secondary 
objectives. The first was a determined effort to create a viable 
anti-Soviet bloc in the Middle East. The other was to prevent 
secondary and lesser important issues from detracting from the 
administration's efforts to promote the desired anti-Communist 
grouping. With these strategic objectives uppermost in their minds, 
the administration initially disregarded the implications of regional 
dynamics and the civil war in Beirut. This failure was caused through 
faulty perspective more so than a lapse in logic.
Their strategy of restricting Soviet influence although in itself 
coherent, led to futile attempts to impose abstract Cold War premises 
on the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the civil war in Beirut. 
One and a half years later, the administration withdrew the Marines in 
defeat, Beirut was in flames and over 250 Americans were dead, 
most of them victims of humiliating and devastating terrorist attacks.36 
This was the highest number of Americans who had been killed in an 
attack since the Vietnam War and the highest number killed in a 
single bomb attack since the Second World War.37
On April 18, 1983 Shi'ite terrorists attacked the U.S. embassy in 
West Beirut.38 The truck-bomb exploded in the portico of the building 
directly beneath the offices utilised by Robert Ames, the National 
Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, and Kenneth Haas, the CIA 
chief of station in Beirut. Seven out of the nine CIA officers stationed 
in Beirut were killed in the attack.39 Ames was one of George
36 See Jim Muir, "The Stark Options Facing Reagan And Gemayel," Middle East 
International, No.218, (February 10, 1984), pp.3-5
37 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. p.515
38 For an overview of the incident see Eric Hammel, (1985), op.cit:. pp.77-83 and 
Thomas L Friedman, (.1989), op.cit:. p.198
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Schultz's principal advisors and his death robbed the Secretary of 
State of an important source of objective judgement at a critical 
moment during their policy implementation in Lebanon.40
Ames' death also delivered a serious blow to the decision making 
capabilities of the National Security Council staff.41 Ironically Ames, 
who was the CIA's most qualified and trusted Middle East analyst, 
was investigating the activities of Palestinian and Shi'ite terrorism at 
the time when he was killed.42 Stansfield Turner argues that it is not 
known whether the deaths of the CIA officers was deliberate planning 
on the part of the terrorists or merely a coincidence.43 It is a fact, 
however, that Hizb'allah enjoyed extensive support from Iranian 
intelligence who could have identified Ames as a potential target and 
passed on that information to Hizb'allah.44
See Dilip Hiro, Lebanon Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War, 
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), p.96 and David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:. p.109 See also the Times. October 24, 1983
40 Vincent Cannistraro, former CIA National Intelligence Officer and NSC staff member 
responsible for Middle East terrorism, in an interview, with the author on July 21, 1995, in 
McLean Virginia. See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. pp. 48-49, 50, 52, 86, 90, 93, 108 & 
432 also Patrick Seale, (1988), op.cit:. p.406 and Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, Dangerous 
Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-lsraeli Covert Relationship and the International
Activities it has Served to Conceal. (London, The Bodley Head, 1992), p.334
41 See Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, (.1992), op.cit:. p.334 and Geoffrey Kemp, 
"Lessons of Lebanon: A Guideline for Future U.S. Policy," Middle East Insight, Vol.VI, No.I, 
(Summer 1988), p.61
42 These views were expressed by Howard Teicher former senior NSC Middle East staff 
member, during a telephone interview, with the author on October 23, 1995 and were also 
confirmed by Graham Fuller, in the telephone interview, on October 28, 1995
43 See Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 
p. 162
44 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.120
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3.2 The intelligence imperative
Prior to these two events, American intelligence in the Middle 
East, and Lebanon in particular, had suffered a number of setbacks. 
As early as January 1979 the CIA and Ames had lost their principal 
intelligence asset and informant, Ali Hassan Salameh, the PLO 
security chief and close confidante of Yasser Arafat.45 Salameh, who 
was reported to be responsible for the Munich Olympics attack,46 was 
assassinated by an Israeli car bomb which inadvertently or perhaps, 
quite deliberately, deprived the CIA of their primary link with Arafat 
and the PLO.47 With the Israeli invasion and the expulsion of the PLO 
from Beirut in August 1982, the CIA lost more of their principal 
sources in the Middle East. Consequently their access to intelligence 
information on terrorism declined substantially at a crucial moment in 
time as Lebanese Shi'ite radicals were rapidly transforming 
themselves into a formidable confessional player and terrorist 
organisation under the auspices of the Hizb'allah movement.48
The attacks highlighted the universal dissatisfaction with the 
performance of U.S. intelligence in Lebanon; policymakers felt 
increasingly ill-served, and analysts, for their part, felt inadequately 
utilised.49 Both sides agreed, albeit for different reasons that
For more details on Salameh, see Michael Bar-Zohar in Eitan Haber, The Quest for 
the Red Prince: The Inside Story of Israel's Relentless Manhunt for one of the World's
Deadliest and Most Wanted Arab Terrorists, (New York, William Morrow, 1983) and David 
Ignatius, Agents of Innocence, (London, W H Allen & Co, 1988) Althgough Ignatuis' work is a 
book of 'faction', it is nevertheless based on the relationship between Salameh, the CIA and in 
particular Robert Ames
46 See Peter Taylor, States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence, (London, BBC 
Books, 1993), p.13 and James Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage, 
(London, Hutchinson, 1994), pp. 140-141
47 See Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, £1992), op.cit:. p.334 and Jillian Becker, The PLO: 
The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, (London, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson 
Ltd, 1984), p.273 and Peter Taylor, (1993), op.cit:. pp.62, 171 & 191 and Bob Woodward, 
(1987), op.cit:. p.288
48 Howard Teicher former senior NSC Middle East staff member, during a telephone 
Interview, on October 23, 1995; and Graham Fuller, telephone Interview, on November 15,
1995. See also David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.109 and See Bob 
Woodward, (1987), op.cit:, pp.287-289 and Robert S Dudney and Jeff Trimble, "Spying on 
Terrorists - It's a Tall Order," U.S. News & World Report. July 8, 1985, p.30
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intelligence was not fulfilling its role.50 The Marine Commander, Lt. 
Col. Donald Anderson, complained that,
...the missing element in the protection of the marines in 
Beirut was the deficiency in intelligence with the biggest 
shortcoming the inability of the marines to gauge the 
feelings and emotions of the local population on the 
ground.51
Within the U.S. the perception prevailed that American 
intelligence had failed twice in succession to identify and locate 
terrorists who were responsible for attacks against American 
interests. The media alleged that the Reagan Administration lost the 
ability to retaliate because the intelligence community was unable to 
provide information of the identities of the perpetrators and their 
exact locations.52 This allegation was reinforced by the opinions 
voiced in public by Vice President George Bush, Secretary of 
Defence Caspar Weinberger and General John Vessey the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated that they were unwilling to 
embark upon any retaliatory missions under circumstances where 
there could have been any death or injury caused to to innocent 
persons. Matters were made worse by the French response to the 
bombing of their embassy when they conducted reprisal air raids 
against terrorist targets in the Bekaa Valley.53 The Pentagon and 
Caspar Weinberger, however, remained reluctant to retaliate with 
military force because of the inherent danger of incurring
4 9 See David Kennedy, "Lebanon and the Intelligence Community," Kennedy School of 
Government, (Case Study C15-88-859.0,1988), p.1
50 See William Lee, "Pointing Fingers at Everyone," Middle East International No.211, 
(October 28, 1983), pp.4-5
51 David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.108
52 See David Hoffman, "Reagan Ties Beirut Attack to Curb on Intelligence," 
Washington Post, September 27, 1984 and Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:, pp.165-166
53 Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cif:, p.166 and Caspar Weinberger, (.1991), op.cit:, 
p.161 and David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, pp.132-139 and Howard Teicher, 
(1993), op.cit:, p.267
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unacceptable losses in innocent lives. Part of their frustration was 
aimed at the intelligence community. This was because intelligence 
could not guarantee that there would be no casualties among 
innocent individuals if the terrorists were attacked by U.S. forces at 
any time. That concern sparked off controversy among the principal 
cabinet members. It resulted in a public argument between Schultz, 
who was in favour of using force to respond to terrorism, and 
Weinberger, who was against the use of force.54 Their public 
disagreement demonstrated to Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria, that the 
United States did not have the political cohesiveness and will to 
respond to terrorism with force.55 The result was that intelligence took 
the blame for a policy on terrorism that was unrealistic. The criticism 
levelled at the intelligence community only served to reveal a 
problem of greater magnitude, which was the difference in opinion 
within the cabinet over how best to respond to the attacks and the 
phenomenon of terrorism.
With its focus on the phenomenon of terrorism, one of the biggest 
problems that faced the intelligence community and the 
administration was arriving at an agreed upon definition of terrorism 
and international terrorism.56 Wilkinson and Schultz define four types 
of terrorism: war, revolutionary, state and sub-revolutionary terrorism. 
Revolutionary terrorism is defined as, "...violence employed by 
revolutionary movements and groups as a means of initiating a 
vicious cycle of terror and counter-terror intended to alienate the 
population from the target government with the objective of achieving 
a political revolution or change."57 State terrorism is defined as, "...the
54 Caspar Weinberger, (1991), op.cit:. p.161. See also Jeffrey D Simon, The Terrorist 
Trap, (Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1994)
See "Schultz vs. Weinberger - When to Use U.S. Power," U.S. News & World 
Report, December 24, 1984, pp.20-21. Also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. pp.649-651 and 
The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1984 and the New York Times, December 3, 1984
56 See Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, (1986) op.cit:, p.25
57 See Paul Wilkinson, "Three Questions on Terrorism," Government and Opposition, 
No.8, (Summer 1973), pp.298-299
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threat and or the employment of extranormal forms of political
violence, in varying degrees, by an established political system
against both internal and external opposition."58 The U.S. government
defined international terrorism as, "...the threat or use of violence for
political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in
opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions
are intended to influence a target group wider than the immediate
victim or victims."59 It also defines international terrorism as,
"...terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or
organisation and / or directed against foreign nationals, institutions or
governments."60 Hoffman has identified two major types of terrorism;
secular and religious terrorism. According to Hoffman, secular groups
tend to calibrate their attacks with more operational caution as they
see terrorism as a means to an end. They are subject to greater
moral restraint as opposed to religious groups who are motivated by
their perceptions of divine right. This often results in terrorism
becoming an end in itself for religious groups.61 A factor which makes
religious groups even more complex to deal with is if they are
state-sponsored such as Hizb'allah and Amal.62 State sponsored
terrorism introduces more complex dynamics into crises as the
targeted authorities are compelled to contend with the demands and
objectives of multiple adversaries. In the case of Iran and Hizb'allah,
the former being the sponsor, the nature of their close co-operation
was demonstrated by the transfer of William Buckley, the kidnapped
58 See Edward Mickolus, "What Constitutes State Support of Terrorists?", in Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol.1, No.3, (July 1989), pp. 287-293 and Richard Schultz, 
"Conceptualising Political Terrorism: A Typology," Journal of International Affairs. No.32, 
(Summer 1978), p.10
5 9 See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of International Terrorism, 1992, 
(Washington D.C., Govt Printing Press, 1982), p.i
See Bruce Hoffman, "Technology and Terrorism," in Paul Wilkinson, (ed.), Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol.5, No.2, (Summer 1993), pp.16-19
62 Dr Magnus Ranstorp, Lecturer in Middle East studies, during an interview, at St 
Andrews University, May 25, 1995
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Chief of Station of the CIA, from Beirut to Teheran.63 This took place 
via the Pasdaran contingent in the Bekaa valley so that he could be 
more effectively interrogated by Iranian intelligence.64 The close 
collaboration between Hizb'allah and Iran was alluded to by 
Rafsanjani and his brother-in-law, General Moshen Rafiqdoust, the 
former minister of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, who stated that, 
"Both the TNT and the ideology which in one blast sent to hell 400 
officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the Marine Headquarters had been 
provided by Iran."65 Without accepting direct responsibility Iranian 
secular and clerical officials have indicated on numerous occasions 
that they are sympathetic to terrorist attacks carried out by Hizb'allah 
operatives in Lebanon and elsewhere.66
The intelligence community's problems in coming to terms with 
defining the concept of terrorism notwithstanding, specific criticism 
levelled at the intelligence community has been expressed by 
Howard Teicher who suggests that the problem was not due to the 
lack in understanding the concept, or an absence of intelligence. The 
problem, he argues, was with its content: "The NSC staff were always 
in possession of sufficient warning intelligence, although the 
intelligence in question was almost only in the form of "overheads" 
(photo intelligence). The CIA was continually tasked with 
requirements, however, they were never able to provide adequate 
intelligence based on human source reports."67 Teicher confirms that
63 For an overview of the role of Iran and the Pasdaran in Lebanon and in support of 
Hizb'allah, see Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat, 
(Washington D.C., Seven Locks Press, 1993), pp.85-86 and Al Watan Al Arabi, Paris, 
August, 25, 1991. The kidnapping of William Buckley is the subject of the following case 
study and is discussed in Chapter 4.
64 See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee, The Iran-Contra Affair, Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affairs, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, 1987 and Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, May 29, 1985
65 See Mohammad Mohaddessin (1993), op.cit:, p.205 and his translation of this 
statement by Rafiqdoust which appeared in Ressalat, July 20, 1987, into English.
66 See Bruce Hoffman, (March 1990), op.cit:. pp.15-19 and Mohammad Mohaddessin, 
(1993), op.cit:. p116
67 Teicher's opinion was confirmed by Graham Fuller, in a telephone interview, on 
November 15, 1995 Whereas technical and photographic intelligence assets are capable of
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the death of Ames dealt a serious blow to the CIA's human 
intelligence capabilities in Lebanon and points out that the 
reactivation of George Cave, a former Iranian expert, who was 
brought in from retirement, is an indication of the extent to which the 
CIA's human intelligence capabilities had been eroded.68 Despite the 
CIA's shortcomings, however, Teicher asserts that the dysfunction 
occurred at the senior policy making level and should be attributed to 
the bias of the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who 
consistently argued that the U.S. was not at war. Weinberger's 
argument was based on his innate belief that military force should 
only be used as a last resort and did not agree with the principle of 
using the military as an instrument of diplomacy.69 Consequently, the 
Marines' rules of engagement (ROE), which went so far as to prohibit 
the security guards at the Marine barracks in Beirut from carrying 
loaded rifles, prevented them from being able to respond physically 
and effectively to any warnings that they received.70 In this instance it 
was a case of a principle overriding reality. The Pentagon's objective 
of avoiding confrontation submerged all the warnings. Intelligence 
and all its indications, not least the first embassy bombing, was 
unable to guarantee good decision making.
providing intelligence on an adversary's capabilities, they fall short in providing insight into the 
minds and intentions of the adversary. This is of particular importance in a civil war setting, 
where techint is of little value and where political and social chaos prevails and 
communications infrastructure, the source of technical intelligence, has broken down.
Howard Teicher during a telephone interview, on October 23, 1995. George Cave 
retired from the CIA in 1980 when his status changed to that of 'consultant.' He was the only 
member of the Agency who spoke fluent Farsi. See Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The 
Iran-Contra Affairs, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991), p.126
69 See Lou Cannon, "Setbacks in Beirut Bare Conflicts, Uncertainty at White House," 
Washington Post, February 19, 1984, pp.A1 & A22. See also "A Reluctant Congress Adopts 
Lebanon Policy," 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p.114 and Bernard Gwertzman, 
"Schultz Refuses to Put Limits on Marines' Mission," New York Times, September 25, 1983, 
pp.1 & 14 and Helen Dewar, "Senate Democrats Dig In Their Heels," Washington Post. 
September 18, 1983, pp.A1 & A12
See Vincent A Auger, The War Powers Resolution and U.S, Policy in Lebanon, 
1982-84, (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
School of Foreign Service, Pew Case Study No.358, 1983) and Margot Hornblower, "Hill 
Gives Troop Plan Mixed Review." Washington Post, September 21, 1982, p.A10
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The loss of 241 American lives as a result of the bombing of the 
BLT barracks71 resulted in questions raised throughout the 
administration and Congress concerning the ability of the U.S. 
intelligence community to support the political system in providing 
warning and current intelligence.72 Like the bombing of the U.S. 
embassy a few months before, the rationale behind the attack was 
rooted in the perception of Islamic fundamentalist forces that the U.S. 
was an ally of Israel and the Christian Phalange in Lebanon.73 When 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) came under attack from 
Syrian-backed forces on the Suq al Gharb, which was within close 
proximity to the American ambassador's residence, Robert 
McFarlane, who was in the residence at the time, insisted that the 
U.S. naval task force use gunfire in support of the LAF. Despite 
doubts raised by U.S. intelligence analysts who were also present, 
McFarlane persuaded the administration that all was close to being 
lost and that the LAF was facing defeat at the hands of Soviet 
surrogate forces should U.S. forces not intervene.74 According to a 
naval intelligence communications officer who was present at the 
time, Robert McFarlane informed the ambassador that he had sent 
his "Sky is Falling" cable only after he had despatched it to 
Washington. The contents of the cable sent by McFarlane to the NSC 
on Sunday September 11,1983, reported that pitched battles were 
been waged within five kilometres of the Presidential Palace and the
71 See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. pp.161-169 and David Martin and John 
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, pp.104-112 & 125-134 and Frederic Hof, "The Beirut Bombing of 
October 1983: An Act of Terrorism," Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College, 
Vol.XV, No.2, pp.69-74
72 See the U.S. Embassy Bombing In Beirut: Hearing Before the Committee On 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983) and the U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the 
POD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. The Long
Commission Report. (Washington D.C., Department of Defense December 20, 1983) and See 
also David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. pp. 108-109
73 Thomas L Friedman, (1989), op.cit:. pp. 199-201
74 Comments made by William Beck, former U.S.navy intelligence communications 
officer in Beirut, during a telephone interview, with the author on August 2, 1995
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U.S. embassy in Beirut. He claimed that if the American government 
failed to intervene, the Lebanese government would fall. McFarlane's 
call for naval fire included the use of tactical air support.75 The 
Reagan Administration succumbed to McFarlane's appraisal which 
dovetailed with their mind-set of Soviet culpability for world-wide 
conflict and terrorism.76 McFarlane's opinion was opposed by local 
intelligence officers and not least by the Marine commander, Lt Col. 
Geraghty, who correctly predicted that it would increase the Marines 
exposure to further acts of violence.77
Despite this opposition McFarlane's views prevailed and on the 
19 September, the U.S.S destroyer the John Rogers and the missile 
cruisers Virginia which were situated in the Bay of Lebanon, opened 
fire on Druze positions, located seven miles away in the Suq al 
Gharb mountains.78 This failure to limit the means of force in 
responding to the crisis, reinforced their adversary's perceptions that 
U.S. interests, and the Marines in particular, were legitimate military 
targets.79 It also demonstrated how the Reagan Administration was 
unable to respond on an adequate level, as Robert Fisk observed: 
"...exhumed by an American administration so enamoured of the big 
screen, the resurrection of the 40 year old, 45,000 ton battleship New 
Jersey for duty off Lebanon was surely the most preposterous symbol 
of America's folly. The New Jersey was thus a true representative of 
U.S. policy in Lebanon: unthinking, unwieldy and hopelessly out of 
date."80 Thus the U.S. was unaccustomed to fighting a war where
75 See William Beck, U.S. Foreign Policy in Lebanon Under the Reagan Administration 
1981-1989, (M.A. Thesis, George Washington University, 1989), p.45
76 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, in Washington D.C. See also David 
Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p. 121
77 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:.p.505 and David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:. p.151
78 See William E Smith and Robert Suro, "Helping to Hold the Line," Time, October 3, 
1983, p.13. See also Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:, pp.506-507
7 9 See Glen Hastedt, "Intelligence Failure and Intelligence: The Attack on the Marines 
in Beirut," Conflict Quarterly, (Spring 1988), p.13. See also Dilip Hiro, (.1993) op.cit:. 
pp.106-110 and See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. pp.515-518
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terrorism and more specifically truck-bombs, were used as a blatant 
part of the adversary's strategy. The administration's military 
instruments of statecraft were equipped and trained to deal with 
conventional conflict and nuclear war. America's strategic military 
doctrine was inappropriate for the Lebanon environment where 
terrorism and civil war were the medium of conflict. Conventional 
wisdom denied the Reagan Administration of the conceptual key with 
which to unlock the series of crises precipitated by terrorism and 
which compounded the overall Lebanon issue. Over confidence in 
their military power acted as an effective barrier, thereby preventing 
them from recognising that, using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, 
would not suffice.
The lack of intelligence and interaction between the intelligence 
community and the decision making elite prevented the 
administration from realising that it should limit its objectives in 
Lebanon. Consequently the adaptation of the principle of limiting the 
means employed to achieve the objectives remained an anathema to 
the Reagan Administration. Despite their experiences in Vietnam and 
Korea, the military had not maintained their capabilities and expertise 
to function in hostile third world countries and were simply not geared 
to support diplomatic initiatives in unconventional environments.
The Iranian revolution and hostage situation was too recent an 
incident at that time for the administration to respond to, despite the 
fact that it was an important lesson. Any lessons which may have 
been learnt in that episode had not yet been carried over and 
consequently, no adaptations within the armed forces and the 
intelligence services had been made. On the contrary, the 
disadvantage of the concentrating all one's assets in one place and 
the failure to establish a fall-back network of intelligence assets in 
Iran, did not appear to have taught the intelligence community any 
lessons at all.80 1 This was demonstrated by the kidnapping of the CIA
80 See Robert Fisk, £1992), op.cit:. p.507
81 John Walcott, editor U.S. News & World Report, during an interview, on July 17,
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chief of station in Beirut, William Buckley in 1984, which will be dealt 
with in the following case study.82 They had also failed to learn the 
lessons of Iran, where they relied too heavily on one segment of the 
population, namely, the Shah's circle and SAVAK, for intelligence 
information and sources.83 In Lebanon, the administration relied 
predominantly on the LAF for supplemental intelligence information. 
Consequently, neither the armed forces or the intelligence community 
were in possession of the appropriate assets to provide an adequate 
defence or institutional response during terrorist type crises which 
occurred outside its territorial borders. The lack of specific 
intelligence information pertaining to the identities and location of the 
terrorists who had attacked U.S. interests in Beirut, prevented the 
use of military instruments of statecraft in punishing and deterring 
those responsible.
Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Syria perceived the 
U.S. to be an accomplice in an Israeli - Phalangist plot against the 
PLO and Syrian interests in Lebanon. Israel's objectives were aimed 
at installing a Lebanese government that would be responsive to its 
security needs in southern Lebanon.84 After proceeding as far as 
Beirut, driving the PLO out of Lebanon and occupying the Shouf 
mountains, the Israeli army withdrew, precipitating a full-scale civil 
war. This included a fierce battle between the Druze and Phalange 
forces for control of former Israeli positions in the Shouf mountains. 
The U.S. Marines, who were initially deployed as peacekeepers, 
found themselves forced into taking sides as a result of the decision 
made by Robert McFarlane to fire in support of the Phalange 
government on the Druze positions in the Suq al Gharb. This
1995, and reinforced by Noel Koch, in a telephone interview on February 21, 1996
82 See Con Coughlin, Hostage: The Complete Story of the Lebanon Captives. (London, 
Little Brown and Co., 1992), pp.73-74
83 The SAVAK was the Iranian intelligence service during the reign of the Shah.
81 For an overview of the role and influence of Israel, see also Robert Fisk, (1992), 
op.cit and George Ball, (1984), op.cit:. pp.77-78
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catapulted the U.S. into the war and made it a legitimate target in the 
eyes of the Phalange's enemies. The withdrawal of the PLO from 
Beirut and the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, resulted in the 
Sabra and Shatila massacres.85 Horrified by these massacres, the 
U.S. felt morally obliged to re-deploy the Marines to Beirut.86 Syria 
and its surrogate forces', however, perceived this as American 
intervention and part of a triad alliance consisting of Israel, the 
Phalange and the U.S. governments.87 That belief was emphasised 
by Nabih Berri who issued a statement on September 1, 1983 to the 
effect that, "...the Marines had turned into a fighting force against 
Muslims in Lebanon." Bern's statement was supported by Walid 
Jumblatt who told a press conference in Damascus that, "...the mere 
fact that the U.S. are providing the Lebanese factional army with 
logistical support, expertise and training, is enough for us to consider 
them [as] enemies."88 89
It has already being demonstrated that in this instance, 
intelligence was unable to guarantee good policy or decision making. 
Cogan points out that when we attempt to apply the concept of 
management to crises we assume that by putting together a 
mechanism that is designed to respond and assist us in coping better
On September 14, 1982 a bomb exploded at the Phalange Party headquarters in 
Ashrafiya, East Beirut which killed Bashir Gemayel. Although there was evidence implicting 
Syrian intelligence to the assassination of Gemayel, it is alleged that General Sharon of the 
IDF spread the rumour that it was the work of undercover PLO commandos who had stayed 
behind after the evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO from Beirut. The head of the IDF 
Northern Command, Major General Amir Drori authorised the forces of Elie Hobeika, 
Gemayel's intelligence chief to search the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila for 
the undercover commandos. While the IDF surrounded and controlled the access to the 
camps, Christian Phalange commanders massacred the inhabitants of the two camps over a 
thirty-eight hour period between the 16 and 18 September. About 2000 men, women and 
children were murdered See Dilip Hiro, (1983), op.cit:. pp.92-93, and Michael Jansen, The 
Battle of Beirut, Why Israel Invaded Lebanon, (London, Zed Press, 1982), pp.97-109. See 
also Robert Suro, Time, September 27, 1982
86 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. and George Ball, (1984), op.cit:. pp.77-78
Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, in Washington, D.C., and David Martin
and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.94
89 See the testimony of General James Mead in the section, "Americans the Focus of 
Anger," U.S. House of Representatives, Committee On Armed Services, Armed Services
Investigations Subcommittee, (Washington, D.C., December 20, 1983), p.14. See also David 
Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p. 115
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with foreseeable situations, we can also implement the management 
of crisis forecasting.89 One should be wary of jumping to the 
conclusion that, a system which is capable of providing warning 
intelligence which will prevent crises, can be successfully 
implemented. The fact of the matter is that crisis prevention is only 
partly dependent upon warning intelligence and that it is the 
interactive relationship between intelligence and decision making, i.e. 
the correct intellectual interpretation of the information in relation to 
the consumer's values and interests, which governs the success of 
intelligence.
These conceptual tools, however, are not always identical or a 
lasting feature of national security and crisis management. They will 
vary in capability, integrity and effectiveness in accordance with the 
qualities and abilities of those individuals tasked with that 
responsibility. In government, the concept of national interest and 
security provides the axiom and focus for intelligence activity.90 In 
crisis dynamics the function of intelligence is primarily to forewarn the 
authorities of an impending crisis situation. Reliable, accurate and 
timely information is indispensable during crises for the successful 
management thereof and intelligence therefore will continue to play a 
pivotal role. Used as an instrument of war, terrorism against U.S. 
interests in Lebanon highlighted the role of intelligence as an 
essential tool towards its prevention.91
See Charles Cogan, "Intelligence and Crisis Management: The Importance of the 
Pre-Crisis." Intelligence and National Security, Vol.9, No.4 (October 1994), p.635
90 See Stafford T Thomas, "CIA Functional Diversity and the National Security Policy 
Process," in Stephen J Cimbala, (ed.), Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic 
Society. (New York, Transnational Publishers, Inc.,1987), p.96 and Harry Howe Ransom, 
Central Intelligence and National Security, (Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press, 1958), pp.2-4
91 See comments made by William Casey in "Briefing to the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence," Time Magazine, July 1, 1985, and Robert McFarlane, "Deterring Terrorism," 
Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, June 1985, p.63 and Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:, 
p.167
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When political decision makers have been disappointed by the 
intelligence community, particularly at the onset of a crisis, they tend 
to fall back upon their own judgement and analytical instincts.92 This 
is a fundamental mistake which only serves to compound crises. 
Once a crisis situation is underway, however, warning intelligence 
gives way to current intelligence and its support for crisis response in 
the form of operational and tactical intelligence. This category of 
intelligence is aimed at providing the crisis management team with 
up-to-date information on the situation as it develops and feedback 
on the effectiveness of response initiatives. Robert Gates, the former 
DCI, has noted that given the difficulty in predicting events, the best 
that intelligence services can hope to achieve with regards to crisis 
situations, is to offer a selection of choices to the decision-maker 
during times of crisis.93 His observation supports the concept that 
during crises, the intelligence community must exert a more 
participative role in crisis management.
The intelligence imperative implies the provision of intelligence 
support to those structures that exist within the political 
administration that are equipped to deal with crises by providing them 
with warning, strategic and current intelligence. These crisis 
management and response structures do not operate in isolation. 
They are influenced by the political processes and climate which 
prevails at the time. Cogan attributes this reality to the fact that every 
presidential administration in the US has its own distinctive 
management style. Initially it takes time for each new administration 
to develop a system that will cope with crises at the political level. 
This, he argues, is one of the principal reasons why there always 
tends to be one major crisis situation that is usually handled badly 
during the early stages of each administration.94
92 Comments attributable to Maj.Gen.Chris Thirion (Retired) of the South African 
Defence Force - Chief of Staff - Military Intelligence during an interview, with the author in 
Pretoria, on 18 March 1994.
qo
See Charles Cogan, (October 1994), op.cit:. p.633
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Another explanation lies in the fact that since the end of World 
War Two, with the exception of the Quemoy / Mitsu crisis between 
the US and the Peoples' Republic of China in 1958, the Berlin 
Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crises and the Yom Kippur War, there 
have been few crises that have actually carried the risk of war 
between the US and Soviet Union. The majority of other crisis 
situations which have involved terrorist type strategies, such as the 
fall of the Shah of Iran, the Hostage Crises in Iran during 1979-1981, 
and in Lebanon from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, have been 
incidents for which the intelligence and the policy-making community 
were not equipped to deal with at an adequate conceptual level.
Intelligence gathering and analysis has been focused upon 
supporting the traditional concept of national interest and the security 
of nation-states since the advent of the industrial revolution. Given 
the need for adaptation to the changing environment by intelligence 
communities, the overall function of intelligence is not expected to 
change. Responding to environmental dynamics and technological 
advancements will, however, affect the manner in which tasking, 
collection and analysis of intelligence is conducted.
Technological change has effectively revolutionised the methods 
of communication and the dissemination of intelligence. Whereas 
artificial intelligence and increased computing technology is also 
expediting the speed at which information can be verified and 
analysed, there is currently a dysfunction between the speed with 
which information can be intellectually processed and the speed at 
which it can be distributed, absorbed and responded to.94 5 Intelligence 
management and technology are currently not in harmony. This was 
certainly the case during the Lebanon crisis, where the Marines were 
inundated with unmanageable quantities of intelligence information
94 Ibid., p.645
95 This opinion was expressed by Stansfield Turner, former DCI, during an interview, 
with the author on July 22, 1995, Skipworth, McLean Virginia.
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which lacked specific details.96 This is usually always the case, 
however, when details are hard to come by because of the 
impentrable nature of the intelligence target.
Frustration leads to increased effort which unfortunately tends to 
produce increased quantity instead of quality. This factor, combined 
with the abundance of information that has become available to crisis 
managers, all contribute towards the tendency of decision makers to 
circumvent the analysis process and to reach out for what is 
available, rather than for what is necessarily more accurate, highly 
evaluated and true. The Middle East debacle and its terrorist 
dimension presented the U.S. intelligence community with one of its 
most formidable problems with regard to collection requirements. The 
challenge was to monitor an adversary who did not engage the 
Marines in full scale conflict, however, but on an intermittent basis. 
This task was to gain access to information pertaining to the 
capabilities and intentions of Islamic zealots who were determined to 
attack American interests. Information gathered was to serve as 
warning intelligence in order to enable the administration to pre-empt 
acts of violence.
As case studies of strategic surprises repeatedly demonstrate, 
warning intelligence is no easy task.97 Not only do emerging outlines 
of events become clear only after the fact but surprise often succeeds 
despite accurate and timely warnings. Established policy
See US Department of Defence, Report of the POD Commission on Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. December 20, 1983. (Washington D.C., 
US Govt Printing Office, 1983) and John F Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. pp.8-9. For an account of 
how data overload can affect intelligence analysis, see Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: 
The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. (New York, Basic Books, Inc, 1985), pp.86-98
97 See Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1962) and Richard Betts, Surprise Attack, (Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institute, 1982), for additional insight into the problems of intelligence and surprise, see Klaus 
Knorr and Patrick Morgan (eds.), Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, 
(New Jersey, Transaction Press, 1983) and Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence 
Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis," World Politics, XVI:3, (April 1964), 
pp.461-462 and Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1987). For a more contemporary discussion see James J Wirtz, 
"Miscalculation, Surprise and American Intelligence after the Cold War," International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol.5, No.1, pp.1-13.
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commitments, alert fatigue and unrealistic expectations concerning 
what can be predicted, all deaden the impact of intelligence 
warnings.98 In this regard, terrorism remains one of the most difficult 
phenomenons to deal with.99 In Lebanon, one of the problems was 
not the lack of warning intelligence, but the lack in content and of 
specific information pertaining to the intentions of the terrorists, i.e. 
specifics about the adversaries themselves and the dates, times and 
places of attacks. According to an Israeli intelligence source, "While 
the CIA had reason to believe that Iranian backed terrorists would 
eventually bomb the Marine barracks in Beirut, it lacked information 
needed to prevent the 1983 attack or to warn of its imminence."100 
Linked to this was the absence of current intelligence which failed to 
provide an overall socio-political framework within which to 
understand the motives and the intentions of the adversary. Current 
intelligence was also required to enable the administration to punish 
those terrorists groups who were responsible for past terrorists 
attacks.101
Finally the intelligence imperative does not only apply to the 
collection of information pertaining to adversaries. During crises, it is 
just as important to remain fully informed about the behaviour and 
activities of one's allies. During the Lebanon debacle, the U.S. 
foreign policy initiatives were repeatedly frustrated by General Ariel 
Sharon, the Israeli Defence Minister.102 It also appeared that Sharon 
was pursuing a separate agenda in Lebanon than that of the Israeli
98 See Mark Lowenthal, "The Burdensome Concept of Failure," in Alfred Maurer, 
Marion Tunstall and James Keagle (eds.), Intelligence Policy and Process, (Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1985), pp.45-56
See Glen Hastedt, "Can Intelligence Agencies Learn: Reporting After The Terrorist 
Attack On The Marines in Lebanon," Seminar paper presented at the International Studies 
Association, Atlanta, (April 2, 1992), p.11
100 Robert A Manning, Steven Emerson and Charles Fenyvesi, "Casey's CIA: New Clout, 
New Danger," U.S. News & World Report, June 16, 1986, p.27.
1 01 Robert S Dudney and Jeff Trimble, (July 8, 1985), op.cit:. p.30
102 See George Ball, £1984), op.cit:. pp.25-29
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Cabinet.103 This was not only the case with regards to the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, but also in relation to the massacres in 
the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.104 Intelligence if 
used correctly during crises, should assist the authorities in 
determining what factors threaten their objectives and how the 
behaviour of other actors will have an impact upon those goals. 
Included in most U.S. intelligence assessments, is a section which is 
titled, "Implications for U.S. policy" which allows for the intelligence 
community to make comments relevant to the content and the policy 
issues that it may affect. The comments spell out the assumptions 
and obvious conditions which could have an impact upon policy 
objectives.105 An understanding of the goals of an ally during bilateral 
and multilateral crisis response is essential towards the coordination 
and the application of instruments and techniques and towards 
identifying common objectives. This is an important factor in relation 
to the principle of limiting objectives given the prevalence of adverse 
conditions and the need for restraint. It is important to avoid any 
undue escalation in the level of the threat presented by the crisis. 
This is an important aspect that necessitates consideration by policy 
makers and intelligence analysts when it comes to identifying 
intelligence requirements for collection.
See Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel 
in Lebanon, (Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Paper No.27, 
October 1984), pp.25-41 and Wadi Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors, 
(Washington D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 
1985), p.75. See also See Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince, (Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp.264-266
104 See George Bail, £1984), op.cit:, pp.25-29 & 67. See also George Schultz, (1993), 
op.cit:, pp.43-61 & 101-114. Also Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New 
York, Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp.31-61. See also R T Naylor, "From Bloodbath to 
Whitewash: Sabra - Shatilla and the Kahn Commission Report," Arab Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.5, (Fall 1983), pp.337-361. For more information on the massacres, see The Commission 
of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut - 1983 - Final Report (Kahan
Report)
105 Described by Graham Fuller, former NIO and CIA officer during the Reagan 
Administration, during a telephone Interview with the author on November 15, 1995
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3.2.1 Intelligence tasking
The first step in the intelligence process involves the identification 
of information requirements by the consumer. Intelligence 
requirements have their origins in the response by consumers, 
analysts and intelligence gatherers to stimuli which are related to the 
consumers objectives as they become known, and in the perceived 
threats and risks involved in the pursuit of those objectives.106 
Whereas the intelligence cycle suggests that requirements for 
collection are generated by policy makers, this is rarely the case.107 
Policy makers often know little about the depth of existing data and 
are unfamiliar with the intelligence community's capabilities and 
vulnerabilities in gathering their requirements. Collection 
requirements are also generated by the analytical components which 
understand where gaps in existing data need to be filled and by the 
collectors themselves, who recognise the logical progression of 
information as they collect it.108 This principle implies therefore, that 
producers and consumers must maintain regular contact with one 
another.
During the Lebanon initiative, the core capabilities of the 
intelligence community for political analysis were rooted in the 
operations and intelligence directorates of the CIA. Within the 
Directorate of Intelligence, the Office for Near East and South Asian 
Analysis (NESA) was responsible for Lebanon intelligence.109 The 
relevant body in the Reagan Administration responsible for initiating 
intelligence requirements during the period in question was the 
Secretary of State, the National Security Council staff, the National
106 See Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:. p.135
1 D7 -See Harry Howe Ransom, (1958), op.cit:. p.13 and Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989), 
op.cit:, p.3.
108 This observation is based upon the author's personal experience as an intelligence 
officer.
109 See Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989), op.cit:. pp. 11-17
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Intelligence Officer and Reagan's Middle East envoy, Philip Habib.110 
In the early stages of the administration the architect of the U.S. 
government's Lebanon policy was Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig.111 It is not known how often or whether Haig or Habib consulted 
the intelligence community prior to or during the times when they 
made policy decisions.
The consequences of their policy, however, would suggest that 
whatever they did, the available intelligence was simply ignored. In 
addition, tension between the Secretary of State and the National 
Security Advisor and the Director of Central Intelligence prevailed 
throughout the Reagan Administration.112 Furthermore Philip Habib 
was described as somewhat of a dogmatic character who had definite 
ideas on how the U.S. should approach the Lebanon situation and 
was seldom amenable to discussion, particularly when it led to 
dissenting opinions.113 He therefore inadvertently became part of the 
problem instead of contributing towards its solution.114 He was not 
amenable to suggestions when they contradicted his opinions and 
went his own way and seldom, if never, consulted the intelligence 
community.115 Underlying tensions therefore dominated the 
relationships between the key policy makers which created barriers 
between the intelligence community and the consumers.
110 Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:. pp 169-191; See also Chrostopher Andrew, For the 
President's Eves Only, Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to
Bush, (London, Harper Collins, 1995), p.468
See Alexander Haig, (1984), op.cit:. p.310
Ibid.
Habib's bias was described by Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, diuring an
interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. The same view on Habib's behaviour and mind 
set were expressed by John Walcott, editor U.S. News & World Report, during an interview, 
on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. See also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. pp.45 & 110; 
Also Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, pp.172 & 218 and "Habib, Miracle Man of the Mideast," 
U.S. News and World Report, August 30, 1982, p.8 and "Habib the Peacemaker," Newsweek. 
August 30, 1982, p.36.See also Eric Hammel, (1985), op.cit:. p.16
114 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
115 Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. According to Kemp, 
Habib would shout everyone down at meetings and was nicknamed "the Volcano".
in
112
113
Page 122
Page 123
When George Schultz took over from Alexander Haig as 
Secretary of State in 1982, he relied upon Habib for guidance with 
regard to the State Department's policy objectives in Lebanon115 16 and 
lent his support to the Habib plan, without due consideration of the 
intelligence community's opinions, whom he instinctively 
mistrusted.117 He did not question or test the basic assumptions upon 
which the Haig-Habib policy initiatives had been based.118 At an early 
stage in the crisis, Haig and Habib decided that the key to their 
Lebanon strategy lay in persuading Israel and Syria to withdraw from 
Beirut while simultaneously resurrecting the Lebanese Armed Forces 
which would provide the security base for the unification of the 
Lebanese government under the Christian leadership of Bashir 
Gemayel.119 Habib was confident that he could negotiate a quick 
withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. His strategy was based upon 
the primary objective of securing an agreement between Israel and 
Lebanon. In his mind, once Israel had withdrawn, Syria would 
automatically follow suit.120 Habib's assumptions and expectations of 
Syrian behaviour led him not to consult with Asad during his 
negotiation efforts between Israel and Lebanon, other than to keep 
Syria informed in general as to the progress that was being made 
with the talks.121 This alienated Asad, who perceived the U.S.
115 For a comprehensive overview of Schultz's views on Lebanon see the published 
excerpts from George Schultz News Conference of August 20, 1982, U.S. Department of
State Bulletin. No.82, (September 1982), pp.8-13
117 Stansfield Turner, former DCI, during an interview, with the author on July 22, 1995, 
Skipworth, McLean Virginia. See also Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit;. p.51. See also 
George Schultz, (1993), op.cit;. p.60
118 -Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. The same opinion 
was expressed by John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
11 q See Geoffrey Bowder, "Lebanon's Struggle for Survival," World Today. No.39, 
(November 1983), pp.443-449 and Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:. pp.143-174
120 .For an overview of Habib's assumptions on the behaviour of Syria and Israel in 
Lebanon, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Dealing With Syria," Foreign Policy, No.55, (Summer 1984), 
pp.92-112
121 See Robert Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol.62, No.2, (Winter 1983), p.240. See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee On 
Foreign Affairs, Developments in the Middle East, November, 1983, Ninety-Eighth Congress,
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initiatives as an American-Israeli conspiracy to undermine his 
influence in Lebanon and Syria's national security interests.122 This 
ultimately caused the Reagan Administration to miss an opportunity 
to bring Syria into the peace plan and to secure U.S. objectives.123 
Habib's perception of Syria's compliance was reinforced by promises 
made by Saudi Arabia to that effect and upon his expectations that 
moderate Arab states would influence Asad to withdraw once the 
Israelis had departed.124 He maintained a disproportionate level of 
self confidence in his powers of persuasion and believed that he 
could convince the Lebanese government and President Asad to 
adhere to the terms of the May 17 agreement.125
At the most senior and strategic levels, the intelligence community 
and the administration were divided over the issues of the 
administration's policy strategy in the Middle East.126 This extended to 
the Soviet Union's alleged support for international terrorism.127 An 
irreconcilable difference in opinion prevailed between the Directorate 
of Intelligence's analysis on international terrorism and the perception 
of the DCI, William Casey, who shared an unshakeable belief with 
Alexander Haig and President Reagan that the Soviet Union was 
universally culpable for international terrorism.128 Shortly after the
First Session, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp.8-9
122 See Patrick Searle, (1988), op.cit:. pp.394-395 also Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit:. p.97
12 3 See Paul Wilkinson, "The Lebanese Powderkeg," Contemporary Review, No.243, 
(August 1983), pp.64-71
124 Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle East staff member, during a telephone 
interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C. See Dan Tschirgi, (1989), op.cit. pp. 193 
& 233 also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, pp.57-61 also Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit:. p.97
125 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995
126 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995.
127 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. See also Bob 
Woodward, (1987), op.cit.'. pp.93 & 134-135
128 Casey, Reagan and Haig had been heavily influenced by Claire Sterling's book: The 
Terror Network (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981), which is based upon her hypothesis 
that the Soviet Union was responsible for coordinating and exploiting international terrorism 
towards its foreign policy objectives. Ironically, much of the information that she obtained in 
her research was the product of a previous CIA disinformation campaign conducted in Italy a
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BLT bombing, government sources in Washington went so far as to
allege that the Soviet Union may have also been involved.129 The
intelligence community, however, pointed out that there was no
factual evidence to support the claim after Alexander Haig, in his
capacity as Secretary of State, had converted his sentiments into the
holy grail of U.S. counter-terrorist policy. Haig's belief was based
upon Claire Sterling's book, The Terror Network, which alleged that
the Soviet Union was the mastermind behind international
terrorism.130 His views were no doubt reinforced by his personal
experience in Belgium where, as Commander-in-Chief of Nato, he
survived an attempt on his life by the Red Army Faction Terrorist
Organisation in 1979.131 132The Reagan Administration maintained an
over simplified view of the complexities of political violence. An
example of the administration's tendency to oversimplify the
phenomenon of political violence by sweeping it under the carpet of
'terrorism', is provided by Jack Davis who was a member of the CIA
briefing team that was responsible for briefing President-elect
Reagan on the PLO. During a briefing session, Davis presented
Ronald Reagan with an Agency memorandum that described the
subtleties of the Palestinian movement. This memo discussed the
complex array of background, personalities, ideologies, tactics and
strategies that divided Palestinian people and characterised the
myriad of groups inside and outside the Palestine Liberation
Organisation. After giving the memo careful consideration, Reagan
turned to Davis and said, "But they are all terrorists, aren't they?'"'32
few years before. See Jeffrey D Simon, £1994), op.cit:. p.168. See also the United States 
Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, 98 th Congress. 1st Session, January 1, 1981 to
December 31, 1982, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p.26. Also P 
Jenkins, "The Assassins Revisited" Claire Sterling and the Politics of Intelligence," Intelligence 
and National Security, (1989)
129 See the front page article by Robert Fisk, the Times, October 24, 1983
See Claire Sterling, (1982), op.cit.
131 See Peter Taylor, £1993), op.cit:. pp.80-82
132 See John L Helgerson, Central Intelligence Agency CIA Briefings of Presidential 
Candidates. Chapter 6: Reagan and Bush: A study in Contrasts, (Washington D.C., CIA
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Haig and Casey tasked the CIA with providing evidence to sustain 
their convictions.133 Following the CIA’s analysis which had failed to 
provide evidence in support of this policy line,134 Casey tasked the 
DIA to conduct its own investigation. The resultant analysis, however, 
was so blatantly skewed that Casey had no option but to reject that 
report as well in the interests of protecting the integrity of analysis.135 
This demonstration of cognitive bias at the administration's most 
senior level is an example of how consumers, by tasking the 
intelligence community, can inadvertently, or quite deliberately, 
influence the requested analysis. Policy statements that have already 
been made can induce condescending individuals within the 
intelligence community to provide substantiating evidence in support 
of existing policy bias.136
The differences between William Casey's background, his manner 
of operating, and the CIA's institutional ethos, strained the 
relationship between William Casey and the organisation that he 
headed.137 Casey, a former OSS operative took command of the CIA
Centre for the Study of Intelligence May 22, 1996)
133 See US Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 
January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982, February 28, 1983, (Washington D.C., US 
Government Printing Office, 1983), p.26. On February 11, 1981, Alexander Haig announced 
that international terrorism would be the number one foreign policy priority of the new 
administration. See Robert Olson, "Denigrating America's Challengers," Middle East 
International, No.227. (June 15, 1984), pp.17-18
134 See "CIA Said to Doubt Soviet Tie to Terrorism," Washington Post. March 29, 1981
135 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, CIA analyst responsible for the analysis on the role of the 
Soviet Union in international terrorism, interview, on August 1995, Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C.
136 While Haig and Casey were guilty of biais, however, this point deserves further 
clarification. Notwithstanding the fact that these senior individuals based their beliefs upon an 
erroneous assumption, hindsight indicates, with some recent disclosures from Stasi files, that 
their original perceptions were nevertheless partly correct. Evidence has come to light which 
indicates that the former German Democratic Republic was instrumental in supplying and 
supporting European terrorist groups in Western Europe and some Middle East terrorist 
operations in Europe. See the report by Marc Fisher, "E,Germans Said to Aid Anti-US 
Terrorist Acts," Washington Post, March 27, 1991. See also a report titled "Stasi Role in 
Lockerbie Bombing Examined," Per Spiegel, April 18, 1994 as well as an article (untitled) in 
the Frankfurter Rundshau, July 2, 1991, wherein a former RAF operative confirmed that the 
Stasi provided assistance and training to the Red Army Faction.
137 For an in-depth overview of Casey's personality and how he disagreed with the 
Agency's analysis on Soviet support for international terrorism, see Joseph E Persico, £1990), 
op.cit:. pp.217-222
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at a time when there was littie confidence in the analytical expertise 
of the Directorate of Intelligence, since the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board had conducted the A-Team B-Team experiment.138 Casey 
created further tension between himself and the CIA bureaucracy by 
appointing a rank outsider, Max Hugel, as his Deputy Director of 
Operations. Hugel's appointment alienated the CIA bureaucracy and 
chafed the feelings of the career operations personnel as he had not 
risen through the ranks nor did he have any previous intelligence 
experience. The whole issue was exacerbated when allegations 
pertaining to Hugel's former business dealings and insider trading 
were disclosed in public. This controversy further undermined morale 
within the CIA.139 Casey, a Brooklyn lawyer, felt at odds with the Ivy 
league graduates of the Directorate of Intelligence.140
The relationship between the DCI and the Directorate of 
Intelligence was not harmonious. From the beginning Casey made a 
point of targeting the production of National Intelligence Estimates.141 
He believed that analysts were too preoccupied with protecting their 
carreer and positions and that their analysis was too ambivalent and 
bereft of opinion. Casey reformed the format and style of NIEs by 
demanding that they be produced quicker, that the language be more
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the PFIAB conducted an 
experiment aimed at evaluating the quality of collection and production of US intelligence on 
Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. The experiment comprised of a comparasion in 
the analysis of an NIE between the Directorate of Intelligence, known as the A-Team and 
three independent groups of outside academics, known as the B-Team. The exercise 
highlighted shortcomings in the CIA's analytical capabilities, particularly with regard to their 
ability to predict Soviet intentions. Unfortunately the whole exercise was compromised and 
politicised as a result of leaks to the press about the results. See the A-B Team Experiments 
in Competitive Estimating, 1976, Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
(Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1978)
139 Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. pp.145-146
140 See Joseph E Persico, £1990), op.cit:. pp.217-222. This was also confirmed by 
Abraham Shulsky, senior researcher at the Rand Corporation, interview, on July 18, 1995, 
Washington D.C.
141 See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.3. Also Robert A Manning, Steven Emerson 
and Charles Fenyvesi, "Casey's CIA: New Clout, New Danger," U.S. News & World Report, 
June 16, 1986, pp.24-31
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declarative and the key evidence be highlighted.142 As an activist, 
Casey believed that intelligence analysis should be used as an 
instrument by the intelligence community towards influencing policy 
and used the Presidential Daily Briefings toward that objective.143
In its foreign policy initiative in the Middle East, the Reagan 
Administration viewed the Lebanon problem through the same lens 
as the East - West superpower relationship instead of in the context 
of the regional dynamics between Israel, Syria, Iran and the 
emergence of Shi'ite fundamentalism.144 The administration's focus 
upon the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East and international 
terrorism blinded administration officials to the local dynamics and 
the ambitions of these principal Middle Eastern actors and their role 
in Lebanon.145 The administration also failed to recognise Syria's 
determination to safeguard its political and security interests in 
Lebanon.146 In response to a question put to him concerning Syria's 
support for renegade elements of the PLO the Under Secretary of 
State for political affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, replied that the 
State Department was confident that Syria had an appreciation of the 
U.S. political concerns in Lebanon.147 His statement is a reflection of 
the attitude that prevailed within the State Department and a view 
that was held personally by George Schultz. The Secretary of State 
firmly believed that Syria had seriously considered the commitment
See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.3.
143 See Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:, p.221
144 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, pp.300-301 also Robert Neumann, (Winter 
1983), op.cit:. p.255
145 See Geoffrey Jansen, "Khomeinists on the March in Lebanon," Middle East 
International, No.230, (July 27, 1984), pp.15-16
146 See Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "Operations Other Than War," in 
Paul Davis, (ed.), New Challenges For Defence Planning. (Santa Monica, California, Rand, 
1994)
147 See U.S,Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C., 1983), p.13
Page 128
Page 129
and determination of the U.S. to achieve its policy objectives and that 
President Asad as well as Syria's allies would be intimidated by 
America's superpower status and corresponding military capability.148 
What Schultz failed to grasp, however, was the fact that the U.S. 
military instruments of statecraft were ill-suited for applying coercion 
in the Lebanon environment.149 The effects of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and its siege of Beirut upon the local Shi'ite population, 
were overlooked in the broader scheme of developments of the U.S. 
foreign policy in the region.150 Consequently the NSC failed to 
recognise the use of terrorism as an effective instrument of leverage 
in the hands of Syria, Iran and their Shi’ite fundamentalist allies in 
Lebanon.151 Despite the fact that, following the first embassy bombing 
the NSC staff tasked the intelligence community to concentrate its 
attention on Hizb'allah, none of the cabinet members paused to ask 
what the underlying motives for the attacks might be. The focus of the 
administration and Congress on the activities of the PLO, indicate 
that they underestimated the importance of Hizb'allah. Kemp argues 
that the May 17 agreement failed because Schultz and Habib did not 
have a firm grasp of the finer details. For example, no one had 
recognised the importance of arranging for the Lebanese government 
to withdraw its 1975 invitation to Syria to assist in maintaining 
Lebanon's stability.152
Graham Fuller, telephone Interview, on November 15, 1995
149 See Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, (1994), op.cit:. pp.233-235
150 For an in-depth overview of the impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, see Dilip 
Hiro, (1993), op.cit. See also George Ball, (.1984), op.cit. See Jonathan Randal, The Tragedy 
of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventures and American Bunglers, (London, Chatto 
& Windus, 1989). See Michael Jansen, (.1982), op.cit. Also Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), 
op.cit:. pp.52-55. This was confirmed by John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, 
Washington D.C.
151 This opinion was also expressed by Howard Teicher, telephone interview, on 
October 23, 1995, Washington D.C.
152 Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C
Page 129
Page 130
Although the NSC staff tasked the intelligence community with 
collecting information on the intentions of the terrorist groups, they 
failed to request information on the background and political 
objectives of Hizb'allah and its relationship with Iran and Syria within 
the context of U.S. objectives.153 The extent of the administration and 
the President's ignorance of the complexities of the relationship 
between Hizb'allah and Iran, were aptly demonstrated during 1987, 
when in defence of the Iran-Contra initiative, President Reagan 
stated that there was no link between the arms sales and the release 
of the hostages, because the arms were being sold to Iran and not to 
Hizb'allah.154
At the helm of the administration, President Reagan's 
management style made matters worse. The president was not a 
strong or decisive leader and was unable to take the lead when his 
senior cabinet members disagreed over policy matters.155 He relied 
upon his advisors and cabinet members to point him in the right 
direction.156 Furthermore, a troika consisting of the president's 
counsellor, Edwin Meese, the Chief of Staff, James Baker, and his 
deputy, Michael K. Deaver, formed an effective barrier between 
Reagan and the rest of the White House staff. Senior staff and 
cabinet members' access to the president was tightly controlled which 
at times prevented critical information from reaching the president.157 *
15' For insight into Hizb'allah's objectives and relationship with Syria and Iran, see 
Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints," in Hooshang 
Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), Iran and the Arab World. (London, Macmillan, 1993). 
See also Sean K Anderson, "Iranian State-Sponsored Terrorism," Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 11, 
No.4, (Fall 1991) and Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 
(Austin, University of Texas Press, 1987), and S Shapira, "The Origins of Hizb'allah," 
Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol.46, (Spring 1988)
154 See Christopher Andrew, £1995), op.cit:, p.485
See Ronald Reagan, (1990), op.cit:, p.477
1’’ For a descripton of President Reagan's management style by those that served 
under him see Alexander Haig, £1984), op.cit:. pp.84-86 and Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:,
pp.1-4 and Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:, p. 181
*' See John Prados, Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council 
from Truman to Bush, (New York, William Morrow, Inc.,1991), pp.449-454
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The troika's activities was one-of the principle reasons for Alexander 
Haig's resignation in 1982.158
Unlike President Carter, who had elevated the status of his 
National Security Advisor to cabinet level, President Reagan 
elevated the status of the Director of Central Intelligence to cabinet 
level. Instead of the NSA, Casey became the president's chief 
intelligence advisor159 and therefore held a more senior position than 
the NSA.160 Reagan's appointment of Casey can be attributed to their 
personal relationship and the fact that Casey had been Reagan's 
presidential campaign manager. Casey who had originally set his 
sights on the position of Secretary of State, but failed to secure the 
post, accepted the position of DCI.161 Although Schultz fought 
incessant bureaucratic battles with Caspar Weinberger,162 he also 
perceived William Casey as a threat to his position and he distrusted 
Casey and the CIA.163 This was compounded by the fact that 
President Reagan had inadvertently created the situation for two 
Secretaries of State to compete within his administration.164 This 
created problems within the National Security Council. With regard to 
the Lebanon debacle, this meant that the administration seldom 
spoke with one or a uniform voice. This enabled Israel and the U.S.'s
Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:. p.223. During the eight years of the two Reagan 
Administrations, there were no less than six National Security Advisors - See Christopher 
Andrew, (1995), op.cit:. p.460
160 See Christopher Andrew, (.1995), op.cit:. p.460
161 Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p.16
162 See Ronald Reagan, (1990), op.cit:. p.511
163 See Oliver North and William Novak, Under Fire, (New York, Harper Collins, 1991), 
p.178
154 See Christopher Andrew, £1995), op.cit:. pp.478 & 497, who argues that Casey's 
personal relationship with Reagan allowed him to influence the president's attitude toward the 
Soviet Union during the first half of the administration. It was only at a much later stage, that 
Reagan mollified his stance. According to Andrew, "Casey's dissapearance confirmed 
Schultz's role as the chief architect of Reagan's policy to the Soviet Union." For further 
information on Casey's relationship with Reagan and the tension between Casey and Schultz, 
see Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:. p.281. See also Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:, p.51 
and Ronald Reagan (1990), op.cit:, p.477
Page 131
Page 132
adversaries to identify weaknesses in the administration, such as 
indecisiveness or cabinet dissention, and to exploit the situation to 
their advantage.165 The disagreement that prevailed between Schultz 
and Weinberger over the use of force in responding to attacks by 
Hizb'allah is an example. Consequently, as these senior policy 
makers within the administration sought to limit the power and 
influence of the DCI and the NSA, they marginalised the intelligence 
community, particularly the CIA. As Dumbrell points out: "The great 
irony of the close Reagan-Casey relationship lay in the degree to 
which the administration actually chose to ignore CIA analysis."166 
While Casey enjoyed a special relationship with the president, this 
was certainly not the case with his cabinet colleagues. As they 
disagreed and mistrusted each other, it was inevitable that the 
respective institutions which the cabinet members headed would be 
ignored as a matter of principle.167 *
The administration became increasingly preoccupied with the 
wider ramifications of the Lebanese political dabacle and most 
notably, the failure of Israel to cooperate with the U.S. and to stick to 
its timetable for withdrawal. Syria's refusal to recognise the May 17 
agreement caught the administration unawares, despite the fact that 
the intelligence community had quite pertinently warned them that 
Asad would not accept it.163 The intelligence community and its 
Middle East analysts were almost unanimous in their reservations of 
Habib's strategy. Experienced in the intrigues of Syrian and 
Lebanese politics, they recognised and warned that of all the Middle 
Eastern leaders, Asad was one of the region's most determined, 
ambitious and fractious.169 Analysts believed that Asad regarded
165 Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:. pp.209-222
166 See John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy. (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1990), p. 15*1
16‘ Ibid., p.98
Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995.
‘ See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. pp.8-9 and Robert G Neumann, "Assad and the
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Lebanon as his own back yard and that he was determined to remain 
a major player in events in Lebanon and would not allow events to 
happen unless he could extract the maximum advantage for Syria.170 
Historically, this has always been the case. President Asad's motives 
in Lebanon were based upon security and economic interests. Since 
the 1970s, he had pursued a strategy of a greater Baathist economic 
sphere incorporating Lebanon.171 The intelligence community failed to 
convey their reservations to the key policy makers in a manner in 
which the implications of Syria's greater ambitions were fully 
appreciated and acted upon. The problem, however, was not so 
much faulty analysis, as it was cognitive dissonance on the part of 
George Schultz and Philip Habib.
In addition to their analysis on Syria, the intelligence community 
believed that the Reagan Administration was overly optimistic about 
a speedy Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Furthermore the 
announcement of the Reagan Plan implied that Israel would have to 
relinquish its occupation of the West Bank. This infuriated Begin. In 
the Knesset he described the Reagan Plan as the biggest betrayal 
since the establishment of the state of Israel. This induced Israel to 
delay its compliance in the political settlement in Lebanon.172 
Consequently, the intelligence community who was sceptical about 
Israel's pliability and made this judgement known, was ignored by the 
administration and Philip Habib.
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Future of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol.62, No.2, 1983, (Winter 83/84), p.254
170 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995. See Patrick Searle, 
(1988), op.cit:. p.400 and Geoffrey Kemp, (1988), op.cit:. pp.57-60. See also Ze'ev Schiff, 
"Dealing with Syria," Foreign Policy, No.55, (Summer, 1984) and Helena Cobban, (1991), 
op.cit:. pp.31, & 44-57 and the editorial titled, "Asad the Spoiler," Middle East International, 
No. 193, February 4, 1983
171 See also Robert Olson, "Syria in the Maelstrom," Current History, No.83, January 
1984, p.25
172 For a detailed discussipon on the Reagan Plan and Israeli reaction, see George 
Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. pp.85 -100. Also Dan Tschigri, (1989), op.cit:. pp. 190-203 and David 
Kimche, The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat and Sadam Hussein. The Quest For Peace in
the Middle East, (London, Scribner's, 1991), p.157. See also U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee On Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress. 1st Session. Documents On Middle East
Peace, 1982-88, April 1989, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989)
Page 133
Page 134
With regard to the internal political climate in Lebanon itself, 
analysts questioned the fundamental wisdom of the administration's 
goal of unifying Lebanon.173 Lebanon could not be described as a 
nation, it had no borders, it was even harder to identify a Lebanese 
citizen given the confessional divergence of its inhabitants.174 The 
composition of the LAF in which the officers were predominantly 
Christians and the rank and file Muslims, made them question the 
viability of the LAF as a security force that would be loyal to a 
Christian led government. Lebanon's political players did not regard 
Bashir Gemayel as a statesman or a strongman.175 The intelligence 
community viewed the Gemayels and the Phalangists as one of a 
number of religious-political factions within the confessional-politico 
morass of Lebanon.176 This despite the fact that Bashir Gemayel had 
been on the payroll of the CIA. He had been recruited by the Agency 
when he worked at a law firm during the 1970s in Washington D.C.177 
Despite this long-standing relationship, they were sceptical about the 
recognition, legitimacy and Gemayel's ability to lead a strong enough 
coalition government.
Finally, the intelligence community together with the Secretary of
Defence, Caspar Weinberger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, warned
against the utilisation of the Marines as an instrument of foreign
policy and diplomatic bargaining in Lebanon.178 The intelligence
173 See Ronald Steel, "Why is the United States in Lebanon?," Parameters: Journal of 
the US War College, No. 13, December 1983, pp.78-82, and David Kennedy (1988), op.cit:. 
p.12
11 See Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:, p 135. also Douglas Watson, "In Lebanon, 
Hatred Clouds Issues of Peace," U.S. News & World Report. October 10,1983, p.23
1/5 For an overview of how sectarian overshadowed national loyalties and Gemayel's 
struggle to hold the Phalange factions together, see Geoffrey Bowder, "Lebanon’s Struggle 
For Survival." World Today, No.39, (November 1983), pp.443-449
176 See Dilip Hiro, (1993), op. cit;. pp.61-78; also David Gilmour, Lebanon: The 
Fractured Country. (London, Sphere Books, 1987), pp. 196-197. See also Douglas Watson, 
"Why Road to Lebanon Peace is so Rocky," U.S. News & World Report, November 14, 1983. 
p.28
1 See Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, (1990), op.cit:, p.265
° John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. See also Howard 
Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, p.289
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community warned that in the political mosaic of Lebanon, the
Marines would not be able to maintain their neutrality. When the U.S. *
opened fire with the 6th Fleet on Druze militia positions the Suq al
Gharb in support of the LAF, they violated the last remnants of their
neutrality and immunity.179 This argument was subsequently ignored
by the State Department and the NSC staff. Inevitably when the U.S. ;
government and the Marines tried to bolster the Lebanese
government, their actions were indeed interpreted as partisan
support for the Christian Phalangists.180 In the published text of an
open letter addressed by Hizb'allah to the downtrodden in Lebanon
and the World, which was subsequently published on February 16,
1985, Hizb'allah's enmity towards the United States was 
demonstrated as that organisation accused America of arrogance 
and of reducing the status of Hizb'allah to, "...a handful of fanatics 
and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up drinking, 
gambling and entertainment spots and other such activities."181 The i
leadership of Hizb'allah conceptualised the U.S. as its enemy on a j
par with Zionism and Israel and as the primary source of vice aimed 
against Islam.182
Indicative of the traditionalist mentality that prevailed at the time,
t
the intelligence community was not presented with a formal occasion 
in which to make its reservations about the Reagan Administration's
policy in Lebanon known.183 Their expectation was that once the
_____________________________________________________________ 1
I
179 In fact the U.S.S. New Jersey was not the first U.S. warship to fire at the Druze. On I
September 8, 1983, the destroyer U.S.S. Bowen fired at a Druze gun battery that had fired on
a Marine compound next to the airport. On the morning of September 19, 1983, after 
McFarlane had sent his 'Sky is Falling Cable', (September 11) the destroyer U.S.S. John 
Rogers opened fire off the Lebanese peninsula at the Druze in the Suq Al Gharb. It was joined 
later that afternoon by the missile cruiser, U.S.S. Virginia. It was only joined later by the 
battleship, the U.S.S. New Jersey. See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. pp.506-507 ■
i
180 See Glen Hastedt, "Can Intelligence Agencies Learn: Reporting After The Terrorist 
Attack On The Marines in Lebanon," Seminar paper presented at the International Studies 
Association, Atlanta. (April 2, 1992), p.9
181 See Augustus Richard Norton. (1987). op.cit:. pp.167-171 j
152 Ibid., pp.171-172 !
*33 David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.9
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administration requested a formal National Intelligence Estimate on 
the subject, they would have an opportunity to express their 
misgivings. Contrary to the intelligence community's expectations, 
however, the Reagan Administration did not issue a request for either 
a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) or a Special National 
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) between 1982 and late October 1983, 
when Graham Fuller, the NIO at the time issued a request for a 
SNIE.184
The administration's failure to effectively task the intelligence 
community reflected their insufficient appreciation of the complex 
dynamics of the situation and their subsequent inability to recognise 
where the deficiencies in their information were rooted. Haig and 
Habib acted on their own initiative and in many instances attempted 
to bulldoze their policy initiatives through without prior consultation 
with the NSC. This fact is reflected in the frustration that was 
experienced by the National Security Advisor, William Clark, who had 
difficulty in following the objectives of Philip Habib and Alexander 
Haig.185 Intelligence managers were frustrated during policy sessions 
with Habib and his inner decision making circle, who consistently 
demonstrated that they had already settled strategic and tactical 
questions in their own minds before consultations.186 This left the 
intelligence representatives wondering why they had bothered to 
attended policy meetings in the first instance.
ic4 During a telephone interview with the author, on November 15, 1995, Graham Fuller 
stated that he recalls placing the request for an SNIE in the summer (October) of 1983. He 
cannot recall, however, the total number of NIEs that were produced, but states that there 
were at least two. Following the administration's dissatisfaction with the analysis contained in 
the first report, Schultz and Casey specifically requested that a new NIE be undertaken which 
would take into consideration the assumption that Syria was well aware of the U.S. objectives 
and resolve in Lebanon. Fuller states that Casey passed the instruction on to him personally.
* 5 See Alexander Haig, (1984). op.cit:. p.310
6 David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:, p.9
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This strain in the relationship between the administration and the 
intelligence community resulted in their increased marginalisation 
and was a factor which inhibited the administration and the NSC staff 
from tasking the intelligence community effectively, not only at the 
beginning of the crisis, but as the administration experienced 
increasing resistance from the key players and emerging forces of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon. Throughout the intelligence 
community the perception existed that the administration was 
reluctant to request specific intelligence from the analysts because 
the administration resented the intelligence community's disapproval 
of its policy initiatives. In response to this claim, consumers argue 
that their reluctance to consult the intelligence community was due to 
the lack of intelligence that was available.187 This alienation was 
reinforced by the intelligence community's perception that despite the 
availability of intelligence, the administration failed to respond or to 
alter its objectives accordingly.188 Consequently, intelligence was only 
conveyed on an informal basis and in the form of point papers and 
lower-level artforms.189 Talking points for DCI Casey and the Middle 
East National Intelligence Officers were produced on a daily basis 
who utilised them in their meetings with the president and at the 
assistant secretary level.190 *
Key intelligence items were also conveyed in Presidential Daily 
Briefs (PDBs) and in the National Intelligence Dailies (NIDs). The 
overall result was that intelligence was being disseminated and 
digested on a fragmented basis, whereas an overall comprehensive
187 These explanations were made by Noel Koch, in a telephone interview on February
21, 1996 and also by Howard Teicher, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, 
Washington D.C.
189 Howard Teicher, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C.
169 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995
190 See John A Gentry, Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation, (Boston, 
University Press of America, 1993), Chapter 3. The Institution in Practice, pp.21-66 and Loch
K Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1989), seethe section Production and Analysis, pp.89-95
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briefing became the missing dimension, because the request for a
comprehensive analysis was never forthcoming at senior level, at
least not before the Summer of 1983.191 According to Fuller, the
National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East after Robert Ames,
the first NIE was issued in the summer of 1983 and after it was
rejected by the principal cabinet members, predominantly, George
Schultz and William Casey, the intelligence community was
requested to undertake another analysis but to include in its estimate
the premise that Syria recognised the determination of the U.S. to
achieve its objectives in Lebanon and that the U.S. government ;
would not be swayed.192
Notwithstanding the administration's reluctance to deal with the
j
intelligence community with regards to its overall foreign policy in 
Lebanon, the necessity for intelligence in order to respond to acts of j
terrorism was being recognised, albeit in limited quarters. Despite his 
disdain of the CIA, George Schultz, advocated a strong-line approach 
in responding to terrorism, making it clear that any response was
I
dependent upon sound intelligence.193 However, it was not until April J
i
1984 that the administration tasked the intelligence community to j
assist in the fight against terrorism when President Reagan signed -5
the National Security Decision Directive 138.194
4
------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---- -—.----------------------- i
191 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, CIA analyst responsible for the analysis on the role of the ;
Soviet Union in international terrorism, during a telephone interview, on October 31, 1995
192 Graham Fuller, claims that he was approached by Casey personally with the request j
for a revised estimate, during a telephone interview, with the author on November 15, 1995 i
1 Jeffrey D Simon, £1994), op.cit:. p.180
The implications of this NSDD are discussed in the following chapter. j
4
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3.2.2. Intelligence collection
Collecting intelligence with regards to terrorist organisations and 
their intentions, is one of the most difficult tasks that intelligence 
services have to deal with.195 In Lebanon, collection was rendered 
more difficult given the nature of the objective and the consumer that 
it had to serve. In this instance the consumer was the Pentagon. The 
military establishment, however, was averse at the time to being used 
as the instrument in combating terrorism. Their reluctance was not 
only due to the fact that as a military institution they perceived the 
use of force to be reserved for the greatest threat to U.S. national 
security, i.e. war against the Soviet Union, but was also based on 
their sensitivity to public attitudes towards the utilisation of America's 
armed forces. As Jenkins points out: "A military campaign against 
terrorism seemed filled with the perils of imprecise missions, political 
constraints, and uncertain measures of success."196 The Pentagon 
was reluctant to become involved in a mission that could discredit the 
military and affect their image, prestige and ultimately their 
relationship with Congress, as this could have had negative 
implications for their budget requirements. As a prerequisite for their 
involvement, the Pentagon stipulated that the intelligence community 
must be in a position to provide adequate intelligence which could 
identify targets and justify the use of military force and be prepared to 
divulge that intelligence.197 * These requirements were almost 
impossible for the intelligence community to deliver given the nature 
of their intelligence targets, the environment in which they were
See Stephen J Cimbala, £1987), op.cit. p.170
196 See Brian M Jenkins, "The American Response to Terrorism," in Steven Spiegel,
Mark Heller and Jacob Goldberg, (eds.), The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East, 
(Los Angeles, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1988),
p.185. See also Gail Bass, Brian M Jenkins, Konrad Kellen and David Ronfeldt, Options of 
U.S. Policy on Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report R-2764-RC, July 1981)
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expected to collect information and the need to protect their sources 
of information.
Prospective intelligence agents are at a disadvantage when 
joining terrorist groups as they are often compelled to commit 
unlawful acts in order to prove their bona fides.198 In most instances, 
terrorist groups organise themselves into tightly-knit cells, making 
infiltration almost impossible.199 In Lebanon the situation was no 
different. Infiltration by intelligence agents was even more difficult 
because Hizb'allah recruited its followers from among family and 
along clan lines.200 Its operations were carried out mainly by the 
Mughniya and Hamadi clans.201 Infiltration and response was difficult 
given the nature of the terrorist groups and an environment that was 
much more complex because of the civil war. In addition, the 
organisation was protected from infiltration by its Special Security 
Apparatus (SSA) under the leadership of Muhamar Mughniya. He 
was the mastermind behind the group that was later responsible for 
the taking of Western hostages and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. 
Their operations were planned and supported by a sophisticated and 
secretive network which involved Iranian diplomats who were 
instrumental in providing intelligence on prospective targets and the 
Pasdaran which supplied weapons, logistics and training.202 The 
latter were elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps who had
199 See Robert S Dudney and Jeff Trimble, (July 8, 1985), op.cit:. p.30 and Stansfield 
Turner (1991), op.cit: p.175
199 See John M Oseth, "Combatting Terrorism: The Dilemmas of a Decent Nation," 
Parameters. Vol.XV, No.1 and Ken Robertson, "Intelligence, Terrorism and Civil Liberties," in 
Paul Wilkinson and Alaisdair Stewart, (1989), op.cit:. pp.551-555
200 See James B Motley, "Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence 
Dilemma," in Stephen J Cimbala, (ed.), (1987), op.cit:. pp.168-170. See also the interview 
with former DCI William Colby in Newsweek, July 1, 1985, p.27
T 01 For an overbiew of the composite clan elements and organisational structure of 
Hizb'allah, see Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.117. See also William Casey, 
"International Terrorism: Potent Challenge to American Intelligence," remarks made at the 
Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 17, 1988
' 2 See Magnus Ranstorp, <1994), op.cit:. p.120 and see the Wall Street Journal, 
August 16, 1989, the New York Times, March 14, 1986 and the Independent, April 26, 1988
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established themselves in fhe Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in 
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and who were the spearhead of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini's strategy to export his Islamic revolution.203
These difficulties made the collection of humint impossible and 
prevented the verification, integration and synchronisation between 
techint and humint. This detracted from the U.S. intelligence 
community's abilities to analyse its intelligence take effectively.
3.2.3 Evaluation and interpretation
The type of intelligence that was available to the NSC staff at 
most times throughout the crisis and even before the first embassy 
bombing was predominantly photographic and imagery intelligence 
that was supplied by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 
Access to human intelligence sources remained difficult to acquire 
and scarce. The Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa Valley was 
consistently maintained as a high priority intelligence target which 
was set by the NSC staff.204 Prior to the U.S. embassy bombing, the 
NRO were in possession of photographic evidence of a mock-up of 
the embassy at a training base in the Bekaa Valley.205 The NRO 
analysts, however, were unaware of the significance of the evidence 
as provided by the imagery before them and were unable to relate 
this information to the layout of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. The failed 
to analyse the information because they were unable to interpret it in 
context of the threat posed to U.S. interests in Beirut.206
203 See Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored 
International Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report No. R-3783-USDP, March 
1990), pp.9-15
204 Howard Teicher, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D C
206 Unattributable interview with a former member of the DIA, Washington D.C., July
13, 1995. This was also confirmed by John Walcott, during an interview, on July 17, 1995, in 
Washington D.C.
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While it can be argued that the administration should have 
correctly predicted the attack based upon the evidence mentioned, 
the information only assisted the NSC staff and the Marine's 
commanders to identify the potential target of the attack. It was, 
however, insufficient as far as determining the specific date and time 
that the attack would take place. Photographic intelligence is a 
reliable asset in determining intelligence with regards to the 
capabilities of an adversary. As a reconnaissance tool it is capable of 
providing physical and real-time proof of any change in quantifiable 
variables. For example, photoint may reveal an increase over time in 
the number of missile silos that have been build by the enemy, or it 
may produce physical evidence of troop concentrations. However, it 
remains a passive medium that is incapable of providing insight into 
the intentions and the minds of the enemy.207 This remained the 
fundamental shortcoming in the intelligence community's capabilities 
in monitoring terrorist activity in Lebanon.
The extent and calibre of the administration's humint pertaining to 
the first embassy bombing that was collected, remains unknown. 
However, there are indications that the administration was in 
possession of a limited amount of warning intelligence prior to the 
attacks on the embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983. In an 
exchange between Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
and Senators Smith and Levine during the Congressional Hearing on 
the U.S. embassy bombing held on June 28, 1984, Eagleburger was 
asked if the embassy had received any threats or warnings 
whatsoever before the bombing or any advance surreptitious 
information and if any threats had been received subsequent to the 
embassy bombing. Eagelburger responded that he would prefer to 
answer both questions during the executive session. Had the 
administration not been in possession of any intelligence to that
20 ? For an overview of the comparison between technical and human intelligence 
collection techniques, see Abraham N Shulsky, £1991), op.cit:, see Chapter 2, Spies, 
Machines and Libraries: Collecting the Data, Comparison of Humint and Techint, pp. 11-30
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effect, he could have easily said so. His response suggests that the 
administration was, in fact, in possession of warning intelligence prior 
to the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 1983 and, because the 
information was classified, he could only respond to these questions 
during the executive session. The latter is limited to access by those 
senators who have received the necessary security clearances, and 
who are privy to classified information.208
The bombing episodes are pertinent examples of where disputes 
can arise over the difference between intelligence and policy failures. 
One the one hand, former NSC staff members claim that the 
administration was in possession of the necessary intelligence, but 
failed to respond because the policy makers at the most senior level 
failed to recognise the significance of the intelligence and the nature 
of the environment in Beirut. The unrealistic demands (rules of 
engagement) enforced upon the Marines by Caspar Weinberger 
arguably bear testimony to this fact.209 On the other hand, senior 
policy makers allege that the failure cannot be attributed to them, but 
to the inadequate performance of the military officers on the scene 
who had in turn been let down by the intelligence system and by their 
own inefficiencies in taking adequate security precautions.210
While some of the reasons for the administration's failure to 
respond to the warnings must be attributed to a combination of the 
behaviour of the principal cabinet officers, who failed to recognise the
200 U.S.Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, House of
Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C., 1983), pp.17-18
209 Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle East staff member, telephone 
interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C. The same opinion was expressed by 
Vincent Cannistraro, during an interview, on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia. This is also the 
view of John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
210 See Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:. pp.161-166. Also George Schultz, (1993), 
op.cit;. pp.220-234. See also the U.S.Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in 
Beirut, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress. June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983) and The Investigations Subcommittee on the 
Terrorist Bombing at Beirut International Airport, U.S. Congress Committee on Armed 
Services House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, January 31, 1984 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984) also confirmed by Geoffrey Kemp, 
former NSC staff member, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C.
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implications of the facts as revealed to them by the intelligence 
community, and the difficulty that the CIA experienced in ascertaining 
the exact date of the attacks,211 it should be recognised that 
intelligence gathering with regard to the intentions of terrorist groups 
remains one of the most difficult tasks that any intelligence 
community has to carry out. Another explanation for this failure was 
the fact that the NSC staff, who were the intermediary level between 
the intelligence community and the Cabinet, were actually 
adjudicating and implementing policy. They had resorted to this 
behaviour in the vacuum that had been created through President 
Reagan's indecisive management style and the stand-off between 
Caspar Weinberger and George Schultz.212 The NSC staff displayed 
a cognitive resistance towards the intelligence that they received 
which was in conflict with the policy initiatives that they had 
implemented.
In contrast to the siege mentality that prevailed among the 
members of the diplomatic and intelligence community on the ground 
in Beirut, the intelligence community in Washington, situated in the 
White House, Langley and the Pentagon, were totally complacent. 
Intelligence information gathered in Beirut had mostly been collected 
by intelligence officers whose movements were restricted as a result 
of their hostile environment. Intelligence was essentially gathered by 
officers who liaised with their counterparts on the diplomatic cocktail 
circuit rather than through regular recruitment and debriefing 
activities of local agents.213 Intelligence gathering through human
211 See the statement of the Hon. Bill Nicols, the Chairman of the Investigations 
Subcommittee on the Terrorist Bombing at Beirut Internationa! Airport, U.S. Congress 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, January
31, 1984 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984), p.3. This was also 
confirmed by Howard Teicher, telephone Interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C
212 See John Dumbrell, (1990), op.cit:. p.98
"13 John Walcott, during an interview, with the author on July 17, 1995, Washington 
D.C. This is a particularly difficult point to verify. The fact of the matter is that most of the CIA 
officers concerned were killed in the embassy bomb in 1983. Further efforts to obtain 
comments and opinions from analysts and consumers during that time were met with 
understandable reluctance out of respect for their fallen colleagues. However, during a 
second telephone interview between the author and Noel Koch, on June 19, 1996, the latter
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assets, was mostly achieved by intelligence sharing between the 
U.S., its allies and the Lebanese Armed Forces, who were not 
renown for their unbiased or objective reporting.214 Following the 
embassy attack in April 1983, the CIA’s humint operations were 
conducted from out of its embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo. The CIA 
was therefore geographically remote from its target area. 
Supplementing their poor human intelligence was signals intelligence 
which monitored communications between the Pasdaran in Ba'albek 
and the Iranian Embassies in Beirut and Damascus.215
In examining the phenomenon of terrorism in Lebanon, however, 
the intelligence community concentrated upon the symptoms and 
failed to examine the underlying causes more thoroughly.216 To be 
specific, no tasking instructions were issued to the intelligence 
community to conduct an interrelated study of the effect of terrorism 
upon American foreign policy objectives in Lebanon. The intelligence 
community on its part did not offer any alternative view papers on the 
intentions and objectives of Syria or Iran. It did not examine the 
effects that the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and in particular, 
Beirut, had on the local Shi'ite population. Iran's influence exercised 
through the interaction between the Shi'ites and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) in the Bekaa Valley, was not fully 
appreciated.217 If the intelligence community had conducted a more
stated that the quality of intelligence emanating from Beirut at the time did not leave him very 
impressed and that given the hostile environment, it would not have been unusual for 
collection to have taken place in restaurants and bars.
214 For the interaction between the U.S. Marines in Beirut and the LAF, see Eric 
Hammel, (1985), op.cit. See Christopher Simpson, (1995), op.cit:, "National Security 
Decision Directive 128, Lebanon," p.362. Also Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle 
East staff member, during a telephone interview, October 23, 1995, Washington D.C
215 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. p.293
216 See Marc Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, (London, Mansell 
Publishing Co., 1987), pp.26-27
217 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.102. See also Christopher Dickey, "Assad 
and his Allies: Irreconcilable Allies," Foreign Affairs, Vol.66, No.1, (Fall 1987), pp. 58-76 and 
Christian Marshall, "Syria and Iran: A Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991," Orient, Vol.33, No.3, 
(September 1992), pp. 433-446
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thorough interpretation and integrated their findings with the crisis 
management principle of the limitation of objectives, their analysis 
could have identified the faulty assumptions upon which the 
administration's Lebanon policy had been construed. Having made 
that observation, however, there is still no guarantee that, given the 
cognitive dissonance that prevailed within the NSC staff and the 
policy makers, that it would have made any difference. As the events 
in this case study demonstrate, the availability of intelligence does 
not necessarily guarantee good decision making.
An indication of this complacency was demonstrated by the fact 
that there had been no request from the decision making community 
for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Lebanon. NIEs 
represent the most authoritative analysis on a subject by the U.S. 
intelligence community and is the most ambitious and comprehensive 
information that combines current intelligence with prediction on how 
a specific situation is expected to evolve.218 NIEs are usually 
generated by decision makers and officials who operate at the 
intelligence - policy making - interface level, such as the NSA or 
NIOs who are appointed by the Nations! Intelligence Council as case 
officers on specific topics of importance to national security, such as 
terrorism and weapons' proliferation.219 Notwithstanding the flaws in 
their collection and analysis, the distribution of intelligence from the 
analytical community via their managers and the NSC staff to the 
NSC presented a further obstacle as will be explained below.
See Abram N Shulsky, (1991), op.cit:, pp.57-58. See also Roy Godson, Intelligence 
Requirements for the 1980s, Analysis and Estimates. (Washington, D.C., National Strategy 
Information Centre, 1982), pp.1-11
“1' For a comprehensive explanation of the analysis production process and the 
interface between the intelligence and policy making communities, see Jeffrey T Richelson, 
{1989), op.cit:, pp.433-437. See also Richard K Betts, "American Strategic Intelligence: 
Politics, Priorities, and Direction," in Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg, 
(1981),op.cit:, pp.245-263. For an overview more pertinent to the Reagan Administration, see 
John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, pp.447-481
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3.2.4 Dissemination and communication
In the absence of the call for a National Intelligence Estimate and 
given the strained relationship between the intelligence community 
and the administration, intelligence was distributed on a fragmented 
and uncoordinated basis. Where intelligence was formally 
disseminated from the intelligence community to the consumers, it 
was retarded by the bureaucratic pathology, lengthy chain of 
command and the analysis review process itself.220 The chain of 
command ran from Washington to Nato Headquarters in Mons, 
Belgium. From there it proceeded to Stuttgart, then to the 
Commander U.S. Naval forces in Naples, then to the deputy Naval 
Commander Europe in London. From the UK it was then routed to the 
Commander of the Sixth Fleet in Gaeta, Italy and then to the 
Commander of the Marine Amphibious Unit at Beirut airport.221 
Geographical proximity, or rather the lack of it, compounded by this 
convoluted chain of command isolated the intelligence community 
from the dynamics of the problem.222 Consequently the intelligence 
analysts in Washington and those stationed in Stuttgart were remote 
and divorced from the circumstances on the ground in Beirut.223 The 
Marine commanders in Beirut would not necessarily have had an 
appreciation of the wider political ramifications, nor of the 
administration's internal dysfunction in Washington. There was no 
platform whereby the respective perceptions of the analysts situated 
in Washington, at the European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart,
220 Refer to the section on multiple producer - consumer relationships and the 
Intelligence Production Process in the previous chapter. .
See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p. 108.
222 See Eric Hammel, (1985), op.cit:. p.91
223 See the statement of the Hon. Bill Nicols, the Chairman of the Investigations 
Subcommittee on the Terrorist Bombing at Beirut International Airport, U.S. Congress 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, January
31, 1984 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984), p.3. See also David 
Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p. 108
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and at ground zero in Beirut could be compared, let alone 
synchronised.224
The administration's failure to appreciate the nature and modus 
operandi of Hizb'allah prevented them from implementing the 
necessary changes to the intelligence distribution process. The 
speed with which intelligence was processed and conveyed between 
the intelligence community and the military commanders in Beirut 
was too cumbersome and time consuming. Neither the government 
nor the intelligence community had a coherent understanding of the 
problem of Islamic fundamentalism.225
In all crises, communication remains the pivotal link. This does 
not only apply to communication between the bureaucratic elements 
of government, but between the authorities and its adversaries, allies, 
the media and the public. The principles pertaining to intelligence 
dissemination in the intelligence cycle and the principles of 
communication and legitimacy in crisis management are interrelated 
and provide the core framework in the analysis of the role of 
intelligence in crisis management. In the Lebanon crisis, however, 
the underlying problem was not just the manner in which intelligence 
was disseminated but must also be attributed to the fact that the 
decision makers were essentially not receptive to the evidence that 
the intelligence community passed on. The dynamics in the producer 
- consumer relationship played a major part in influencing the crisis.
224 See the U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 98th Cong., 2nd Session, 
1984:S359. This fact is supported by the comments of the Long Commission which 
recommended that in order to deal with terrorism, "...the Secretary of Defense directs the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a broad range of appropriate military responses to terrorism 
for review, along with political and diplomatic actions, by the National Security Council." The 
Commission also concluded that, "...U.S. forces were not trained, organized, staffed or 
suppprted to deal effectively with the terrorist threat in Lebanon." See also Marc Celmer, 
(1987), op.cit:, p.88
2- See the comments made by former DCI Robert Gates in James Adams, £1994), 
op.cit:. p.237
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3.2.5 The producer - consumer relationship
The producer consumer relationship is not confined to the 
function of intelligence alone. In the context of crisis management, 
this relationship hinges upon the fundamental understanding 
between the intelligence community and the policy maker on the 
nature of the threat that the crisis posits against the policy objectives, 
values and norms of the consumer. It also relates to the objectives 
that the policy maker pursues in responding to the emergency, the 
methods used, the perceived legitimacy of the authorities response 
measures in the eyes of the public and allies, and the manner in 
which all information is conveyed between the policy maker and their 
external environment by the intelligence community. This concept 
provides the linkage between the components of the intelligence 
cycle and the principles of crisis management, as the following 
sections will demonstrate.
The underlying tenets of Sherman Kent and the traditionalist 
orthodoxy which kept the analysts at arms length from the policy 
makers and the NSC staff prevented the intelligence community from 
enjoying greater exposure and insight into the administration's policy 
and strategy.226 In this instance blind adherence to traditionalist 
discipline had disastrous consequences. In many instances, 
intelligence analysts tend to assume that consumers have made 
policy decisions only after having given due consideration to relevant 
intelligence.227
The dissemination of intelligence is conducted in a manner that 
presupposes that consumers are competent and adept at screening 
useful items from intelligence analyses and applying these to the 
policy at hand. When William Corbett, the Marine's intelligence 
support analyst who was stationed in Stuttgart reported to the Marine
“6 David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.11
“"7 See John A Gentry, £1993), op.cit:. pp.255-256
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commanders that Hizb'allah had conducted no less than 118 car 
bomb attacks against their enemies during the past thirteen months, 
he assumed that the significance of the information would be 
appreciated by the commanding officers in Beirut and that they would 
implement the necessary physical measures accordingly.223 When 
Robert McFarlane insisted that the U.S. navy shell Druze positions in 
the Shouf mountains in support of the LAF, CIA officers who were 
also on the scene in Beirut warned quite explicitly against any such 
action on the grounds that it would reinforce the perception among 
the Muslim forces that America was a military ally of the LAF. They 
warned that this would result in an escalation of violent acts against 
U.S. ground forces. They believed that their advice would be heeded, 
but were surprised to learn that McFarlane had despatched his cable 
to Washington without their concurrence, thus demonstrating a clear 
failure on the part of McFarlane and the members of the NSC to 
appreciate the implications of intelligence advice.229
From the perspective of the intelligence community, this faulty 
assumption can contribute to a lack of interaction between key policy 
making individuals and intelligence analysts. Consequently analysts 
underestimated the value of closer interpersonal contact between 
themselves and policy makers. In the case of Lebanon, the 
organisational structure of the U.S. military forces and their support 
services, such as their intelligence analysts who were stationed in 
Germany as opposed to Beirut, compounded this lack of interaction. 
Distance prevented regular contact and reduced opportunities to 
present alternative views and policy options to decision makers.230 * 19
~“9 See Martin and Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, pp.107-108
~“9 Comments made by William Beck, former U.S. navy intelligence communications 
officer in Beirut, during a telephone interview, with the author on August 2, 1995
“30 Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, in an interview, with the author on July
19, 1995, Washington. This this was also confirmed by Grahan Fuller former NIO for Middle 
East, in a telephone interview, with the author on October 28, 1995.
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In Washington, this barrier was reinforced by the tendency of the 
administration to substitute the intelligence community with the NSC 
staff. This was reflected in the role that the NSC staff came to play as 
intelligence analysts, combined with their responsibility as policy 
advocates for the administration, and later on when they were used 
to circumvent legislation and acted as a vehicle for carrying out 
covert operations.231 The use of the NSC staff as a medium for 
conducting covert operations was a loophole that was used by the 
activists within the Reagan Administration, and in particular William 
Casey, to circumvent the restrictions placed upon the intelligence 
community by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment Act.232 It was also used 
by Casey and Robert McFarlane to overcome the bureaucratic 
impasse that prevailed between Schultz and Weinberger.233 
According to Kemp, the deadlock between Schultz and Weinberger 
over Lebanon convinced some Reagan followers, especially Casey 
and NSC staffer Lt. Col. Oliver North, that a capability should be 
developed to conduct covert operations outside the system.234 This 
practice reinforced the role of the NSC staff as an alternative 
intelligence body. Thus the locus of the responsibility for intelligence 
analysis which served the Reagan Administration throughout the 
Middle East crisis was effectively transferred from the domain of the 
intelligence community to that of the policy maker. This created a 
precedent upon which further covert action was based and paved the 
way for the use of the NSC staff to facilitate the illegal arms transfers
231 See Joseph E Persico, £1990), op.cit:, p.433 and Theodore Draper, £1991), op.cit:, 
pp.12-13
232 The Hughes-Ryan Ammendment Act was legislation passed by Congress during the 
Ford administration and following William Colby's testimony before Congress on the CIA and 
its covert activities in the aftermath of Watergate. In terms of the Act, the DCI is obliged to 
make a written presidential finding when authorising any covert operation affecting the 
national security of the U.S. and to notify Congress in a timely fashion of the description and 
scope of the operation. It does not require the president to obtain permission or to notify 
Congress prior to embarking upon such operation. See Christopher Andrew, (1995), op.cit:, 
p.403
233 Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:, pp.399 & 453
234 See Geoffrey Kemp, (1988), op.cit:p.67
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between the USA, Israel and Iran, which led to the Iran-Contra 
affair.235
The distinction between policy and intelligence failures is often 
confusing. Therefore evaluating case studies on the basis of 
measuring an actor's behaviour according to the components and 
principles of the intelligence cycle alone is an inadequate method 
since the intelligence cycle does not offer any insight into the 
principles that govern crisis decision making. An integrated approach 
which combines the elements of both the analysis process and the 
principles of crisis management offers a framework for a more 
interrelated analysis. In the producer - consumer relationship, there 
should always be a clear-cut understanding between the parties 
involved as to the objectives of the policy maker. The objectives 
sought must be clearly defined and understood. Whereas policy 
objectives reflect ambitions, during crises the influence of 
extraordinary circumstances and the fact that core values and 
objectives are being threatened, may exert pressure to alter or at 
least limit their scope and the means employed to achieve them. This 
includes avoiding decisions that cannot be implemented or 
enforced236 The Reagan Administration failed to appreciate this factor 
during the Lebanon crisis. Once they found themselves under attack 
from Islamic fundamentalist forces, no reappraisal of their overall 
objectives in Lebanon was conducted. There is no evidence to 
suggest that a new threat analysis was conducted, which factored in 
the reasons and motives behind the terrorist attacks. The civil war 
environment in Beirut blurred their conceptual vision and perception 
that the attacks were not only a symptom of the civil war, but that they 
were part of a concerted strategy that was being used by Hizb'allah,
235 During Tower Board Hearing, Senator Edmund Muskie stated that during the Reagan
Administration it was not the NSC system that was faulty, but the manner in which the system
itself was abused which led to the Iran-Contra affair.See the Tower Board-NSC Function
Hearing. U.S. Congress, Joint Hearing of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives.One Hundredth Congress, (April 30, 1987), p.5
"6 See Patrick Lagadec, (1993),op.cit. pp.263
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Syria and Iran in an effort to coerce the U.S. administration to 
abandon its Lebanon policy.
Given the fact that the U.S. was under physical attack, they did 
not alter their objectives and limit their immediate actions to dealing 
with or responding to the threat of terrorism while continuing with 
their overall policy objectives. It is essential for both parties to remain 
informed vis a vis any change in objectives and any changes in 
circumstances which may affect the means employed in the pursuit of 
policy goals. The crux of the problem, however, remains the 
receptivity of the consumer to the information that he receives and 
how he responds to it. If he chooses to ignore the intelligence, 
despite its availability, then there is not much more that the 
intelligence community can do. This is where the activist discipline 
advocates greater involvement of the intelligence community towards 
exercising greater influence over the will of the consumer to listen to 
and to respond to intelligence.
Intelligence does not only provide information pertaining to the 
crisis. It is an essential tool in the crisis management machinery 
because it provides feedback to the policy maker and the crisis 
management team about the reaction of the external environment to 
their response initiatives.237 The Reagan Administration and in 
particular Robert McFarlane, who succeeded William Clark as the 
NSA, ignored this principle at a crucial point in time in the Lebanon 
crisis. By failing to listen and appreciate the comments of the 
intelligence community about the potential consequences of using 
naval gunfire in support of the LAF, the administration ignored 
feedback from the external environment, illustrating the point made 
above. This blunder may have been the first step in the crisis which 
inadvertently caused the administration to fail in Lebanon.
237 The importance of communication in crisis management is described by Coral Bell, 
[1971), op.cit:. p. 37. For the necessity of feedback from the policy maker to the intelligence 
community see Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:. p.131 and Robert Jervis, "What's Wrong 
with the Intelligence process?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
Vol.1, No.1, Spring 1986, pp.36-37 and Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1970).
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Adherence to traditionalist principles contributed towards the 
maintenance of distance between the intelligence community and the 
policy makers and in this instance inhibited closer interaction which 
prevented the administration from effectively understanding and 
anticipating the reactions of its external environment and its 
adversaries towards it policy objectives. This problem was rooted in 
the policy makers' reluctance to listen to the intelligence community 
because their advice ran contrary to the policy that the administration 
was pursuing.
In addition to the role of the intelligence community in providing 
feedback to the crisis management system, the structure of that 
system and the interface mechanism between the intelligence 
community and the crisis response team, influences the producer - 
consumer relationship. This is apparent in the manner in which 
administrations structure their crisis contingency capabilities.
3.3 The creation of crisis contingency capabilities.
Each presidential administration designs its own crisis 
management system. The structure of the system, however, varies in 
accordance with the management style and personality of the serving 
president.238 In the following discussion, the difference in the national 
security management styles of Presidents Nixon, Carter and Bush 
are briefly explained in order to demonstrate the Reagan 
Administration's crisis management system which evolved from the 
structure of its antecedent administrations but which did not, 
however, conform to either one of the presidential or secretarial 
management systems, as demonstrated below. k
"'b For a detailed account of how each president structured and managed their crisis 
management systems, see Joe Schoemaker, £4991), op.cit:. and John Prados, (1991), 
op.cit:, and Christopher Andrew, (1995), op.cit.
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President Nixon, for example, was obsessed with the potential for 
opposing views and leaks within the State Department, the 
bureaucracy and the NSC structure.239 His obsessive distrust of the 
NSC led him to authorise the Federal Bureau of Investigation to carry 
out wire-taps on the phones of key NSC staff members, such as 
Morton Halperin, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Daniel Davidson.240 
Together with Henry Kissinger, he implemented an acute form of the 
presidential system, using backchannel methods and relying on 
select individuals both within and without the administration, many of 
whom were not part of the NSC system to provide them with the 
relevant information that they required towards resolving crises. 
Kissinger in his capacity as NSA, was at times solely responsible for 
crisis decision making. Consequently, President Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger succeeded in isolating and frustrating all the departments 
that dealt with the NSC thereby reducing the NSC to an empty 
shell.241 Nowhere was this more apparent than during the crisis of the 
Yom Kippur War in October 1973. During the war Nixon received a 
strongly worded cable from the Soviet President Leonoid Brezhnev to 
the effect that should the U.S.- USSR effort to enforce a Middle East 
cease-fire fail, the Soviets would act unilaterally to prevent the 
destruction of the Egyptian Eighth Army. To emphasise their point, 
the Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and deployed an 
eighty-five vessel flotilla to the Mediterranean. After consultation with 
President Nixon, who was distracted by the resignation of vice 
president Spiro Agnew and the Watergate crisis,242 Kissinger held a 
mini-rump NSC meeting acting as both the Secretary of State and
239 See Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1979), p.30. See Also John Prados, (1991), op.cit:. pp.261-265
210 See Christopher Andrew, (1995), op,cit:,pp.361-362
241 See Ray S Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," Foreign Policy, No. 17, (Winter 
1974-75)
242 William B Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967, (Washington D.C., the Brookings Institute Press, 1993), p.162.
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National Security Advisor, together with the newly appointed 
Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger. Also in attendance were 
William Colby the DCI and Generals Haig and Scowcroft of the White 
House staff. Colby attended as an observer only and not as an NSC 
member. Kissinger dominated the NSC procedure, not unlike most 
other instances where he presented Nixon with resolutions for 
approval in one-on-one discussions. The Secretary of Defence 
concurred with Kissinger's foregone decision to respond 
diplomatically and to simultaneously send a strong negative signal to 
the Soviets against unilateral action. While Kissinger replied to the 
Soviets that the U.S. would not tolerate Soviet intervention through 
the deployment of its forces in the Middle East, Schlesinger ordered 
the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer to place U.S. 
strategic forces on Defence Condition-Three (DEFCON III).243
This management style was contrary to the spirit of the NSC 
structure, whose purpose it was to provide the president with as 
broad an opinion as possible on matters affecting national security. It 
thus prevented Nixon from the benefit of wider representation and 
input from the both the intelligence community and the National 
Security Council during crises. While the intelligence community 
gained in importance in terms of its involvement and utilisation in 
domestic surveillance and covert operations, it found itself restricted 
and therefore limited in its participation in crisis management during 
Nixon's tenure.244
Under President Carter, the White House Situation Room served 
as the official crisis management structure.245 The responsibility for 
crisis management fell directly under the National Security Advisor 
who chaired the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) of the NSC.
“43 See Christopher Andrew, (1995), op.cit:.pp.392-393. See also William B Quandt,
(1993k op.cit:. p.173 1
I
~44 See Christopher Andrew, (1995), op.cit:, pp.350-354
4
"45 Admiral Stansfield Turner, former DCI of the CIA under President Carter, interview, j
on July 23, 1995, Skipworth, McLean Virginia. j
f JT
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The crisis management system was designed by his NSA, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, in accordance with the Presidential system of national 
security management.246 Having taken over office in the wake of 
Watergate and given the CIA's involvement, the Carter 
administration's marginalisation of the intelligence community was to 
be expected.247 These arrangements did not suit everybody in the 
Carter administration. The DCI, Stansfield Turner, lamented the fact 
that the White House Situation Room maintained an obsessive desire 
for raw intelligence, which circumvented the normal analytical 
process of the intelligence community and which could lead to the 
decisions and response initiatives being implemented without the 
benefit of objective analysis from the intelligence experts.248
As a former DCI turned president, George Bush tended to act as 
his own analyst during crises. President Bush believed that over the 
years, the NSC had been diverging away from its intended purpose 
which was to advise on decided policy decisions and to assist in the 
integration of policy. In his opinion the NSC was never intended to 
function as an integral component of the policy making loop. He was 
opposed to the increased access of the National Security Advisor to 
the oval office on the grounds that it created the opportunity for the 
NSC staff to encroach upon policy making. During the Carter and 
Reagan Administrations the power and function of the NSA 
inadvertently created two secretaries of state and two secretaries of 
defence, who were always in competition with one another.249 
President Bush's views on the NSC system can be traced back to his 
eligibility as an ideal candidate for the position of DCI under the Ford 
administration. His appointment to the position on January 30, 1976,
246 See Brzezinski, (1985), op.cit:. pp.59-60.
247 See Christopher Andrew, (1995), op.cit:. p.425. See also See Stansfield Turner, 
(1991), op.cit:. p.51
248 See Admiral Stansfield Turner, (1986), op.cit:. p.263
249 See George Bush, Looking Forward, (New York, Doubleday Publishers, 1987), 
p.173.
Page 157
Page 158
was made by a president who was driven by the need to rebuild 
confidence in America's government institutions and to re-establish 
congressional trust in the CIA, following the Watergate scandal.250
President Bush held strong views on the role and function of the 
CIA and the NSC in line with the traditionalist approach. In his 
previous government assignment as U.S. ambassador to China, he 
had experienced the management style of the former Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger, who had allowed him little room for 
manoeuvre. This contributed towards the marginalisation of the NSC 
during his administration, which also realised the exclusion of the 
intelligence community from crisis decision making. A few years later,
President Bush's penchant for excluding the intelligence community 
was evident during the Gulf War. Then his administration's crisis 
team excluded the DCI of the CIA, William Webster, from its decision 
making deliberations.251 Following the Gulf War and by his own 
admission, President Bush stated that the intelligence community, 
and in particular the CIA, had performed well and that they (White 
House) had received good intelligence prior to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. This significance of Bush's statement is to be found in what 
he did not say rather than in his praise for the CIA's performance.
Implicit was the fact that whereas the Agency had performed well, the 
White House had failed to respond adequately to the warning 
intelligence that had been provided preceding the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. This point was also made by Senator Boren who praised the 
CIA's assessments for July and August prior to the crisis. The New 
Jersey Democratic Congressman, Robert Torricelli, also stated that,
"There may have been a better understanding of the intelligence 
situation than a comprehension by policy makers of the implications 
of what was taking place."252 *
250 See Mark Perry, (1992), op.cit:. pp.135-139. :
i
251 Charles Cogan, "Intelligence and Crisis Management," Intelligence and National |
Security, London, Frank Cass, Vol.9 No.4 (October 94), pp.634-635 j
252 See (no author), the Washington Post, August 4, 1991.
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President Bush's crisis management style can be criticised on the 
basis that it was highly selective. During his tenure as DCI, and 
following the assassination of the U.S. ambassador Francis. E. Meloy 
in Beirut on June 16, 1976, President Ford called an emergency 
meeting of the NSC in the White House Situation Room where Bush 
was requested to advise on the policy option of ordering the 
evacuation of Lebanon of all U.S. citizens.253 In effect at this juncture 
in his career he acted in a typical activist fashion by advocating 
policy. This incident and the U.S. response in evacuating its 
personnel may also have contributed to the rationale behind Syria 
and Hizb'allah's terrorist strategy in Beirut during the Reagan 
Administration a few years later. Having observed that the U.S. 
government pulled its troops out as soon as their casualties began to 
mount and incur domestic criticism, Hizb'allah may have realised that 
in order to force the Reagan Administration to withdraw from Beirut, 
all it needed to do was to place the administration in a similar 
position. The fact that raw intelligence was being fed directly into the 
White House, as alluded to by Stansfield Turner, is testimony to the 
danger of crisis management being conducted according to 
unevaluated intelligence information and the marginalisation of 
intelligence analysts from the crisis management process.
During the Reagan Administration the National Security Council 
staff and in particular, its Crisis Pre- Planning Group (CPPG), 
functioned as the interface between incoming intelligence reports, 
diplomatic cables, press reports and the principal members of the 
NSC. The CPPG was an interactive body comprised of senior-level 
officials from the NSC member agencies. Not all of its members were 
trained analysts. It was responsible for providing support during crisis 
management by analysing the collective information and in preparing 
response options in advance for use by the Special Situation Group
Page 159 ..
253 See George Bush, (1987), op.cit:. pp.171-172.
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(SSG).254 The SSG functioned as an interagency crisis management 
body and was created by President Reagan in 1982 and chaired by 
Vice President George Bush.255 In effect, the CPPG not only 
provided staff support to the SSG and the NSC during crises, but 
became its analytical arm.256 When Robert McFarlane replaced 
Philip Habib as the administration's Middle East envoy, he was also 
the deputy NSA. Technological innovation equipped McFarlane with 
a tacsat which facilitated encrypted and direct satellite 
communications between himself in Beirut and the NSA William Clark 
in Washington D.C. Owing to the fact that McFarlane was Clark's 
deputy and aided by this technological innovation, a back channel 
which bypassed the entire policy making and national security 
bureaucracy effectively enabled the NSC staff to function on an 
operational basis and without the insight and advice of the security 
and intelligence community.257 * Consequently the epi-centre for 
intelligence analysis was transferred from the domain of the 
intelligence community to the NSC staff and its CPPG components 
which functioned as policy-option auxiliaries to the formal National 
Security Council and President Reagan.
During the Reagan Administration the problem of international 
terrorism remained near the centre stage of its foreign policy.259 
Despite the shortcomings that the Reagan Administration inherited
^54 =" For an explanation of how the NSC staff were supported during crises by the CPPG, 
see the chapter 15 by former NSA Robert McFarlane, titled, "The National Security Council: 
Organistion for Policy Making," in R.G. Hoxie (ed.), (1984), op.cit:. p.270-271
”55 See Scott D. Breckinridge, (1986), op.cit:. pp. 14-21 and John Prados, (1991), 
op.cit:, p.456.
Howard Teicher, former NSC and CPPG member during the Reagan Administration, 
responsible for the Middle East, in a telephone interview, on October 16, 1995
“5' See John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, p.472
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," Foreign Policy. No.69, Winter 
1987-88, p.97 and The Reagan Administration De-classified National Security Council 
Document in terms of the Freedom of Information Act: National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) Number 3, December 14, 1981 Crisis Management
1 See Glen Hastedt, (Spring 1988), op.cit:, p. 11
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from previous administrations'-failures to develop adequate counter 
terrorist capabilities,260 the president attempted to make institutional 
provision for greater coordination of counterintelligence capabilities 
towards combating international terrorism. This is reflected in terms 
of National Security Decision Directive 30, whereby the responsibility 
for responding to various types of terror attacks against U.S citizens 
or interests, was divided among the major federal agencies. Under 
NSDD 30, the administration sought to coordinate intelligence 
gathering, response training and command authority for handling 
such incidents prior to their occurrence. It created a new 
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism chaired by the State 
Department which was responsible for policy coordination pertaining 
to terrorism.261 According to Simpson, ’’...still classified sections of the 
memo gave an interagency committee of the NSC staff the 
responsibility for antiterrorist operations, under Lt.Col. Oliver 
North."262
In spite of the initiatives shown in NSDD 30, the contingencies 
that the administration attempted to implement failed to have any 
effect. The fragmented nature of the intelligence community and more 
pertinently, the nature of the producer - consumer relationship, 
contributed to this failure. The intelligence imperative dictates that for 
any organisation to be able to implement crisis management 
effectively, it must be in possession of relevant information pertaining 
to the potential crises that may befall that organisation as well as an 
appraisal of its own capabilities and vulnerabilities. In this instance 
traditionalist behaviour regulated the relationship between the 
intelligence community and the White House and acted as a barrier 
that detracted from this principle. Bureaucratic competition,
260 See Oliver North and William Novak, £1991), op.cit:. p.47
261 Paul Bremmer, former US ambassador on Terrorism and senior member of 
Kissinger Associates, New York, during a telephone interview, in New York, July 11, 1995
262 Christopher Simpson, (1995), op.cit:, p.61
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divisiveness and tensions prevented the organisations from 
co-operating as a unified whole against terrorism and compromised 
whatever advantages there were to be gained from the wider 
expertise available throughout the federal agencies.263
With regard to the actual foreign policy problem in Lebanon itself, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the question, "What would the 
administration do in the event that Habib and Schultz's initiative to 
restore the Lebanese Christian government and to secure a 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, failed?" was ever 
asked. While some members of the administration assumed that their 
strategy would work, those that did not, such as Caspar Weinberger 
and the JCS, did all that they could to obstruct the policy through 
their intransigence and lack of co-operation.264 An example of their 
heel dragging was the last minute withdrawal by the U.S. from 
participating with France in the reprisal air strike against the Sheikh 
Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa Valley, following the bomb attacks 
against their barracks in Beirut.265
Although one may question the legitimacy of defining the attacks 
themselves as crisis incidents, they had a severe effect on U.S. 
policy. They exposed the tension between Schultz and Weinberger 
and demonstrated the paralysis that gripped the administration and 
its inability to respond with military force making it abundantly clear to 
the perpetrators that the USA was impotent in the face of terror 
attacks.266 The bombing attacks struck at the very heart of President 
Reagan's Middle East policy.267 Media focus on the sensational
“63 See the comments of Robert McFarlane to the Washington Post, cited in John 
Prados, (1991), op.cit:. p.483
264 Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, interview, on July 19, 1995
"65 See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, pp. 138-139, for an account of 
how the JCS and Caspar Weinberger were reluctant, and in the end failed to carry out the 
NSC decision made on November 14, 1983, to join the French and conduct a retaliatory raid. 
See also Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit., p.525
-66 See Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit.
” Robert Fisk, "Bomb Toll Rises to 39 at U.S. Embassy,” Times, April 19, 1983
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aspects of the attacks projected the Reagan Administration's policy 
objectives into the public arena and generated scepticism in 
Congress,266 * 68 as Senator Barry Goldwater warned that, "...the United 
States was heading for trouble in Lebanon."269
The terrorist attacks were pre-emptive propaganda strikes against 
the Reagan Administration. In the words of one of its erstwhile NSC 
staff members, Lt.Col. Oliver North, "It is a fundamental rule of 
politics that whoever gets his side of the story out first is usually able 
to set the agenda for the ensuing discussion."270 What Syria and its 
Shi'ite allies had accomplished, however, was to set the agenda for 
the debate in America about its Lebanon policy and ultimately the 
Reagan Administration's political defeat at the hands of Syria and her 
allies. They had accomplished this through the use of terrorism as a 
strategy. They played right into Asad's hands when they deployed 
their forces in an area of Beirut where he controlled the local militias, 
while they believed that they were carrying out a peacekeeping 
role.271
During his twentieth press conference on October 21, 1983, which
was two days prior the bombing of the Marine barracks, President
Reagan was questioned extensively by the media over the number of
casualties and U.S. policy and resolve in the Middle East. In his
response he stated that despite Syria's efforts to undermine the
process that, "...the U.S. would stay the course..."272 Whatever Syria's
level of complicity in the attack, and given President Reagan's
266 See William E Smith and Robert Suro, "Lebanon Takes its Toll," Time, September
1983, pp.14-17
o c 9
- Ronald Reagan, (1990), op.cit:. p.461 and Christopher Walker, "Little sign of Israel 
softening terms for troop withrdawal," Times, April 20, 1983, p.7
270 See Oliver North (1991), op.cit:. p.7
271 See James Kelly and Robert Suro, "Syria: Clashing with the U.S. Bidding for a 
Bigger Role," Time. December 19, 1983, p.16
See Nicholas Ashford, "Reagan pledges to stay course on Middle East and 
Euromissiles," Times, October 21, 1983. See also "Statement by Deputy Press Secretary 
Larry Speakes on U.S. Marine Casualties in Lebanon, September 6, 1983," in Public Papers 
of President Reagan, (US Government Printing Office, 1984), Vol I, pp.417-419
Page 163
Page 164
statement to the press, there can be no doubt that the incident could 
not have occurred at a more opportune moment in time for Syria.
Another consequence of the attacks was the allegation that the 
intelligence community had failed. These charges were made by 
Congress, the media and the defence establishment.273 One of the 
reasons for these allegations was the fact that those who accused 
the intelligence community had little understanding of the difficulty for 
any intelligence service in trying to access terrorist organisations. 
The CIA was operating in an area that was extremely dangerous and 
effectively a denied area to their operations personnel. It was not 
until 1987, however, before they attempted to break the siege and 
recruit informants among Nabih Berri's Amal militia, with limited 
success.274
Apart from the problem in collecting intelligence information, the 
failure was rooted in the bureaucratic labyrinth that intelligence 
products had to follow before these reached the consumers and the 
failure of the consumers to appreciate the implications of what the 
intelligence was indicating. Ultimately these incidents which raised 
questions about the legitimacy of U.S. involvement and policy in 
Lebanon, also demonstrated the necessity for contingency planning 
to consider the reaction of the media and public in responding to 
adverse and negative incidents. This principle dovetails with the 
importance of ensuring legitimacy for crisis response amongst one's 
public and allies.
■7J Glen Hastedt, (Spring 1988), op.cit:, p.11
4 Mark Perry, (1992), op.cit:, p.83
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3.4 The principle of legitimacy
In crisis management the objective behind the principle of 
legitimacy is to secure the maximum amount of domestic and 
international support for response strategies and initiatives, while 
simultaneously undermining sympathy and support for the 
adversary.275 In the domestic context it is necessary to educate the 
public about the inherent difficulties encountered when dealing with 
crises. Through communicating with the public and making one's 
position known, the level of stress induced upon the political 
leadership can be reduced,276 and a conduit for feedback on the 
amount of support that the authorities enjoy for their strategy and 
initiatives can be determined.277 In addition to securing domestic 
support, it is also necessary to obtain political support from allies for 
the coordination and implementation of any initiative. Where crises 
involve more than one state actor, this is necessary in order to avoid 
any cross-purpose activities as well as any potential confusion and 
tensions from arising.278
The role of the intelligence community with regard to this principle 
is to monitor the reaction of the public, allies and the adversary and 
to provide feedback to the crisis management team and the policy 
maker throughout the crisis. This is another area where the
275 See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management, 
Lessons From the Past," in Daniel Frei (ed.), International Crisis and Crisis Management, 
(London, Saxon House, 1978), pp.8-9
276 For an overview of the effects of stress on decsiion makers during crises and 
terrorist incidents, particularly hostage-taking incidents, see Margaret G Hermann and 
Charles F Hermann, "Hostage taking, the presidency, and stress," in Walter Reich, (ed.), 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp.211-222 and Alexander George, "Adaptation to Stress in Political 
Decision-Making: The Individual, Small Group and Organisational Contexts," in George V 
Coelho, David Hamburg and John E Adams, (eds.), Coping and Adaptation, (New York, Basic 
Books, 1974)
277 See Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmidt, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A 
Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4, (Winter 
1992), pp.322-330
i7B See Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to 
Terrorism," in idem (ed.), £1981), op.cit.
Page 165
Page 166
administration failed. It neglected to consider the objectives of 
Israel279 and inadvertently found itself embroiled in public and 
international controversy over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and 
that country's subsequent involvement in the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres.280 Of greater significance, however, was the fact that the 
U.S. involvement in Lebanon was a direct consequence of Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon in the first place.
In Lebanon the principle of legitimacy worked against the Reagan 
government and was the focal point which led to a split in the cabinet 
between the military and diplomatic establishments. The division in 
the administration became all the more apparent in its attempts to 
respond to the terrorist attacks which exacerbated its frustration. Vice 
President George Bush, Caspar Weinberger and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, all concurred in their 
belief that the United States could not commit its armed forces in 
support of foreign policy initiatives without the support of Congress 
and the American public.281 This was in contrast to the State 
Department and the NSC staff who, as activists within the Reagan 
Administration, advocated a more confrontational approach and were 
adamant that diplomacy should be supported by military force where 
necessary. The difference in opinion between these principle cabinet 
members, however, failed to generate or consolidate public support. 
On the contrary, this polarisation reflected a divided government 
which not only had domestic repercussions, but demonstrated the
279 For an overview of the importance of considering the objectives of an ally during 
crises, see Michael Ledeen,"The Lessons of Lebanon," Commentary, No.77, May 1984, 
pp. 15-22 and Ze'ev Schiff, "The Green Light," Foreign Policy, No.50, Spring 1983, pp.73-85
“ See Ze'ev Schiff, "Lebanon:Motives and Interests in Israel's Policy," Middle East 
Journal, Vol.38, Spring 1984, pp.220-227 and Ze'ev Schiff, "Dealing With Syria," Foreign 
Policy, No.55, Summer 1984, pp.99-112 and for a discussion of the role of Menachem Begin 
and General Ariel Sharon in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the controversy over Israel's 
role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Who Decided Who Informed," 
New Outlook, No.25, 1982, pp. 19-22. Also R.T. Naylor, "From Bloodbath to Whitewash: 
Sabra - Shatila and the Kahan Commission Report," Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.5, Fall 1983, 
pp.337-361
_S1 See George Ball, (1984), op.cit:, pp.77-78 and Caspar Weinberger (1991), op.cit:, 
pp.8-9, 31 & 34. See also Dan Tschirgi, (1989), op.cit:, pp.56-57.
Page 166
Page 167
administration's lack of resolve in addressing the Lebanese crisis as 
a whole.282 At a loss for resolving the Lebanese crisis, the 
administration tried to regain its credibility by shifting attention from 
Lebanon to Libya.
Frustrated by its inability to retaliate against Syria, Iran and 
Hiz'ballah, the administration focused on Libya, which they believed 
was an easier target for retaliation. The principal reason for the 
administration's focus on Qadaffi, as opposed to other state sponsors 
of terrorism such as Syria and Iran, was mostly attributed to Qaddafi's 
erratic and belligerent behaviour. For example, the day after the 
bomb attacks on the French and U.S. barracks in Beirut, he was 
quoted as having said, "...the attacks were the courageous actions 
undertaken by nationalistic forces in Lebanon."283 Unlike Qaddafi, 
Syrian state controlled radio and television stations only reported the 
incidents and refrained from making any emotive comments.284 
Qaddafi's behaviour made him an easier target than Syria and Iran 
and paved the way for domestic and international support of 
American punitive measures against him.285 The administration and 
the CIA initiated a campaign against Libyan leader, Muhammar 
Qaddafi, and portrayed him as the patron of international terrorism in 
the region. The Reagan government launched an intensive campaign 
using the intelligence community to implement a covert operation that 
was aimed at destabilising Qaddafi and used the U.S. Navy to taunt 
him in the Gulf of Sidra.286 This detracted attention as well as 
intelligence resources from the more crucial issue of Lebanon and
282 See Leslie H Gelb, "Reagan, Power and The World," New York Times Magazine. 
November 13, 1983, p.77
283 See the front page article by Robert Fisk, The Times, October 24, 1983
284 Ibid.
? 8 5 Vincent Cannistraro, interview, on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia
286 This observation was made by Vincemt Cannistraro, a former NIO for 
counterterrorism and NSC staff official in the Reagan Administration in an interview with the 
author on July 21, 1995, at McLean Virginia.
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the U.S. confrontation with Iranian revolutionaries such as Amal and 
Hizb'allah.287 Apart from the fact that Libya was an easier target, the 
U.S. was at a disadvantage when it came to implementing retribution 
and punitive measures against Hizb'allah once that organisation 
embarked upon its strategy of taking American and Western citizens 
hostage.288 Any attempts at retaliation which would have endangered 
the lives of the hostages would have undermined the administration's 
legitimacy.
Although the administration was concerned about maintaining its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the American public, its failure to do so can 
be attributed to the breakdown in communication between the NSC 
staff and the intelligence community which could have provided the 
administration with an objective overview of the environment's 
reaction to their policy initiatives. As the administration marginalised 
the intelligence community it inadvertently and effectively undermined 
its source for feedback from its external environment. Together with 
the media the intelligence community was an important output - input 
mechanism for generating and testing popular support of the 
government's Lebanon policies. Had the administration maintained 
closer ties with the intelligence community, it may have come to the 
realisation at a much earlier stage during the crisis that Syria and 
Israel had no intention of giving up their territorial positions within 
Lebanon as easily as America had assumed they would.289 The close 
relationship between the President and the NSC staff, who came to 
share his views and sentiments, resulted in convergence of thought 
and the NSC staff were unable to perform with the necessary degree 
of objectivity.290 Essentially the communication of vital information
"87 Vincent Cannistraro, interview, on July 21, 1995. See Martin & Walcott (1988), 
op.cit:, p.73, also Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:. pp196-201, and Charles Cogan, "The 
Response of the Strong to the Weak: The American Raid on Libya, 1986, Intelligence and 
National Security, Vol.6, No.3 (1991), pp.608-620
“88 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. pp.276-277.
~89 See George Ball, (1984), op.cit:. p.74
"?0 See Oliver North (1991). op.cit:, p.153
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and insight into the problem failed to reach the key administration 
officials. Where that information did reach them, they failed to 
respond to its significance.
3.5 The principle of communication
Just as important as communication is to the intelligence cycle, so 
too is it a vital component in the successful management of crisis 
situations. Communication is the common axle upon which both the 
intelligence cycle and crisis management rotate. In both instances 
communication not only provides the vehicle which facilitates the 
conveyance of intelligence and information to and between the 
decision makers, but it is also necessary to convey feedback on the 
impact and effect that response initiatives have upon the adversary 
and the public to the policy maker. Just as there must be a 
continuous review of intelligence, an isolated segment of information 
cannot categorically establish the likelihood of an event. Singular 
scans of the political environment are unlikely to provide any 
comprehensive insight into the intentions of an adversary. A 
consistent and continuous review of the environment should be 
maintained if patterns of thought and intentions are to be identified 
and interpreted in perspective.291 In this instance the media plays an 
important and three-dimensional role. The first occurs when it 
functions as a source of overt intelligence information for the 
intelligence community. The second occurs when the media becomes 
direct competition for the intelligence community as a source of 
information for the policy maker. The third dimension is when the 
media's behaviour makes it part of the crisis problem instead of a 
participant in its solution.292
See John Oseth, "Intelligence and Low Intensity Conflict," Naval War College 
Review, No.37, 1984, pp. 19-36
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For the intelligence community reliance upon the media as a 
source of overt collection has inherent pitfalls, as an investigation 
carried out by Glen Hastedt in 1992 demonstrates. The mentioned 
study examined the lessons that can be learnt following media 
reporting on the terrorist attack on the Marines in Lebanon. Hastedt 
concluded that the content of the JPRS reports revealed scant 
information of value that could have stimulated the intelligence 
community in its analysis. The JPRS reports are charged with 
providing the intelligence community with translations and reprints of 
material appearing in foreign newspapers, periodicals, books, news 
agency transmissions and broadcasts. Not only were the reports 
devoid of detailed attention to the root causes of terrorism in 
Lebanon and the objectives of the organisations involved, but they 
appeared to be based upon no more than four or five of the same 
sources on a repetitive basis.292 93 His observations suggest that the 
intelligence community failed to ask alternative questions pertaining 
to the terrorist organisations' objectives and strategies because of the 
absence of sufficient stimuli contained in the media's reports. This is 
not surprising as the media will focus its attention and slant its 
reporting upon the more sensational aspects of an incident in order 
to maintain the newsworthy content of the event covered.294 News 
editors do not task their reporters according to the same criteria as 
intelligence managers task their intelligence collectors. While 
Hastedt's argument may hold for the content of foreign media reports, 
the impact of the U.S. media should have been of greater 
significance as it reflected American domestic concern. An analysis 
of U.S. media reports pertaining to these two incidents, reveals that
292 This aspect of the media is explored more fully in the case study on the hijacking of 
Flight TWA 847 in Chapter 5
293 See Glen Hastedt, (1992), op.cit:, p.25. A rough division of labour exists between it 
and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), where FBIS concentrates on the 
immediate translation and compilation of foreign radio broadcasts.
~9<! See Julian J Landau, (ed.), The Media: Freedom Or Responsibility. The War in 
Lebanon, 1982, A Case Study, (Jerusalem, Ahva Press, 1984).
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they focused their attention on-the devastation caused, the trauma of 
the victims and their families, potential options for American 
retaliation, and the failure of intelligence to provide warning of the 
attacks. The usual speculation in the media over why the attacks 
were carried out prevailed. Despite allegations of Syrian and Iranian 
complicity, this question was never answered by anyone in 
authority.295
During crises the failure to manage communication effectively can 
have adverse consequences. In the wake of the attack on the Marine 
barracks, the Reagan Administration initially responded by attempting 
to deflect criticism by explaining the rationale behind their continued 
presence in Lebanon. George Schultz argued that, "...it would be a 
fatal mistake to withdraw...", as any such move would only serve to 
encourage other radical groups to adopt similar strategies and to rely 
upon the Soviet Union for assistance while undermining America's 
credibility in protecting its allies. In a rare display of solidarity with the 
Secretary of State, Caspar Weinberger reiterated that, "...a pull out of 
U.S. forces at that time would result in Lebanon becoming a Soviet 
dominated enclave." President Reagan stated further that, "...the 
entire stability of the Middle East would be threatened by a U.S. 
withdrawal."296 However, in spite of the administration's efforts to 
contain the damage that the bombing of the Marine barracks had 
inflicted upon its Lebanon objectives domestic pressure for the 
withdrawal of American forces, together with the reluctance of the 
military establishment to sustain its half-hearted support, increased 
and compelled them to leave.297 Finally on February 7, 1984,
2 95 -See the statement made by George Schultz, The Situation in Lebanon, October 24, 
1983, (Washington D.C., United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, Current 
Policy No.520, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1983), p.2 See also Jim McGee, "U.S. knew of 
Syria link to '83 embassy blast," Miami Herald, August 3, 1986, p.A1
? qfi See the front page article by Robert Fisk, The Times, October 24, 1983, and 
"Agonizing Decisions" U.S. News & World Report, November 7, 1983, pp.24-25, and 
"Lebanon: High Risk in Staying On - or Getting Out," U.S, News & World Report, November 
7, 1983, pp.26-27
297 For the political effects of the bombing of the Marine barracks, see Larry Fabian,
"The Middle East War: Dangers and Receding Peace Prospects," Foreign Affairs, Vol.62,
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President Reagan announced the withdrawal of the remaining 1,600 
Marines from Lebanon.
In managing communications during crises and under normal 
circumstances, it is not an uncommon practice for policy makers in 
the USA to insist upon establishing direct links with intelligence 
operations personnel stationed at US embassies abroad rather than 
to receive intelligence briefings via the formal analytical branches 
and channels.* 298 Policy makers cannot be forced to read or act on 
intelligence under circumstances where policy making is subject to 
deadlines or is crisis driven. They will always be more interested in 
intelligence information that helps them to deal with the problem on 
hand and not with a problem that may develop in the future.
During crises, decision makers tend to pursue direct links with the
intelligence community through the National Intelligence Officers
(NIO) rather than with the formal bureaucracy.299 This in itself can
create problems: since NIOs are usually experts in their respective
fields, they do not always have the conceptual tools for linking their
domain with the extraneous factors present in a crisis situation.300
NIOs intrinsically lack insight into the 'big picture1 in the wider
perspective of policy making. They are not always alert in identifying
inaccurate or deliberately false or misleading information.301 With less
time available for careful evaluation and verification of intelligence
No.3, 1984, pp.632-658 and "The American Presence." Illustrated London News, No.271, 
December 1983, p. 11 and William E Smith and Robert Suro, "Lebanon Takes its Toll," Time. 
September 12, 1983, pp.14-17
298 See John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, p.472
299 Admiral Stansfield Turner, former DCI of the CIA under President Carter, interview, 
on July 23, 1995, Skipworth, McLean Virginia. And Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on 
November 13, 1995 and Vincent Cannistraro, interview, on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia.
J°° See John A Gentry (1993), op.cit:, p.303. According to Gentry, a former CIA analyst 
and senior National Intelligence Officer, NIOs have substantive regional or functional 
responsibilities, supervise the preparation of intelligence estimates, and perform liaison and 
coordination functions. Some NIOs have no significant intelligence backgrounds.
301 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 13, 1995. Graham Fuller was 
the NIO who was initially responsible for the Reagan Administration's approach in fostering 
links with moderate elements within the Iranian government in an attempt to secure the 
release of the US hostages.
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information, deception by an adversary is always a possibility during 
analysis and an additional critical factor during any crisis situation. 
However, in specific crises, where diplomacy or negotiation takes 
place between the parties involved, the need to utilise confidence 
building measures in order to demonstrate sincerity can contribute 
towards reducing this danger. It was ultimately upon the advice of 
Michael Ledeen, a consultant to the NSC staff and NIO Graham 
Fuller, that the Reagan Administration became involved with the 
Iranian government in an attempt to secure the release of its 
hostages.302 Ledeen and Fuller believed that through the influence of 
moderate Iranians, Hizb'allah could be persuaded to release the 
American hostages in Beirut.303 This proved to be disastrous, 
however, and ultimately led to the Iran-Contra affair. Shortages in 
information, and when combined with the acute need for an 
immediate response, can detract from the principle that policy makers 
should wait until they have all the facts at their disposal before 
making decisions and implementing them. Betts points out that, 
"Consumers want previously co-ordinated analysis in order to save 
time and effort. In this respect the practical imperatives of day to day 
decision making contradicts the theoretical logic of ideal 
intelligence."304 In crises temporal limitations imposed upon decision 
makers encourages short-cuts in acquiring and processing 
intelligence. The availability of real-time and almost instantaneous 
information, which can be provided by the media, presents policy 
makers with an alternative to intelligence which takes too long to 
process.305 The one prominent danger in relying upon the media for
302 See Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:. p.22, and Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, 
Neither East Nor West: Iran. The Soviet Union and the United States, (London, Yale 
University Press, 1990), p.175
303 See Amir Taheri, Nest of Spies: America’s Journey to Disaster in Iran, (London, 
Hutchinson, 1988), p.230, and Ben Bradlee, Jr, Guts & Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver 
North, (London, Grafton Books, 1988), pp.301-309 and Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. p.202
304 See Richard Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable." World Politics, 31 (October 1978), p.70
305 For more information into the problems of information overload and cognitive
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information during crises, is the possibility of disinformation and 
biased reporting. Not all journalists maintain integrity and objectivity 
in their reporting. A few months after the Lebanon crisis, studies that 
were conducted into media behaviour revealed that in many 
instances, they were guilty of bias and even disinformation.
The results of a survey conducted on the American media 
revealed that on the whole, the New York Times was the most 
objective and unbiased. Newsweek magazine, however, was prone to 
statistical inaccuracies. CBS was found to be partial towards Israel 
and NBC was the least objective with constant anti-Israeli sentiments. 
ABC maintained the most balanced perspective. On the whole, the 
media performed below its professional standard during the crisis.306 
Politicisation dogged the media just as it did the administration and 
the intelligence community. In Germany, the media attempted to 
portray the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its expulsion of the PLO 
in the same light as Hitler's final solution. Reports in Die Zeit and 
Stern magazine equated Israel's actions with Nazism.307 This was an 
indirect attack against the legitimacy of the U.S. in the eyes of its 
allies in Europe. The U.S. was judged to be guilty by association with 
Israel.
Television media depicted the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 
worst possible light by showing footage of Israeli forces moving 
through the cities of Tyre, Sidon and Damour with untold damage to 
houses and civilians in the background. What they omitted to report, 
however, was the fact that the PLO developed a deliberate strategy 
of locating their strongholds in or near civilian centres, thereby 
rendering civilian casualties inevitable. Much of the damage to these
shortcut functions, see Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:. pp.428-431
306 See Joshua Muravchik, "Misreporting Lebanon," Policy Review, No.23, Winter 1983, 
pp.11-66 and Nick Thimmesch, "The Media and the Middle East," American-Arab Affairs. 
No.2, Fall 1982, pp.79-88
,07 See Frank Offenbach, "A Footnote to Bias," Encounter (London), No.60, April 1983, 
pp.87-89
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cities had been incurred by-the PLO before the invasion.308 In 
defence of the media, it must be pointed out that in some instances, 
reporting in Lebanon was partly influenced by propaganda, 
intimidation and threats issued against Western journalists by the 
PLO309 and various Lebanese militias.310
During crises, as cables, faxes, and reports increase, the problem 
of information overload intensifies. In the process origins of thought, 
decisions and lines of instruction also become obfuscated. The result 
is that it also becomes more difficult to distinguish between 
intelligence and policy failures, since analysis (intelligence) and 
policy (decision making) are interactive. This was certainly the case 
during the Reagan Administration. A fusion of activities occurred 
within the NSC staff where NSC staff officers were responsible for 
analysis, formulating policy options and implementing policy 
decisions.311 * The lines between these distinct yet interrelated 
functions became blurred to the point that staff officers were 
entangled in making lower-level policy decisions as they 
implemented policy decisions taken by the NSC members and the
See Frank Gervasi, "The War in Lebanon," in Julian J Landau (ed.), The Media: 
Freedom Or Responsibility.The War in Lebanon, 1982 A Case Study. (Jerusalem, Ahva 
Press, 1984), p.43. See also James Lewin, "Bad Press Largely Due to Media Bias," 
Newsview, November 30, 1982 and Walter Laqueur, "Foreign News Coverage :From Bad To 
Worse." Washington Journalism Review, June 1983.
309 According to a report in the New York Times, July 1982, the publicationstated that, 
"...It is clear to anyone who has travelled in southern Lebanon, as have many journalists and 
relief workers, that the original figures of 10,000 dead and 600,000 homeless, reported by 
correspondents quoting Beirut representatives of the international committee of the Red 
Cross, were extreme exaggerations..." See "PLO Propaganda War: Phony Casualty Figures," 
New York Post. July 15, 1982. See also Alfred Mady, "The Post’s Lebanon Coverage: True of 
False?," Washington Post, July 26, 1982 and George F Will, "Mideast Truth and Falsehood," 
Newsweek Magazine, August 2, 1982 and Emmet R Tyrrell Jr., "How Cameras Lied For the 
PLO," Washington Post, August 30, 1982 and Melvin J Lasky's analysis of the Times 
(London) reporting, in "Embattled Positions," Encounter, September-October 1982
310 -See Kenneth Timmerman, "How the PLO Terrorised Journalists in Beirut," 
Commentary, No.75, January 1983, pp.48-50 and Ze'ev Chafets, "Beirut and the Great Media 
Cover-Up," Commentary. No.78, September 1984, pp.20-29 and Rita J Simon, "The Print 
Media's Coverage of War in Lebanon," Middle East Review, No. 16, Fall 1983, pp.15-16 and 
Frank Gervasi "The War in Lebanon: Intimidating the Press," Julian J Landau (ed.) op.cit:. 
p. 52-55
Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, interview, on July 19, 1995 and Howard 
Teicher, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C
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president. Gradually, as ambiguity increased, the threshold of these 
lower-level decisions increased until the NSC staff was functioning as 
an activist body in the decision making process.312
From a normative perspective, however, and from the point of 
view of this thesis, the decision maker bears the final responsibility 
for crisis response and the consequences of the decisions made. 
Whereas Caspar Weinberger deflected the blame for placing the 
Marines in an untenable situation, President Reagan acknowledged 
this principle and accepted full responsibility for the Marine's 
predicament.313 Following the bombing of the Marine barracks, 
statements were made to the press by senior administration officials. 
These statements included accusations of possible Soviet complicity 
made by Caspar Weinberger. They highlighted the prevailing belief 
within certain quarters of the administration that the Soviet Union was 
behind international terrorism and was somehow also responsible for 
the conflict between the U.S. and its adversaries in Lebanon.314 This 
increased the administration's bias as decisions were increasingly 
based upon ideological inputs instead of intelligence reports that 
reflected the reality.315 While communication during crises is essential 
towards seeking and maintaining legitimacy for response initiatives, 
due consideration must be given towards issuing statements of intent 
which inadvertently paint one into a corner and limit response options 
for the future. Creating precedents for oneself can be 
counterproductive and ultimately limits room for manoeuvre. The
313 See Weinberger's reaction and statement in response to the Long Commission 
Report in Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:, pp.164-168 and George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, 
pp.231-234
314 See the statement made by George Schultz, The Situation in Lebanon, October 24, 
1983, (Washington, D,C., United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Current Policy No.520, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1983), p.2. See the front page article by 
Robert Fisk in the Times, October 24, 1983 and William E Smith and Strobe Talbot, "Carnage 
in Lebanon." Time, October 31, 1983, p.14
315 See the POD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 
1983, Part Four: Intelligence, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1984), pp.57-62
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Reagan Administration stumbled across this line at the beginning of 
its first term, when President Reagan promised "...swift and effective 
retribution...", and vowed that the U.S. would never negotiate with 
terrorists.
3.6 The principle of preventing precedents
The last principle of crisis management is to avoid creating future 
precedents. Extraordinary circumstances created by crises and the 
corresponding demands placed upon the authorities to respond, must 
not be allowed to infringe upon existing agreements. In addition to 
ensuring that response actions comply with domestic and 
international law, the response strategies adopted must take 
cognisance of existing treaties and agreements between any parties 
that may be involved or affected.316 By making hard and fast rules, an 
agenda is created for an adversary to exploit by engineering a 
situation where the only solution necessitates the infringement of 
those rules. An example of this was the Reagan Administration's 
principle that it would not negotiate with terrorists.317 For most 
democratic governments, responding to terrorism through 
negotiation, is unavoidable and inevitable. The alternative is the 
implementation of para-military instruments and techniques of 
coercion, which is not always a desirable option for state actors who 
cannot afford to sustain unacceptable levels of collateral civilian 
damage and incur criticism for contravening human rights. For 
democratic states the principles of democracy create precedents 
which already hold the state hostage and limit its options for dealing 
with terrorism. The notion exists that in guaranteeing the protection of
316 See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons From the Past," in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit:. pp.13-14
317 See William Beck, U.S. Foreign policy in Lebanon Under the Reagan Administration 
1981-1989, (M.A. Thesis, George Washington University, 1989), pp.61-63
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their citizens, democratic governments are obligated to practice 
democracy while protecting it Wilkinson explains that, "One obvious 
but extremely important factor is the inherent civil rights and 
freedoms of liberal states which terrorist organisations can exploit. 
Freedom of movement both between and within liberal states, 
freedom of association, and freedom from totalitarian style police 
surveillance and control, are all rightly highly valued by citizens of 
Western liberal states. Yet they can be all too easily taken advantage 
of by terrorists."318 The establishment of an effective response 
strategy using intelligence assets poses difficult issues for 
democratic states.319 Demands for justification of actions undertaken 
by the authorities can place intelligence sources at risk and 
jeopardise ongoing and future operations.
Concern of incurring unacceptable risks to innocent bystanders is 
what prevented the U.S. government from exacting "swift and 
effective retribution" against Hizb'allah in the Bekaa Valley following 
its attack on the U.S. embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983.320 
This statement, together with Reagan's pledge that the U.S. would 
not give in to terrorists, forced the administration to search for an 
alternative technique to manage the hostage crisis which evolved 
later. Their alternative strategy was to make use of an intermediary 
which was Iran, who they perceived to have an influence over the 
leader of the terrorist group that was holding the hostages.321 The 
administration believed that by using Iran as an intermediary that it 
could negotiate an acceptable solution to the hostage crisis without 
compromising on its publicised principles of not negotiating directly 
with terrorists.322
318 See Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London, MacMillan Press, 
1977), pp. 102-103
319 See Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:. pp.171-173 and Walter Laqueur, (1985), 
op.cit:. pp.201-203.
320 See Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:, p.188
321 See Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:, pp.277-278
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The irony of the administration's stated policy towards terrorism, 
however, was in the fact that among U.S. security agencies, 
negotiation is standard policy. It is standard operational practice for 
law enforcement agencies, such as local police Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT) teams and the FBI to establish direct lines of 
communications with the parties and to negotiate for the release of 
any hostages in either barricade or hostage situations.* 323 This 
doctrine is regularly taught in unclassified courses which is provided 
nation-wide by the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP), in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), as well as representatives from the FBI, the Department of 
State, Justice Department, the Treasury, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, 
Defence and Intelligence Community.324 To the contrary, most 
countries that claim not to deal with terrorists, however, do. Israel has 
negotiated with Palestinians, Britain with the IRA and Spain with 
ETA. Virtually the entire U.S. foreign policy network and the 
intelligence community were aware of the policy.
The problem arose, however, when President Reagan specifically 
announced that the U.S. would not negotiate. Had the administration 
been more "in-touch" with the intelligence community from the outset, 
this blunder may have been averted. One of the principle reasons for 
this 'short-circuit', is the tendency on the part of most new 
presidential administrations to announce policy changes merely for 
the sake of demonstrating change and a departure from the practices 
of the previous government. Change is implemented for its own sake 
and not necessarily for any perceived benefit or advantage. 
President Reagan's statement was made before the new 
administration had taken time to consult, reflect and formulate its
79 9
Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.192 and Jeffrey Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.175
323 Robert Grace, Special Agent In-Charge, FBI Crisis Management Centre, Quantico 
Bay, Maryland, interview, on July 13, 1995
324 William Beck, (1989), op.cit:. p.623.
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stance on this issue.325 The reality was that the U.S. maintained a 
dual policy with regard to terrorism and the hostage crisis. While 
publicly announcing that it would not compromise on its principles, 
the administration was conducting secret negotiations with a third 
party, Manucher Gorbanifar an Iranian-born intermediary who 
claimed to have influence with moderate elements among the Iranian 
government. Iran was the state sponsor of the terrorist group that was 
holding the U.S. to ransom. The Reagan Administration also paid 
millions of dollars in ransom money to secure the release of some of 
the hostages.326
While it must be acknowledged that dealing with terrorists on an 
international platform is different from confronting terrorists in one's 
own country, the limitations that the authorities face as a result of 
international law, geographical boundaries and territorial sovereignty 
are further reasons for governments to face up to the reality of their 
limitations and the restraints in applying instruments and techniques 
of coercion.327 *In most cases, negotiation is the only viable option 
available and governments should refrain from making public 
statements to the effect that they will never negotiate as this is untrue 
and impractical. The Beirut crisis demonstrated that statements of 
intent and principle should be limited and drafted in a manner that 
does not limit options for crisis resolution by any conceivable means.
This observation was made by Noel Koch, in a telephone interview on February 21,
326 See Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:. pp.277-280
32 7 The United States discovered this when their attempts to arrest the hijackers of the 
Achille Laura at Italy's Sigonella airbase, were frustrated by the Italian government.
1996
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3.7 Conclusion
Tasking failures result in intelligence failures when policy makers 
and intelligence managers neglect to identify relevant requirements 
for collection. Impediments to effective crisis intelligence arise from 
poor communication between the decision maker and the intelligence 
analysts.328 This was certainly the case between the administration 
and the intelligence community with regards to their objectives and 
initiatives in Lebanon. A sense of overriding superiority and 
invincibility of the U.S. and its superpower status on the part of the 
administration and in particular key individuals, such as Philip Habib, 
George Schultz and Robert McFarlane, created a cognitive barrier 
which prevented threat analysis. The administration failed to 
recognise the importance of terrorism as a primary threat to their 
objectives and the safety of their forces, despite numerous warnings 
to the contrary. Following the first embassy attack, there was no 
sense of urgency in increasing security precautions at the Marine 
barracks.329 The tendency to downplay terrorism was influenced by 
the overall fear of an expanding threat to their policy objectives in 
Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, such as the Persian Gulf 
and the Iran-Iraqi war. In Beirut, immediate problems such as 
securing the base at the airport, which was inundated with large 
quantities of unexploded ordnance, a series of clashes with Israeli 
forces and Druze artillery and sniper fire directed at the Marines, all 
detracted from the phenomenon of terrorism.330 With regard to the
329 See Stan Taylor and Theodore Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis 
Management," in Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. pp.397-399
32 9 -See Stephen Engelberg, "A Warning Preceded Beirut Barracks Attack," New York 
Times, September 24, 1986. Engelberg reports an assertion by Noel Koch that he informed 
Caspar Weinberger nine months before the BLT bombing that international terrorists had 
moved away from kidnapping and that they had switched tactics to assassinations and large 
car bombs. Caspar Weinberger tasked Koch with the responsibility for drawing up a plan of 
action and to report back. He alleges that after nine months of failed attempts to obtain an 
appointment to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the BLT was attacked - one month before the 
scheduled briefing date.
330 See "The U.S. Marine Tragedy: Causes and Responsibility," New York Times, 
December 11, 1983
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wider issues, the administration failed to ask the right questions. 
They failed to direct the intelligence community to provide 
intelligence on the nature of the political and social environment 
within which the administration intended to implement its policy 
initiatives.
The intelligence community failed to support the administration in 
other areas of the intelligence cycle as well. Collection failures occur 
when the community fails to collect relevant and specific information. 
In Beirut none of the intelligence reports received by the Marines 
contained any specific information pertaining to the time or date of a 
predicted attack. Most could not be verified. The problem was not the 
quantity of intelligence available, but the quality, given the 
shortcoming in necessary details.331 The only report that came close 
to warning about the attack was a report in the National Intelligence 
Digest on October 20, 1983, to the effect that U.S. forces (Marines) 
might soon be the target of a major terrorist attack.332 Although this 
report was accurate from a temporal point of view it failed to provide 
any further specifics.
Guidance in selecting collection targets can be initiated through 
sources within the intelligence community, or by external stimuli 
through requirements levied by the policy maker. Often consumer 
ignorance pertaining to the capabilities of the intelligence services 
can produce unrealistic expectations. The expectation that specific 
details of a terrorist attack can be provided reflects a fundamental 
lack of appreciation of what intelligence organisations are able to 
achieve under difficult circumstances. Intelligence gathering on the 
intentions of terrorist organisations is a daunting task, given the
According to the testimony of General Paul X Kelley, the Marines received at least 
100 intelligence reports of car bombs between June 1 and October 23, 1983. Between 
September 15 and October 23, one intelligence section provided over 170 pieces of 
incomplete information. None of this was useful and had the reverse of effect of desensitising 
the Marines to the potential danger. See Report of the POD Commission on Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, December 20, 1983
See the New York Times, December 11,1983
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operational constraints that are generated by secrecy, paranoia and 
fanaticism, as well as the usually small number of individuals who are 
involved. The collection of specific details pertaining to terrorists' 
intentions in most cases remains almost impossible.
Despite the frustration experienced by the intelligence community 
at not being requested by the consumers to produce a 
comprehensive estimate on Lebanon, the analysts in turn, did not 
make any great effort to stimulate a request for an estimate from 
somewhere within the administration. Neither did they volunteer to 
produce one on their own accord.333 Their lack of initiative can be 
attributed to the traditionalist approach and the injunction against 
analysts offering policy advice which created a mind-set that the 
analysts would not speak unless spoken to. The intelligence 
community operated according to the norm that it was there to 
provide a service as prescribed by its policy masters and therefore 
focused its attention solely upon those areas selected by its master. 
The adherence to the traditionalist discipline in this instance 
undermined lateral thinking and adaptation to the dynamics of the 
socio-political climate in Lebanon.
Both the Committee on Armed Forces of the House of 
Representatives and the DOD Long Commission reports found that 
the upper levels of the chain of command failed to exercise effective 
oversight of the Marine's operation and to recognise the magnitude of 
the terrorist threat. They also concluded that they failed to adjust their 
instructions to the Marines and the intelligence community in 
accordance with the dynamics of the situation.334
David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.11
See Adequacy of U.S. Marines Corps Security in Beirut. Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, December 19, 1983, p.26 - which came to the 
conclusion that security measures taken to protect the Marine Unit from threats and 
intelligence support were inadequate. See also the Report of the POD Commission on Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, December 20, 1983.
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An analysis and distribution failure becomes an intelligence 
failure when the system fails to evaluate and interpret the information 
properly and to disseminate it to the appropriate consumers for 
translation into action. The evidence suggests that in addition to the 
absence of detailed information, there was a also an inadequate 
capacity to process the volume of warning intelligence that was being 
fed into the system. The production review process and the 
convoluted chain of command delayed the timely distribution of 
intelligence information. In fact, the DOD report not only criticised the 
FBI for failing to insert its analysis into the DIA, CIA and State 
Department communication channels, but the processing time 
required for intelligence reports to be distributed between the naval 
task force lying off shore and the Marine barracks, took an average of 
thirty to forty hours.335 The absence of trained analysts, who were 
experts in terrorism, contributed towards the processing failure. Had 
the producer - consumer relationship functioned in accordance with 
the activist approach, however, history may have been different. In 
the instance of the Marine barracks bombing the intelligence failure 
was overshadowed by the inability of the key individuals within the 
administration and the marine commanders to interpret and translate 
the warnings into action. Access to analytical experts on terrorism 
may have enabled the Marine commanders to learn what they could 
expect from terrorism, making them more receptive to the analysis, 
thereby enabling them to react to the information. Not being experts 
in terrorism and lacking analysts who were, the Marines failed to 
interpret and appreciate the implications of the warnings that they 
had received.
Given the fundamental flaw in the administration's management 
style, there is no guarantee that the intelligence community could 
have made a difference. Essentially two different policy failures took 
place with regard to the Marines' mission in Lebanon. One was the 
failure to act on warnings received. This failure is evident given the
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events and intelligence warnings between the first embassy bombing 
and the attack on the BLT. The second was rooted in the failure of 
the administration to re-evaluate the Marines' mission once they had 
recognised the fact that their environment had changed to such an 
extent that the mission they had set for the Marines was no longer 
viable given the environmental dynamics. The Marines were given a 
political mission which became incompatible with maintaining a 
non-combatant presence. Despite the objection of the Marine 
commanders in Beirut, who expressed their misgivings over the 
wisdom of using naval power to shell the Muslim Druze positions, the 
administration failed to grasp the potential consequences of that 
action for the safety of the Marines.
This was not the only level where a dysfunction in the chain of 
command was evident. Within the White House, despite the 
existence of a general agreement which prevailed between the 
various members of the intelligence and security services who served 
on the National Security Council staff, consensus between senior 
level staff, i.e. between the principal cabinet members, was notably 
absent. Conflicting opinions prevailed between the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defence. This extended to relations between the 
Secretary of State and the DCI and between the Secretary of 
Defence and the NSC staff. Cabinet dissention diluted the defence 
community's appraisal of their environment in Lebanon. This was 
reflected in the rules of engagement (ROE) under which the Marines 
operated. Caspar Weinberger made matters worse by refusing to 
acknowledge that the Marines were deployed in a hostile 
environment which necessitated them operating under a different set 
of rules. Being averse to committing American troops to hostile areas 
without Congressional and public support and the restrictions 
imposed upon the him by the War Powers Act, Weinberger made it 
almost impossible for them to act in self defence except in the most 
dire circumstances. These restraints did not pass unnoticed by their
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adversaries. While the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 
precipitated a crisis for the Reagan Administration, the intelligence 
community failed to apply opportunity analysis through lateral 
strategic thinking which could have taken advantage of the 
situation.336 Lebanon provided the administration with the opportunity 
to achieve strategic goals vis a vis the Soviet Union and the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. The U.S. could have exploited the 
situation to stimulate the peace process, enhance the security of its 
allies while curtailing the influence of the Soviet Union. The 
administration failed in this endeavour as a result of the role played 
by individuals and the processes that constrained their interaction. 
Competition for dominance between key cabinet members and their 
institutions, specifically the White House staff, the State Department, 
Defence and the CIA, under the indecisive and almost indifferent 
management style of President Reagan towards Lebanon, 
undermined initiative. Two schools of thought prevailed within the 
administration. The first, which was dominated by globalists such as 
Alexander Haig, Schultz, William Casey, Geoffrey Kemp and Howard 
Teicher, viewed the crisis in terms of the East-West conflict. The 
second school of thought, the regionalists, comprised individuals 
such as Philip Habib, Morris Draper and Nicolas Veliotes, who 
preferred to analyse the situation in terms of the dynamics and 
interplay of the political, security, economic and social factors 
between the region's actors.337
These competing schools of thought together with traditionalist 
values, which governed the process in the relationship between the 
intelligence community and the policy makers, inhibited opportunity
336 For an overview of the concept of Opportunity Analysis, see Jack Davis, "The 
Challenge of Opportunity Analysis," An Intelligence Monograph, (Washington D.C., CIA 
Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CSI 92-003U, July 1992) and Roy Godson, Intelligence 
Requirements for the 1990s, (Lexington MA, Lexington Books and the National Strategy 
Information Centre, 1989) pp.6 - 7. See also Roy Godson, Ernest May and Gary Schmitt 
(eds.), U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, (London, Brasseys, 1995), 
see the chapter on analysis.
337 For an explanation of the individual alliances within the Reagan Administration and 
their approach to the crisis, see Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:, pp.3 -7
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analysis. The prevalence of multiple ambitions and voices within the 
administration detracted from consensus over the objectives and the 
methods utilised to secure them from being reached. On the one 
hand, the regionalists sought to exploit the situation sans force and in 
line with the principle of limiting the means employed to achieve the 
objectives. On the other hand, globalists recognised the advantages 
in employing a combination of U.S. diplomacy and Israeli military 
force against Syria and the PLO. This divergence in views polarised 
opinions and resulted in the absence of consensus and raised doubts 
over exactly what American policy towards Lebanon should be.338
Overconfidence in U.S. abilities to influence and intimidate its 
adversaries detracted Alexander Haig, Philip Habib, George Schultz 
and William Casey from limiting their objectives during the crisis. This 
same belief in American invincibility contributed towards their inability 
to apply more appropriate instruments and techniques against their 
adversaries and Hizb'allah. While Vice President George Bush, 
Caspar Weinberger and the JCS cautioned restraint and insisted 
upon the limited use of military force against Hizb'allah, they acted 
out of institutional interest and did not necessarily realise, or 
consider, the consequences that their reluctance and opinion would 
have upon their adversaries perceptions of American resolve and 
determination in Lebanon. A dilemma arose between the principles of 
legitimacy and setting a precedent, one which encouraged Syria, Iran 
and Hizb'allah to escalate the pressure on the U.S. through 
increasing terrorism.
Finally, the interaction between intelligence and crisis 
management malfunctioned as a direct result of the traditionalist 
doctrine of the producer - consumer relationship and the absence of 
communication between policy makers, such as the NSC staff and 
the State Department, and between the White House administration 
and the intelligence community in general. Following the withdrawal 
of the Marines from Beirut in 1984, the administration and
338 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
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intelligence community continued to suffer setbacks which 
undermined their crisis response and intelligence capabilities even 
further, as the following two case studies, which examine the 
kidnapping of the CIA Chief of Station in Beirut, William Buckley and 
the second bombing of the U.S. embassy will demonstrate.
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Chapter 4
THE KIDNAPPING OF WILLIAM BUCKLEY ON MARCH 16, 1984
AND THE EMBASSY BOMBING ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1984.
As President Reagan approached his second term in office, 
his counterterrorism program was proving to be all threat 
and no action, so he turned to the CIA and covert action. 
Covert action would give the activists - Schultz, Casey and 
McFarlane - a means of by-passing Weinberger and the 
bureaucrats in both the State Department and the CIA who 
had been resisting a broad interpretation of the pro-active 
policy.1
4.1 Introduction
This case study is a continuation of the analysis of the Reagan
Administration's response to the phenomenon of terrorism in Beirut. It
focuses upon the impact and the consequences of the kidnapping of
the CIA Chief of Station, William Buckley, and the reasons behind the
failure to prevent the second embassy bombing - the third major
terrorist car-bomb attack against the U.S. in Lebanon over a period of
seventeen months. The effects that the continued erosion of
intelligence capabilities had upon the administration's response to
the crisis and the producer - consumer relationship are examined.
The study examines how the U.S. struggled against this decline and
the manner in which intelligence analysis reflected information in
support of preconceived ideas instead of policy objectives based
upon the reality of the opportunities and constraints reflected by
intelligence. Against the backdrop of the Lebanese civil war, the
escalation of terrorism as a method of waging war against the United
1 Stansfield Turner, "The Fadlallah Folly," in S Turner (1991), op.cit. p.182. See also 
Christopher Simpson, "NSDD 138. Pre-emptive Strikes Against Suspected Terrorists," in 
National Security Directives of the Reagan & Bush Administrations, (Oxford, Westview Press, 
1995), p.365. Simpson states that, "Prior to the kidnapping of William Buckley, George 
Schultz had been the most influential voice within the administration favouring dramatic 
Israeli-style clandestine war against Islamic guerrillas. But he often had been opposed by 
Caspar Weinberger and by most of the career staff of the CIA, who favoured more cautious 
tactics. The Buckley kidnapping put Casey decisively in Schultz's camp."
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States, and the U.S. hostages in Beirut, the study reveals how the 
NSC staffs initiative towards Iran was based on unverified 
information and faulty assumptions which went unchecked by the 
intelligence community. The kidnapping of William Buckley and the 
bomb attack against the American embassy exposed the inability of 
the administration to utilise its intelligence effectively. They 
demonstrate that the communication between the intelligence 
community, the policy makers, the Marine and embassy security 
personnel either malfunctioned, or that the intelligence was simply 
ignored. The incidents revealed a lack of appreciation by the 
administration of the determination and objectives of their adversary, 
notably Hizb'allah, who they clearly underestimated.
On March 16, 1984 William Buckley, the CIA Chief of Station, was 
kidnapped in Beirut by members of the Islamic Jihad Organization.2 
Buckley was the third American citizen to be kidnapped, after Frank 
Reiger's abduction on February 10, 1984 and CNN correspondent, 
Jeremy Levin's kidnapping on March 7, 1984.3 Buckley's case was of 
greater significance than Reiger and Levin, as he was a CIA officer 
and his disappearance created a crushing blow to U.S. intelligence in 
Lebanon. Following the deaths of Robert Ames and the former Chief 
of Station in Beirut, Kenneth Haas, in the first embassy bombing, 
Buckley's kidnapping meant the loss of the second CIA Chief in 
Beirut in thirteen months. This event had a paralysing effect upon the 
Agency's activities in the Middle East.4 As a precaution that Buckley 
had disclosed the identities of their agents and CIA operations to his
2 For the account of Buckley's kidnapping, see------- , "Come See! Come See! They're
Taking Mr.Buckley!," Special Report, the Los Angeles Times, December 28, 1986, p.A.1 Also 
Paul Eedle, "American Diplomat Kidnapped At Gunpoint," Reuters North European Service. 
March 16, 1984 and Newsweek, March 26, 1984
3 See "American diplomatic kidnapped," Times, March 17, 1984, p.36 According to the 
report, Buckley was kidnapped by three males at 07h30 at gunpoint and driven away in a 
white Renault in the direction of South Lebanon.
4 See M.C Johns, "The Reagan Administration and State Sponsored Terrorism," 
Conflict, Vol.8. No.4, 1988, p.251 and Stephen Engelberg and Bernard E Trainor, "Iran Broke 
CIA Spy Ring, U.S. Says," New York Times, August 8, 1989, p.A6. See also "CIA Network 
Wrecked in Middle East." Sunday Telegraph. October 22, 1989, p.13
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kidnappers during torture, the Agency was forced to withdraw its 
agents and assets from Beirut.5
The event also occurred two months after the U.S. had officially 
placed Iran on its list of state sponsors of international terrorism in 
January 1984. This was partly motivated by the U.S. response to the 
bombing of the Marine BLT barracks. However, there were other 
strategic considerations, not least the fact that the administration was 
preparing the legal groundwork to prevent the sale of U.S. military 
equipment to Iran during its war with Iraq.6 America's objective was 
motivated by its concern that Iraq would lose the war and that a 
triumphant Iran would export its Islamic revolution throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.7 With the arms embargo 
(U.S. Operation Staunch) having had an effect upon Iran's military 
re-supply capabilities, that country was desperate to acquire U.S. 
replacement parts and weapons that had been lost in its war with 
Iraq.8 It was this premise that led the NSC staff under the influence of 
the National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, the NSC consultant
5 For an in-depth account of William Buckley's career and his fate in Lebanon, see 
Gordon Thomas, Journey into Madness, (London, Bantam Press, 1988) and John K. Cooley, 
Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East. (Brassey's (US) Inc., 1991). See also Con 
Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. p. 112-117. According to the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 
Database on Terrorism as cited in the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Qabas, Buckley had been 
secretly moved to Iran via Syria. The fact that he had been moved to Teheran resulted in the 
U.S. sending a warning to Iran through Switzerland that the U.S. would strike at Iran if 
American kidnap victims were endangered or put on trial. The same newspaper cites Syrian 
sources as having said that they were unaware of the fact that Buckley had been moved from 
Lebanon to Iran via the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Buckley was smuggled out of Syria 
aboard a private plane to Teheran with Moshen Rafiqdust, the Commander of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard who had been on a visit to Syria at the time. The Kuwaiti newspaper 
based its story on a political military bulletin published monthly in Lebanon, under the name 
of Al-Taqrir - see the Middle East News Agency March 28, 1985
6 See Eric Hooglund, "The Policy of the Reagan Administration toward Iran," in Nikki R 
Keddie & Mark Gasiorowski, (1990), op.cit:. pp. 182-183 and Mark A Heller, "Soviet and 
American Attitudes Toward the Iran-Iraq War," in Steven Spiegel, Mark A Heller and Jacob 
Goldberg (eds.), The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East. (University of 
California, Institute on Global Conflict and Co-operation, 1988), pp.269-283
7 See Geoffrey Kemp, (1994), op.cit:. pp.22-23
8 Operation Staunch was the code name given to the U.S. initiative to cut off Iran's 
access to purchase U.S. weapons. This operation also went much further and included U.S. 
intelligence assistance to Saddam Hussein and Iraq which helped him to repel Iranian infantry 
and armoured attacks. See Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:. pp.120-121 and Jeffrey D 
Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.222. See also Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:. p.123 and Ben 
Bradlee Jnr, (1988), op.cit:. pp.308-393.
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Michael Ledeen and Oliver North to believe that Iran would be 
amenable to U.S. overtures for help in the hostage crisis. Ironically, it 
was the success of Operation Staunch that paved the way for the 
Iran-Contra initiative.9
The rationale behind Operation Staunch was to exploit Iran's 
desperate need for weapons in its war against Iraq, especially 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as the basis for an exchange of 
American hostages for arms to Iran.10 The details of the plan entailed 
supplying Iran with the missiles and other components from Israeli 
stocks, which in turn would be replenished by the U.S. A diversion of 
some of the financial proceeds of the operation were then used to 
fund the American supported Contras in Nicaragua.11 Not only was 
this part of this scheme illegal in the sense that Congress had barred 
the Contras from receiving U.S. aid, 12 but it also violated U.S. policy 
of not negotiating with terrorists.
The mastermind behind the kidnapping of William Buckley was 
one Immad al-Haj Mughniah. His motive was the release of the al 
Da'wa 17 prisoners, who were in prison after they had been 
convicted of blowing up the French and U.S. embassies in Kuwait. 
Mughniah was the brother in law of Mustafa Yusif Badr al-Din, one of 
the al Da'wa 17 prisoners.13 He was also responsible for Hizb'allah's 
strategy of kidnapping western hostages in Lebanon and is said to 
have had close ties with Syrian and Iranian intelligence.14 Although
9 See Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:. p.120
10 See Amir Taheri, £1988), op.cit:. p.163
11 See Jonathan Marshall, Peter Scott and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: 
Secret Teams and Covert actions in the Reagan Era. (Boston, South End Press, 1988), 
pp.110-114.
12 See Oliver North and William Novak, £1991), op.cit:, and David Barrett, "Presidential 
Foreign Policy," in John Dumbrell, The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1990), p.87
13 See Augustus Richad Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian 
Connection," in John L Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, (Miami, Florida 
International University Press, 1990), p.129
14 See Dilip Hiro, £1993), op.cit:. p.124 and Jeffrey D Simon, £1994), op.cit:. p.175. See 
also Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, p.281 and Augustus Richad Norton, (1990), op.cit:.
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Iran was quite rightly considered as a player in the strategy of 
hostage taking against the West in Beirut, this monolithic 
conceptualisation by the U.S. was oversimplified.15 It is doubtful, 
however, if anyone or any analyst within the intelligence community 
at that time appreciated the complexity and the dynamics of the 
influential relationships which prevailed within the leadership circles 
of Hizb'allah and between that organisation's leadership and Iran.16
Following the first embassy explosion that killed the Agency's 
officers, the CIA was in desperate need of qualified operations 
personnel to rebuild their intelligence network in Beirut.17 Now with 
Buckley having been kidnapped, the whole network was at risk. 
William Buckley, who had been appointed by Casey, was the officer 
in charge of the CIA operation that had been training the security 
detail of Anwar Sadat when he was assassinated and was therefore 
no stranger to the Middle East.18 He was despatched to Beirut without 
sufficient consideration of the potential dangers and consequences 
for his safety and that of the CIA's assets and capabilities. Buckley 
was certainly known to Iranian and Syrian intelligence, who may have 
been instrumental in selecting him as a target and passing the 
mission on to Mughniah and Hizb'allah.19 His kidnapping 
compromised the agency's humint capabilities. Hizb'allah is reported
p.129
15 For an overview of Hizb'allah and Iranian motivations behind the kidnappings see 
Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. pp.135-146 and Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, 
"Behind Beirut Terrorism." New York Times, August 10, 1984
16 This judgement is based on the evidence presented throughout this thesis and in the 
first seminal work that was completed on the origins and structure of Hizb'allah in Magnus 
Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit.
17 This comment was made by Noel Koch, former Pentagon counter-terrorist officer, 
during a telephone interview, with the author on February 21, 1985. This was also 
confirmed by Stansfield Turner, in an interview, on July 22, 1995, Skipworth, McLean 
Virginia
18 Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p.487.
19 See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.175 and substantiated by the comments of 
William Beck, former Naval intelligence communications officer in Beirut, interview, on 
August, 2, 1995
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is reported to have gained access to the classified documents in the 
burn-bag that he was carrying at the time and from over four hundred 
pages of testimony extracted from him under duress while he was 
interrogated in captivity.20 According to Noel Koch, a direct 
consequence of Buckley's kidnapping, was the hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847 in June 1985. It is strongly believed that Buckley's 
disclosures in detention provided Hizb'allah with strategic information 
pertaining to U.S. counter-terrorist strategy and capabilities and that 
this information facilitated their planning of the TWA operation.21 The 
Buckley incident reveals a fundamental lack of appreciation by the 
CIA of the nature and determination of their adversaries in Lebanon. 
It is an indictment of the Agency for their inadequate practice of 
operational security procedures. It is not known whether this was due 
to general ignorance on the part of the CIA or as a result of their over 
confidence in their own capabilities.
The kidnapping of Buckley and Casey's reaction had two direct 
consequences for U.S. intelligence and policy. One was rooted in 
William Casey's influence over President Reagan to adopt a more 
aggressive response against terrorism, a policy that was also 
strongly advocated by George Schultz.22 It galvanised the hawks 
within the administration and the NSC staff and provided further 
motivation for the presidential directive on terrorism. The latter, 
National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138), was signed by
20 The burn-bag is a briefcase fitted with an incendiary device which is supposed to be 
activated by the CiA officer in the event of kidnap or an attempt to obtain the bag from him / 
her by unauthorised persons. In Buckley's case, he was assaulted from behind by his captors 
and probably had no chance to activate the device. Buckley was allegedly transferred from 
Lebanon to Teheran where he was interrogated and then send back to Beirut. See Middle 
East News Agency March 28, 1985 and Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:. p.43
21 Noel Koch, former Pentagon counter-terrorist officer, during a telephone interview, 
with the author on February 21, 1996.
22 See George Schultz, £1993), op.cit:, pp.650-664 and Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, 
U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, (London, Mansell Publishing, 1987), p.63 and an extract 
of a statement made by George Schultz in an address to the Trilateral Commission on April 
3, 1984 as published by the U.S. Department of State, Realism, Strength, Negotiations: Key 
Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration (Washington D.C., U.S. Department 
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 1984), p.8
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President Reagan on April 3, 1984.23 This finding was a de facto 
declaration of war against radical Islamic guerrilla groups in the 
Middle East and Northern Africa and was an important milestone in 
the administration's response to terrorism.24 It promulgated the 
administration's policy of responding to terrorism with military force 
and authorised the use of covert action.25 NSDD 138 also authorised 
the establishment of secret FBI and CIA para-militrary squads and 
the use of military units such as the Green Berets and the Navy 
SEALS for conducting counter-terrorist operations.26 The directive 
made provision for sabotage, pre-emptive strikes and covert 
operations against terrorist groups which threatened U.S. national 
security.27 Although this directive created the legal framework for the 
establishment and use of military force against terrorism, the 
administration itself remained divided over when to employ force and 
effectively lacked the political will to retaliate militarily against 
Hizb'allah in Lebanon.28 The revelations that President Reagan had 
authorised covert actions, however, proved to be an embarrassment 
for the administration a year later with the unsuccessful assassination 
attempt against Sheikh Fadlallah in Beirut.29
23 See "Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed," Washington Post. April 16, 1984, 
p.19 as well as "Secret Policy on Terrorism Given Airing," Washington Post, April 18, 1984, 
p.1, and Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:, pp. 179-180.
24 See Marc ACelmer, £1987), op.cit:. pp.114-117.
25 See Stansfield Turner, £1991), op.cit:, p.168 and Christopher Simpson, (1995), 
op.cit:, p366.
26 See Robert Toth, "U.S. Acts To Curb Terrorism Abroad," Los Angeles Times, April 
15, 1984 and David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer, "Secret Policy on Terrorism Given Airing," 
Washington Post, April 18, 1984
27 Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:, p.185. According to Turner, while terrorism was 
certainly a problem and cause of frustration for the Reagan Administration in Lebanon, it was 
not a threat to America's national security.
28 See Juliana S Peck, The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, 
(Washington D.C., The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), pp.115-118. See also George 
Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, pp.643-653
2 9 While the directive did not authorise assassinations, it did not rule out terrorists 
being killed in retaliatory military raids. The Fadlallah incident was not carried out by the CIA, 
however, but it is alleged that William Casey came to a secret agreement with Saudi 
intelligence to mount an operation using Lebanese agents and an ex-British SAS explosives
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From the perspective of intelligence tasking, the resulting 
response initiative (NSDD 138) placed a burden on the intelligence 
community to provide the administration with information pertaining to 
terrorist organisations and individuals in order for the administration 
to use that information towards justifying its response initiatives. This 
created a dilemma for the intelligence services as the protection of 
their sources and methods were placed at risk of exposure and 
further compromise for the purposes of political expediency.30 
Governments normally have only two response options. One is 
military retaliation. The other is to arrest and convict the perpetrators. 
Both options imply that information pertaining to the terrorists 
planning and operations must be made public which would 
necessitate the disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. This 
places future intelligence operations and agents at risk of exposure 
and compromise. The principle of legitimacy clashed directly with 
intelligence in that it threatened to expose the Agency's agents and 
methods of collection. At the same time their covert operations 
against terrorism and their activities in the interests of the securing 
the release of the hostages, was in direct opposition to the principle 
of legitimacy.
The second consequence of the Buckley saga was the Reagan 
Administration's mollified stance towards Iran and the origins of the 
Iran-Contra Affairs which evolved later.31 Although the concept of 
rapprochement with Iran originated with Geoffrey Kemp as early as 
January 1984, the idea was not acted upon until a year later when 
the NSC staff, prompted by McFarlane and Donald Fortier, the senior
expert to assassinate Fadlallah. See Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:. p.435 and Bob 
Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. pp.489-492
30 Stansfield Turner, former DCI, in an Interview, on July 22, 1995, Skipworth, McLean
Virginia.
31 See Sue Baker, "U.S. Dealt With Iranian Tied to Buckley Kidnapping," Reuters 
Library Report, November 18, 1987 and "Iran-Contra Report: Arms, Hostages and Contras: 
How a Secret Policy Unravelled," New York Times. November 19, 1987, p.A12. and 
"Iran-Contra Hearings: 'Felt Keenly For Buckley'," New York Times, August 1, 1987, p.A7
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director for political-military affairs, requested the CIA to prepare a 
SNIE on Iran. Fortier requested Graham Fuller the NIO for the Near 
East and South Asia for help. Fuller's SNIE, titled, "Toward a Policy 
on Iran," was submitted to Casey on May 17, 1984 and warned of the 
growing threat of the Soviet Union in the region (following that 
country's invasion of Afghanistan)32 and the impending struggle for 
succession within Iran.33 It also pointed out that the U.S. policy of 
denying weapons to Iran (Operation Staunch) and accusing Iran of 
sponsoring terrorism was having a decidedly negative effect upon 
U.S. - Iran relations. Fuller argued that the U.S. and Iran shared a 
common interest in preventing Soviet expansion in the region and 
advocated a policy of rapprochement towards Iran.34 Casey, 
McFarlane, NSC consultant Michael Ledeen and Fuller believed that 
by making contact with moderate elements within the Iranian regime, 
the two countries would strive towards a more harmonious 
relationship that could culminate in a common strategy against Soviet 
expansionism. This belief originated from Ledeen's contact with 
Israeli officials, David Kimche and Prime Minister Shimon Peres.35 *
The Israeli intelligence originated from a report that was submitted to 
Mossad on May 2, 1985 by a dubious character, Manucher 
Ghorbanifar. In this report, Ghorbanifar claimed that there were three 
factions competing for power in the line up for the succession of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini.35 Ghorbanifar displayed an intimate knowledge 
of the players and claimed to have intimate contact with the moderate 
camp. He persuaded the Israelis that in order to curry favour with the
32 See Michael Schaller, Reckoning With Reagan, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1992), p.157 and Nikki R Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, £1990), op.cit:. p.176
33 See David Mervin, Ronald Reagan & The American Presidency, (London, Longman, 
1990), pp. 152-153 and Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:, p.149
34 See Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p.407 and Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:, p.202.
35 See Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
1990), pp.335-336 and Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:, p.201
5 See David Ben Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution, (London, Holmes & 
Meier, 1990), p.377 and Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:. p.133
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moderates, that Israel should sell weapons to the Iranian government 
via his connections.37 This would strengthen the Iranian moderates 
position and would pave the way for better relations between them. 
During his visit to Israel in May 1985, Ledeen was approached by 
Shimon Peres to request U.S. permission for Israel to sell American 
made TOW missiles to Iran.38 The NSC staff under McFarlane 
regarded this as an opportunity to gain a new foot in the door with 
Iran and the hope prevailed that a natural follow up would be to 
approach the moderate camp to exercise its influence over Hizb'allah 
to secure the release of the hostages.39 In fact, this idea was 
encouraged by David Kimche and Manucher Ghorbanifar.40 
According to Draper, the CIA supported this view and issued a 
revision of its basic analysis on Iran on May 20, 1984 in which it 
reinforced the need to compete with the Soviets for Iran's favour.41
The Agency's optimism may have stemmed from the statements 
that had been made during the past twenty four months by the 
Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, in which he 
declared that Iran saw no shame in using and acquiring American 
weapons.42 This was supported by the fact that a CIA source 
disclosed that there were between 30 to 40 requests per year from 
Iranians and Iranian exiles for American arms.43 On June 11, 1984, 
Donald Fortier and Howard Teicher presented a draft National 
Security Decision Directive to the NSC that represented the above
37 See Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, (1990), op.cit:. pp.334-335
38 See Michael Ledeen, (1988), op.cit, and Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:, p.139
See Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:, p.444 and Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:
p.112
40 See Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, (1990), op.cit:. pp.334-336
41 See Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:, pp.149-150
4 ? See David Ben Menashri, (1990), op.cit:, pp.375-376
43 See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The Tower Report, 
(Washington D.C., 1987), p. B/3
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position. While Schultz agreed that relations between Iran and the 
U.S. should be improved, he was against the policy proposal. 
Weinberger rejected the whole concept and called it absurd.44
The CIA's support of this flawed strategy is an indication of the 
poor quality of their intelligence, the danger of relying upon 
intelligence liaison with Israel and the failure of Agency analysts to 
test and question the origins of their information.45 The fault may 
have originated with the analysts who did not understand the 
factional complexities that existed within Hizb'allah and between that 
organisation, Iran and Syria.46 The decision making dynamics 
according to which decisions were taken within Hizb'allah and Iran, 
and to what extent decisions were influenced by Hizb'allah's patrons 
appears to have eluded the intelligence community. Intelligence 
managers were either not in touch with their analysts or they 
deliberately ignored any dissenting views in favour of the concept of 
improving relations with Iran and seeking an end to the Buckley 
crisis. A consideration and perhaps the motivation for ignoring the 
evidence was the belief that any efforts to secure the release of the 
hostages by dealing with Hizb'allah directly would be pointless and 
therefore alternative avenues of dialogue had to be found. Ultimately, 
the chance of moderate outsiders being able to exert any influence 
over Hizb'allah's leadership was wishful thinking and is a reflection of 
the lack of understanding of the fundamental dynamics of that 
organisation by key members within the NSC staff and the 
intelligence community.47 *
44 See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, £1988), op.cit:. pp. 178-179. This was also 
confirmed by Howard Teicher during a telephone interview with the author on October 23, 
1995 and by Geoffrey Kemp during an interview with the author on July 19,1995 in 
Washington, D.C.
45 See Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:. p.148 and see the comments of Robert 
McFarlane in the The Tower Report, p. 171
46 See Robin Wright, "Shi'ite Leaders Far From United," Christian Science Monitor, 
June 25, 1985 and "Iran's Embassy in Syria Called the Key," Los Angeles Times, June 21, 
1985
47 See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, (New York,
Random House, 1985) and Nikki R Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, £1990), op.cit:, pp. 185-188
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The intelligence community's failure to question the logic in this 
instance was made worse by the fact that Ghorbanifar was known to 
the CIA and was considered a fabricator and an unreliable source.48 
In addition, the Agency overlooked the memorandum that had been 
written by Geoffrey Kemp, the NSC staff officer and senior director for 
Near East and South Asian Affairs, that he had written in January 
1984. In that report, Kemp had pointed out that an improvement in 
relations with Iran would remain highly unlikely for as long as 
Khomeini was still in power and alive. It confirmed the perception of 
Iran as a revolutionary regime and America's inability to affect events 
in Iran and even went so far as to recommend covert operations 
against Iran.49 Conditions within Iran had not changed at the time of 
the Fuller/Ledeen initiative and McFarlane and his NSC staff chose 
to ignore the contents and implications of the Kemp report. The fact 
of the matter is that the whole Iran Affair was based upon 
Ghorbanifar's initial report to Mossad. Either the Agency overlooked 
this fact or it succumbed to pressure from the consumers, i.e. from 
McFarlane and Casey, to produce an initiative on Iran and the 
hostage issue.
In addition to the above conceptual error, the policy of no deals 
with terrorists, no bargaining for hostages and no compromise with 
blackmail, placed a restriction upon the administration in dealing with 
Hizb'allah to secure the release of William Buckley and the other 
hostages.50 The administration was faced with two choices: Either 
change the policy, or accept the captivity of the hostages in order to 
uphold its policy.51 Casey and Fuller believed that by making contact
See Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:, p.413 and Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, 
£1990), op.cit:, p.334
4 9 This fact was disclosed by Geoffrey Kemp in an interview with the author on July 
1995 in Washington D.C. For further confirmation see The Tower Report, p. B/2-3
50 See the New York Times, July 1, 1985
51 See Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:. p.121
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with moderate Iranian officials, they could justify and circumvent this 
restriction without compromising the administration's legitimacy.52 By 
negotiating with moderate individuals within the Iranian regime, the 
administration could claim that it was not reneging upon its position 
of refusing to negotiate with terrorists.53 On a tactical level, their 
approach was influenced by the belief that they needed to conduct 
their overtures to the Iranians on a clandestine basis. Because of the 
high-level of disapproval of the concept of the arms for hostages 
swap within the administration, McFarlane kept its implementation 
within the NSC staff. The CIA was cut out of the operation with the 
shift of power and some covert operations to the NSC staff.54 The 
result of this 'need to know* operating procedure was that they were 
unable to consult on a wider basis throughout the policy making 
community and obtain greater expertise. This also prevented them 
from seeking independent counsel, Congressional approval and 
public support for their policy initiative.55
While as far as covert operations go, the objective in itself was
not flawed, it was their methodology of attempting to secure the
release of the hostages first, that precipitated failure and culminated
in the Iran Affair.56 The CIA (Casey) who were concerned over the
fate of William Buckley supported the Fuller-Ledeen initiative on
condition that the hostage issue was resolved first.57 Although it is
For an explanation of circumventing an adversary in crisis management, See Robert 
L Pfaitzgraff, Jr., "Crisis Management," in Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulrike Schumacher,- 
Conflicts, Options and Strategies in a Threatened World, (Kiel, Institute for Political Science, 
Christian Albrechts University, 1987), p.29
53 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995.
54 See the remarks made by William Casey in an interview with Time, on December 
22, 1986. See also John Ranelagh, (1987), op.cit:. p.712 and the account in footnote no.72 
on page 816
5 5 See John Tower, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission 
Report, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987)
56 For an overview of the Iran-Contra affair, see Jonathan Marshall, Peter Scott and 
Jane Hunter, (.1988), op.cit. For additional information see also Michael Ledeen, (1988), 
op.cit.
57 See Nikki R Keddie and Mark J Gasiorowski, (1990), op.cit:. pp.172-173 and Ben 
Bradlee Jnr, (1988), op.cit:. p.305
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recognised that the release of Buckley was a primary objective, the 
administration's response was over ambitious and reflected a failure 
to limit their objectives during a crisis.
On September 20, 1984, six months after the kidnapping of 
Buckley, Hizb'allah bombed the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut.58 
The suicide driver, who managed to evade the vehicle barriers, was 
killed by one of the bodyguards of the British Ambassador who was 
waiting outside of the embassy at the time.59 Although this prevented 
the suicide driver from reaching the basement parking lot - his 
intended point of detonation, the explosion collapsed five floors of the 
building but failed to destroy it completely.60 Subsequent 
congressional investigations, however, found no fault with the 
performance of the intelligence community and placed the blame for 
the attack squarely on the shoulders of the embassy's security 
personnel.61 The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence came 
to the conclusion that, "...better use of intelligence regarding 
terrorism could be made."62 There can be no doubt that sufficient 
warning intelligence was available prior to this bombing attack. 
Turner observes,
...after the incident, photo interpreters studied the satellite 
photographs of the Sheikh Abdullah Barracks and found a 
mock-up of the obstacles that had been placed in the front 
of the embassy annex together with track marks which 
indicated that drivers had practised exercise runs through 
them.63
See Nora Boustany, "Terror Bomb Kills 23 at U.S. Embassy Office in Lebanon," 
Washington Post, September 21, 1984
59 See John Kifner, "Flaws Seen at West Beirut Embassy," New York Times, 
September 25, 1984
60 See William E Smith, Time, October 1, 1984, pp.20-23. It was alleged that the driver 
of the van intended to drive the vehicle into the basement parking level which would have 
resulted in the collapse of the entire building.
61 See U.S. Intelligence Performance and the September 20, 1984 Beirut Bombing,
U.S. Congressional Report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of
Representatives, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984), pp.2-3
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The embassy attack revealed a dysfunction between intelligence 
and its consumers at the lower and functional levels of the 
bureaucracy. Communications between the intelligence community 
and the security personnel either failed, or the security personnel 
were simply incompetent. At this lower end of the producer - 
consumer relationship, there is a case to be made for greater 
interaction between the intelligence community and the executive. An 
activist approach would certainly facilitate the involvement of 
intelligence personnel who could galvanise the security personnel 
into action. The same can be said about the producer - consumer 
relationship and the government's response to the kidnapping crisis. 
This revealed that the breakdown in the producer - consumer 
relationship did not only occur at the point of implementation, but at 
the policy making level as well. In the administration's efforts to 
secure the release of the hostages, subsequent overtures that were 
developed and made by the administration toward Iran were ill 
considered and incohesive as will be explained below.
4.2 The principle of identifying and limiting objectives
The biggest mistake that was made by the Reagan Administation 
was that its policy objectives with regard to the Lebanon problem 
were not limited, neither were they prioritised. In addition, Hizb'allah's 
strategy of hostage taking, created a fundamental dilemma. On the 
one hand they were compelled to respond to their moral obligation of 
protecting their citizens from international terrorism, and lending 
credence to President Reagan's pledge to exact "swift and effective 
retribution". On the other hand the administration had to maintain its 
credibility by upholding its principles and commitment of not making
Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.177 and David Martin and John Walcott (1988), 
op.cit:, p.159 and Bob Woodward and Charles R Babcock, "Antiterrorist Plans Rescinded 
After Unauthorised Bombing," Washington Post, December 2, 1985
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concessions to terrorists.64 This was based upon the premise that any 
such overtures would encourage further acts of terrorism.65 This 
policy dictum precluded negotiations with Hizb'allah.66 This dilemma 
could not have occurred at a more inopportune time. The 
administration was facing the 1984 presidential campaign and 
election politics and their campaign strategy overshadowed all other 
immediate political concerns.67 The memories of the U.S. embassy 
siege and hostages in Iran during the Carter administration were still 
fresh in the minds of the American public. The Reagan team did not 
want to incur a repetition of an administration being held to ransom 
over U.S. hostages for any protracted length of time. Most 
importantly, they did not want another hostage crisis to become a 
focal campaign issue. The primary objective of the administration in 
responding to the emerging hostage crisis was to suppress the 
problem as far as possible, keeping it from the public agenda. This 
placed the burden upon the NSC staff and the intelligence community 
to respond to the crisis in a covert manner. They were forced to 
remain focused upon a response strategy that would exclude direct 
contact and negotiations with representatives of Hizb'allah. This 
steered their initiatives in the direction of those actors whom they 
perceived as being able to wield influence over Hizb'allah. The 
administration identified Syria, but more importantly Iran, as potential 
players in a strategy of circumventing Hizb'allah. On a higher 
strategic level, Iran featured within the government's greater 
ambitions of Soviet containment in the region.68
64 See Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force On Combating Terrorism. 
(Washington D.C., U.S. government Printing Office, February 1986) and the U.S. Department 
of State, International Terrorism: U.S, Policy on Taking Americans Hostage, (Washington, 
D.C., Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1986).
65 See Brian Jenkins, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma," Armed 
Forces Journal International, (April 1985) and Ronald Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmidt, 
"Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol.4 No.4, (Winter 1992), pp.307-340
66 See Paul Wilkinson, £1987), op.cit.
bl See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit.
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4.3 The principle of limiting the means
This inhibitive strategy prevented the CIA and the administration 
from entering into direct negotiations with Hizb'allah. The result was 
that they were unable to determine and address the key issues 
behind the hostage crisis which were Hizb'allah's objectives of 
securing the release of the al Da'wa 17 detainees in Kuwait and 
forcing the United States to withdraw from Lebanon.68 9 Consequently, 
intelligence tasking concentrated on the search for information in 
support of the administration's counter terrorist policy which 
distracted them from applying a more lateral approach and 
addressing broader policy objectives and alternatives.
Hizb'allah's attack against the U.S. embassy annex demonstrated 
a total disregard of intelligence warnings by the consumer despite the 
fact that ample warnings had been circulated.70 What is surprising 
was the fact that at the State Department - intelligence interface level 
there appeared to be little appreciation of the fact that it remained 
Hizb'allah's objective to remove the physical presence of the United 
States from Lebanon. The implications of Hizb'allah's statements of 
intent appears to have been ignored by the policy makers and those 
consumers responsible for the physical safety of U.S. interests. In 
view of the domestic political impact of the first two bomb attacks in 
1983, the prevention of any similar incidents should have been a high 
priority. This was even more relevant given the fact that 1984 was an 
election year.71 At the very least the U.S. ambassador should have
68 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War 
American National Security Policy, (Oxford University Press, 1982)
69 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit.:. p.162 and the Arab Times. March 28, 1984 
and the Financial Times, April 24, 1984
70 This observation was made byStansfield Turner, former DCI, interview, on July 22, 
1995, Skipworth, McLean Virginia and also by Noel Koch during a telephone interview, with 
the author on February 21, 1996. See "U.S. Had Reliable Warnings Diplomats Were Bombing 
Target: Explosives Were Tracked to Lebanon," Washington Post. October 18, 1984, p.A1 and 
"The Issue of Embassy Security Stalks Another Administration," Washington Post, 
September 30, 1984, P.A26
71 The embassy annex attack was used by Senator Walter Mondale to launch a
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insisted on delaying the occupation of the new premises until all the 
physical security measures were in place.72 Furthermore due to the 
sensitivity of the American public, the U.S. government should have 
insisted on protecting the embassy annex with its own military 
personnel and not abdicated this responsibility to the Lebanese 
Armed Forces, who took over form the Marines a few days prior to 
the attack.73 The Marines were withdrawn as part of a decision to 
scale down the number of American personnel in Lebanon.
In focusing upon the immediate problem of the administration's 
response to terrorism and the hostage crisis during 1984 amid the 
re-election campaign, the intelligence community maintained an 
ethnocentric perspective. Efforts to examine the administration's 
policy objectives on a broader conceptual level were conducted 
within the confined framework of U.S. - Soviet strategic relations. The 
administration was cognitively confined by a policy predilection that 
focused their response on the premise that Hizb'allah was pursuing a 
strategy of terrorism against U.S. interests at the behest and direction 
of Iran. They discounted the fact that Hizb'allah was largely an 
independent actor. They placed a far greater emphasis on the 
secular influences within Hizb'allah and failed to recognise the 
extremely influential role of its clerics.74 The administration's focus on 
the state-sponsorship dimension of the crisis was driven by their 
perception that it was easier to respond and retaliate against a state
scathing attack on the Reagan Administration wherein he stated that in an interview on CNN 
in October 18, 1984, that, "...there is growing evidence that no one is in charge of American 
foreign policy and security, and I don't recall any time in modern history where we've had one 
right after another of the identical threats, the identical acts, and steps not taken." See 
"Eyeing Beirut Security Warnings, Mondale Asks 'Who's in Charge?," Washington Post. 
October 19, 1984, p.A4.
72 Despite additional warnings from the Defence Intelligence Agency and the Beirut 
Embassy Security Chief Alan Bigler that incomplete security arrangements at the embassy 
annex posed a grave threat to the U.S. and personnel, the State Department occupied the 
building anyway. See Marc A Celmer, £1987), op.cit:. p.24
73 See William E Smith, Time, October 1, 1984, pp.20-23
74 See Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism, (London, 
Sphere Books, 1987). See also Bruce Hoffman, (March 1990), op.cit:. pp.9-14 and Magnus 
Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit.
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actor, such as Iran, than a terrorist organisation that was fragmented 
and integrated with the civilian population to the point of being almost 
intangible. By limiting their perception of realpolitik to the concept of 
state actors the administration focused the problem on the inter-state 
level. In so doing it avoided the dilemma having to recognise and 
retaliate against an elusive organisation.
The focus on state actors resulted in the independent objectives 
and influence of non-state actors, such as Hizb'allah, being given 
much less consideration and even discounted. The administration 
failed to recognise that its objectives could be opposed effectively by 
a non-state actor. This cognitive error prevented the intelligence 
community from asking the appropriate questions and from 
identifying the relevant intelligence requirements. They did not reflect 
upon the extended nature of their objectives and how, when faced 
with the crisis of continued terrorism in Lebanon, it might have been 
prudent to limit the U.S. objectives. It also failed to address the 
problem of Hizb'allah divorced from the context of secular control and 
the wider parameters of U.S. - Soviet relations. In short, the 
intelligence community failed to make its presence felt within the 
decision making community.
4.4 The intelligence imperative
With their human intelligence sources and assets compromised 
William Casey ordered the intelligence community to increase its 
monitoring of communications signals between Teheran and Baalbek 
in the hopes of gathering information that could point to Buckley's 
whereabouts.75 Much of the human intelligence that was collected 
was through intelligence liaison with British and Israeli sources.76
75 See Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. p. 112
75 William Beck, interview with the author on August, 2, 1995. This was also
confirmed by Vincent Cannistraro, during an interview with the author in McLean, Virginia,
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What little American humint that was collected was done mostly by 
U.S. Foreign Service Personnel, and then on the cocktail circuit in 
Beirut.77 This overt reliance upon Israel for human intelligence also 
rendered the U.S. vulnerable to Israeli manipulation and mistakes as 
demonstrated in the discussion on the origins of the Iran Affair.78 In 
the absence of the CIA's humint network, the intelligence community 
had to rely on its techint capabilities and resources for collection. 
This overt dependence upon techint affected the analysis of its 
information and made the verification of intelligence much more 
difficult. This was one of the factors that contributed towards the 
second embassy bombing in September 1984.
4.4.1 Intelligence analysis; problems encountered with 
politicisation and in crisis communication
...intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans and 
operations to have the greatest amount of guidance and 
must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity 
of judgement.79
In the aftermath of their numerous setbacks in Lebanon the U.S. 
administration's critical introspection of its intelligence performance 
was judged against a very narrow set of criteria.80 The acts of 
violence against American installations and personnel placed the 
emphasis on warning intelligence and failed to include opportunity 
analysis. After the second embassy bombing President Reagan in his
on July 21, 1995.
77 See the testimony of Herman Cohen before the Hearings Of The Commission On 
The Roles And Capabilities Of The United States Intelligence Community, Washington D.C., 
January 19, 1996
78 See Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, (1992), op.cit:. p.337 and George Ball, (1984), 
op.cit:, pp.79 & 134, and "Mossad Deceived CIA, U.S. Military," Reuters Report, September 
14, 1990
79 See Sherman Kent, (.1966), op.cit:. p.37
8 0 Stansfield Turner, interview on July 23, Skipworth McLean, Virginia
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mounting frustration attempted to place the blame for his 
administration's failure to implement adequate security measures at 
the embassy annex on the crippled intelligence capabilities brought 
about during the Carter Administration.81 Reagan alleged that the 
problem was the result of the previous administration's response to 
public pressure to limit the powers of the intelligence community. He 
also blamed their over emphasis on the development of technical 
intelligence assets as opposed to human sources.82 No one in his 
administration made mention of the fact that the CIA had been 
compromised in Lebanon as a result of the kidnapping of William 
Buckley. In essence, intelligence requirements and tasking remained 
focused upon implementing the President's unrealistic promise of 
"swift and effective retribution." The intelligence community did not 
offer any alternative solutions because they simply were not asked to 
provide any.83 The tradition of not advocating policy objectives 
remained an insurmountable barrier between a policy that was 
obsolete by design and suffered from a fundamental lack of 
innovation. In this instance, the administration did not find itself 
having to limit its objectives. The nature of the problem, their 
environment, policy and the fact that Hizb'allah had the initiative 
through the hostages, prevented any real alternatives. Together with 
the limited means at its disposal, the administration was constrained 
in a grid-lock and unable to respond to the strategy of terror that 
Hizb'allah, Syria and Iran so effectively applied against it.
For the intelligence community it held different implications. 
These were the threat to their institutional interests and the danger of 
disclosure of their intelligence assets and methods as explained 
above. Another implication was the inherent tension between
See Stansfield Turner (1991), op.cit:. p.174
82 See David Hoffman, "Reagan Ties Beirut Attack to Curb on Intelligence," 
Washington Post, September 27, 1984
83 See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:, pp.9-12
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terrorism, state response and legitimacy. Counter terrorist operations 
usually include covert operations, surveillance, mail interception and 
electronic eavesdropping. All of these methods are regarded by the 
electorate as an intrusion into the lives of individuals and invoke 
protests against the infringement of civil liberties and the fear of 
abuse by the authorities.84 A key requisite for successful 
counter-terrorist intelligence is the collection and analysis of 
extensive data on the background and activities of members and 
associates of known terrorists and suspect individuals.85 While 
terrorism is generally recognised by the majority of the public as a 
threat to security within democratic societies, public concern arises 
from the knowledge that extensive data pertaining to suspected 
individuals and organisations can be collected and stored in 
instances where such persons may be innocent.86 While the concern 
is that this function of intelligence can be abused and that civil 
liberties may be infringed, the counter argument is that in many 
instances suspect individuals and organisations are not always 
immediately identifiable. This necessitates a preliminary amount of 
observation and recording of data pertaining to their activities until 
any involvement can be either confirmed or negated.87
The danger of counter-terrorist intelligence lies in the access that 
it provides government and security agencies in collecting 
information on almost anybody and the application opportunities that 
such information provides for illegitimate and extraneous purposes.88
8 5 For an overview of the use of intelligence in counter terrorism, see Ken Robertson, 
£1987), op.cit:. p.555
86 See F Donner, "The Terrorist as the Scapegoat," The Nation, May 20, 1978 and 
Walter Laqueur, £1985), op.cit:. pp.326-332
87 See R.H. Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today, (Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1977), p.3
88 See Abraham H Miller and James S Robbins, "The CIA, Congress, Covert 
Operations, and the War on Terrorism," in Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:, pp. 145-162 
and Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows, Volume 2, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1975)
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A classical example of intelligence abuse under the guise of national 
security by the CIA, was the Watergate affair in 1973.89 The 
unfortunate consequence of this debate, however, is the fact that it 
has been polarised into simplistic extremes.90 It is nevertheless this 
dichotomy that generates tension between the intelligence imperative 
and the principle of legitimacy - a problem that overshadows crisis 
contingency capabilities and counter terrorism. One of the most 
important factors affecting legitimacy is the manner in which the 
actions of the authorities are portrayed and the degree to which 
response measures are judged to be commensurate with the 
perceived threat or excessive. The media play a crucial role in this 
regard and where response initiatives are uncoordinated, the 
authorities run the risk of incurring severe criticism.
It is at this juncture that the tension between terrorism and 
government response initiatives, which revolves around the concept 
of legitimacy, surfaces. An underlying principle of legitimacy has to 
do with the public's perception, "...whether or not terrorism is 
synonymous with war or whether certain groups involved are in a 
virtual war."91 Another aspect was the problem that one of the factors 
that complicates intelligence gathering on terrorism, is the distinction 
between intelligence analysis for the purpose of producing estimates 
and intelligence for law enforcement.92 Whereas strategic intelligence 
is an aid towards policy-making, in terrorist induced crises, the 
function of intelligence is aimed at assisting with the investigative 
process. In this instance intelligence is relied upon to provide 
evidence for prosecution purposes as well as for planning and 
upholding the legitimacy of the government's response actions.93
A Q See (author unknown), "What the CIA Knew," Newsweek. July 15, 1974, p.29
90 Grant Ward law, (1989), op.cit:. p.136
91 Ibid, p.559
See Ken Robertson, "Intelligence Terrorism and Civil Liberties", in Paul Wilkinson 
and Alasdair M Stewart, (eds.), £1987), op.cit:. p.556
See G Davidson Smith, "Decision Making and Crisis Management Machinery," in G93
Page 211
Page 212
Legitimacy is a key issue when considering counter terrorism and is 
based on the relationship between the perceived threat (terrorism) 
and consensus. Robertson argues that there must be a general 
consensus regarding the existence of a perceived threat, and that the 
response measures applied by the authorities are commensurate with 
the level of the threat He explains further that it is only usually during 
a time of war when the government is permitted to resort to methods 
that do not lead to prosecution and the infringement of civil liberties. 
The key question he argues, is "...whether such a consensus exists 
over terrorism."94 This influences intelligence tasking with regard to 
counter terrorism. Robertson points out that, "Intelligence gathering 
must be based on a clear conception of threat and it must be a 
perception of threat which can command a high degree of public 
support."95 The objective of prosecuting terrorists for their deeds in a 
court of law places greater emphasis on collection requirements that 
are designed for the purposes of providing proof, rather than analysis 
of terrorist intentions and their underlying motives.
In most western societies, the responsibility for counter-terrorism
falls within the ambit of the national police and counterintelligence
agencies, where such activity is governed by legislation.96 The
National Security Decision Directive 138 issued by President Reagan
tasked the intelligence community with collecting information
pertaining to terrorism. This directive helped to skew the focus of
intelligence gathering on providing proof of culpability and the identity
of those individuals and state sponsors for attacks that had been
carried out.97 This demand contributed to the intelligence
Davidson Smith, The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the 
Policies of Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, (Aberdeen, Aberdeen 
University, PhD Thesis, 1986), p.408
94 -See Ken Robertson, £1987), op.cit:, p.557
qk
See John Ranelagh, (1987), op.cit:, p.700 and Ken Robertson, £1987), op.cit:, p.559
96 Many governments have allocated the responsibility for counter-terrorism to the 
counterintelligence divisions of their law enforcement and national intelligence communities. 
This was also the case in the United Kingdom and South Africa.
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carried out.97 This demand contributed to the intelligence 
community's limited vision and from applying counterintelligence 
principles to the crisis.
The objective of counterintelligence is to deny an adversary 
access to your capabilities and intentions, while simultaneously 
seeking information pertaining to his.98 The goal of 
counterintelligence is to wield the enemy's agents and other methods 
of collection against him, seeking an advantage, rather than to 
destroy or punish those involved.99 The overall strategy that is 
pursued in counterintelligence is that of divide and ruin. This implies 
seeking out those areas of vulnerability that will present the 
authorities with the opportunity to generate confusion, complication, 
distrust and fragmentation among the terrorist organisation's 
leadership, as well as their rank and file. It is a counter strategy 
against the terrorist objective of driving a wedge between the 
incumbent authority and the target population. It is essentially a war 
of minds, as opposed to the pursuit of law. Given that resources and 
intelligence assets are usually scarce commodities, the concept of 
the dual role of intelligence in counter terrorism is often overlooked in 
a world of diminishing budgets and intelligence assets. Consequently 
intelligence efforts are focused upon gathering information towards 
the prevention of terrorist incidents and the prosecution of those 
responsible, as opposed to responding to the threat by frustrating the 
ideological integrity of the terrorist individual or group. Intelligence 
analysis remains too narrowly focused with the result that lateral
Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan & Bush 
Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S, Political & Military Policy 1981-1991,
(Oxford, Westview Press, 1995), pp.405-411
98 For an overview of counter intelligence see the essays by George Kalaris, Leonard 
McCoy and Merrill Kelly and the discussions by Kenneth de Graffenreid and James Geer in 
Roy Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, 
Counterintelligence and Covert Action. (Washington D.C., The National Strategy Information 
Center, 1989), pp. 127-164 and Abraham Shulsky, (1991), op.cit:. p.178
99 -See Ken Robertson, op.cit:, p.557
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thinking and opportunity analysis remain subordinate to prevention 
and prosecution.
In Lebanon the American intelligence community concentrated 
upon gathering information that would lead them to the location of the 
hostages and for potential targets for military reprisal. This was 
largely superfluous given the fact that unless they were able to 
identify the location of all the hostages simultaneously at any given 
moment, a rescue attempt would endanger the lives of those 
hostages that could not be located and freed. In addition, the 
divisions within the administration over the use of force against 
terrorists undermined the political will to authorise any rescue 
operations. Analysis did not focus upon the growing phenomenon of 
Hizb'allah, its strengths and weaknesses nor its underlying objectives 
in the region. Even if the intelligence community had applied itself on 
a more lateral basis, it remains doubtful whether anything would have 
been achieved, given the breakdown in the producer - consumer 
relationship and the dysfunction in consumer receptiveness to 
intelligence input. For the policy makers, the problem had 
international political ramifications namely, the application of 
terrorism by a state actor such as Iran.
William Casey and George Schultz believed that the U.S. was 
involved in a war where terrorism was being used as a strategy 
against them and by a state actor, namely, Iran. Schultz became the 
most outspoken cabinet member of the Reagan Administration in this 
regard and argued that, "...the U.S. was in fact at war against the 
forces of international terrorism and that it had an obligation to play a 
leading role in the fight against terrorism."100 This perception was 
extended when during 1985, the Denton Committee, a U.S. Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism named after Senator
See George P Schultz, £1993), op.cit:. pp.687-688 and George Schultz’s comments 
before an audience at the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, October 25, 1984 and see 
George Schultz's comments in, An Address Before the American Society for Industrial 
Security, Arlington, Virginia, February 4, 1985, p.2
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Jeremiah Denton, was heavily influenced by a report by Ray Cline 
and Yonah Alexander.101 They came to the conclusion that the U.S. 
was engaged in a struggle against terrorism and that this could be 
described more accurately as covert warfare that was being waged 
against the U.S. by state - sponsors of terrorism.102 This underlying 
perception side-tracked analysts from considering the factors which 
influenced Hizb'allah's motives and activities. They overlooked the 
fact that it was an organisation with a will of its own. This failure 
becomes more evident as we continue to examine the 
administration's response and its dilemma in applying appropriate 
instruments and techniques during the hostage crisis.
Following the events of 1983, a far more complex producer -
consumer relationship evolved within the Reagan Administration.
Essentially this myriad of multiple interactive relationships consisted
of: (a) the link between the Agency and its director, William Casey,
(b) the link between the Agency and the executive, (c) the
relationship with the NSC staff and (c) the Agency's relationship with
Congress. At cabinet level there was also interaction between Casey,
the president, the National Security Council and Congress. Within
the intelligence community, divergent agendas prevailed with Casey
who was an activist and the Agency which was staffed at subordinate
levels by traditionalist officers.103 This inevitably caused tensions
within the Agency and resulted in Casey's frustration with the 'heel
dragging' that went on when subordinates reluctantly carried out
demands from the top.104 The bureaucrats in the Agency realised that
in utilising military instruments of statecraft to respond to terrorism
101 See U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, of the 
Committee of Judiciary, The Denton Committee, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1985)
See Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism As State Sponsored Covert Warfare, 
(Arlington, Virginia, Hero Books, 1986)
103 According to Stansfield Turner, interview, on July 22, 1995, in Skipworth, McLean, 
Virginia and John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
104 See Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p.487
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the disclosure of intelligence assets and capabilities would produce 
pressure on the Agency to disclose its methods and sources. These 
concerns and inflexibility undermined opportunity analysis, influenced 
the producer - consumer relationship and reinforced the traditionalist 
discipline.
This perception of the role of intelligence in counter terrorism had 
a direct influence upon intelligence interpretation and analysis. The 
intelligence community remained subservient and un-dynamic in its 
performance, thought and relationship with the decision makers. 
Adherence to traditionalist principles and the prevailing notion that it 
was not the intelligence community's responsibility to suggest policy, 
inhibited lateral thinking and prevented the analysts from challenging 
policy initiatives that were based upon faulty assumptions. An 
example of this was the Iran Affair. An independent investigation 
conducted by DCI William Webster (Casey's successor) into the 
Directorate of Intelligence and in particular the paper of Graham 
Fuller, revealed that the Fuller's memorandum was inaccurate and 
highly politicised. The investigation carried out by an independent 
lawyer, Mark Matthews, also reported that the Iran-Contra affair and 
the Fuller initiative had seriously undermined Agency morale and that 
many senior analysts wanted to resign over the politicisation of 
analysis under Casey and Gates.105
The administration's policy on terrorism and the operational 
requirements for conducting reprisal raids and rescue efforts defined 
intelligence priorities. This dictated the conceptual parameters of the 
intelligence community and stymied its intellectual response. The 
community focused its collection and analytical efforts on the fate of 
the hostages and on possible rescue and retaliation options. It failed 
to consider alternatives, such as initiating negotiations with Hizb'allah 
directly, or attempting to secure the release of the al Dawa 17 
prisoners, which may have opened the way for the release of the
105 See Mark Perry (1992), op.cit:. pp.97-99
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hostages. It did not identify the weaknesses of its adversaries for 
possible exploitation, such as disrupting the logistic support that 
Hizb'allah received from Iran and Syria. The Agency displayed very 
little initiative. The traditionalist posture of Agency managers, who 
preferred to adopt a conservative and cautious approach to the 
kidnapping of William Buckley and the subsequent hostage crisis, 
ultimately led to frustration on the part of William Casey and within 
the NSC staff. This encouraged Casey and other key individuals to 
utilise the NSC staff to circumvent the Agency and to engage in field 
and covert operations on behalf of the United States government.106 
The NSC staff which normally served as the interface between the 
intelligence community and the government usurped the role and 
function of intelligence analysis and conducted covert operations on 
their own.107 This contributed even further to the breakdown in 
communication between decision makers and the intelligence 
community.
Tension caused by the differences in opinion between 
traditionalist and activists prevailed within the CIA and the Agency 
and its consumers. At the helm of the Agency was a director who was 
an activist and determined to circumvent Congress and legislation 
when they frustrated any initiatives to secure Buckley's release and 
that of the subsequent hostages.108 Within the organisation itself, 
career intelligence officers and directors like John McMahon were 
determined to preserve the integrity of the Agency and prevent its 
image from being tarnished. Accordingly they remained reluctant to 
engage in any activities, such as the removal from circulation of 
terrorist leaders, which may have compromised or discredited the
106 See John Prados, (1991), op.cit:. p.517
107 See the U.S. House of Representatives Senate Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. The Tower Commission Report. (Washington D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, February 26, 1987)
108 See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (London, Yale 
University Press, 1989), p.240 and Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p.488. See also Joseph E 
Persico, (1990), op.cit:. p.370
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CIA.109 Rather than taking a firm stance either behind or in 
opposition to their director, key intelligence officers and managers 
within the CIA choose to remain inept and employed delaying tactics 
instead of implementing the DCI's initiatives.110
Despite his attempts to secure the release of Buckley using the 
resources of the intelligence community, including an FBI taskforce, 
Casey's efforts proved unsuccessful.111 One of the reasons for this 
failure was the fact that as DCI, Casey remained at a distance from 
the case and was therefore unable to personally supervise its 
progress. Although this implies Casey's involvement in micro 
management, given the high priority that he personally assigned to 
the case, a more hands on approach could have achieved more. 
Beck who argues that Casey was so frustrated by the inability of his 
subordinates to locate Buckley states that: "... he turned to another 
organisation - the NSC [staff] and an individual who was 
goal-orientated, Oliver North - to accomplish what the Agency was 
unable to do." Beck also claims that in May 1988, Casey's widow 
privately stated that her husband was aware that various 
high-ranking subordinates were not particularly forthcoming about 
Buckley's plight and that Casey knew who they were.112 Given 
Casey's bullish nature and forceful character, it is almost 
inconceivable that he would have tolerated being deceived by his 
subordinates and only lamented about it without taking any action. 
While he may have been deliberately kept in the dark by the officers 
who were assigned with the task of locating Buckley, there was no 
guarantee that a successful rescue attempt would have, or could
See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.185 and Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. 
pp. 106-107
110 See William Beck, U.S. Foreign Policy in Lebanon Under the Reagan Administration 
1981-1989, (Washington D.C., M.A.. Thesis, George Washington University, 1989), pp.45-58
111 For an overview of the tensions between William Casey and the CIA bureaucracy, 
see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, (1989), op.cit:, pp.229-247 and Mark Perry, (1992), op.cit:, p.57
112 See William Beck, (1989), op.cit:, p.68
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have been launched.113 Any rescue operation would invariably have 
had to involve the co-operation of the military. Caspar Weinberger's 
stance on the use of the military in counterterrorist operations was 
well known by this stage and any rescue attempt would most certainly 
have been influenced and frustrated by his reluctance to become 
involved in an operation that had no guarantee of success.
While the CIA was hamstrung by its internal dilemma caused by 
the traditionalist versus activist approach, a dysfunction in the 
producer - consumer relationship was also evident between military 
intelligence analysts and the embassy security officers in Beirut 
which led to the embassy annex attack. The administration's initial 
reaction to this latest assault was similar to their response to the 
kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Beirut and influenced by their 
preoccupation with Reagan's re-election to office.114 The 
administration tried to shield itself from the crisis and limit the political 
consequences of the attack by placing the blame on inadequate 
intelligence which they alleged was the result of intelligence humint 
rationalisation under the previous administration. President Reagan 
attempted to deflect the attention away from their inefficient security 
precautions and attributed the failure to the intelligence community's 
deminished capabilities under President Carter's administration and 
Admiral Stansfield Turner's management of the CIA.115 President 
Reagan stated that, "We're feeling the effects today of the near 
destruction of our intelligence capability in recent years, before we 
came here."116 Subsequent investigations, however, proved that this 
latest terrorist attack was not the result of an intelligence failure, but 
that it had been caused by the breakdown in producer - consumer
Wiltiam Beck, interview on August, 2, 1995
114 See Philip Taubman, "Simple Mistake in Beirut Bombing," New York Times, October 
26, 1984
115 See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.172
116 See David Hoffman, "Reagan Ties Beirut Attack to Curb Intelligence," Washington 
Post, September 27, 1984
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communication and the failure of the consumers to respond 
adequately to the warnings that the intelligence community had 
issued.117 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee came to the 
conclusion that, "...the attack was the result of a simple mistake of not 
blocking access to the road leading to the embassy annex."118 In this 
instance it was not inadequate intelligence that was at fault, but the 
failure on the part of the consumers at a lower bureaucratic level to 
react to the information.
In the wake of the bombing the administration's failure to respond 
once again with resolve reflected a bureaucratic malaise which 
paralysed the administration.119 The stalemate between George 
Schultz and the activists who advocated the use of force in support of 
policy objectives, against Caspar Weinberger's dogmatic refusal to 
use force in support of political objectives, remained unresolved.120 
The situation was also exacerbated by an indecisive president.
Rigid adherence to the administration's policy and the conceptual 
barriers which prevailed, dictated the parameters within which the 
intelligence community analysed the problem of terrorism and the 
government response options in Lebanon. At the macro and state 
actor level, containment of the Soviet Union and U.S. foreign policy 
objectives vis a vis the Soviets, Syria, Iran and Israel dominated the 
Reagan Administration's response strategies. The role of non-state 
actors such as the PLO, the Pasdaran, Amal and Hizb'allah remained 
subject to U.S. perceptions of how these organisations featured as 
proxy forces of the state actors.121
117 See U.S. Intelligence Performance and the Beirut Bombing, Report by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, October 3, 1984,
(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984) and John Kifner, "Flaws Seen at 
West Beirut Embassy," New York Times, September 25, 1984 and David Martin and John 
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. pp. 158-160
118 Philip Taubman, New York Times. October 26, 1984
119 Martin and Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.160 and Howard Teicher, former senior NSC 
Middle East staff member, in a telephone interview, with the author on October 23, 1995
120 See John Prados, £1991), op.cit:. p.513
121 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. and confirmed by
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At the micro level, very little attention was paid to the dynamics of 
the Lebanese street militias, who were symptoms of and the engine 
of the malaise of conflict and violence that prevailed within Lebanon 
and Beirut.122 The administration subscribed to the strategic view that 
the crisis could be resolved by the removal of foreign forces from 
Lebanon which would ultimately deprive the Soviets and their allies 
of any further opportunism. Terrorism and its manifestation in 
Lebanon was to be dealt with in terms of the static doctrine of 
non-negotiation and "swift and effective retribution".
Sustained tension between the intelligence analysts and the 
decision makers inhibited closer co-operation and communication 
between them. The engagement in operations by members of the 
NSC staff, such as the Iran-Contra Affair, meant that tasking, analysis 
and policy implementation were conducted by the same group of 
people. What transpired was the pursuit of information that was 
regarded relevant to the practical implementation of NSC staff 
initiatives rather than intelligence and feedback for policy making and 
adjustment. This meant that communication and the dissemination of 
information and feedback became a self-serving loop which 
effectively shut out other key members of the administration, 
including the wider intelligence community.123
Recall that a fundamental principle of crisis management is to 
establish and maintain direct communications between the crisis 
management team and the adversary. This principle is directly 
dependent upon the constraints and limitations imposed upon the 
government and are usually linked to the moral principles associated 
with the issue at stake and the public's perception of the legitimacy of
Abraham Shulsky, a former senior analyst of the Rand Corporation during the Reagan 
Administration, during an interview with the author on July 18, 1995, Washington D.C.
122 For an overview of the role and motivations behind the Lebanese and Beirut militias, 
see Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: Conflict Without End?" Middle East Insight, Vol.VI, 
Numbers I and II, (Summer 1988), pp.43-46
See John Prados, £1991), op.cit:, p.513
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the adversary.124 The employment of negotiation as an instrument of 
crisis management is governed by the balance of opportunities and 
constraints that are omni-present in the political environment. It is 
also subject to the mandate of the parties to grant concessions to one 
another.125 The decision over concessions, however, is affected by 
the deliberation over exactly which moral norms and principles 
should be upheld and applied. Most debates are a time-consuming 
process and are a luxury that cannot be afforded during crises. 
Towards alleviating the situation, crisis contingency planning can be 
used as an exercise to identify those issues and to formulate 
appropriate crisis response policy in the event of specific situations, 
such as terrorism, hostage and barricade incidents.126 The response 
of the Reagan Administration to the hostage situation in Lebanon 
reveals that very little effort was made towards crisis contingency 
planning.
4.5 Crisis contingency capabilities and counter terrorism.
Intelligence is the key to judging the credibility of an actual 
threat and to deciding on the appropriate tactics to employ. 
Intelligence in counter terrorist operations is vital to 
planning and in pre-empting terrorist actions, and in the 
conduct of operations against terrorists in a threat 
situation.127
See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. pp.301-307
125 -See Richard Ciutterbuck, Negotiating With Terrorists," Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Voi.4, No.4, (Winter 1992), pp.263-287
126 These observations were made by Brigadier Andrew Massey, former commanding 
officer of the SAS, during an interview with the author in London on May 5, 1995. This 
opinion was also offered by Robert Grace of the FBI's Crisis Response Unit during an 
interview with the author on July 13, 1995 at Quantico Bay, USA.
127 Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit:. p.145
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Despite the history of terrorist aggression against U.S. interests in 
the Middle East, the administration failed to develop adequate 
contingency capabilities. This was clearly demonstrated by the 
embassy annex incident. On October 18, 1984, the Washington post 
alleged that reliable intelligence sources had revealed that the U.S. 
government had specific and detailed intelligence warnings that 
explosives had been shipped into Lebanon for use against U.S. 
embassy personnel. The report also claimed that a few days prior to 
the annex attack, a vulnerability assessment had indicated that either 
the ambassador's residence or the embassy annex were the most 
likely targets.128 Despite sufficient warnings, the government failed to 
respond with adequate measures.129
This argument also applies to the abduction of William Buckley. 
One of the basic tradecraft skills taught to operational intelligence 
officers is counter surveillance and personal security. In Buckley's 
case it is not known whether or not he practised these precautions. 
No evidence of an internal enquiry to establish whether this was an 
oversight by Buckley alone or if it was part of a broader pattern of 
neglect by Agency operatives in Beirut, exists.130 * *Irrespective of the 
reasons, however, this proved disastrous as once Buckley had been 
kidnapped, the administration lost any advantage that it may have 
had towards developing an effective contingency capability based on 
sound intelligence.
During the hostage crisis the underlying cause that prohibited the 
U.S. from any chance at infiltrating Hizb'allah and from applying 
military force against them in Lebanon was directly attributable to the 
kidnapping of William Buckley. Two months after the bombing of the
128 See the editorial in the Washington Post, October 18, 1984, p.13
1 9 Q ..
See Terence Smith, "U.S. Said to Have Heard Warning of Beirut Raid," New York 
Times, October 20, 1984, p.A1.
William Beck, telephone interview on August 2, 1995. Lt Commander Beck was a 
personal friend of William Buckley and is familiar with the subsequent efforts by the CIA to
locate Buckley after his disappearance in Beirut.
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BLT barracks in October 1983, the U.S. despatched a small team of 
military intelligence and special operations experts to Beirut to 
investigate.131 This task force made recommendations for retaliatory 
options using a combination of intelligence penetration and disruption 
operations combined with military raids against selective targets. The 
operation was coordinated in Beirut by William Buckley. Before their 
departure, the team presented Buckley with a detailed briefing of 
their findings and recommendations.132 Following his abduction, the 
administration, the CIA and the Pentagon had to assume that their 
recommendations, plans and possibly their sources, had been 
effectively compromised during Buckley's torture.133 The U.S. had lost 
the initiative, their intelligence and their sources which were 
necessary for planning and support in mounting a rescue operation 
or exercising a military strike.134
The implementation of crisis contingency capabilities can go a 
long way in establishing policy precedents and creating an 
understanding between the producers who should make their security 
requirements known, and the crisis managers and policy makers 
beforehand.135 This will contribute towards protecting intelligence 
assets and capabilities so that compromise can be avoided. Likewise, 
closer interaction between the intelligence community and crisis 
managers can facilitate a better understanding and appreciation 
between analysts, collectors and decision makers, of the national and 
strategic issues at stake.136 With a clear understanding of the body
See David Martin and John Walcott (1988), op.cit:. pp. 134-135
See William V Cowan, "Intelligence, Rescue, Retaliation and Decision Making," in 
Barry Rubin (ed.), Terrorism and Politics. (London, Macmillan and the Johns Hopkins Foreign 
Policy Institute, 1991), pp.2-3. William Cowan was a Defence Intelligence Officer in the U.S. 
Marine Corps and was one of the members of the intelligence task force despatched to Beirut 
in December 1983
1 11
See Ben Bradlee Jnr, (1988), op.cit:. pp.190-191
134 See "William Buckley was 'biggest catch' for Lebanese abductors," Agence France 
Presse, December 27, 1991
Robert Grace and Robin Montgomery, FBI Special Agents in Charge of the Crisis 
Management Centre at the FBI Academy, interviews at Quantico Bay, on July 13, 1995
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understanding of the body politics' strategic objectives, intelligence 
should perform better during crises. This ideal can only be achieved, 
however, under circumstances where reciprocal communication is 
encouraged and contingency planning is the result of the consumers' 
appreciation of the implications of intelligence analysis which, in turn, 
leads to accurate threat perceptions.136 37
The features of terrorist organisations necessitate high-quality 
intelligence that is capable of penetrating and infiltrating them as a 
basis for prevention, containment and the application of counter 
measures.138 Following the car bomb attack against the U.S. embassy 
annex, President Reagan stated that, "...effective defense against 
terrorism is to infiltrate, intercept and know in advance when and 
where they are going to strike."139 The utility of good intelligence in 
preventing attacks was demonstrated by Israel in the 1970's when its 
intelligence organisations managed to thwart a number of PLO 
attacks in the Middle East.140 The objective of establishing a crisis 
management capability is to shield the political hierarchy from the 
effects of terrorism and to provide for a coordinated response to 
terrorist situations. Given the potential for the media to play an 
instrumental role in exacerbating and accelerating government 
response to terrorist situations and in particular during hostage 
crises, creating a crisis management machinery should include a
136 See Roger Hillsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, (Glenco, Illinois, 
The Free Press, 1956) and Robert Cutler, "Intelligence As Foundation For Policy," a 
declassified intelligence monogram released in terms of the CIA Historical Review Program 
and published in: Studies in Intelligence. (Langley, Virginia, CIA publication, no date or 
volume numbers given)
137 See Stan Taylor and Theodore Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis 
Management," in Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:. pp.315-412 and Richard Betts, "Warning 
Dilemmas: Normal Theory Vs. Exceptional Theory", Orbis. No.26 (Winter 1983), pp.828-833
138 For an overview of terrorist organisational features see Grant Wardlaw, (1989), 
op.cit:. pp. 134-136
139 See comments made by President Reagan as quoted in the New York Times. 
September 21, 1984, p.12
140 See James B Motley, "Coping with the Terrorist Threat: The U.S. Intelligence 
Dilemma," in Stephen J Cimbala, (ed.), (1987), op.cit:. p.166
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plan to manage the media.141 In many instances the media will 
highlight the impotence or concessions made by the authorities with 
regard to terrorist threats which, in addition to compromising 
response initiatives, can invoke public pressure and reaction from the 
victims of terrorism.142
In circumstances where covert operations to deal with terrorism 
are enacted, media interest can expose these initiatives. This can 
open up the debate over civil liberties where it is a case of domestic 
terrorism and human rights in the case of response initiatives on 
foreign soil. All of which may embarrass the government.143 This was 
the case with the failed assassination attempt against Sheikh 
Fadlallah in Beirut.144 In this instance the operation undermined the 
government's strategic initiatives in the region and frustrated the 
administration's overtures towards improving U.S. - Iranian relations 
which was aimed at achieving the following objectives:145 146The first 
was strategic and aimed at preventing Soviet expansionism. Linked 
to this goal was their second objective that was based on the 
apprehension of an internal political collapse in Iran and the potential 
for subsequent exploitation by the Soviet Union.145 The third objective 
was the immediate concern for the fate of the other American 
hostages, that had been kidnapped before and after William Buckley, 
and the administration's fear of Iranian control.147 The administration
141 See Robert Oakley, "International Terrorism." Foreign Affairs. Vol.65, No.3, (1986)
142 See Edward Joyce, "Reporting Hostage Crises: Who's in Charge of Television," SAIS 
Review, (Winter/Spring 1986), pp.169-176 and Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit:. pp.151-157 
and Newsweek, February 16, 1987
143 See "Anti-Terrorist Plan Rescinded After Unauthorised Bombing," Washington Post. 
May 12, 1985, p.1
144 See Roland Crelinsten, "Victims Perspectives," in David L Paletz and Alex P Schmidt 
(eds.), Terrorism and the Media, (London, Sage, 1992), pp.208-238
14 5 See David Ben Menashi, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution, (London, Holmes 
and Weier, 1990), pp.374-385 and See James A Bill, "The U.S. Overtures to Iran, 1985-1986: 
An Analysis," in Nikki R Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski (eds.), £1990), op.cit:, pp.166-179
146 Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:, p.408 and 433
147 See John Tower, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission 
Report, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987), p.261.
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desperately wanted to avoid another protracted hostage crisis where 
Iran's hold over the administration would dominate the headlines. 
The fourth goal represented the desire to end the Iran-Iraq war. 
Lastly, the perceived need to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities in 
relation to Iran and its neighbours, was an important goal.
After the fall of the Shah of Iran, the loss of the sophisticated 
listening posts at Kapkan and Behshahr, crippled American 
intelligence capacity to monitor Soviet activities and the war in 
Afghanistan.148 By attempting to re-establish ties with Iran, the 
administration and the intelligence community hoped to restore part 
of their crippled intelligence capacity in the Middle East. The role of 
intelligence in predicting and pre-empting terrorist incidents which is 
an integral function towards threat analysis, however, contributes 
towards the tension between legitimacy and crisis contingency 
capabilities in democratic societies, as will be demonstrated below.
4.6 The principle of legitimacy.
The administration's stated anti-terrorist policy acted as a 
constraint. Its agreements with its allies on combating terrorism and 
the need to uphold its credibility as an opponent of international 
terrorism restricted the government from establishing direct ties with 
its principal adversary. During the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations, the U.S. government had entered into a number of 
international treaties and declarations with its European allies aimed 
at combating terrorism.149 This placed the administration in a tenuous
For an overview of multilateral negotiations and declarations on combating 
international terrorism, see Marc Celmer, (1987), op.cit:. p.111 Among those listed are: June
1980 at the Venice Economic Summit - Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages. 
December 1980 At the North Atlantic Assembly, the Resolution on Terrorism was announced. 
At the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, a Declaration on Terrorism and U.S. Hostages was 
signed. In 1983 at the Madrid Conference on Security Co-operation in Europe there was a 
Provision on Terrorism which was signed, and in London in June 1984, at the London 
Economic Summit a Declaration on terrorism was issued.
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position and restricted the government from initiating dialogue or 
negotiations with Hizb'allah directly because it was expected to 
maintain a hard line stance towards terrorism.150
Other compounding factors which made any overtures between 
the administration and Hizb'allah difficult was the persistent 
antagonism displayed towards America by that organisation and the 
perception of the U.S. administration that dialogue with Hizb'allah 
was impossible.151 This influenced the intelligence community and the 
administration to focus upon Syria, and Iran as alternative avenues 
towards dialogue. In the pursuit of these initiatives external sources 
of persuasion, and even finance, were utilised.152 The administration 
used individuals, businessmen and organisations such as CNN and 
the Texas billionaire, Ross Perot, who worked together with the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson,153 to function as intermediaries with Iran.154 
Because these initiatives were being conducted by the NSC staff, 
and controlled from the White House, the intelligence community 
remained uninformed.155 A result was that these initiatives towards
See U.S. Department of State, "President Ford Signs Ratification of Convention on 
Terrorism," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, (November 1976) p.554. In a response to a 
series of kidnappings of diplomats and businessmen in South and Central America, the 
Organisation of American States (OAS), signed the "Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts 
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons of International Significance." This 
treaty was signed in Washington on February 2, 1971 by 13 OAS states and was ratified by 
the U.S. on October 8, 1976.
151 See Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit:. pp.203-207
152 -See Bob Woodward, "North Enlisted Billionaire Perot to Ransom Hostages," 
Washington Post, February 2, 1986
153 For an overview of the role played by Ross Perot Jesse Jackson and the U.S. 
hostage crisis in Iran and Lebanon, see, Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. p. 408 and 
Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. pp.23, 38-39,39-42, 91, 68, 69, 107, 159 & 208. See also 
Ben Bradlee Jnr, (1988), op.cit:. p.303 and New York Times. December 3, 1986, "The White 
House: A Billionaire Tried to Help," and Richard L Berke, "The White House Crisis: Perot 
Says North Got Him to Put Up Ransom Money," New York Times, December 2, 1986
154 The U.S. had managed to use Syria successfully to secure the release of David 
Dodge, Frank Reiger and Frenchman, Christian Joubert through the intervention of Syria and 
Amal in April 1984. See International Herald Tribune, 23 July, 1982, New York Times, 
September 13, 1982 and International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984 and Washington Post, 
May 9, 1984. See also Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985
155 Geoffrey Kemp, interview on July 19,1995 in Washington, D.C.
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the hostage crisis were characterised by the employment of an array 
of official and unofficial mediators who lacked a clear appreciation 
and understanding of the constraints and opportunities created by 
the political environment in Lebanon and the region. This was evident 
by the erratic fluctuations in U.S. attitude towards Iran and Syria. 
Operating on a clandestine basis together with the NSC staff, these 
individuals were unable to benefit from any general and background 
briefings that the intelligence community could have provided.
Given Iran's predominant hostility towards America, the 
administration initially focused its efforts on Syria.156 However, 
President Asad who exerted a degree of control over Amal,157 
maintained his distance from the U.S. overtures, placing greater 
value on Syria's strategic and financial relationship with Iran.158 The 
administration's efforts to secure Asad's co-operation demonstrated 
its inability to grasp the complexities of interdependence that existed 
between Syria, Iran and Hizb'allah. It was also unrealistic to expect 
any results with the exclusion of Hizb'allah's officials from 
negotiations.159 While the no-concessions and no-contact policy 
between the U.S. and its adversaries dominated the strategic thinking 
of most of the key administration members, the intelligence 
bureaucracy for its part displayed very little initiative, if any at all, in 
correcting this cognitive and strategic error. This problem was never 
overcome due to the traditionalist discipline that reinforced the
See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.172 for confirmation that Frank Reiger was 
released through the efforts of Amal, who stole him from Hizb'allah and then released him.
157 For Syria's relationship with Amal, see Augustus Richard Norton, £1987), op.cit:.
p.68
158 For an overview of Asad's strategic relationship with Iran, see Patrick Seale, Asad, 
(London, I. B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, 1988), pp.351-354. See also BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, August 21, 1979. See also the Independent. August 3, 1989 and April 25, 1990 
and Xavier Raufer, Middle East Terrorism: Rules of the Game," Political Warfare, (Fall 1991), 
p.11
159 See See the editorial in the Washington Post, August 18, 1989 and the Independent. 
October 23, 1991. See also Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizb'allah's Command Leadership: Its 
Structure, Decision Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol.6, No.3, (Autumn 1994), pp.303-339
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overcome due to the traditionalist discipline that reinforced the 
subservient relationship between the CIA's bureaucracy and the 
administration and the general lack of confidence in the Agency by its 
officers and consumers alike.160 This was exacerbated by an absence 
of communication between the executive and the legislative branches 
of government.161
It is not very often that intelligence failures are a consequence of 
collection failures. They are more often the result of the failure to 
interpret and integrate information in relation to policy objectives. 
Intelligence as knowledge is punctuated by a series of barriers 
between its competent collection and its incompetent utilisation.162 In 
the case of the embassy annex bombing no fault could be found with 
the communication and dissemination of intelligence prior to the 
attack. Subsequent investigations fixed the blame on the shoulders of 
its consumers, the embassy security personnel. The cause of this 
failure was not intelligence or policy but the effective appreciation of 
its implications and an adequate response to the numerous warnings 
by those responsible at the embassy in Beirut.
In response to the kidnapping of William Buckley, however, the 
intelligence - policy malfunction was the result of inadequate initiative 
exercised by the intelligence community. Poor communication 
inhibited closer contact between producers and consumers with little 
consideration having been given to whether or not the consumers 
had asked the right questions. The intelligence community, 
unaccustomed to the practice of questioning or advocating policy 
options, did not question the government's counter terrorist policy 
and continued to conducted its activities in support of the established
160 For an explanation of the reasons behind the CIA's loss of nerve and ability to be 
innovative, see John Ranelagh, (1987), op.cit:. pp.656-659. See also Christopher Andrew, 
(1995), op.cit:. p.459
161 See Robert Ruhl Simmons, "An Evaluation of Intelligence performance During the 
First Reagan Administration," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
Vol.4, No.1, (Spring 1990), p.4 and John Ranelagh, (1987), op.cit:, pp.657-671.
162 See Christopher Brady, "Intelligence Failures: Plus Ca Change," Intelligence and 
National Security, Vol.8, No.4, (October 1993), pp.86-96
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policy. In addition to the these constraints, the lack of intelligence 
support in the form of context specific information prevented the 
Reagan Administration from responding effectively to Hizb'allah and 
the hostage crisis. The greatest difficulty lay in determining the exact 
location of the hostages. This was rendered almost impossible by the 
fact that the terrorists continually moved the hostages between safe 
houses. Exacerbating the situation was the strategy used by the 
terrorists to conceal themselves by dispersing among the civilian 
population and using the hostages as a shield against military 
reprisal. This made the implementation of any rescue mission 
difficult. The reality was that the hostages would have had to be 
rescued before any retaliation could be carried out. It is also doubtful 
whether the administration would have responded any differently to 
the crisis even if they were in possession of better intelligence.
Apart from policy and intelligence problems, the military were led 
by a reluctant Secretary of Defence and a generation of officers 
whose confidence had been undermined by their failures in 
Vietnam163 and the Iranian rescue mission. In this instance, the crisis 
management principle of limiting the means to achieve one's 
objectives was a principle that the administration had no alternative 
but to follow under the circumstances.164 For the duration of its 
experiences against Hizb'allah in Lebanon, the government found 
itself having to exercise almost total restraint in applying military 
instruments against its adversary. While Hizb'allah and Amal were 
militarily inferior to the U.S., they nevertheless became an
163 According to Noel Koch, during a telephone interview, with the author on February 
21, 1995, the legacy of the CIA's involvement in Vietnam and the negative publicity 
surrounding the excesses committed by South Vietnamese agents during Operation Phoenix, 
contributed towards a reluctance on the part of CIA officers to embark upon counter-terrorist 
operations.
164 For an overview of the U.S. attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages see Lt. Col. 
Charles Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers, 1983) and Martin and Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, Ch.1 and Stansfield Turner, (1991), 
op.cit:. Ch.15-16
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insurmountable security problem which exposed the intractability of 
the Reagan Administration.
The consequences of applying military instruments of statecraft 
against Hizb'allah had already been demonstrated when the U.S. 
navy bombarded Syrian and Hizb'allah militia positions in the Suq al 
Gharb in 1983.165 Similarly, the French air-strikes against the Sheikh 
Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa valley on November 17, 1983, 
following the attacks against the French and U.S. barracks, had failed 
to modify Hizb'allah's behaviour.166 On the contrary, military 
retaliation against Hizb'allah had demonstrated that it only served to 
galvanise support and encourage more recruits for its cause.167 
Instead of intimidating Hizb'allah, reprisals only served to escalate 
the threshold of violence that Hizb'allah applied to its enemies.168
Where the U.S. attempted to retaliate using force, however, it 
remained unsuccessful with its initiatives resulting in negative 
consequences. As soon as Hizb'allah kidnapped their first U.S. 
hostage, the risk of applying military force as a means of retaliation 
against Hizb'allah increased. That organisation's operational secrecy, 
its decentralised chain of command and its strategy of deploying its 
operatives among the civilian population of Beirut, similar to the 
strategy of the PLO, all enhanced their safeguard against American 
reprisals. By expanding their strategy of hostage taking to include
See Admiral James D Watkins, "Countering Terrorism: A New Challenge to our 
National Conscience," Sea Power, (November 1984), p.37 and William E Smith, "Helping to 
Hold the Line," Time, October 3, 1983 and Brett A McCrea, "U.S. Counter- Terrorist Policy: A 
Proposed Strategy for a Non-traditional Threat," Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 
Vol.2, No.3, (Winter 1994), pp.502-503
166 See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.139 and Annie Laurent and 
Antione Basbous, Guerres' Secretes au Liban, (Paris, Gallimard, 1982) and Pierre Marion, La 
Mission Impossible, (Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1991), p.233
167 For statements by Hizb'allah with regard to martyrs and how acts of violence against 
the organisation and its members strengthens their cause, see the Independent, October 8, 
1991 and the Times, February 2, 1984
168 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.270 and Times, February 2, 1984 and the 
comments by Sheikh Abbas al Musawi who warned that, "...America should think very 
carefully before carrying out any foolish actions against Hizb'allah," Independent, August 3, 
1989
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citizens of France, the United Kingdom, West Germany and Israeli 
soldiers, Hizb'allah rendered these states hostages to one another by 
making the safety of the hostages of each country vulnerable to any 
act of reprisal by the other states.169 Their vulnerability was 
demonstrated in 1986 when after the U.S. raid against Tripoli, Abu 
Nidal acting on Qadaffi's behalf, purchased and executed the 
American hostage, Peter Kilburn, and British hostages, Philip 
Padfield and Leigh Douglas.170
In 1985 the dangers of counter-terrorist initiatives became all too 
apparent after Casey was suspected of requesting the assistance of 
Saudi Arabia in carrying out the assassination of Sheikh Fadlallah 
the spiritual leader of Hizb'allah.171 The attack caused the death of 80 
innocent civilians but failed to kill Fadlallah. This resulted in an 
international outcry and bad publicity for the U.S. despite its denials 
of complicity in the failed attack.172
4.7 The principle of preventing precedents
While the attempt on Fadlallah's life raised domestic concerns 
that the CIA may have been involved in an assassination operation, 
German, French and British fears centred around the safety of their 
citizens who were being held hostage.173 Limited by the precedents
1 See the International Herald Tribune, September 22, 1984, the Washington Post, 
February 5, 1987 and Newsweek, February 9, 1987
170 See Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. pp.284-287
171 See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. pp. 182-187
172 See the Guardian, March 8, 1985 and the International Herald Tribune, May 17, 
1985 and Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:. pp.430, 435-6 and 441-443. Sheikh Fadlallah the 
spiritual leader of Hizb'allah was reported to have blessed the suicide drivers of the van which 
exploded outside the U.S. embassy annex in 1984. See David Martin and John Walcott, 
(1988), op.cit:. pp.133 and 220. The details of the attempt on Fadlallah's life and the alleged 
U.S. complicity are described in the following chapter.
173 For an overview of the assassination attempt against Sheikh Fadlallah, see 
Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. pp.182-187 and Bob Woodward, (1988), op.cit:. pp.386-398
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that it had created for itself when President Reagan announced the 
administration's predilection against making concessions to terrorists 
and in its options in applying military coercion against Hizb'allah, the 
administration resorted to diplomacy, economic and legal 
instruments.174 Whereas the U.S. were able to apply diplomatic 
pressure against Syria with limited success,175 the absence of formal 
diplomatic ties with Iran did not allow for this strategy and economic 
sanctions were applied against the latter instead.176 However, in 
terms of its global strategic interests the U.S. could not afford to allow 
the antagonistic relationship between itself and Iran to continue.177
The application of diplomatic isolation as an instrument of 
coercive diplomacy, however, detracts from the crisis management 
principle of establishing communication with the adversary.178 Ever 
since the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, diplomatic 
links between the two nations had been severed which made 
communication with Iran during this hostage crisis difficult. Efforts to 
negotiate directly with the Iranians over this issue had not borne too 
much fruit either. In its efforts to apply diplomatic pressure on 
elements within Iran's clerical factions for the purpose of influencing 
Hizb'allah to modify its behaviour, the U.S. was dependent upon 
intermediaries and third parties, who all had their own agendas. This 
difficulty and Iran's intractability was demonstrated on December 3, 
1984 when Hizb'allah operatives hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner and flew
174 For an overview of U.S. restrictions in dealing with terrorism, see Grant Wardlaw, 
£1989), op.cit:. pp.203-20. See also Gail Bass, Brian M Jenkins, Konrad Kellen and David 
Ronfeldt, (eds.), Options for U.S. Policy on Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, Rand 
Report R-2764-RC, July 1981) and Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. p.277
See Paul Lewis, "Syria, Isolated at UN, Drops Terrorism Plan," New York Times, 
December 2, 1987
176 See Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, "Economic Sanctions as a Response to 
Terrorism," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.3, No.1, (May 1980), pp.89-98 and the 
Independent, December 3, 1987 and August 30, 1989
177 -For an overview of the strategic importance of Iran to the U.S. see Geoffrey Kemp, 
£1994), op.cit:. p.5
178 See William B Quandt, Time, October 1, 1984, p.23
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to Teheran.179 During that incident, two American passengers were 
killed.180 Iran ensured that there was extensive media coverage. This 
was not very helpful during the incident and the U.S. had to rely upon 
British and Swiss intermediaries to secure their objectives.181
The strategy of coercive diplomacy is rooted in the objective of 
persuading an adversary to cease its provocative or aggressive 
behaviour through the threat of punitive measures rather than the 
application of overwhelming force.182 During crises, the management 
team rely upon their ability to demonstrate their resolve and 
determination to utilise force if required. The advantage in utilising 
coercive diplomacy lies in the possibility of achieving the objective 
with the least amount of force.183 While this approach may contribute 
towards the prevention of an unwarranted escalation of force, it 
nevertheless constitutes the inherent dialectical tension between 
diplomatic and military logic.184 The issue at stake here was to 
exercise the necessary degree of coercion against Hizb'allah, short 
of applying military force, while concurrently demonstrating to that 
organisation that their actions would not go unpunished. This was the 
problem that beleaguered the Reagan Administration as Caspar 
Weinberger refused to support the diplomatic posturing of the 
Department of State, George Schultz and President Reagan, who
David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. pp.208
180 See Terence Smith, U.S. Links Iranian-Backed Group to Hijacking of Kuwaiti 
Airliner," New York Times, December 7, 1984, P.A1 and John S Lang, "Frustrating Search 
For Answers." U.S. News & World Report, December 24, 1984, pp.18-19
181 See cover article, Time, December 17, 1984, p.25 and David Martin and John 
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. pp.208
182 See Alexander George, £1991), op.cit:. p.384 and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Ultimata 
and Coercive Diplomacy." International Studies Quarterly, No.16,(1972), pp.131-165
183 See Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signalling, (London, 
Longman, 1987)
184 For an explanation of the tension between military logic and the requirements of 
diplomacy in crisis management, see Alexander George, (1991), op.cit:, pp. 13-21 and 
Alexander George, D. K. Hall and W Simons, (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 
(Boston, Little Brown, 1971), and Alexander George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of 
Political and Military Considerations," Survival, Vol.26, No.5, (September 1984), pp.223-234
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repeatedly issued threats against the perpetrators of terrorism in 
Beirut.185 The integrity of the administration's coercive diplomacy was 
thus undermined by a recalcitrant Secretary of Defence.
Weinberger was determined not to allow the military to become 
involved in a conflict situation without the approval and support of the 
public and Congress.186 While he attempted to support his argument 
on the grounds that it was morally wrong to attack terrorist targets 
which may result in collateral damage to innocent civilians, it 
inadvertently created a precedent that would undermine any future 
U.S. counter-terrorist and crisis initiatives by setting restrictive rules 
of engagement for military operations. In order for the administration 
to invoke the use of military instruments of statecraft, the government 
would have had to provide irrefutable proof as to the legitimacy of its 
targets.187 While this principle is laudable from a moral point of view 
and supports the concept of legitimacy, it undercuts the requirements 
of operational secrecy for intelligence.
The producer - consumer relationship and the function of 
intelligence in counter terrorism is thus directly influenced by the 
principles of legitimacy, legality and the avoidance of setting 
precedents. Whereas the terrorist organisation bases its attacks 
against the interests of the government on ideological grounds, the 
strength of the authorities response is usually directed by the right of 
law, as most terrorist actions contravene criminal codes.188 
Government response must reflect adherence to the laws of criminal 
procedure and evidence, which are precedents in themselves.189 In
185 See Raymond Tanter, £1990), op.cit:. pp.210-211 and 222-227
186 See Caspar Weinberger, (1991), op.cit:. pp. 160-162
187 See Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.177 and Ronald Reagan, £1990), op.cit:. 
pp.463-464
188 See Alex P Schmidt, "Terrorism as the 'Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes'," 
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol.4, No.4, (Winter 1992): Special Issue on Western 
Responses to Terrorism, p. 11-13 and Franklin L Ford, Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to 
Terrorism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1985)
18 9 See Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World, (London, Routledge, 
1994), p. 14 and John E Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law,
Page 236
Page 237
support thereof, the relationship between the intelligence community 
and the consumer is two-fold. While the government will look to the 
intelligence and security services to provide proof of culpability of 
those who stand accused of acts of terrorism, it also tasks the 
intelligence community with providing warnings of impending attacks 
and strategic options in dealing with terrorism as a phenomenon that 
is a threat to its interests and society.190 From a normative 
perspective, the resultant strategies presented to the consumer in the 
intelligence community's opportunity analysis must reflect deference 
to the principles of legitimacy and precedent. It must be remembered 
that it is the struggle for legitimacy which lies at the core of terrorist 
rationality.
4.8 Conclusion
Ultimately between 1983 and 1984, there was no improvement in 
U.S. intelligence capabilities. To the contrary, the kidnapping of 
William Buckley led to the further compromise of U.S. intelligence 
assets in Lebanon. The absence of communication between the 
executive and support branches of government reinforced the 
traditionalist mentality.191 In the case of Lebanon, the obsessive need 
to protect intelligence sources inhibited the fusion of intelligence and 
its dissemination to units in the field, such as embassy security 
personnel. Instead, much of the vital intelligence was being 
communicated directly up the chain of command to policy makers. 
Intelligence was conducted in support of the preconceived non
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1991) and Ronald D Crelinsten, Danielle 
Laberge-Altmejd and Denis Szabo, Terrorism and Criminal Justice, (Lexington, 
Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1978) .
Robert Grace, interview on July 13, 1995 with the author at FBI Academy, Quantico
Bay.
190
See Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:, pp.217-227
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negotiation and no concessions policy towards terrorism. This 
compelled the administration to focus on forces that were located on 
the periphery of the problem instead of on the main perpetrators and 
their principal adversary, Hizb'allah. In this instance the principle of 
legitimacy was misinterpreted and too rigidly applied.
The result was that the quest for legitimacy became the lynch-pin 
of the administration's counter-terrorist policy, constraining crisis 
response initiatives, instead of guiding them. Arguments between the 
two principle cabinet secretaries over how to respond to terrorism 
without compromising on these principles, exposed the deep 
divisions that prevailed between the Secretaries of State and 
Defence. This demonstrated the government's vulnerability to 
terrorism and hostage taking.192 During crises, it is the perceived will 
to use force that forms the key variable in crisis management.193 The 
Reagan Administration not only failed in its ability to demonstrate its 
resolve and determination to wield force as an instrument of 
statecraft, but advertised this shortcoming to its adversaries. 
Hizb'allah seized upon this vulnerability and exploited it to their 
advantage. Not only did the U.S. crisis response create a dilemma for 
the administration, but the presence of the other western hostages in 
Beirut effectively prevented the use of military force by the United 
States. Retaliation could have endangered the lives of not only the 
Americans who were held hostage, but the other European nationals 
as well.194 * Intelligence not only failed at an intellectual and 
conceptual level, but it also failed at the implementation stage within 
the lower echelons of the U.S. government. This breakdown in the 
producer - consumer relationship was demonstrated by the failure of 
the embassy security personnel to respond adequately to and ensure
192 See Brian M Jenkins and Robin Wright, "The Kidnappers in Lebanon," TVI Report, 
Vol.7, No.4
193 See Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., (1987), op.cit:. p.29
1 94 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. p.
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that the necessary precautions against further terrorist attacks were 
implemented.195 In the case of the second embassy bombing, a 
mitigating factor prevailed. This was the distraction of warning 
intelligence caused by the "cry wolf' syndrome which detracted the 
Embassy security personnel from appreciating the value of the 
intelligence warnings that were issued before the incident itself. It is a 
fact that prior to the embassy annex bombing, the intelligence 
community had issued numerous warnings of an imminent car bomb 
attack against U.S. interests and personnel in Beirut. Repeated 
warnings had contributed towards desensitising its recipients. The 
numerous cases in history of surprise attack, in particular the case of 
Pearl Harbour, testify to this phenomenon.195 This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that the intelligence warnings were not 
detailed or specific enough to be of much use. A subsequent 
congressional hearing concluded that although the intelligence 
community had performed adequately, the embassy security 
personnel were at fault.* 197 Finally, an evaluation of the performance 
of the intelligence community during the crisis reveals that a 
dysfunction between intelligence and policy occurred because both 
were carried out in secret and in opposition to Congress.198 The very 
fact that it was conducted in a covert manner, resulted in the 
exclusion of the broader intelligence community and objective 
expertise from the decision making process. This created an effective 
barrier between the producers and consumers. While the 
administration chose to respond to the hostage crisis during 1984 in
See Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.172
See Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University 
Press, 1962) and Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept. (New York, McGraw Hill, 1981) and for 
additional insight into the problems of intelligence warnings and strategic surprise, see Ariel 
Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprise, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1987).
197 U.S, Intelligence Performance and the September 20, 1984 Beirut Bombing, Report
by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, (Washington 
D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, October 3, 1984), pp.3-4 and John Kifner, "Flaws Seen at 
West Beirut Embassy," New York Times, September 25, 1984.
1 QR -See Robert Ruhl Simmons, (Spring 1990), op.cit:. p.4
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a low-key and covert manner, it was eventually forced to deal with 
another hostage crisis openly and in full view of the international 
community during the hijacking of Flight TWA 847,199 which 
introduced another key variable in the management of crisis 
situations, which is the management of the media.
See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus (1988), op.cit:. pp.411-412 footnote No. 107. 
Six months before the TWA crisis, a tally of the news reports pertaining to the hostages that 
appeared in the New York Times revealed a total of 8 reports. During the TWA crisis and the 
week thereafter, there were a total of 191. In the three months after the crisis, this paper 
showed an increase in its reporting of the fate of the hostages in Beirut with a total of 34 
reports. This pattern suggests that the media were not really aware of hostage crisis in 1984
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Chapter 5
THE HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847: CRISIS
MANAGEMENT, INTELLIGENCE AND THE MEDIA
It was late afternoon in Beirut by the time that the Red 
Cross convoy pulled out of the schoolyard and headed for 
Damascus and freedom. Howard Teicher watched as CNN 
broadcast the pictures of the convoy pulling out of the 
schoolyard while the intelligence community continued to 
report that it could not confirm the hostages' departure1
This case study will research the role of intelligence and the 
influence of the media during the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. By 
analysing the competing objectives of the key actors involved, the 
crisis response options that were available to the administration will 
be examined. This will be followed by an analysis of the intelligence 
community's role during the crisis, and the relationship that prevailed 
between the intelligence community, the decision makers, the NSC 
staff and the media. This incident is highly significant as it further 
exposes the Reagan Administration's sustained inability to deal 
effectively with terrorism.2 It also reveals the tension between 
intelligence and the media as well as the difficulties experienced by 
crisis managers when the media becomes part of the crisis instead of 
part of its solution.
In relation to the previous two case studies, this incident differs in 
the following sense: The hijacking reflected a switch in tactics by 
Hizb'allah from attacking U.S. interests in Lebanon to attacking U.S. 
targets abroad3. Furthermore the nature and duration of the hijacking
1 John Martin and David Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.201
2 See William L Chaze, (ed.) "Reagan's Hostage Crisis," U.S. News & World Report, 
July 1, 1985, pp.18-21
3 See Jeffrey D Simon, U.S. Countermeasures Against International Terrorism, (Santa 
Monica, California, The Rand Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 
[R-3840-C3I], 1990), Summary, pp.v-vii
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presented the U.S. government, media and public with an incident of 
lengthy duration in comparison to the previous bombing of U.S. 
facilities in Beirut. Bombing incidents are events that have a short 
and sharp impact upon their audience.4 The crisis lasts for as long as 
death, injury and damage are portrayed by the media. Once the 
carnage is cleared and repaired the story ends and the 
sensationalism dies down relatively quickly after the event, whereas 
a protracted hostage-barricade situation sustains media and public 
interest over a longer time.5 In relation to the kidnapping of William 
Buckley and the other six American citizens in Beirut during 1984, the 
TWA crisis was also different. This was because those events 
occurred over a staggered time. They involved the fate of one 
individual over a prolonged and seemingly endless period of time as 
opposed to the collective fate of a larger number of people within a 
concentrated time frame. The crisis differs substantially from the 
previous events because of the media's extensive involvement. This 
introduced an additional dimension to the problem. Furthermore the 
behaviour of the NSC, and its crisis management elements, i.e. the 
NSC staff and the Crisis Pre Planning Group, can be studied to 
determine how the institutional behaviour and barriers affected the 
producer - consumer relationship.
5.1 Introduction
On Friday, June 14, 1985, TWA Flight 847 bound for Rome was 
hijacked by two Hizb'allah terrorists shortly after take off from Athens. 
At first the hijackers demanded that the aircraft be flown to Algeria,
For a description of how the government and public over-reacted to the Beirut 
bombings, see Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored 
International Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, The Rand Corporation, National Defense 
Research Institute, [R-3783-USDP], March 1990), pp.11-12
5 According to Walter Laqueur, "The terrorist act by itself is nothing; publicity is all." 
See Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media and the Police," in Robert Kupperman and 
Darrell Trent, Terrorism, Threat, Reality, Response, (Stanford, California, Hoover Institute 
Press, 1979), p.332
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but had to modify their demand when the pilot pointed out to them 
that there was insufficient fuel. The hijackers therefore changed their 
destination and went to Beirut airport. Upon their arrival they 
released 19 women and children passengers in exchange for more 
fuel.6 The plane then took off again, this time for Algiers. The 
Algerians had gained international recognition for their diplomatic 
skills and their past involvement in mediating between Iran and the 
U.S. over the release of the hostages during 1979-1981.7 Perhaps of 
greater significance why the hijackers first intended to fly to Algeria 
was because the Algerians were not party to the Bonn Convention - a 
multi-lateral anti-hijacking agreement. This would have made escape 
a greater possibility for the hijackers.8 Secondly, in the wake of the 
hostage taking in Beirut, there was no longer a large press corps left 
in Lebanon to provide the media coverage that the hijackers sought.9 
The terrorists waited until they had landed in Algiers before issuing 
their first set of demands.10
Initially they sought to exchange the passengers and crew for the 
release of over seven hundred Lebanese Shi'ite prisoners of war 
whom the Israelis had captured in southern Lebanon and who were 
being held in Atlit prison in Israel.11 The Hizb'allah operatives, led by 
Mohammad Ali Hamadei, demanded the release of the al Da'wa 17 
prisoners held in Kuwait as well as the Atlit prisoners.12 They
6 See Robert Fisk, "Lebanese gunmen shoot passenger on hijacked plane," Times, 
June 15, 1985, p.1 and Washington Post, June 30, 1985
7 See Christos C Anastassiades, "U.S. and Israel Face Embarrassing Situation,"
An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo. June 28, 1985 and Nora Boustany, "Hijackers Hold 
Americans on TWA Jet," Washington Post. June 15, 1985, p.1 v
8 For a list of the member states who signed the Bonn Convention on July 17, 1978 
and its clauses, see John F Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political 
& Economic Dimensions, (Boulder, CA, Westview Press, 1989), p.70
9 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. p.606
10 See William E Smith, "Hijack," Time Magazine. June 24, 1985, pp.24-30
11 The Israeli captives were incarcerated in Atlit prison in northern Israel and bacame 
known and refered to as the 'Atlit prisoners.'See Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:, pp. 187-189
12 The operation was led by Hamadei and was planned by immad Mughniah, whose
Page 243
threatened to begin shooting hostages if the U.S. and Israeli 
governments refused their demands. A further 21 women and 
children were then released in exchange for fuel and food.13 The 
aircraft spent a total of six hours on the ground in Algiers before the 
hijackers forced the pilot to return to Beirut.
Within the first day of the crisis, the terrorists had manoeuvred 
themselves into a strong bargaining position.14 They seized and held 
onto the initiative by creating a crisis situation for the U.S. and Israel 
and secured a strong bargaining position in the form of their 
possession of the hostages. They then sought to establish legitimacy 
for their actions. First they selected a respectable intermediary in the 
form of Algeria. Then by releasing the women and children, they 
demonstrating their flexibility and reasonableness which improved 
their credibility. By linking the release of the remaining hostages to 
the Atlit prisoners in Israel they attempted to cast Israel as the 
villian.15 The detention of the Atlit prisoners was considered illegal in 
terms of international law and had been criticised in the United 
Nations and by the United States. By focusing the crisis on Israel's 
detention of the Atlit prisoners they sought to drive a wedge between 
the two allies.16 In shifting the location of their action from Beirut to
brother-in-law was one of the al Da'wa 17 prisoners. See Robert Fisk, £1992), op.cit:. p.605. 
See also Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. pp.196-197. And Nigel Hawkes and Tony Catterall, 
"Europe Faces Split on Deals With Terrorists," (Publication unknown), February 1, 1987. 
Muhammed Ali Hamadei is the younger brother of the chief of security of Hizb'allah, 
Abdelhadi Hamadei. See Farhang Johanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis," The World 
Today, February 1992, p.34
13 See "Journey of Flight TWA 847: A Logbook of Terror," New York Times. June 17, 
1985 and "Hijackers Free 64, Set New Deadline," Los Angeles Times. June 16, 1985
14 See Rodney A Snyder, Negotiating With Terrorists: TWA Flight 847, (Washington 
D.C., Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Dilpomacy, School of Foreign Service, 
Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case 333, 1994), p.4
15 The release of women and children by the hijackers was not a major concession on 
their part, however, as Islamic law prevents them from harming women and children.
16 See Dan Fischer, "Hijack Crisis Straining U.S.- Israeli Relations," Los Angeles 
Times, June 19, 1985 in which it is reported that, "...the Red Cross protested the cross-border 
transfer [of the Atlit prisoners] at the time, stating that it violated Articles 49 and 76 of the 
Geneva Conventions which prohibit the forcible transfer of civilians from their own country to 
the territory of an occupying power. The State Department also objected. See also "U.N. Says 
Israelis Took More Shi'ites," New York Times. June 19, 1985
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Algiers, the terrorists sought to place the focus of the crisis on 
Israel's illegal custody of the Atlit prisoners instead of on the actual 
terrorist act of the hijacking. They attempted to divert the issue of 
legitimacy from their actions to the behaviour and response of the 
Israeli and U.S. governments. Having conducted this against the 
backdrop of Beirut as a potential venue for the crisis to be resolved, 
they effectively demonstrated to the U.S. that the situation could 
develop beyond their control or response.17 Ultimately the hijackers 
had succeeded in seizing and holding onto the initiative, while the 
Reagan Administration found itself confronted by a crisis that not only 
threatened its counter terrorist principles but also its relationship with 
two of its most important allies in the region, namely Israel and 
Kuwait as they struggled to resolve the crisis without making 
concessions to terrorists. The U.S. government found itself compelled 
to consider the objectives of its allies besides its own and was put to 
the test in exercising restraint in the pursuit of its objectives to 
prevent an escalation of the crisis.18
The hijackers flew back to Algiers where they were joined by the 
third member of the team, Ali Atweh, who after having been detained 
by the Greek authorities, was released and flown to Algiers to join his 
comrades.19 The aircraft then returned to Beirut where all but three of 
the aircraft's crew were taken from the plane and held in safe houses 
scattered throughout Beirut to frustrate any rescue attempts.20 The 
hijackers who, were then reinforced by members of Amal, appointed 
that organisation's leader, Nabih Berri, who was also the Lebanese 
Minister of Justice, as their representative to negotiate on their
17 Howard Teicher, during a telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington
D.C.
1B As the champion of democracy, the administration found that in responding to 
terrorism, the tenents of democracy acted as restraints. Noel Koch, the Pentagon's counter 
terrorist planner described this dilemma when he stated that, "Our virtues are our 
vulnerabilities." See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:. p.92
19 See William Smith, "Hijack", Time, June 24, 1985, pp.24-30
on
See Stansfield Turner, £1991), op.cit:. p. 191
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behalf.21 Berri, who wasted no time in increasing the demands to 
include the release of Shi'ite prisoners in Cyprus and Spain22. It also 
ordered the passengers and remaining taken from the aircraft and 
moved to safe houses around Beirut.23 The crisis continued over a 
period of nineteen days as the U.S. government attempted to 
maintain the appearance that it was not making any concessions to 
the hijackers while conducting intensive negotiations with Israel and 
Syria.24 During this time, both sides maintained inflexible stances in 
the eyes of the public. The U.S. government demonstrated its resolve 
by deploying U.S. warships off the coast of Lebanon and increased 
its rhetoric over possible retaliation against the hijackers.25 The 
hijackers capitalised on the media's scramble to cover the crisis and 
staged an anti-American demonstration at the airport26 as well as a 
media-hostage conference in Beirut.27 The hijackers successful
At first, the hijackers were prevented from landing at Beirut airport by Nabih Berri's 
militia, Amal, who controlled the airport. Only after they threatened to blow up the plane over 
Beirut, were they granted permission by Amal to land. It is not clear why and at what stage 
Amal decided to co-operate with Hizb'allah. One reason may be attributed to the possibility 
that Berri saw the hijacking as an opportunity for him to increase the prestige of Amal in 
Lebanon. See Con Coughlin, Hostage, (London. Little Brown & Company, 1992), p.197 and 
Robert Fisk, "Muslim King Stands To Gain Twin Crowns From Hijack Negotiations," Times, 
June 19, 1985, p.7 and Jim Muir, "Berri's Uncomfortable Role," Middle East International. 
June 28, 1985, pp.3-4
22 See Elaine Sciolino, "Go-Between in the Beirut Hostage Crisis: Nabih Berri," New 
York Times. June 18, 1985 and Richard Wigg, Times, June 18, 1985, p.6
23 See Norman Kempster, "Hostages Spirited Off Jet, Berri Says," Los Angeles Times, 
June 18, 1985
24 See Nicolas Ashford, "U.S. Seeking Formula for Exchange of Hostages," Times, 
June 20, 1985 and Robert Fisk, "Israel to release 31 Shia Prisoners," the Times, June 24, 
1985 and Mary Curtuis, "Berri Under Pressure, U.S. its Allies - and Perhaps Syria - Lean on 
Shi'ite Leaders to End Hostage Crisis," Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1985, and Jonathan 
Randall, "Syrian efforts to Free Hostages Said to Intensify," Washington Post. June 26, 1985, 
p.15 and Karen De Young and William Drozdiak, "Intense Diplomacy, Syrian Weight End 
Crisis," Washington Post, July 1, 1985. See also Margaret Berry, Bargaining Without 
Concessions: The 1985 TWA Hostage Negotiations, (Washington D.C., Conflict Management 
Program, 1985)
25 See Nicholas Ashford and Michael Binyon, "Reagan Refuses to Bow to Terror," 
Times, June 19, 1985, and Christopher Dickey, "Multiple Pressures Build on Amal in Beirut," 
Washington Post, June 26, 1985, p.1 and Fred Axelgard, "Reagan Stands Firm," Middle East 
International, June 28, 1985, pp.4-5 and A Ulansky, "Looking at the TWA Hijack," New York 
Times, July 28, 1985, pp. 10-11
26 See Nora Boustany, "Anti-U.S.Protest," Washington Post, June 22, 1985 and Fred 
Barnes, "Shi'ite Spin Control." New Republic, Vol. 193, No. 10, July 15, 1985
27 For the reaction to the staged hostage-media conference see David Martin and John
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manipulation of the media resulted in controversy back in the United 
States over the role of the media during terrorist situations and the 
influence of the media on the administration during crises.28 After a 
protracted period of time, and only after the U.S. had guaranteed a 
commitment by Israel to systematically release the Atlit prisoners, 
once the hostages had been freed, Syria and Iran applied pressure 
on Amal and Hizb'allah to conclude the crisis. The incident was not 
without complications, however, and the bellicose attitude of the 
Reagan Administration almost prolonged the crisis in the end.29 
During the crisis the administration made consistent statements 
about possible retaliation against the hijackers. This created anxiety 
on the part of the hijackers and resulted in Nabih Berri demanding a 
guarantee from the U.S. that it would not retaliate against them after 
the hostages had been released.30 In the end the U.S. lost its 
credibility once again as a force that was capable of reponding to 
terrorism.
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.191 and Robert Fisk, "Beirut Hostages Produced at Chaotic Press 
Conference," Times, June 21, 1985 and Claudia Wright, "The Hijack and the Media," Middle 
East International, June 28, 1985 and Tom Shales, "The Drama behind ABC's Coup," 
Washington Post, June 20, 1985 and John Dillin,"News Media Coverage of Hostage Story 
Raises Glaring Questions," Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1985
28 See Joseph Fromm, "TV Does it Box in President in Crisis?" U.S. News & World 
Report, July 15, 1985, pp.23-24 and David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.189
29 See Bill Keller, "Warships Set Sail: U.S. Seeks To End Speculation It Will Act," New 
York Times. June 18, 1985. See the following two articles by David Hoffman, "U.S. Has 
Reached Its Limits On Terrorism, Reagan Says," Washington Post, June 21, 1985, p.1, and 
"U.S. may Strike back, Reagan Hints," Washington Post, June 29, 1985, p.1. See also 
Christopher Dickey, "Don't Flex Muscle, Shi'ite Says," Washington Post, June 23, 1985.
30 See Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:. p.335 and Christopher Dickey, "Berri Demands 
U.S. Disavow Retaliation," Washington Post, June 30, 1985, p.1 For a detailed account of the 
crisis, see David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. Chapter 7 and Stansfield Turner, 
(1991), op.cit:. Chapter 24.
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5.2. The principle of limiting objectives
The crisis was a direct challenge to America's counter-terrorist 
policy. Under the circumstances the Reagan Administration, who had 
publicly advocated the virtues of not giving in to terrorism and had 
linked this principle with the threat to retaliate with force against it, 
found that it was unable to resolve the problem without compromising 
over these principles. The use of force either as a means to rescue 
the hostages or in retaliation against Hizb'allah had also effectively 
been ruled out.31 This was not only due to the concern over the safety 
of the TWA hostages, but as a result of the six U.S. citizens who had 
been kidnapped between 1984 and June 1985 in Lebanon and who 
were still being held in captivity.32 Any military reprisal could have 
endangered the lives of all the hostages, including those hostages 
who were citizens of other western nations. Therefore the political 
and security risks associated with retaliation by the U.S. could have 
had far reaching consequences.33 Notwithstanding the above 
argument the debate over the administration's disposition to respond 
with military force was conducted at length in the media which 
exposed the cleavage between the State Department and the 
Secretary of Defence in public.34 The administration defended its
See George Church, "The Dilemma of Retaliation," Time, June 24, 1985, p.31, and 
Gary Sick, "When U.S. Hostages Are in Peril, Willpower Counts As Much As Firepower, Says 
Crisis Expert Gary Sick," People Weekly, July 1, 1985, pp.55-56 and Nicolas M Horrock, "Too 
Late To Retaliate For Hijack, Experts Say," Chicago Tribune. July 10, 1985
For a chronology and the identity of these hostages, see Con Coughlin, £1992), 
op.cit:. Appendix I, pp.546-466. Although everyone was still referring to the seven hostages, 
the fact of the matter was that there were only six left alive as William Buckley had already 
died in captivity in March 1985.
33 Geoffrey Kemp, during an interview, with the author on July 19, 1995, Washington
D.C.
For an example of this argument from a liberal perspective see: Editorial, 
"Unfinished Business," New Republic, July 29, 1985. For an overview of he argument from 
the conservative point of view see: George F Will, "With a 'Genteel' Touch," Washington Post, 
July 2, 1985. See also Robert Kuppermann, "Should U.S. Strike Back at Terrorists?" in an 
interview with U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1985, p.22 and George Church, "The 
Dilemma of Retaliation," Time, June 24, 1985, p.31 and John M Oseth, "Combatting 
Terrorism: The Dilemmas Of A Decent Nation." Parameters, Vol.XV, No.1, (1984), pp.65-76
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inaction during the crisis when President Reagan explained that 
retaliation, which could result in the death of innocent people, would 
reduce the American government to the same level as that of the 
terrorists.35 This aspect is discussed in greater detail further on in this 
chapter.
Compounding the crisis was the growing public awareness and 
concern over the fate of the six Beirut hostages.36 This was a problem 
that the administration had successfully managed to suppress until 
the TWA crisis flushed that issue out into the open.37 The American 
public were more concerned with the fate of the TWA hostages, 
rather than the fate of the six U.S. citizens who were a mixture of 
journalists, officials and academics. However, the crisis created a 
platform for the family members of these original hostages to petition 
the administration to exert a greater effort on their behalf.38 This 
additional problem induced the administration to try and link the 
release of the TWA passengers to the release of the Beirut 
hostages.39 President Reagan's attempts to include the Beirut 
hostages in the TWA hostage deal were too ambitious. This resulted 
in the administration expanding its crisis objectives which
See News Conference of June 8, 1985, Public Papers of the President of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan, 1983-1986, p.784
36 The hostages were: Frank Reiger, a professor at the American University in Beirut - 
kidnapped in February 1984 and released in April 1984; Jeremy Levin, CNN Bureau Chief - 
kidnapped in March 1984 and who escaped in February 1985; William Buckley, CIA Chief of 
Station - kidnapped in March 1984; Benjamin Weir, American Presbyterian Minister - 
kidnapped in May 1984; Peter Kilburn, Librarian at the AUB - kidnapped in December 1984 
and Terry Anderson, Associated Press Bureau Chief - kidnapped in March 1985 and David 
Jacobson, Director of American University Hospital - kidnapped in May 1985. See Con 
Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. pp.464-465 and "The Other American Hostages - What About 
Them?" U.S. News & World Report, July 8, 1985, p.26
37 See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says 7 Missing Must Also Go Free With Air 
Hostages." New York Times, June 28, 1985.
38 See M C Johns, "The Reagan Administration and State-Sponsored Terrorism," 
Conflict, Vol.8, No.4, 1988, p.249 and Marvin Howe, "Kin Of Hostages' See a Chance To 
Increase Efforts for Their Cause," New York Times, June 22, 1985, p.6. See also Stansfield 
Turner, "A Media Hijacking," in S Turner, (1991), op.cit:, p.194 and David Martin and John 
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.197
39 See Doyle McManus, "Wants 7 Beirut Kidnap Victims Released Also," Los Angeles 
Times, June 28, 1985 and Charles P Wallace, "U.S. Seeks Return of Earlier Captives," Los 
Angeles Times, June 28, 1985
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contradicted the principle of limiting one's objectives during a crisis. 
Consequently it elevated the tension level between the hijackers - 
Hizb'allah and Amal and the American government.
Faced with these problems, the administration's crisis objectives 
were aimed at securing the release of the hostages without having to 
use force and compromising its stated position. The latter included 
avoiding the perception that it had made any direct concessions to 
the hijackers. The crisis thus forced the Reagan Administration to 
balance conflicting objectives and to avoid the perception that it was 
forced to compromise. This was highly significant given the 
administration's rhetoric which advocated a tough stance against 
terrorism. The Reagan administration had also criticised the Carter 
administration's weakness and indecision in relation to the Iranian 
hostage crisis, and exploited it as an election issue during its 
presdential campaign.40 American policy on negotiations with 
terrorists has oscillated between compromise and a strict 
no-concessions policy.41 Jenkins argues that U.S. government 
response and policy has not exerted any meaningful influence over 
terrorist incidents.42
A policy of not making concessions to terrorists was strongly 
advocated during the Nixon administration when he announced that 
the U.S. would not negotiate over the kidnapping of U.S. diplomats by 
Black September in Khartoum.43 President Nixon defended this policy
40 See Stansfield Turner, "The Changing of the Guard," in S Turner, (1991), op.cit:, 
pp. 155-160 and Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. p.196, and Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, 
(1988), op.cit:. pp.92-93
41 See Brian M Jenkins, Konrad Kellen and David Ronfeldt, Options for U.S. Policy on 
Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report R-2764-RC, July 1981), pp.4-5
42 See Brian M Jenkins, Janera Johnson and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some 
Statistical Observations From 77 International Hostage Episodes, (Santa Monica, California, 
Rand Report P-5905, July 1977), p.32
43 In 1973, the Black September Organisation seized a number of American diplomats 
in an operation against the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum. Among their demands, was 
the release of Sirhan Sirhan the assassin of Robert Kennedy. The U.S. response was a 
refusal to negotiate or make any concession to terrorists.See Brian Jenkins, Embassies 
Under Siege: A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers. 1971-1980, (Santa Monica, California, 
Rand Corporation, January 1981), op.cit:. pp.10 & 28. See also Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), 
op.cit:. p.109
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policy on the basis that it would endanger the lives of all other 
diplomats if the government met the terrorists' demands.44 According 
to Jenkins, this incident, in which the U.S. hostages were killed, 
became the cornerstone of subsequent U.S. official policy on 
terrorism.45 This premise also formed the basis of a number of 
international treaties signed by over 120 countries, including Greece, 
who agreed to refuse to make concessions to terrorists.46 Of greater 
significance, however, was the relationship that prevailed between 
the U.S. and Israel and the the fact that the crisis created a strain in 
that relationship.47 Israel's counter-terrorist policy was well known. 
Whereas they have generally always been known to retaliate, Israel 
has admitted that it will at least negotiate with terrorists.48 From the 
political perspective neither the U.S. nor Israel could afford to make 
any exceptions. In this instance, however, the Israeli government was 
also in an untenable position. Not only was the demand contrary to 
their policy on terrorism, but the government had recently come 
under severe criticism for having exchanged 1000 Palestinian 
prisoners for 3 Israeli soldiers captured during the civil war in 
Lebanon.49 The controversy over that exchange had threatened the 
coalition government.50 The demands emanating from the TWA
For an overview of this incident and its outcome, see Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), 
op.cit:. pp. 108-109
45 Ibid., p.110, see the comments of Brian Jenkins in footnote 91.
46 See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, p.654
47 See Thomas L Friedman, "Israelis Appear Angered by Subtle U.S. Pressure," New 
York Times. June 21, 1985 and "The Quandry for Israel," New York Times. June 22, 1985 
and Bernard Gwertzman, "Schultz and Peres Agree to Oppose Shi'ites Demands. Seek to 
Ease Tensions," New York Times. June 22, 1985
48 For an overview of Israeli counter-terrorist policies, see Samuel M Katz, Guards 
Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism. (London, Arms & Armour Press, 1990) and 
Peter Taylor, (1993), op.cit:. and David Tinnin and Dag Christensen, Hit Team, (London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
49 See Peter Kidron, "Israel's Dilemma," Middle East International. June 28, 1985, 
pp.5-6
50 See "Israel’s Peres On The Spot," U.S. News & World Report, July 18, 1985, p.25
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incident were attributed in some Israeli quarters as a direct 
consequence of that lopsided exchange and it was alleged that it had 
encouraged the hijacking.51 Israel's initial response placed the U.S. 
government in a predicament when the Israeli government issued a 
statement to the effect that it would consider accommodating the 
United States and release the Atlit prisoners if the American 
government issued a formal request to the Israeli parliament. This 
angered and frustrated the Reagan Administration that was placed in 
an untenable position by its ally.52 Israel was well aware of the U.S. 
stance on making concessions to terrorists. The U.S. viewed the 
Israeli response and statement as impertinent and provocative given 
the fact that the U.S. had already voiced its disapproval when Israel 
removed the Atlit prisoners from Lebanon and incarcerated them in 
Israel.53
An impasse prevailed as both nations remained inflexible and the 
situation was exacerbated when the Israeli Minister of Police, Haim 
Bar-Lev, announced that the crisis was essentially America's problem 
and that Israel was under no obligation to take the initiative.54 This 
added to the strain as the administration could not contradict its 
hard-line stance and request Israel to exchange the Atlit prisoners for 
the hostages. The Israeli government only mollified its stance when it 
began to receive adverse publicity in the United States. Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres responded by calling George Schultz, and 
pledged Israel's support.55 Peres gave an undertaking that Israel
51 See "Daily Report," June 17, 1985, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service FBIS, 
Middle East and Africa, Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew, (Washington D.C., U.S. 
Department of State), June 16, 1985, p.11
52 For an overview of the administration's attitude towards Israel during the crisis, see 
"Reagan's Hostage Crisis." U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1985, p.20
53 See "Israel's Peres On The Spot," U.S. News & World Report, July 18, 1985, p.25
54 See Christopher Walker, "Israel Says U.S. Must Move First," Times, June 18, 1985, 
p.1. According to the Israeli Minister of Police; "The plane is an American plane. The 
hostages are American citizens and the crew is American. We need not take any initiative."
55 See Amy Wilentz, "Managing The Crisis", Time. July 15, 1985, pp.24-25
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would release the Atlit prisoners as soon as it believed that security 
conditions would enable it to act accordingly.56 Soon afterwards Israel 
released 31 Atlit prisoners, but stated that their release was not 
related to the hijackers' demands, but rather due to the normal 
administrative and legislative processes in Israel.57 Despite the 
rhetoric which flew back and forth between Israeli and U.S. 
spokesmen, an agreement with Israel became imperative for the 
Reagan Administration or the crisis would have remained 
deadlocked.
The Americans had two options:58 Despite Israel's insistence that 
the U.S. would have to formally request Israel to release the Atlit 
prisoners, it conceded that such a request emanating from a "private 
forum" within the U.S. government would be acceptable and secure 
Israel's co-operation.59 This was essentially a semantic ploy which 
would have hardly distanced the administration from the request. The 
alternative was for the administration to provide Syria with a pledge 
on behalf of Israel that it would release the prisoners in due course.60 
The latter option was exercised by the administration with the 
assistance of the United Nations special envoy, Jean-Claude Aime. 
He played a significant role and persuaded President Asad to briefly
56 See Bernard Gwertzmann, "Schultz and Peres Agree to Oppose Shi'ite Demands 
and Speak to Ease Tensions," New York Times. June 22, 1985 and Peter Kidron, "Israel's 
Dilemma," New Republic, Vol.193, No.10, July 15, 1985
57 See Robert Fisk, "Israel To Release 31 Shia Prisoners," Times, June 24, 1985. 
According to John Walcott, the Reagan Administration had secretly applied direct pressure on 
Israel when the Chairman of the International Federation of the Airlines Pilots Association, 
Thomas Ashwood, met with Amiram Nir, the Israeli Prime Minister's counter terrorist advisor, 
and advised him that that organisation was considering a boycott of Ben Gurion airport as a 
means of applying pressure on Israel to release the Atlit prisoners. The release of the 31 Atlit 
prisoners followed shortly afterward. See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, 
p.195
See George D Moffett III and Peter Grier, "Hijack Confronted U.S. and Israel With 
Agonizing Choices." Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1985, p.1
5 9 See Thomas L Friedman, "Israelis Say U.S. Must Ask If It Wants Shi'ites Released," 
New York Times, June 18, 1985 and Michael Gether, "Officials Continue to Express 
Optimism for Hostage Deal," Washington Post, June 28, 1985, p.1
60 See also Thomas L Friedman, "Israelis Appear Angered By Subtle U.S. Pressure, 
New York Times, June 21, 1985 and Thomas L Friedman, "The Quandry For Israel," New 
York Times, June 22, 1985
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hold the hostages once the U.S. had provided an assurance that 
Israel would comply with the release of the Atlit prisoners after the 
hostages had been set free. Asad agreed and a U.S.-Israeli 
understanding was acknowledged by anonymous officials on both 
sides.61 The Israeli authorities disclosed that the U.S. had requested 
Israel not to release any of the Atlit prisoners until all the hostages 
had been freed, as the U.S. was afraid of losing its leverage over the 
hijackers. This statement did not make any mention of the six Beirut 
hostages which was an indication that the TWA hostages remained 
the administration's primary concern at the time. However, the 
administration demonstrated its concern over the remaining hostages 
and dealt with this issue when President Reagan announced that he 
was still confronted with the dilemma of how to secure their release 
and howto punish those responsible.62
While an agreement had been reached between the U.S., Israel, 
Syria and Amal, no agreement with Kuwait had been forthcoming. 
This country was also considered as one of the more friendly Persian 
Gulf states to the United States. The hijacker's demand that Kuwait 
release the 17 al Da'wa prisoners placed the U.S. and Kuwait in the 
same predicament as between the U.S. and Israel. The Kuwaiti 
government, however, refused to realease the prisoners. The al 
Dawa 17 issue appears to have faded into the background of the 
crisis as the negotiations and media coverage concentrated on the 
Atlit prisoners held by Israel and the TWA hostages.63
61 For an explanation of this arrangement, see David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:. p. 197-198: This understanding was the result of a backchannel communication 
between George Schultz and Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Ambassador to the UN. Schultz 
worked through Charles Hill, who was the State Department's head of Arab-Israeli affairs and 
Schultz's executive assistant. Hill was also a close friend of Netanyahu and enquired about 
Israel's plans over the future of the Atlit prisoners. Netanyahu reported back that the Israeli 
government's stance was that all that stood in the way of the release of the Atlit captives was 
the freedom of the TWA passengers and crew. This paved the way for the U.S. administration 
to provide Syria with the assurance that Israel would comply. This was confirmed by Ariel 
Merari, in a telephone interview, during February 1996.
62 See David Hoffman, "U.S. May Still Strike Back, Reagan Hints," Washington Post. 
June 29, 1985, p.1
63 See Jim Muir, "Shi'ite Leader Caught in a Tight Spot," Christian Science Monitor. 
June 25, 1985.
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It would appear that Nabih Berri managed to suppress the 
demand for the release of the al Dawa 17 detainees and that he 
persuaded the hijackers to limit their objectives to the demand for the 
release of the Atlit prisoners.64 Nabih Berri was an astute political 
player. Within the myriad of the Lebanese civil war his Amal militia 
controlled Beirut's international airport.65 As the circumstances of the 
hijack operation unfolded, Hizb'allah was left with little choice but to 
form a temporary alliance with Amal and to seek Berri's assistance as 
their representative. The exact motives for Berri's involvement are 
unclear, however, it is possible that as the head of Lebanon's main 
Shi'ite militia, he recognised an opportunity to enhance his status in 
Lebanon and ingratiate himself with the United States by acting as 
mediator between the hijackers and America.66
America's final consideration was its political and geostrategic 
objectives of preventing the radical Shi'ites, Palestinians, Syria, Iran 
and the Soviet Union from deriving any influence in the region or 
political advantage from the crisis situation. In addition to the problem 
of balancing its objectives with those of its allies and two competing 
adversaries, nl, Hizb'allah and Amal, the administration was beset 
with a triangular institutional tension between the State Department, 
the NSC staff and the intelligence community.
For the intelligence community, however, the TWA hijacking could 
have not occurred at a more inopportune moment. Its intelligence 
capabilities in Lebanon had been severely crippled, and in order to 
supplement its sigint capabilities, it was relying upon its agents 
stationed in Israel, Egypt and Cyprus, to manage its humint assets,
See Robin Wright, "Shi'ite Leaders: Far From United," Christian Science Monitor, 
June 25, 1985, p.1 3
65 See Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers, A History of the Lebanese Civil War. 
(London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp.117-118 and Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and 
the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, (Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1987), 
pp. 139-140
66 See Jim Muir, "Shi'ite Leader Caught in a Tight Spot," Christian Science Monitor, 
June 25, 1985 and Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. pp.605-609
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operations, and objectives throughout the whole region.67 An 
immediate objective of the intelligence community was to push for its 
dominance and leadership of the Early Support Teams (EST) which 
are an advance party deployed by the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) during crises to facilitate the rescue of hostages 
abroad.68 The EST which is predominantly composed of CIA and 
other intelligence community officials, acts as an advance 
intelligence gathering mission. Since its function is to collect 
intelligence in support of JSOC operations, and in those 
circumstances the local CIA personnel provide auxiliary support and 
logistics (techint), the CIA had argued that it should lead the EST. As 
the Pentagon provided logistical support in the form of transportation 
and communications, and the State Department was designated as 
the lead agency for international counter-terrorism, institutional 
wrangling over leadership of the EST became a constant source of 
contention.69 In the case of the TWA crisis, a State Department 
Middle East Specialist, David Long, was assigned to lead the EST. 
Although it was despatched to the Middle East, it was airborne nine 
hours after the incident had first been reported. An additional ten 
hours later it arrived in Cyprus, where it remained for the crisis 
duration.
At Cyprus, David Long and a handful of agents left and flew to 
Algiers but arrived after TWA Flight 847 had departed upon its last 
leg to Beirut.70 The JSOC Delta Force, led by Brig.Gen. Carl Stiner, 
arrived in Cyprus a full thirty-four hours after the hijack started. This 
delay had been caused as a result of an argument between the
57 Ariel Merari, during a telephone interview, during February, 1996
68 The JSOC controls the U.S. counter-terrorist forces which are comprised of the Army 
Special Forces' Delta Force and the Navy's Seal Team 6. They are supported by 
counter-terrorist and intelligence experts seconded from the Pentagon, the CIA and the State 
Department. See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.175
The sentiments expressed by Noel Koch, during a telephone interview, on February 
21, 1996.
David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. pp.178-180
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CPPG, its Terrorist Incident Working Group and the Pentagon. The 
former had wanted to despatch Delta Force immediately, however, 
the latter was reluctant to deploy its forces until the TWA flight had 
come to a final stop. While there was undoubtedly sense in 
Pentagon's argument, their lethargy was characteristic of the its 
reluctance to become involved in counter-terrorist operations.71 The 
failure of Desert One, albeit five years previously, had undermined 
the administration's and the military's confidence in the use of force 
in non-conventional operations.72 The failure of that operation was 
attributed to poor military planning and the failure of vital equipment, 
no less the poor state of maintenance of the RH-53D Sea-Stallion 
helicopters operated by the U.S. navy.73 Caspar Weinberger 
maintained the opinion that the U.S. armed forces should be used 
only in situations of war and then only when the U.S. had total public 
support and an overwhelming chance of success.74 The institutional 
conflict did not end there. In addition to the bureaucratic wrangling 
over who should lead the EST during the crisis, the intelligence 
community became entangled in the negotiations process between 
the State Department and the Israeli government. This sparked a row 
between George Schultz and William Casey, which added to the 
former's distrust of the intelligence community.75
The latter's involvement in the crisis was thus dominated and 
preoccupied by institutional conflict as opposed to effective tasking, 
collection and analysis. The tension between Schultz and Casey 
resulted in the State Department and the CIA functioning in an
71 See Caspar Weinberger, £1991), op.cit:. p.159 and Appendix I, "Text of Remarks by 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to the National Press Club - November 28, 1984," 
pp.445-457
72 Observations made by Noel Koch during an interview on February 21, 1996
73 For an overview of the circumstances surrounding the failure of Operation Desert 
One, see Charles Beckwith and Donald Knox, (1983), op.cit:, also David Martin and John 
Walcott (1988), op.cit:, pp.6-42 and Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:, pp.126-131
74 See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, £1988), op.cit:, pp.50-53
75 See George Schultz, £1993), op.cit:, pp.659-660
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uncoordinated manner which-was embarrassing and increased the 
marginalisation of the intelligence community and encouraged 
Schultz in his tendency to ignore its advice.76 The intelligence 
community was marginalised and confined to providing tactical 
intelligence in support of rescue and retaliation options,77 but 
remained excluded from the administration's policy deliberations. The 
same problem prevailed in the relationship between the intelligence 
community and the National Security Council and its staff, which 
used intelligence estimates on a selective basis in order to 
strengthen its position in the bureaucratic war between the Reagan 
Administration's departments and key officials.78 Bureaucratic 
competition is not an uncommon phenomenon in government and 
these tensions are most often the result of the influence of 
competitive individuals. The analyses in the previous chapters have 
illustrated the role and influence of key players such as Philip Habib, 
George Schultz, President Reagan, Caspar Weinberger and William 
Casey. Their respective faults, driven by their parochial and 
institutional concerns, had a negative impact on the administration's 
ability to deal effectively with its previous problems in Lebanon. 
However, none of these individuals were as central to the failure of 
American policy in the region as the National Security Advisor, 
Robert McFarlane, who used intelligence on a selective basis and in 
his own interests.79 The most glaring example of his "misuse" of
76 For an example of the tension between Schultz and Casey, see George Schultz, 
(1993), op.cit:. p.659. Schultz was angered by the fact that while he was persuing his 
backchannel communications with Benjamin Netanyahu the CIA were doing exactly the same 
with Mossad. This led to embarrassment because Netanyahu had asked him if any other 
communications were being conducted between the U.S. and the Israeli government to which 
Schultz had answered no.
77 See "Antiterror Forces: At Reagan's Call," U.S. News & World Report, June 24, 
1985, p.12
7 8 For an example of how intelligence is politicised and how Caspar Weinberger used 
intelligence selectively to distrort the Soviet threat and to achieve Reagan's backing for his 
defence proposals, see David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, (New York, Harper & Row, 
1986), p.290.
79 John Walcott, editor U.S. News & World Report, in an interview, on July 17, 1995, 
Washington D.C.
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intelligence was came about through an act of omission rather than 
commission, when he called for naval fire in support of the Lebanese 
army without seeking independent confirmation of the Lebanese 
commander - in - chiefs assessment that a major offensive against 
the LAF had been launched.80 Another example of his manipulation of 
intelligence occurred on August 31, 1984 when he requested an 
interagency analysis on U.S. relations with Iran after the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. This study concluded that arms transfers would 
not necessary guarantee the resumption of relations with Iran. 
Dissapointed with this assessment, he tasked Howard Teicher and 
NIO Graham Fuller to prepare another Special National Intelligence 
Estimate which was more in line with his policy of selling arms to Iran. 
This SNIE which was produced in May 1985 concluded that, the U.S. 
lacked the ability to counter Soviet imperialism in the region following 
Khomeini's death and that Israel may be able to fill the void be selling 
American arms to Iran and then being replenished by the U.S. The 
estimate supported McFarlane's preferred policy over the opposition 
of Schultz and Weinberger who were against selling American arms 
to Iran.81 This meant that he only paid attention to intelligence when 
it was consistent with his policy objectives and which could help him 
to prove his arguments.82 This contravened the basic principles of 
intelligence. Recall that intelligence should be a reflection of the 
reality upon which policy objectives should be based, as opposed to 
a product which is used to justify preconceived policy decisions. As 
one key participant and observer has noted, "McFarlane used 
intelligence as a weapon in bureaucratic warfare, rather than a tool 
for rational decision-making."83 McFarlane especially saw his role
80 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:. p.504
81 See Raymond Tanter, £1990), op.cit:. p.221
82 Ibid., p.217
83 William Beck, former Naval intelligence communications officer in Beirut who worked 
closely with Robert McFarlane when he replaced Philip Habib as special envoy to Lebanon, in 
an interview on August, 2, 1995. This opinion has been substantiated by Geoffrey Kemp who 
worked with McFarlane at the NSC, during an interview with the author on July 19, 1985,
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especially saw his role more as a shaper of foreign policy than a 
mediator between departments on national security issues, and his 
behaviour inevitably brought him into conflict with Caspar 
Weinberger and George Schultz, as described above.84
When policy disputes arose between the various departments 
concerning policy-making on Lebanon, the intelligence community 
was used in the decision making process as a force multiplier, 
lending credence to arguments. Intelligence estimates on Lebanon 
were only used to reinforce arguments instead of as a general a 
guide to decision making. The key to manipulating intelligence lies in 
the ability of an individual or institution concerned to task the 
intelligence community with collecting and preparing an intelligence 
report or estimate on a selected subject.85 An example of this practice 
was McFarlane's request for a Special National Intelligence Estimate 
on the likelihood of an Israeli attack against the PLO in Lebanon. His 
motive was to use the SNIE when prospects for war in Lebanon were 
increasing, to strengthen the position of the White House in setting 
foreign policy vis a vis the State Department, by requesting the 
production of the estimate at the right time.86 In his official capacity as 
the NSA, McFarlane was in the best position to order, schedule and 
re-schedule national intelligence estimates on any current or relevant 
topic. He was able to maintain an advantage over his bureaucratic 
competitors by altering scheduled intelligence requirements and 
expediting them.87 This interruption in the intelligence planning 
process had a direct effect upon the analytical quality of the reports 
as analysts were often hard-pressed to complete their estimates
Washington D.C.
04 See Jane Mayer Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:, p.63 and John Prados, £1991), 
op.cit:. p. 481-483
85 See Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:. p.70
56 William Beck, during an interview with the author on August, 2, 1995
07 See Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:, p.218.
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ahead of schedule and without the necessary information which still 
may not have been collected, interpreted or verified. Under 
McFarlane's supervision, the NSC staff used the CIA's capacity and 
resources to conduct covert operations, but ignored the Agency's 
analytic capability to evaluate the dangers and chances of success of 
its initiatives.88
Evidence of McFarlane's marginalisation of the intelligence 
community in the policy making process can also be found in the 
failure of the U.S. brokered 17 May Treaty between Israel and 
Lebanon.89 In this instance, Schultz, Habib and McFarlane pursued 
the agreement against the CIA's advice that Syria would not comply 
with its terms and that President Asad had the ability to effectively 
veto its implementation.90 McFarlane's intelligence selectivity also 
became evident much later on during the Iran-Contra operation.91
Under McFarlane's predecessor, Judge William P. Clark, the NSC 
staff had swelled to over 186 staff members, which was the highest 
number for the NSC under any presidency.92 Clark was also 
responsible for the installation of a sophisticated computer system 
which had been installed in the Crisis Management Centre and which 
had given the NSC staff direct access to raw data and information 
available from the intelligence community.93 Although the'technical
88 Jane Mayer Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:. p.61 and Raymond Tanter, (1990), 
op.cit:, pp.219-226
89 For a case study overview of the Treaty, see Barry Rubin and Laura Blum, The May 
1983 Agreement Over Lebanon, (Washington D.C., The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Pew Case Study No.312, 1992)
qn
See Raymond Tanter, (1990) op.cit:, p.219
91 See the Report of the President's Special Review Board, The Tower Commission 
Report, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, February 26, 1987). According 
to the report the intelligence community had produced a SNIE on Iran that challenged the 
White House assumptions upon which the arms transfers were based. The SNIE was ignored 
by McFarlane. See also Raymond Tanter, (1990), op.cit:, p.220. McFarlane's tendency to use 
intelligence on a selective basis was also revealed in a report published by the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence which found that the National Intelligence Estimate publiched in 
April 1985 indicated that Israel had its own motivations for encouraging the arms sales to 
Iran.
92 John Prados, £1991), op.cit:, p.455
This computer system was the brainchild of Professor Richard Beal, a Brigham
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wizardry did not provide the NSC with everything, it certainly tipped 
the scales in its favour and provided it with an overwhelming source 
of information that empowered it to operate with greater flexibility and 
independence from the intelligence community. The administration's 
crisis centre thus acquired its own capability to collect and analyse 
information. Despite the large number of staff, McFarlane only 
worked closely with his deputy, Admiral John Poindexter, Donald R. 
Fortier, his chief strategist, Howard Teicher, the politico-military 
affairs director and Lt.Col. Oliver North. Teicher's presence in this 
close-knit circle was a source of continual controversy that fuelled 
allegations of a pro-Israeli lobby at work within the NSC staff because 
of his Jewish origins, that contributed to the tensions between the 
State Department and the NSC staff over their approaches to Israel 
during the TWA crisis.94
The NSC staff was supposed to have provided the mechanisms 
by which policy disputes within the administration should have been 
resolved and combined departmental initiatives implemented and 
co-ordinated. Rather than resolving bureaucratic impasses, the NSC 
staff instead resorted to implementing policies that it had created 
which were based upon their perceptions of what the President 
wanted.95 Under Robert McFarlane's stewardship it became the 
"...engine for policy disputes."96 The NSC was a greater cause of
Young University professor, who installed $10 million worth of equipment in the NSC's Crisis 
Management Centre in room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building. This prevented the 
Pentagon and the CIA from being able to choke off NSC planning for covert operations, as 
they were no longer able to slow down the flow of information to the NSC staff. The NSC 
staff's operational capabilities were further enhanced with the introduction of the IBM 
"Professional Office System" (PROFS). This was a computer e-mail system with encryption 
which enabled the inner-circle of the NSC staff members to communicate with each other in 
secret. It was used by Lt. Col.Oliver North during the Iran-Contra Affair. For greater details of 
how technology empowered the NSC staff, see Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), 
op.cit:. pp.62-63
94 This has been alluded to by Howard Teicher personally in an interview with the 
author on October 23, 1995 and also mentioned by David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:. p.193
°5 See John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, pp.472-473
’5 See Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:, pp.198-202 and Martin and Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:, p.192.
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conflict within the administration than their resolution. The catalyst of 
most of these disputes with regard to its foreign policy in Lebanon, 
was Israel which was continuously drawing the U.S. into its activities, 
such as its Invasion of Lebanon, the crisis over the expulsion of the 
PLO, the Sabra and Shatila massacres97 and now the TWA crisis and 
the issue over the Atlit prisoners.98
As the politico-military analyst on the NSC staff at the time, 
Teicher believed that the cause of the hijack problem originated with 
Syria and President Asad's exercise of 'realpolitik.' Asad was 
perceived as a ruthless actor whose considered Lebanon as an 
extension of Syria's national security. It was therefore in Asad's 
interest to embarrass the U.S. in the region and to drive a wedge 
between America and Israel.99 The combination of Teicher's 
sympathy for Israel and Syria's role may have undermined his 
analytical objectivity. It may have caused him to overlook the fact that 
the TWA crisis stemmed from Israel's arrest of the Hizb'allah 
guerrillas in southern Lebanon and their detention at Atlit prison in 
Israel.
Crises exert a direct impact upon government policy and process. 
Because they demand an immediate response, they enable the 
White House to seize the initiative and take the lead over other 
government departments which would normally be entrusted with the 
implementation of policy. This introduces tensions over policy when 
in the absence of strong and decisive leadership, ambitious cabinet
See Zeev Schiff, "Who Decided, Who Informed," New Outlook, Vol.25, (1982), 
pp. 19-22 and Nick Thimmesch, "The Media and Middle East," American Arab Affairs. No.2, 
(Fall 1982), pp.79-88
98 It should be remembered that Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its expulsion of the 
PLO was the reason why the U.S. had become involved in the multi-lateral peacekeeping 
force and the subsequent attacks against its marines and embassies. For an overview of how 
Israel dragged America into the Lebanon quagmire see George Ball, (1984), op.cit:, and 
Jonathan Randal, The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventures and 
American Bunglers, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1989) as well as John Mackinlay, The 
Peacekeepers, (London, Unwin Hyman, 1989)
99 Views expressed by Howard Teicher during a telephone interview, with the author 
on October 23, 1995 and confirmed by David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.193
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members are likely to seize the initiative and attempt to further their 
own interests. This is what happened during the Reagan 
Administration as exemplified by the behaviour of Robert McFarlane 
and William Casey. The underlying responsibility of the NSA and the 
NSC is to balance diplomacy and force. Under the leadership of the 
president and his national security council members, such as the 
Secretaries of State and Defence, they should lead an interagency 
process that is designed to integrate and harmonise political and 
military responses to crises. The role of the NSA is to act as an 
honest broker in the interagency process.100 McFarlane failed in this 
responsibility and frustrated by the intransigence that prevailed 
between Weinberger and Schultz and President Reagan's 
indecisiveness, acted as an independent policy formulator.101 In this 
instance, he overreached the activist principle and not only 
advocated policy options102, but through using and directing the NSC 
staffs resources crossed over the line between policy making and its 
implementation.
The TWA crisis revealed the divergent interests which prevailed 
between the government's departments and demonstrated that 
institutional competition and interests can exert negative influences.
It also demonstrated that in managing a crisis situation where more 
than one state actor and adversary are involved, a balancing act 
between the interests and objectives of all the key players is required 
and that crisis decision making does not occur in a vacuum. This 
reality enforces the principle that it is advisable to limit one's
100 See Christopher Shoemaker, "The Role of the Assistant to the President," in 
Christopher Shoemaker, £1991), op.cit:. pp.110-115 and Leslie Gelb in Lawrence J Korb and 
Keith D Hahn, (eds.), National Security Policy Organisation in Perspective, (Washington D.C., 
American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp.19-20 and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC’S Midlife 
Crisis," Foreign Policy. No.69, (Winter 1987-89), p.82
101 See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:, pp.54-65. The same opinions 
pertaining to McFarlane and his role as NSA were expressed by John Walcott in an 
interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.
102 For an overview of Robert McFarlane's opinions on terrorism,response and the 
divergent views of George Schultz and Caspar Weinberger, see Robert C McFarlane, 
"Terrorism and the Future of Free Society," Terrorism, Vol.8, No.4, (1986), pp.315-326
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objectives during a crisis - situation. Furthermore conservative 
objectives should also go hand in hand with an economy of means if 
an escalation in the tension level of the crisis is to be avoided. The 
Reagan Administration, however, failed to adhere to this principle as 
the following section demonstrates.
5.3 Limiting the use of force and the dilemma of responding to
terrorism
A ransom agreed in negotiation is a ransom which can be 
afforded and so should not be withheld.103
The administration compounded the situation by threatening to 
use military force in retaliation against the hijackers at various times 
during the crisis. This threat was conveyed when George Schultz 
stated that the use of force could not be ruled out and when the 
Pentagon announced the presence of its Sixth Fleet off the Lebanese 
coast.104 This increased the tension level during the crisis by adding 
to the hijackers fears of retaliation and delayed its resolution towards 
the end when Berri insisted on a commitment by the U.S. that it would 
refrain from retaliating against the hijackers after the release of the 
hostages.105 Although the administration sought to respond to the 
situation in a controlled manner, it nevertheless elevated the crisis 
threshold by attempting to link the release of the TWA hostages with 
the six Beirut hostages, who were being held by the a,-Jihad group 
within Hizb'allah.106 In this instance the crisis management team 
failed to exercise restraint in limiting its objectives during the crisis.
103 Martin Hughes, "Terror and Negotiation," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.2, 
No.1, (Spring 1990), p.72
104 See Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit:, p.607
105 See George de Lama and Terry Atlas, "Did Reagan Speech Botch Deal? Tough Talk 
Has Administration on the Defensive," Chicago Tribune, June 30, 1985, p.1
*3° Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says 7 Missing Must Also Go Free With Air Hostages,"
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Before Amal resorted to dispersing the TWA hostages in Beirut, 
they were already in a relatively secure position against any possible 
attack from the U.S. The Beirut hostages held by their temporary 
allies, Hizb'allah, provided this assurance as any military reprisal 
could have resulted in the execution of these hostages.107 In fact, the 
use of force against Hizb'allah would always have been ruled out for 
as long as Hizb'allah was able to use the safety of the western 
hostages in Beirut as a safeguard against reprisal by the U.S.108 
Despite Reagan's rhetoric and military posturing, the government 
found itself faced with only one option which was to negotiate.109 
Given the administration's vehement and dogmatic stance against 
making concessions to terrorists, this created a political and moral 
dilemma.
A fundamental principle of negotiation holds that parties who 
negotiate can only participate successfully from a position of 
strength.110 In the case of the U.S., however, the only leverage that it 
possessed was to threaten the hijackers with military retaliation or an 
economic boycott of Beirut and its airport.111 Neither of these options
New York Times, June 28, 1985
107 See Robert Fisk, "Group of hostages in clutches of pro-Iranian extremists," Times, 
June 22, 1985. According to Fisk, Amal held four hostage groups and Hizb'allah a fifth, in 
addition to the six Beirut hostages kidnapped during the previous year in Beirut.
108 See Jamil Nasser, "The Uncostly War," New Statesman, February 20, 1987, pp.9-10 
and Helena Cobban, "Responding in Lebanon and Elsewhere," New York Times, June 23, 
1985
109 This sentiment was expressed by Stansfield Turner and by Noel Koch, the 
Pentagon's counter-terrorist officer at the time. See David Martin and John Walcott, (1988), 
op.cit:. p.181. This was confirmed by Noel Koch, during a telephone interview, on February 
1996. Also for the difficulties in responding to hostage situations see Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
"When Terrorists Take Hostages: Obsession Leads to Paralysis," New York Times, June 27, 
1985.
110 See T E Abbott, "Time-Phase Model for Hostage Negotiation," Police Chief, Vol.53, 
No.4, 1986, pp.34-36 and R Fisher and W Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements 
Without Giving In, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co, 1981) and R B Cialdini, J E Vincent, S K 
Lewis, (et.al) "Reciprocal Concessions Procedure For Inducing Compliance: The door-in-face 
technique." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.31, 1975, pp.206-215
111 See Mark Whittaker, "Reagan's Options," Newsweek, July 8, 1985, pp.22-24 and 
William L Chaze, "What Price For the Hostages?," U.S. News & World Report, July 8, 1985, 
p.23 and Hugh Sidey, "The Courage of Restraint," Time, August 14, 1989, p.14
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were plausible and nor would- have been in America's geostrategic 
interests. For reasons discussed, military retaliation had to be ruled 
out and the administration feared that any closure of Beirut 
international airport would have elevated Syria's influence in 
Lebanon as its airport in Damascus could become a credible 
substitute given the short distance between he two cities.112 Although 
the administration tried to link the release of the six Beirut hostages 
to its counter-demands, there can be no doubt that this was partly in 
response to mounting public pressure from their relatives. It was also 
a tactic on the administration’s part to build in a demand that they 
would be able to drop as a concession and therefore create room to 
manoeuvre during their negotiations. Despite America's relatively 
weak position, the media fuelled the debate over the U.S. options to 
use force against the hijackers. In addition the administration's 
rhetoric over international terrorism and its threats of reprisals 
against the hijackers, increased the tension levels.
The media contributed to the tension by publishing debates which 
fuelled speculation over the administration's likelihood of retaliation. 
For example, the opinions of former government officials, notably that 
of Henry Kissinger,113 Lawrence Eagleburger and four previous 
Directors of the CIA, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William 
Colby and Stansfield Turner were sought, broadcast and published in 
at least one weekly news magazine.114 *
Helms advocated a steady and unemotional approach. He 
cautioned against the temptation of 'declaring war on terrorism' and 
argued against assassination as an option. He in fact warned against
112 -See David B. Ottoway, "Possible Sanctions Against Hijackers May Be Futile," 
Washington Post, June 26, 1985, p.17 and Rodney Snyder, (1994), op.cit:, p.15
113 For Henry Kissinger's opinion, see Helena Cobban, "Don't Hit Back," New York 
Times, June 23, 1985. According to Cobban, the 'experts' which included Henry Kissinger and 
who advocated retaliation failed to examine the circumstances in Lebanon and the dynamic 
complexities of the region and its actors.
114 See Strobe Talbott, "The Problems With Retaliation. Four ex-CIA chiefs weigh the
options for countering terrorism," Time, July 8, 1985, pp.13-14
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any forms of violent retaliation, arguing that improved intelligence 
and increased co-operation amongst intelligence services of different 
countries, which could assist in penetrating and frustrating terrorist 
objectives and operations, was the only suitable approach. Helms 
used the opportunity to criticise the leaks that prevailed within the 
administration and Congress and pointed out that this factor was 
what inhibited increased international co-operation.115
James Schlesinger reminded the public that democracies forgo 
certain options by the nature of their societies and the whole set of 
ideals that they represent. He advocated a clear and unambivalent 
policy against terrorism which included offensive operations against 
terrorists. While he was not in favour of assassination, he thought the 
U.S. should not refrain from conducting operations against terrorist 
organisations and that if any terrorist was killed as a result of an 
operation, it should not be considered identical to an ordered 
assassination.116
William Colby was the most outspoken critic of the U.S. 
intelligence and para-military capabilities to counter terrorism. He 
placed the blame on the "...labyrinthine military structure." and the 
absence of a dedicated counter terrorist force.117 118Colby condemned 
assassination as an instrument but supported military force against 
terrorist bases and depots conducted in accordance with the rules of
116 Ibid., These interviews were published exclusively in Time. No other references are 
available which cover this aspect.
117 It is interesting to note that William Colby, a career intelligence officer, had served in 
an operational capacity in the OSS and the CIA before he became the DCI. More significantly, 
however, he was the director in charge of Operation Phoenix in Vietnam. See William Colby 
and William Forbath, £1978), op.cit. For a description of Operation Phoenix and William 
Colby's involvement, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, (1989), op.cit:. pp. 166-167
118 Strobe Talbott, (July 8, 1985), op.cit:. pp.13-14
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Personal agendas also came to the fore as Stansfield Turner 
used the crisis as an opportunity to appear on television and 
reciprocate in criticising the CIA's management and response to 
terrorism under Casey. In an interview with Time magazine, he 
referred to Casey's botched covert operation against Sheikh 
Fadlallah in March that year and stated that, "Another problem is that 
we've got to be very careful about the sort of people who do our dirty 
work for us. What assurances do we have that our proxies won't take 
out 80 innocent people?"119 He also stated that the military was not 
attuned to conducting para-military operations and advocated a CIA 
appendage to Delta Force which could assist the military with the 
operational details required for infiltrating Delta Force operatives 
among airline passengers.120 All four of these former CIA directors 
came out strongly opposed to assassination as a form of retaliation 
against terrorism. The use of assassination by the intelligence 
community had been outlawed by President Ford in 1976 in an 
executive order and it been upheld by Presidents Carter in 1978 and 
Reagan in 1981.121 These former CIA directors advocated the use of 
the Agency in a more activist role in counter-terrorist operations. In 
addition to the advice of former government officials, the media also 
published the opinions of a number of leading former policymakers, 
advisors and academics.122 These public debates and opinions had
119 -For Turner's criticism of William Casey and the Sheikh Fadlallah operation, see 
Stansfield Turner, "The Fadlallah Folly," in S Turner (1991), op.cit:, , pp. 183-187
120 Strobe Talbott, "The Problems With Retaliation. Four ex-CIA chiefs weigh the 
options for countering terrorism," Time, July 8, 1985, pp. 13-14
1 ? 1 -See Abram N Shulsky, £1991), op.cit:, p.91. See also Executive Order 11905, 
"United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," February 18, 1976, sect.5 (g) [41 
Fed.Reg.7733 (1976)], President Carter retained the ban in Executive Order 12036, January 
24, 1978, sect.2-305 [43 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1978)] and President Reagan upheld the same ban 
in Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981, sect.2.11 [48 Fed. Reg.59947 (1981)]
122 The U.S. News & World Report published a debate between former Under Secretary 
of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, the then President of Kissinger Associates and Robert 
Kupperman, a senior adviser at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and 
International Affairs. Whereas Eagleburger came out strongly in favour of military retaliation 
against terrorist groups, Kupperman cautioned against the use of military force on the 
grounds that it would encourage counter-retaliation. He warned against the pitfalls of 
response when driven by emotion rather than by cold-blooded calculation. While Eagleburger 
pointed out that a cycle of violence already existed and that failure to respond to terrorist
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little effect upon the administration's policy, however. The only effect 
they had as they raged back and forth in the media and on television, 
was to highlight the dilemmas faced by democracies in combating 
terrorism.123 Of little use to the administration, the publicity only 
served to demonstrate to America's adversaries in Lebanon that their 
strategy of using terrorism against the world's leading democratic 
state was highly successful. The increase in tension between the 
parties served to conceal the fact that, contrary to its publicised 
principles, the government was in fact compromising. It circumvented 
the problem by using backchannel methods to communicate with 
Israel and, through semantic manipulation, created the impression 
that no negotiations were taking place and that the release of the 
hostages had been secured as a result of the creation of satisfactory 
conditions acceptable to the hijackers.124
Underlying the administration's limitations was the fact that the 
security and intelligence communities were ill equipped in personnel, 
assets and doctrine to support the government that had to balance its 
interests and make decisions based upon limited and often 
ambiguous information.125 The crisis rekindled public concern and 
debate over the role and activities of the intelligence community 
which focused upon the function of the CIA. In a research project on 
the media and terrorism that focused on the network evening news 
coverage of the TWA hostage crisis, Atwater revealed that after 
reports which featured the status of the hostages (34 %), the U.S.
violence in kind would be tantamount to announcing that Americans abroad were fair game 
for terrorists, Kupperman went on to expose America's domestic vulnerability to acts of 
terrorism.See "Pro and Con: Should U.S. Strike Back at Terrorists?" U.S. News & World 
Report, July 1. 1985. p.22 •
123 For an overview of the dilemmas facing democracies and the U.S., see John M 
Oseth, "Combating Terrorism: The Dilemmas of a Decent Nation," Parameters, Journal of the 
US Army War College, Vol.XV, No.1, pp.65-75
124 For an overview of the moral principles at stake in negotiating with terrorists, see 
Martin Hughes, (Spring 1990), op.cit:, pp.73-82
125 See Rodney A Snyder, Negotiating With Terrorists: TWA Flight 847, (Washington 
D.C., Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Dilpomacy, School of Foreign Service, 
Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case 333, 1994), p.1
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government's reaction dominated 17% of the media reports.126 In fact, 
a survey of the leading U.S. newspapers in 1985 reveals that 
following the TWA crisis, the Agency was the theme of 103 editorials. 
Although this is smaller than the 227 recorded in 1975 during 
Watergate, it demonstrates the concern among the U.S. public about 
the intelligence community's activities and the public's recognition of 
the necessity for an intelligence capability that is proficient in 
responding to terrorism without compromising on democratic values 
and principles.127 The intelligence community are best equipped to 
empower the government with the leverage that it requires to 
approach negotiations in crises from a position of relative strength. 
This reinforces the intelligence imperative principle. In the TWA crisis 
the intelligence community failed to provide the administration with 
the information that it needed. Instead the media who had access to 
the scene, the hijackers and the hostages, found itself in an 
advantageous position which enabled them to usurp the role of the 
intelligence community.
5.4 The intelligence imperative and support during the
TWA crisis
National decision makers require information to alert them 
on a timely basis to potentially hazardous events and to 
allow them to manage crises as they occur.128
The TWA crisis reflected a fundamental shortcoming in the 
producer - consumer relationship; this was the absence of effective 
communication. A number of obstacles caused this breakdown
126 Tony Atwater, Terrorism and the News Media Research Project: Network Evening 
News Coverage of the TWA Hostage Crisis, (Boston, Massachusetts, Emerson College, No 
date), p.6
127 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, £1989), op.cit:. p.241
128 Stanley A Taylor and Theodore J Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis 
Management," in Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. p.395
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between the intelligence community and the crisis management team. 
A combination of competing bureaucratic interests, organisation and 
structural arrangements and rigid doctrinal impediments together with 
problems in obtaining access to intelligence assets and information, 
contributed towards the intelligence community's poor performance in 
the areas of collection, analysis and product dissemination during the 
crisis.
5.4.1 Tasking and collection
Amid allegations that the hijackers had been planning the 
operation for weeks in advance, the primary task of the intelligence 
community during the crisis was to establish the identity of the 
hijackers, their strength, armaments, logistics, support and 
objectives.129 In an interview with the New York Times, Senator Jesse 
Helms, who was a ranking member of the U.S. Foreign Relations 
Committee, alleged that Iran had recruited, trained and financed the 
TWA hijack operation.130 Senator Helms' statement must be 
evaluated in the light of possible political posturing on his part at the 
time.131 The significance of his disclosure lies in the allegation that 
his research staff was involved in monitoring developments in Iran 
and that this information was sourced from Iranian, Lebanese and 
other Muslim sources inside the United States.132 While the reasons
129 See Dan Fischer, "Peres Says Hijacking Was Planned for Over a Month," Los 
Angeles Times. June 22, 1985. According to Peres’ press secretary, Uri Savir, he was not 
sure whether Peres was responding to intelligence information.
130 See Bob Secter and Norman Kempster, "Iran-Influenced Hizb'allah Cited by 
McFarlane," Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1985 and Hedrick Smith, "Hostages in Lebanon: A 
Finger is Pointed At Iran. Helms Says Iran Planned Hijacking," New York Times. June 28, 
1985
131 Observations made by John Walcott, in a subsequent telephone interview, on 
February 16, 1996
132 Numerous requests to interview Senator Jesse Helms during February 1996 proved 
unsuccessful!. While Helms contends that his research staff had access to individuals within 
the USA, it is doubtful that they had any meaningful insight into Hizb'allah's plans or activities, 
given that organisation's penchant for security and the fact that it was organised according to
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behind the intelligence community's failure in Beirut have already 
been explained, in this instance warning intelligence failed because 
of the delay in communication and dissemination channels caused by 
limited access.133
Whereas the intelligence community and Senator Helms' staff 
were allegedly in possession of information pertaining to the 'who' 
and 'why', behind the TWA operation, they certainly did not know the 
answers to the questions of 'what', 'when', 'how1 and 'so what', 
pertaining to the planned hijacking. These questions are all 
necessary in constituting the full spectrum of intelligence information.
During the crisis, officials conceded that Washington's 
intelligence assets in Lebanon were 'skimpy', especially with regard 
to terrorist groups.134 Despite the efforts of William Casey to increase 
the community's intelligence assets, the reality was that a whole new 
network had to be build up from scratch in Lebanon. In the interim, 
human intelligence gathering was being staged from Egypt and 
Israel.135 * The intelligence community remained isolated from 
conducting human intelligence operations on the ground in Lebanon 
and Iran, who were the key state actors in the hijacking operation. 
The combined operation between Hizb'allah and Amal demonstrated 
how the various factions were able to co-operate, albeit temporarily 
against the U.S. and the complexity that prevailed within Lebanese 
politics. Their second task was to identify potential targets for
clan lines. Within Hizb'allah itself, only a handful of individuals were ever privy to its 
operations. The possibility of that info extending to the USA was highly unlikely.
133 It remains doubtful whether Senator Helms research staff were in possession of 
more substantial substantial information than was available to the intelligence community. 
The difference, however, may have been that whereas the information was made directly 
available to Heims, in the case of the administration, there were too many bureaucratic layers 
which formed obstacles in the way of effective and speedy communication between the 
producer and consumers. Helms' staff, no doubt like the intelligence community, were in 
possession of information pertaining to the Who and Why, but not the additional and vitally 
necessary What, When and How of the planned hijacking operation.
134 See William L Chaze, Reagan's Hostage Crisis," U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 
1985, p.21
135 Ariel Merari, during a telephone interview, on February 20, 1996
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retaliation after the crisis. In this instance, and given the 
administration's polarised cabinet, this implied identifying targets that 
could be selected for reprisal that would guarantee the government's 
legitimacy and sustained popularity.136 The administration stated that 
since the appointment of William Casey, the CIA had placed 
additional intelligence agents into 'trouble spots', and that it had 
increased its analytical capabilities with the introduction of computers 
to assist with the analysis of the increasing information.137 However, 
it reiterated the fact that it was finding it difficult to make any 
meaningful headway in the Middle East due to the clannish structure 
of the target organisations and their imperviousness to infiltration.138 
This was not the only area where the analytical capabilities of the 
intelligence community experienced shortcomings. Analysis 
pertaining to the influence of inter-group dynamics in Lebanon and its 
effect on U.S. objectives remained the missing dimension.
5.4.2 Analysis
The argument over "how to react" during the crisis overshadowed 
any progress towards its in-depth analysis. Crisis-induced stress 
affects the intelligence process. Under these conditions intelligence 
tends to reflect incremental perceptions based upon a "current events 
syndrome."139 The restraints imposed through the shortage of time 
combined with stress, inhibits the careful evaluation of information
See Mark Whitaker, "Diplomacy By Carrot and Stick," U.S. News & World Report, 
July 15, 1985, pp.18-19
1 07
See Robert A Manning, "Casey's CIA: New Clout, New Danger," U.S. News & World 
Report, June 16, 1986, pp.24-31
1 00
See William Chaze, "What Price for the Hostages," U.S. News & World Report, July 
8, 1985, p.23
139 This syndrome is a phenomenon where intelligence analysts and consumers judge 
events and information in relation to the limited parameters of the crisis incident itself and 
lose sight of the broader ramifications and implications in relation to the wider context of 
events.
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and its integration into a body of evidence that reflects in-depth 
analysis in context of not only the latest myopic piece of information, 
but of the effect upon overall values and objectives by the crisis 
situation - the answers to the 'so what' question in the deductive 
analysis chain.140
An appraisal of the administration's predicament in relation to the 
emerging conflict between Hizb'allah and Amal Shi'ite factions in 
Lebanon, and how the tensions between these two organisations and 
their patrons, Syria and Iran, affected the crisis dynamic was not 
available or forthcoming before or during the incident.141 During the 
crisis, the community's resources remained devoted to ascertaining 
the identities, affiliations and supporters of the hijackers. Their 
second priority focused upon trying to establish the exact number of 
hostages and whether they had been separated and where they were 
being held. Intelligence analysis therefore remained essentially 
reactive and devoid of initiative as opposed to reflecting proactive 
measures or suggestions. The community was slow in responding to 
the information requirements of the NSC as bureaucratic struggles 
between the various intelligence agencies over the need to reach 
consensus in their analyses retarded overall intelligence production 
and communication.142 Efforts at rebuilding the community's human 
intelligence network inside Lebanon and Iran while underway, were 
still in their infant stages and the production of intelligence could not 
be rushed.143 Consequently the crisis managers, the president and
Stanley A Taylor and Theodore J Ralston, (1991), op.cit;, p.405
141 Unatributable source in the U.S. State Department, who served in the NSC staff at 
the time of the crisis.
142 For an overview of how bureaucratic interests impede decision making, see Morton 
H Halperin, "Why bureaucrats play games," Foreign Policy, No.2, 1971, pp.70-90 and Roger 
Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, (New York, 1987). See 
also Bill Jenkins and A Gray, "Bureaucratic Politics and Power," Political Studies, Vol.31, 
1983, pp.177-193
143 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995
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information: an alternative that was not without its own risks.144
While the media were able to provide almost instantaneous
coverage they also served as the hijackers' and Nabih Berri's 
auxiliary communication channel with the administration. In the 
absence of intelligence contributions, opinions expressed in the 
media influenced and shaped the administration's crisis policy and 
response initiatives.145 The media's influence was quite considerable 
while at the same time there was no professional analytical body 
available to interpret events and developments as portrayed in the 
media in the context of the government's objectives. In this manner 
the media, who became competition for the intelligence community, 
played an activist role. This was a dangerous situation as the media, 
like the intelligence community, was also removed from the inner 
sanctum of the decision making process of the policy makers. 
Consequently they could only speculate about the administration's 
crisis response objectives and policy.146 The integrity of the 
information feed into the decision making mechanism was thus 
questionable because it was uni-directional.
5.4.3 Intelligence distribution and communication
Because organisational and hierarchical departmental structures 
result in the fact that virtually all intelligence analysts are located in 
agencies and bureaus, rather than at the level of senior policy 
makers, organisational arrangements impede effective utilisation of 
intelligence during crises.147 This is due to the fact that professional
144 Howard Teicher, telephone nterview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C.
145 See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (New York, 
St Martin's Press, 1991), pp.292-293 and Jeffrey, D Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.187
146 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington, D.C and confirmed by 
Abraham Shulsky, Senior researcher, Rand Corporation, during an interview, on July 18, 
1995, Washington, D.C
147 Noel Koch, during a telephone interview, on February, 1996
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analysts are not usually included in the crisis management team. 
Despite the fact that so much time, effort and money is spent on the 
tasking, collection and analysis of information, very few resources 
and thought are given to providing senior policy makers with 
analytical tools. The result is that senior policy makers tend to 
function as their own analysts.148 This was one of the reasons for the 
breakdown in communication between the intelligence community 
and the crisis management team in the Reagan Administration and in 
particular, during the TWA crisis.
The absence of a contribution from the intelligence community at 
a most crucial stage in that crisis, almost resulted in a delay of the 
resolution of the crisis at the last minute. When on the eve of the 
hostages' release, President Reagan made his televised speech 
castigating the hijackers as murderers and threatening retaliation, 
Hizb'allah refused to release those hostages and crew members 
under their control until the administration had pledged it would not 
mount any reprisal.149 No one within the Cabinet, the NSC staff or the 
intelligence community appears to have advised against the possible 
consequences of the president's speech at such a critical moment. 
Equally significant was the fact that no one asked the intelligence 
community for their advice either. There was no evidence that 
co-ordination between the intelligence community and the 
administration's press office existed, a crucial crisis management 
arrangement. The intelligence community was not involved in any of 
the crisis response debates or the planning process.150 It simply 
remained a collector of information with none of its analysts being 
used as a sounding board by the NSC or its staff. In this instance, the
148 See Ronald H Hinckley, "National Security in the Information Age," Washington 
Quarterly, (Spring 1986), p.128
1 4 Q _
See George Church, "At Last the Agony is Over," Time, July 8, 1985, pp.14-20 and 
Karen De Young and William Drozdiak, "Intense Diplomacy, Syrian Weight End Crisis," 
Washington Post. July 1, 1985
150 Unatributable source in the U.S. State Department, who served in the NSC staff at 
the time of the crisis.
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NSC staff functioned as their own analysts. This is not surprising, 
however, given the scarcity of the intelligence community's 
information.
The CIA's weakness can be attributed to its inflexibility which it 
maintained despite the nature of the threat. Traditionalist norms 
reinforced the reluctance on the part of the intelligence community to 
become intimately involved in the decision making process and to 
offer objective advice. A factor which prevented the intelligence 
community from marketing itself aggressively and greater 
participation in the administration's crisis deliberations was the 
fundamental lack of intelligence. This shortcoming inhibited the 
intelligence community from approaching the NSC and its staff with 
advice and ideas despite the absence of up-to-date information.151 
This was partly the result of the perception of inferiority that was 
created and shaped by the administration.152 This deprived it of much 
needed analytical and institutional memory and guidance from the 
intelligence community.153 The result was that the media, which was 
the de-facto source of real-time information, filled the void.154 
Inevitably, however, the media was an unacceptable surrogate. While 
the administration relied upon it as a source of information, it was no 
substitute for analysed intelligence. In addition, the media's influence 
became ali the more precarious for the administration as it crossed 
the boundary between being an asset as a source of information and 
a liability when it turned into an accessorial actor for the hijackers 
during the crisis.155 The major media networks televised the hijackers'
151 Howard Teicher, during a telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington
D.C.
152 See John Ranelagh, (1987), op.cit:. p.707
153 Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C.
154 This was confirmed by Noel Koch during a telephone interview with the author on 
February 21, 1996 and by an unatributable source in the U.S. State Department, who served 
in the NSC staff at the time of the crisis.
155 See Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. pp.408-409
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the hijackers' cause, which promoted their popularity among the local 
population in Lebanon and gave them international exposure.
5.5 The principle of communication: intelligence, the media and
terrorism
The era of the "trouble-free cathode cage" is long gone. It 
has been replaced with satellite technology that brings 
round-the-clock coverage of revolutions, hijackings, and 
other fast-breaking events.156
As the government could not be seen to be communicating openly 
with the hijackers, it had to find an intermediary or an alternative 
medium.157 The television and printed media, despite presenting the 
crisis managers with additional problems, served this purpose. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, criticism was levelled at the media for their 
unprofessional behaviour.158 Besides debates and no less than one 
congressional hearing over accusations that the presence and role of 
the media encouraged terrorism, one very important lesson 
emerged.159 This lesson demonstrated that advances in technology 
facilitated greater access and direct communication and transmission 
for the media during crises and that the media therefore, became an 
additional factor and key actor which had to be 'reckoned with' during
130 Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.261
157 For an overview of the consequences of adopting a policy of not negotiating with 
terrorists, see Abraham H Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations, (Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, 1980)
158 See Peter W Kaplan, "TV Networks Fight Fiercely on Hostages," New York Times. 
June 30, 1985
159 See the U.S. Senate Select Committee Hearing on the Media, Diplomacy and 
Terrorism in the Middle East. July 30, 1985. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C., 1985) and Tony Atwater, "Terrorism and the Evening News: An Analysis of Coverage of 
the TWA Hostage Crisis on NBC Nightly News," Political Communication and Persuasion. 
Vol.4, pp. 17-24. See also John Dillin, "News Media Coverage of Hostage Story Raises 
Glaring Questions," Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1985 and John Corry, "TV: Intruder in 
the Hostage Crisis," New York Times. June 26, 1985
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crisis management. The initial reaction to this problem by the security 
forces and crisis management officials is to try and limit access by 
the media to the scene of any incident. The answer, however, lies in 
the ability of crisis managers to use the media as an additional 
instrument.160 The media should be used as a means of 
communication between the authorities and the public and to 
establish and maintain legitimacy for crisis response policy and 
initiatives, while simultaneously undermining the credibility of the 
adversary.161 The crucial issue in managing the media is the degree 
to which the authorities are able to exercise strict control over access 
to the scene and the adversary by the media and members of the 
public.162 This applies especially to communications links between 
the terrorists and the media and is usually done by implementing 
physical access control to the crisis terrain and by severing 
communication links, i.e. cutting telephone lines and jamming radio 
signals from the adversary if necessary. In the case of the TWA 
crisis, however, the problem arose because the U.S. government did 
not control the terrain surrounding the hostages nor the 
communication links between the hijackers and the media. There was 
no friendly government that they could approach to carry out these 
measures on their behalf. On the domestic front the media assumed 
the role as the administration's communicator over the crisis not by 
conscious design but through default because of the government's 
intractability and the poor public relations which prevailed between 
the State Department and the relatives of the hostages.163
160 For an explanation of the significance of the media as an instrument of power, see 
Roland D Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the 
Communication Structure," in Paul Wilkinson and A M Stewart, (eds.), £1989), op.cit:, 
pp.419-445
161 See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons from the Past, in Daniel Frei, (ed.), (1978), op.cit:. p.8-9 and Paul Wilkinson, 
"Proposals for Government and International Responses to Terrorism," in P Wilkinson, (ed.) 
£1981), op.cit.
162 See Michael J Kelly, "The Seizure Of The Turkish Embassy In Ottawa: Managing 
Terrorism And The Media," in Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T Charles and Paul 'T Hart, (eds.), 
(1989), op.cit:, pp. 120-123
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The government's reluctance to interact with the public was 
attributable to President Reagan's Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, who 
endeavoured to isolate Ronald Reagan from the public during the 
initial stages of the crisis.163 64 Regan's main objective was to prevent 
the president from becoming emotionally involved in the crisis and to 
prevent a recurrence of the Iranian hostage crisis.165 The 
administration's inability and failure to manage the media in the TWA 
crisis resulted in the media fulfilling two roles: First as the principal 
source of information pertaining to the crisis for the government and 
second as the spokesman between the government, the public and 
the hijackers.
5.5.1 The media fills the intelligence void
The media interview conducted with TWA pilot John Testrake and 
one of the hijackers, by ABC television provided the NSC with 
confirmation of the removal of hostages from the plane, whereas the 
intelligence community was unable to either confirm or deny that the 
hijackers had removed the hostages from the aircraft.166 In this 
regard, the media also functioned as a source of operational 
intelligence for the crisis management team. It provided them with 
information about the hijackers' intentions and movements and the 
reaction of the public to the administration's counter moves. It also 
conveyed the hijackers' response to the American and Israeli
163 For an overview on the debate of the role of the media and terrorism and the media's 
interaction with the public and providing them with information, see Jeffrey D Simon, "Myths 
about Terrorism and the Media" (1994), op.cit:. pp.266-276 and David Martin and John 
Walcott, (1988), op.cit:. p.192
164 See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:, pp.96-101
165 See John Prados, (1991), op.cit:. p.501
166 See Philip Shenon, "U.S. Says It Has Little Information About Passengers Taken Off 
Jet," New York Times. June 17, 1985 and the comments of Nora Boustany in John Dillin's 
article, "News Media coverage of hostage story raises glaring questions," Christian Science 
Monitor. July 2, 1985
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governments' statements back to the U.S. administration. The media 
provided an information contribution to the crisis centre.167 This was a 
function that the intelligence community should have been providing, 
particularly if it had been playing a more activist role in the 
decision-making process. In this regard the media exerted an active 
influence in policy making. The distinction between the roles of the 
media and the intelligence community is that the intelligence 
community provides feedback into the crisis centre which is 
information that has been analysed in the context of the decision 
makers' policy objectives. The media, however, are only able to 
provide information sans the contextual perspectives as they are not 
privy to the decision makers' objectives. Notwithstanding this 
handicap the media are quite capable of influencing policy 
decisions.168 Television anchormen by the very nature of their public 
profiles, are icons and are known to millions of viewers. Celebrity 
status elevates them to the level of policy makers in the eyes of their 
audience. According to Dan Rather, the CBS television Anchorman at 
the time, "...[AJnchormen and prominent correspondents are 
surrogate Secretaries of State."169 Their views are expressed on 
national television and can therefore exert an active influence on 
crisis management and the government which can find itself 
formulating policy in accordance with the opinions and mood 
reflected by the media.170
See Patrick Lagadec, £1993), op.cit:. p.211. Lagadec explains that communication 
during crises is vital since in the absence of information, other actors fill the vacuum who may 
be promoting their own interests.
See Alexander L George, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The 
Effective Use of Information and Advice. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), 
pp. 169-1173
169 -See John Corry, "TV: Intruder in the Hostage Crisis," New York Times. June 26,
1985
170 For an explanation of how the media can set public and policy agendas, see D L 
Shaw and M McCombs, The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting 
Function of the Press, (St. Paul, MN, West Publishing, 1971)
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The media also filled the void created by the lack of intelligence in 
providing useful leads and evidence to the FBI and the Justice 
Department for the identification and subsequent prosecution of 
some of the hijackers.171 In assisting the Justice Department the 
media's role also created a dilemma. There was concern that the 
authorities' requests and subpoenas of the media and journalists 
would create a precedent and result in the perception that some of 
the networks were co-operating with or operating on behalf of the 
administration and the intelligence community. In addition to the 
likelihood that many journalists would plead the Fifth Ammendment, 
concerns were also expressed about what the consequences of this 
belief would herald for the safety of journalists and the media's 
access to future incidents.172 It has already been noted that the media 
is not only a source of overt intelligence for governments, but that it 
can also function as a medium for direct and indirect communications 
with an adversary during crises.173 In fulfilling both these roles the 
media effectively overshadowed the intelligence community as an 
active participant and support mechanism in resolving the crisis. 
President Reagan used the media to convey warnings to the 
hijackers that the U.S. would retaliate in the event of the hostages 
being harmed.174 He also conveyed the message that the U.S. would 
not retaliate as long as the hostages came to no harm.175 * *In addition, 
the administration used the media as an instrument to apply pressure
171 in this instance not all the media networks gave their full co-operation. Most of them 
had to be subpoenaed. This created a dilemma for the networks who were traditionally
reluctant to release material that had not been screened as footage and co-operating in 
bringing criminals to justice. See Alex S Jones, "CBS Compromises on Subpoena For 
Videotapes of Hostage Crisis.'1 New York Times. July 27, 1985
Ibid.
Robert Grace, interview, on July 13, 1995 FBI Academy, Quantico Bay.
See Bill Keller, "Warships Set Sail; U.S. Seeks to End Speculation It Will Act," in the
New York Times, June 18, 1985 for an example of how the administration conveyed a veiled 
threat to the hijackers but simultaneously communicated to them that they would not retaliate 
against them while they had possession of the hostages and the hostages were not harmed.
173
174
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on Nabih Berri during the crisis by increasing its rhetoric and in 
stating that it held him personally accountable for the safety of the 
hostages. While the media proved to be a source of intelligence for 
the administration, this advantage was simultaneously undermined.176 
This aspect is explained below.
5.5.2 Terrorvision: The media becomes part of the problem
I suddenly realised that the American media were there - in 
Beirut - in among the terrorist establishment, and that they 
were not going to cover the crisis, they were going to be 
part of it.177
The turning point in the relationship between the media and 
terrorism occurred during the Munich Olympics, when a global 
sporting event was transformed into a global terrorist event.178 Since 
that incident, terrorists have realised the strategic potential of 
television media, 179 turning it into a phenomenon that Edwin 
Diamond has called 'Terrorvision.'180 The media and its editors, in 
turn, have recognised that terrorist events captivate international 
audiences and sell well.181 In linking the issue of terrorism to the
See the questions posed by Chairman Hamilton and Messrs Lantos and Powell of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing on the Media,
Diplomacy and Terrorism in the Middle East, July 30, 1985. (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C., 1985), pp.24, & 35-37. See also the comments of Ted Turner on 
pages 111 and 113 of the same report.
ITT
See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. p.655
170 Observations made by Pierre Salinger the foreign correspondent of ABC News which 
televised the Olympic Games, during an interview with Jeffrey D Simon, London, July 12, 
1990, cited in Simon (1994), op.cit:, p.261
179 For an overview of the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media, see 
Gabriel Weimann, "The Theatre of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," Journal of 
Communication, Vol.33, pp.38-45
180 See Edwin Diamond, "TV and the Hostage Crisis in Perspective. The Coverage 
Itself: Why It Turned Into 'Terrorvision.'" TV Guide, September 21, 1985, p.10
181 See Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for 
Government, Journalists & the Public, (Brasseys US Inc., 1990), p.44. The above opinions on 
the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism were described by John Walcott, 
interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington, D.C
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media and in alluding to their relationship, one must exercise 
objectivity.182 As Simon quite rightly points out, "Terrorism existed 
before there was a mass media to cover such events."183 The fact of 
the matter is that media coverage of terrorist acts is here to stay. 
What matters is how quickly crisis managers are able to recognise 
and understand the role of the media and include their influence into 
their response strategy.184
What complicated the TWA crisis for the administration was the 
fact that when the television correspondents broadcast live interviews 
with the hijackers, Nabih Berri and the hostages, news editors were 
not on hand to edit footage.185 The problem with live transmissions is 
that they provide an immediate platform by means of the mini-cam 
and satellite transmision which has eliminated the role of the editor.186 
Consequently, journalist professionalism usually practised by the 
media, broke down, as editors were removed from the normal news 
selection and processing system and live transmission prevented 
objective reporting.187 The phenomenon of instantaneous 
transmission placed the hijackers in the driving seat and enabled 
them to retain the initiative and maintain pressure on the government 
to respond to unfolding events almost immediately.188 Finally, the
182 See Robert Picard, News Coverage as a Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous 
Charges Backed by Dubious Science, (Boston, Massachusetts, Terrorism and the News 
Media Research Project, July 1988)
183 Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.269 and also Michael J O'Neill, 'The Role of the 
Media' in Yonah Alexander, (eds.) Conference Report, Terrorism: Future Threats and 
Responses." Terrorism. Vol.7, No.4., 1985, p.394
184 Robert Grace, interview, on July 13, 1995 FBI Academy, Quantico Bay.
185 See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, p.657
106 See Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit:. p.80
187 See the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Sub-Committee Hearing on the Media, Diplomacy and Terrorism in the Middle East, July 30,
1985. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1985) and Alex S Jones, New 
York Times, July 2, 1985
188 ~See James Brooke, "Security Experts Urge Patience in Hostage Talks," New York 
Times, June 21, 1985 and also Robert Kuppermann, "Should U.S. Strike Back at Terrorists?" 
in an interview with U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1985, p.22
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Finally, the media's coverage of the TWA hostage crisis aroused 
public interest in the plight of the other six Beirut hostages.189 
Although the two hostage situations were quite distinct from one 
another, the next of kin of the Beirut hostages perceived that it was 
only due to the media's attention that the Reagan Administration was 
compelled to link the release of the two groups in its communications 
with Nabih Berri.190 The public's growing frustration with the 
administration's inability to secure the release of the Beirut hostages 
exerted additional pressure on President Reagan. Frustrated by a 
divided and intransigent cabinet he turned to William Casey and the 
NSC staff which led to the Iran-Contra initiative. The involvement of 
the media and its intrusion into the policy-making domain of the 
administration by highlighting issues and agendas such as the Beirut 
hostage situation, demonstrated that in the world of technologically 
advanced communications, the ability of crisis managers to be able 
to respond to and control media fallout, had become essential.
Prominent news anchors / presenters such as Dan Rather and 
Peter Jennings from CBS and ABC admitted that the behaviour of the 
journalists at the TWA hostages' news conference in Beirut was a 
poor reflection on their industry. They lamented the fact that 
journalists had scrambled and fought among one another to gain 
access to the hostages during the staged conference at Beirut 
airport. However, this was a relatively trivial issue which detracted 
from the key concern which was the role of the media as a catalyst in 
crisis situations. In defending the media's general performance, they 
explained that fierce competition between the networks was a factor 
which compelled them to perform and to adjust their standards to the 
lowest common denominator among them.191 The media thus focused
See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says 7 Missing Must Also Go Free With Air 
Hostages." New York Times, June 28, 1985, p.6
See M C Johns, "The Reagan Administration and State Sponsored Terrorism," 
Conflict, Vol.8, No.4, 1988, p.249 and Marvin Howe, "Kin of 'Other Hostages' See a Chance 
to Increase Efforts For Their Cause," New York Times, June 22, 1985, p.6
190
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on the emotional aspects of the crisis instead of the political and 
legal issues at stake.191 92 Or as George Schultz argues, it opted for 
conducting an 'alarmist' campaign by promoting all the hype, instead 
of an informative one by reporting the facts and difficulties faced by 
the authorities in such a situation.193
Of all the media networks, CNN maintained the maximum amount 
of coverage.194 Whereas the Beirut bombing of the BLT Barracks in 
1983 was an incident of relative short duration in that after the event 
there was little else to report other than the grief of the victims 
families and speculation over who was responsible, CNN covered the 
TWA crisis around the clock for two weeks. The prolonged media 
coverage elevated the profile of the incident and sustained public 
attention. During the incident CNN effectively replaced the 
intelligence community as the most up-to-date source of information 
in the White House.195 "The result was the development of a 
sub-culture, known as the "CNN syndrome," within the military and 
the government where officials remained tuned in to CNN in the 
event of a crisis developing."196 Its operational strategy of maintaining 
live around-the-clock coverage of crises, combined with interviews 
with 'talking heads'197- the practice of interviewing experts over the 
crisis - that has an impact on crisis policy making.198 199
191 See Peter St John, Air Piracy, Airport Security and International Terrorism, (New 
York, Quorum Books, 1991), p.33
192 See Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:, p.266 and Jonathan Alter, "The Network Circus, 
TV Turns up the Emotional Volume," Newsweek, July 8, 1985, p.21
193 See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, p.657
194 See Tom Rosenstiel, "The Myth of CNN," New Republic, August 22, 1994, pp.23-24
195 For an overview of the meteoric rise of CNN and its significance, see Hank 
Whittemore, CNN: The Inside Story, (Boston, Little Brown, 1990)
196 See Jeffrey D Simon, (1994), op.cit:, p.266
197 'Talking heads' is the euphemism given to experts and consultants, usually former
government employees and academics, who are interviewed live on CNN by the news 
anchormen and women during their coverage of a crisis. They are used by experienced 
anchormen to flesh out the details of any event or crisis.
199 For an overview of how the media influences political decision-making, see T Dye
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The danger of the CNN syndrome, however, is to be found in its 
potential to depict the contents of its 'live' coverage of an event as 
significantly important material which, by virtue of its inclusion and 
the accompanying 'hype', is mistakenly interpreted as having a 
bearing on policy issues.199 In addition, the phenomenon of 
twenty-four-hour coverage creates an erroneous perception that 
more information is better and that everything is therefore and 
somehow relevant.200 This is not the only aspect of media coverage 
that can have an impact upon crisis decision making. The 
consequences of media reporting on crisis response measures of the 
authorities may also precipitate the creation of precedents. This 
concern is explained below.
5.6 The influence of the media on the principle of avoiding the
creation of precedents
It has already been explained why it is important to avoid setting 
precedents when responding to crises so that allies are not exposed 
to further attacks and to avoid the encouragement of similar incidents 
in the future.201 An underlying factor associated with this principle is
and H Ziegler, American Politics in the Media Age, (Belmont CA, Wadsworth, 1982) and D 
Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, (Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 1980), and the R P Hawkins and S Pingree, "Using Television To Construct Social 
Reality," Journal of Broadcasting. No.25, 1981, pp.347-364, as well as the article in the Los 
Angeles Times, January 23, 1991, pp.1 & 5
i qg
' See D L Paletz and R Entman, Media Power Politics, (New York, The Free Press, 
1981) and K H Jamieson and K Campbell, The Interplay of Influence: Mass Media and their 
Publics in News, Advertising, Politics, (Belmont, Wadsworth, 1983) and J B Lemert, Does 
Mass Communication Change Public Opinion After All?. (Chicago, Nelson Hall, 1981) and 
Tom Rosenstiel, (1994). op.cit. pp.23-24
200 For an overview of the anchor-narrator element of TV news, see Sharon Sperry, 
"Television News as Narrative," in R P Adler (ed), Understanding Television, (New York, 
Praeger, 1981), pp.295-312. See also Dan Nimmo and James Combs, Nightly Horrors: Crisis 
Coverage by Television Network News, (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 
pp.14-19
“01 It would appear that as far as the TWA crisis was concerned the US government did 
set a precedent which encouraged further incidents. The hijack of the Achille Lauro less than 
four months later, during which incident the hijackers demanded the release of more 
prisoners by Israel, substantiates this.
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the necessity for the authorities, to display the determination, political 
will and a unified response against a common adversary.202 The 
Reagan Administration failed to manage this principle during the 
TWA crisis, despite the fact that it and the Israeli government 
advocated identical counter-terrorist policies. The cause of this 
problem stemmed from their objectives of wanting to avoid the 
perception that a deal had being made with the hijackers.
Media speculation was a factor which not only increased the 
tension level of the crisis managers, but which resulted in confusion 
between the administration and its Israeli ally and contributed 
towards pre-empting their initiatives during negotiations. Inaccurate 
and uninformed opinions that were published inadvertently 
undermined negotiations.203 For example, the statements in the media 
by the Israeli government over what the U.S. government needed to 
do in order to secure the release of the hostages created the 
impression that Israel and the U.S. were at odds over antiterrorist 
policy.204 While this was not the case, however, both governments 
nontheless attempted to side-step their predicament by attempting to 
place the onus to compromise on one another. On June 21, a New 
York Times article by Bernard Gwertzman, complicated matters 
between the U.S. State Department and the Israeli government. The 
article stated that, "The Reagan Administration has told friendly 
governments that if the 40 American hostages are freed 
unconditionally by the hijackers in Beirut, Israel will follow with the 
release of the 766 detainees, Administration officials said today."205 
The timing and content of this report was released at a most
202 See Paul Bremer III, "The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992), pp.255-262. For a brief discussion of the problems 
associated with collective responses to terrorism, see Paul Wilkinson, (1989), op.cit:, 
pp.459-460
9 n t See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. p.660
204 Ibid., p.656
“c5 See Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times. June 21, 1985
Page 289
inopportune moment as negotiations between Charles Hill of the 
State Department, and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador 
to the U.S., were underway. George Schultz feared that the article 
would lead the Israelis to believe that the U.S. had deliberately 
leaked the information as a means of applying pressure upon Israel 
to comply.205 Not only was this embarrassing for the administration, 
but it also placed Netanyahu in a tenuous position in terms of his 
credibility with his own government. His government had asked him 
when he was conveyed Schultz's overtures to the Knesset if any 
other U.S. government agency was involved. Netanyahu had given 
the assurance that no one else was, however, the press statements 
appeared to contradict the administration's sincerity and his 
credibility.
While their endeavours to avoid the perception that a precedent 
had been created with regard to the release of the Atlit prisoners in 
exchange for the TWA passengers, the U.S. - Israeli efforts almost 
derailed the negotiations process with the hijackers. When Nabih 
Berri realised that Israel intended to release the Atlit captives over 
several months, so as to avoid the appearance of a deal with 
terrorists, he was so incensed that he almost withdrew from the 
negotiation process.207
The argument that the media's approach in the crisis was an 
underlying cause of President Reagan's limited options in responding 
to the crisis is misleading.208 The reality was that the hostages and 
lack of consensus within the administration effectively prevented the 
government from exercising any alternative. The unprecedented 
media coverage of the crisis introduced a new crisis management * 203
See George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. p.660
o 07
Israel released 31 of the Atlit prisoners on June 23 and 300 on July 3, and the 
remainder in small groups during early September 1985. See Stansfield Turner, (1991), 
op.cit:. p.193
203 See Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists," Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.4, No.4, 1992, p.274
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principle. The only precedent that the media's behaviour created 
therefore was the lesson that it taught administration officials. This 
was that during crisis situations the co-ordination and control over 
information that is released to the media is essential to prevent 
inaccurate and uninformed statements from pre-empting initiatives 
and derailing bi-latera, agreements.
The crisis created a 'cognitive' precedent in the minds of the NSC 
staff's inner-circle, notably that of Robert McFarlane, Howard Teicher 
and Oliver North, who believed that the key to the resolution of the 
Beirut hostages lay with moderate factions within the Iranian 
government. This error in perception was triggered when the speaker 
of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani intervened in the hijack 
crisis and travelled to Damascus together with Mohammed 
Mohtashemi, the former Iranian ambassador to Syria and one of the 
principal architects and strategists of Hizb'allah and Moshen 
Rafiqdust, the Minister responsible for the Pasdaran.209 Their visit 
paved the way for the settlement between Berri, acting on behalf of 
Hizb'allah, and the U.S.210 The significance of the Iranian secular and 
clerics' influence in Damascus did not go unnoticed by McFarlane.211 
Howard Teicher's relationship with Amiram Nir, an Israeli counter 
terrorist expert,212 as well as the influence of NSC staff consultant,
Michael Ledeen, and David Kimche213 the former Director General of 
the Israeli foreign ministry, reinforced McFarlane's belief that the six 
Beirut hostages could possibly be released through the intervention
209 See Amir Taheri, £1988), op.cit.. pp.168
210 See Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:. pp.198-199
211 See Walter Pincus, "Secret Talks With Iran Described," Washington Post, June 11, i
1986 i
j
212 For background on Amiram Nir, see Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:, p. 181
213 See Amir Taheri, £1988), op.cit:. pp. 169-174. David Kimche approached Teicher and ;
McFarlane with the concept of Israel selling arms to Iran and Manucher Ghorbanifar's j
suggestion that the sale of arms to Iran could secure the release of the hostages. Despite the j
fact that Ghorbanifar had been declared as an untrustworthy source by the CIA, they went
along with his scheme. This is another example of where the NSC staff's inner-circle blatantly i
ignored intelligence advice which conflicted with their policy objectives. j
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of Iranian 'moderates'.211 * * 14 To support his policy initiative, McFarlane 
requested Graham Fuller to prepare a Special National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iran, its precarious internal political situation, and its 
strategic vulnerability vis a vis Soviet expansionism in the Gulf 
region.215
The fundamental flaw in the NSC staffs strategy of their 
Iran-Contra operation was their clandestine operational approach 
which automatically placed them at a tactical disadvantage in their 
relationship with Iran. Where the NSC staff had to maintain secrecy 
over their dealings with Iran, the Iranian government was not subject 
to the same domestic constraints. In this instance the NSC staff 
displayed an exceptional degree of ignorance. They misunderstood 
the revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime, who understood full 
well the vulnerability of the American administration in this regard.216 
The NSC staff were uninformed about the general perception of the 
mainstream American political and bureaucratic opinion with regard 
to the necessity for repairing relations with Iran. They underestimated 
the level of public support that they could have received if they had 
conducted their rapproachement with Iran in the open.217 The
211 The term 'moderates' is misleading. The fact of the matter is that any moderation 
that was displayed by Iranian leaders was in their own mind a deliberate strategy aimed at
exploiting American ignorance in their long-term goal of defeating the west. See Amir Taheri, 
(1988), op.cit:, p.177-180. For an overview of the rationale behind McFarlane's faulty
perceptions, see Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit:, pp.201-206. For the influence of NSC 
consultant Michael Ledeen over McFarlane's thinking, see the Tower Commission Report,
pp. 165-166
215 See Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:, p.503 and John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, p.512. 
See also Gerald M Boyd, "Reagan Reaffirms Secrecy on Effort to Free Hostages," New York 
Times, November 11, 1986. This was also confirmed personally by Graham Fuller during an 
interview with the author on November 15, 1995. By his own admission Fuller states that the 
SNIE pointed out the dangers of the political instability within Iran and warned of the 
possibility that Iran could turn towards the Soviet Union. This posed a major threat to US 
interests in the Gulf, given the Soviet's involvement in Afghanistan at the time. The memo 
speculated on the possibility of selling arms to Iran as a precursor to detente between the US 
and the Iranian regime.
216 For an overview of the Iranian perspective, see Ali Azad, "USA-lran Arms Deal: The 
Iranian Angle," Middle East International. January 1987, pp.48-50
217 For an explanation of the general ignorance that the NSC staff displayed and their 
faulty assumptions pertaining to Iran and the American public, see Amir Taheri, (1988), 
op.cit:, pp. 175-185
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principle reason why they did not have the necessary knowledge was 
because the NSC staff cut itself off from the intelligence community. 
Consequently there was no institutional mechanism to provide them 
with essential feedback of wider bureaucratic and public opinion. By 
conducting the operation in secret they shut themselves off from 
potential sources of advice and objectivity. To a certain extent, the 
NSC staff were victims of their own propaganda.
Following the numerous accusations that had been levelled by the 
administration that Iran was a state sponsor of international 
terrorism,218 McFarlane and North assumed that the American public 
would find it difficult to reconcile their strategic objectives of 
establishing links with Iran and that it would be condemned.219 This 
was an underlying reason why they embarked on a clandestine 
operation.220 The NSC staff were negotiating from a position of 
relative weakness, given their need for secrecy and the political 
dangers associated was the potential exposure of their operation. 
The Iranian 'moderate precedent' was also doomed to failure 
because McFarlane and Casey linked the concept of detente with 
Iran to the precondition of the release of the hostages.221 Casey's 
support for the inner-circle's initiative originated from his crusade to 
secure the release of William Buckley, and upon learning of his death
218 See Alan Gerson, "Legitimizing International Terrorism: Is the Campaign Over?" in 
Barry Rubin (ed.), Terrorism and Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1991), p.51 and (Editorial), 
"Paper Says U.S. Knew Iran Paid for Beirut Blasts," Los Angeles Times, August, 11, 1986. 
See also the United States Senate Hearing Before The Committee On Armed Services, States 
Sponsored Terrorism, January 28, 1986, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1986)
219 See Jack Nelson, "Irked by Reports of Arms Swap for Aid on Hostages," Los 
Angeles Times, July 11, 1986 and Stephen Engelberg, "Uproar Over Iran: What is Known and 
What Remains to Be Learned," New York Times. November 17, 1986
220 Another probable reason was the link between the diversion of some of the funds 
from the arms payments to finance the Contras by McFarlane. See U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. U.S. 1OOth 
Congress, 1st Session, (Washington D.C.,U.S. Government Printer, 1988.) See also 
Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit:, pp.516-517
221 See Angus Deming and Milan J Kubic, "Cloak and Dagger," Newsweek, November 
17, 1986, pp.46-53 and Doyle McManus, "Freedom for Hostages Was Top Reagan Aim, Aide 
Savs." Los Angeles Times. November 14, 1986. Also Warren Richey, "Obsession Undid US 
Terrorism Policy." Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 1987
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in captivity, Casey's determination to secure freedom for the 
remaining hostages.222 Because the NSC staff operated in secrecy, it 
circumvented the traditional bureaucratic channels223 and excluded 
itself from objective oversight, and from the necessary expertise in 
covert operations who were located within the intelligence 
community.224 Although the CIA provided logistical support to the 
NSC staffs operation by transferring arms directly from Pentagon 
stocks to Iran, its analytical expertise was excluded from the planning 
and overview of the operation's progress.225 The crisis and its 
aftermath resulted in faulty cognitive precedents and revealed the 
dangers that are inherent when a sector of the government isolates 
itself and excludes the intelligence producer from the decision 
making process, relegating it to its traditionalist status.
5.7 Conclusion
The TWA 847 hijacking revealed the following lessons with regard 
to the role and function of intelligence and the interaction of the 
media during crises: In the case of most crises, intelligence has 
either failed to provide the policy makers with the relevant warnings, 
or the policy makers have failed to sufficiently interpret or appreciate 
the implications of the intelligence at their disposal. Either way,
222 See Bob Woodward and Charles Babcock, "Captive CIA Agent's Death Galvanised 
Hostage Search," Washington Post, November 25, 1986 and Doyle McManus and Michael 
Wines, "CIA Chief OK'd Agency's Role in Arms-to-lran Deal," Los Angeles Times, February 2, 
1986
See George Church, Reagan's Secret Dealings With Iran," Time, November 17, 
1986, Cover Story, pp. 12-26. Also Dan Morgan and Charles R Babcock, "North Reprimanded 
on Idea to'Neutralize' Terrorists." Washington Post, February 22, 1987, p.1A.
224 See Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit:. p.229 and Charles Babcock 
and Don Oberdorfer, "The NSC Cabal," Washington Post, June 21, 1987 and Theodore 
Draper, (1991), op.cit:. pp.558-559
225 See Ed Mangnuson, "Plumbing the CIA's Shadowy Role," Time, December 22, 1986, 
pp.26-29 as well as Walter Pincus, "Iran Arms Cash Tied to CIA-Run Account Aiding Afghan 
Rebels." The Washington Post, December 3, 1986 and Pincus, "Counterterrorism Group 
Bypassed on Iran Deal," Washington Post, December 8, 1986
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political crises are the result of a failure to identify an emerging 
threat. This should not be interpreted as an outright condemnation of 
intelligence capabilities, but rather as an observation of reality. The 
intelligence community cannot be expected to forecast each and 
every threat or future event. In the case of the TWA crisis, however, 
the elements of risk were present and should have been recognised. 
The intelligence community simply failed to identify the pattern and 
construct a coherent picture and threat analysis out of the events of 
the preceeding months. The kidnapping of the Beirut hostages 
between 1984 and the hijacking incident had been conducted by 
Hizb'allah and Mughniah as a deliberate strategy to secure the 
release of the al Da'wa 17 prisoners in Kuwait. Following these 
incidents, there had also been the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner 
which was flown to Teheran and the hijacking of the Jordanian 
airliner that had been destroyed at Beirut airport just two days prior to 
the TWA crisis.226 The administration had also failed to recognise the 
determination of Hizb'allah following the kidnapping incidents of the 
Beirut hostages.227 No one tasked the intelligence community with the 
question how that organisation could be expected to escalate its 
efforts? This may have been due to the fact that Hizb'allah was not 
perceived as a monolithic organisation at that stage, as they carried 
out many of their activities under various pseudonyms such as the 
Party of God, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Amal, al Da'wa and al Amal al 
Islamiyya.228 This aspect of Hizb'allah's operational strategy
226 See "Shi'ite Extremists: Who They Are and What They Want," U.S. News & World 
Report, June 24, 1985, p.10
227 The intelligence community's failure in this regard has been confirmed by Noel Koch 
in a telephone interview on February 21, 1996 and by John Walcott during an interview on 
July 17, 1995.
228 See John L Esposito, The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality?." (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp.146-151 and Magnus Ranstorp, £1994), op.cit:. pp.64-67. 
According to Ranstorp, the composite organisations of Hizb'allah must be understood within 
the context of its strategy of achieving rapid growth . To do this, Hizb'allah used the natural 
source of working within the existing framework of existing radical Shi'ite organisations and 
religious institutions. Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader commanded 
a large following throughout the disparate Shi'ite organisations who automatically lend their 
support to Hizb'allah as he became its spiritual leader. See Also Martin Kramer, "The 
Pan-lslamic Premise of Hizb'allah," in David Ben Menashri, (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and
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effectively confused their enemies and prevented the intelligence 
community not only from identifying the head of the octopus, but from 
also determining what its objectives were. In this instance tasking 
failure occurred at the policy making level and at the management 
level of the intelligence community because of the lack of 
comprehension with regard to who the adversary was and what their 
objectives were.
It has been mentioned before that the intelligence community 
focused its collection priorities on identifying the location of the 
hostages and in seeking out potential targets for retaliation. The 
failure by intelligence managers and the decision makers to grasp the 
overall picture resulted in analytical resources being incorrectly 
directed. They were kept focused on identifying the hostages' 
locations and on devising contingency plans to rescue them and 
punish the perpetrators. This was done at the expense of studying 
the macro situation in Lebanon and Hizb'allah's role in the overall 
picture. Compounding their analysis was the fact that it was difficult 
to identify Hizb'allah as a monolithic organisation and that at the best 
of times, the successful penetration of terrorist groups is a rare 
achievement, a factor that frustrates intelligence collection.229 Difficult
I
as it was to gather intelligence information during the normal course 
of events in Lebanon, expectations for the intelligence community to
J
perform adequately during the circumstances of the TWA crisis were j
unrealistic.
It follows that if intelligence tasking is flawed then analysis is also 
prone to failure. The TWA crisis was no exception to this rule and the
4
analytical endeavours of the intelligence community suffered due to |
incorrect tasking. Concomitant with the administration's frustration •;
with Iran and Syria, was their dependence upon these two actors for j
the Muslim World, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1990), p.122
229 See Simon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizb'allah," Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol.46, (Spring 
1988), pp. 115-130
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geostrategic reasons. Furthermore, the prospects for retaliation 
against either Syria and Iran were fraught with security and political 
risks that therefore effectively ruled out this option.230 In its efforts to 
uphold its credibility and to strike back at the phenomenon of 
terrorism, the administration, through the NSC staff, focused its 
efforts and capabilities on Libya, who was considered an easier 
target.231 This diverted intelligence resources from Lebanon which in 
turn diminished their analytical capacity. Of greater significance, 
however, was the intelligence community's poor performance 
preceeding the crisis which undermined its credibility as an adequate 
instrument of warning. What little influence it exercised in the 
policy-making arena was lost and the media filled the void, remaining 
ahead all the time. Ultimately it was the media who elevated the crisis 
to its presidential level and steered the agenda speculating over how 
the administration was going to respond to the situation and by 
fielding the debate over the use of military force against the hijackers. 
Although the intelligence community should have exerted greater 
influence in the crisis deliberations in order to counteract the 
influence of the media on the policy makers, this was not possible 
given the barriers that prevailed between the CIA and the White 
House. The relationship between the intelligence community and the 
NSC staff, who decided what policy should be and then implemented 
it, was neither close nor reciprocal.
Closer to home, criticism of and the attacks against the media in 
the wake of the crisis, were symptoms of a frustrated administration 
in search of a scapegoat. The government could not admit that 
Hizb’allah had planned and conducted a successful strategy
230 See Brian M Jenkins for an appraisal of the various factors which prevented the U.S. 
from retaliating against Syria and Iran. Although Jenkins points out that retaliation against 
Libya was not without risk, in comparison to Syria and Iran, Libya was perceived as the target 
which held considerably less danger. Jenkins, (1988), op.cit:. pp.186-187
231 Vincent Cannistraro, interview, on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia. Also see Charles 
G Cogan, "The Response of the Strong to the Weak: The American raid on Libya, 1986," 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol.6, No.3, (1991), pp.608-620
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throughout the TWA crisis. Despite the thin veneer of pretence and 
semantic manipulation by the Israeli and the U.S. governments that 
the release of the hostages and the Atlit prisoners were not related, 
Hizb'allah had succeeded in forcing the two allies to clash with one 
another in public.232 Both were forced to compromise on their 
publicised anti-terrorist policies. The hijackers had successfully 
exploited and manipulated the media. They also achieved the 
ultimate use of the hostages when their spokesman, Allyn Conwell, 
expressed support for Hizb'allah's demands.233
There were other lessons to be learnt from the crisis. The 
hijacking of TWA 847 differed from most other aircraft-hostage and 
barricade situations in that the circumstances did not allow for the 
aircraft to be immobilised on the ground in favourable territory. This 
contributed towards denying the U.S. of the option of using force. 
Owing to the state of near anarchy that prevailed in Lebanon and the 
factionalism in its government, the Lebanese authorities were unable 
to intervene. The government did not wield any control or authority 
over Beirut airport.234 In this instance it paved the way for the original 
two hijackers to be reinforced by a larger group of Shi'ite militias at 
Beirut airport. Hizb'allah and Amal's strategy of removing the 
hostages from the aircraft and holding them at undisclosed and 
numerous locations, prevented the U.S. from launching any rescue 
missions, let alone conducting any retaliation. Because no military 
solution was feasible, the application of diplomacy backed up by the 
threat of force by the U.S. remained impossible. Hizb'allah's
232 See Thomas L Friedman, "Israelis Appear Angered By Subtle U.S. Pressure," New 
York Times, June 21, 1985 and Thomas L Friedman, "The Quandry for Israel," New York 
Times, June 22, 1985 and Bernard Gwertzman, "Schultz and Peres Agree to oppose Shi'ites' 
Demands and Speak to Ease Tensions," New York Times, June 22, 1985
233 For the controversy over some of the statements made by Allyn Conwell in support 
of the hijackers, see Mark Whittaker and John Walcott, "Diplomacy By Carrot and Stick," 
Newsweek, July 15, 1985, p.20
234 The extent of the factionalism within the Lebanese government is demonstrated by 
the fact that at the time of the hijacking, Nabih Berri's Amal militia controlled it. Berri who was 
also the Lebanese Minister of Justice, however, refused to act in his capacity as a 
government official and used the situation to further the interests of his own party instead.
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involvement of Amal, Nabih Berri and the Syrian government to 
negotiate on its behalf, was an astute move on its part that also 
contributed towards maintaining media momentum and public 
interest. For all the parties involved on the side of the hijackers, the 
outcome had positive effects. The main objective to humiliate Israel 
and the United States and to undermine their relationship 
succeeded.235 Hizb'allah secured the release of the 700 Atlit 
prisoners which was a propaganda victory that undermined Israeli 
support in the U.S. The hijacking again underlined the effectiveness 
of hostage-taking as an instrument of coercion against the United 
States. The Islamic Fundamentalists recognised the potential of this 
strategy when used against western targets, particularly in the light of 
the difference in value that they placed on human life in comparison 
to their western adversaries, which they successfully manipulated.236
The media who elevated the crisis high on the public agenda 
influenced the American public to view the crisis in the short term and 
within a highly emotional context. This induced the administration to 
respond to the situation within at a pace that was maintained by the 
media's 'analysts' and that detracted from longer-term strategic goals. 
Media hype ensured that the crisis enjoyed a high profile that 
demanded the attention of the administration's most senior officials 
and the president237. This kept the hostage issue at the top of the 
political agenda for the duration of the crisis.
On the international front the administration found itself at odds 
with its most important ally in the region and in contradiction with its 
own and Israel's counter-terrorist policy. This dilemma became 
particularly acute as the realisation set in that there was no 
alternative. Even if the situation had favoured the use of military
“ See the editorial, "Unfinished Business." New Republic, July 29, 1985
236 See Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit:. p.197
237 For an overview of the effects of media hype, see J Yardley, "Hype and the 
Manufacturing of News," Manchester Guardian Weekly, No. 128, May 22, 1983, pp. 7-18
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force, the lack of confidence by the Pentagon in the use of the 
military in non-conventional operations may have prevented its use. 
The administration's anti-terrorist policy was further undermined 
when it was compelled to seek the assistance of Syria and Iran, 
countries that it had already identified as being state sponsors of 
terrorism. For an administration that had been elected on the promise 
that it would not allow itself to be held to ransom by terrorists, the 
crisis had exactly that effect. The bankruptcy behind the 
administration's rhetoric was exposed to reveal the emptiness of 
American threats. The administration learned once again that there 
was a difference between declaring war against terrorism and 
actually fighting it.238
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the TWA hijacking was 
the interaction between Syria, Amal, Hizb'allah and Iran that led the 
administration to believe that the key to unlocking the hostage crisis 
lay almost exclusively with moderate elements in the Iranian 
government.239 The view of key officials, notably the NSC staff, 
demonstrate an oversimplified perception of the complexities and 
dynamics of Hizb'allah and the relationship between that organisation 
and its patrons.240 One of the fundamental flaws was their belief that 
the 'moderate' elements in the Iranian regime could exercise 
influence over the Iranian officials who supported Hizb'allah which 
was responsible for the kidnapping strategy against the west.241 Even 
if moderate individuals existed, the reality was that they simply had 
no control over the radicals. For it was essentially the radicals who 
were sufficiently confident to challenge the U.S. and kidnap its 
citizens without fear of reprisal.242 The same ignorance prevailed with
238 Brian M Jenkins, (1988), op.cit, p.185
2 o a
See Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, pp.334-335
240 Ibid.p.361, see also Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.270
241 See Sara Fritz and Karen Tumulty, "Iran Radicals Tricked U.S., Inquiry Finds," Los 
Angeles Times, November 19, 1987
242 Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit:. p.177
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regard to the NSC staff's perception of American public opinion with 
regard to its geostrategic objectives in the region and relations with 
Iran. The assumption prevailed within the NSC staff that given the 
recent history of American - Iranian relations, the public would fail to 
appreciate the reasons behind the administration's change in attitude 
towards Iran. The Iranian revolution, the siege of the U.S. embassy in 
Teheran and the fact that the administration had implicated Iran in 
the bomb attacks against its embassies and the Marine barracks, had 
all contributed to the public perception of Iran as an enemy of the 
U.S. Not only did the NSC staff fail to test this assumption and seek 
public support for its strategy, but it also failed to inform the rest of 
the administration and the intelligence community that it was 
persuing this initiative. Later in 1985 the hijacking of the Achille Lauro 
and the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Germany in 1986, 
increased the administration's frustration and the need to its restore 
its credibility in responding to terrorism.243 This resulted in the U.S. 
attack against Libya in 1986, and led Libya's retaliation and the 
unfortunate event in December 1988 when Pan Am Flight 103 was 
blown up in the sky over Lockerbie.244
243 See Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit:. p.154
244 The reasons behind the attack against Libya and Qadaffi's response with the 
Lockerbie bombing were explained by Vincent Cannistraro the former Pentagon 
counter-terrorist officer who was responsible for the planning of the U.S. retaliatory raid 
against Libyain an interview with the author on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia. Also see 
Bruce W Nelan, "Freedom is the Best Revenge," Time, December 16, 1991, p.32. These 
sentiments were expressed by Vincent Cannistraro.
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Chapter 6.
CONCLUSION
The reason why the enlightened prince and the wise 
general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their 
achievements surpass those of ordinary men is 
foreknowledge.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
6.1 Introduction
This thesis has examind the relationship between intelligence and 
crisis management. It provides a methodological approach that 
analyses the function of intelligence in crisis management and 
examines the dynamics and factors which shape and influence the 
the tasking, analysis and communication of intelligence towards an 
understanding of the producer - consumer dichotomy. Accordingly a 
framework is provided with which to facilitate the combined study of 
the intelligence process within the principles of crisis management. 
This integrated analysis yields new and valuable insights into the 
intelligence analysis process on both an individual and the 
institutional levels. It explains the interactive role that intelligence 
plays in crisis management and reveals the negative consequences 
when intelligence analysis and crisis decision making are attempted 
in isolation from one another.
In answering the questions raised in chapter one of this thesis, 
and given the inadequacies of the intelligence cycle model as 
revealed in this study, an alternative paradigm is proposed. The new 
model reflects the shift in the location of intelligence analysis, the 
importance of communication, the interaction between the producer 
and consumer and the influence of the media and the public within 
the crisis dynamic. All of the above have been found to affect the 
analysis - crisis decision making process. This is illustrated by the
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following key conclusions derived from this study. This chapter 
examines the most important findings on the function of intelligence 
during crisis management, the producer - consumer relationship, and 
the traditionalist versus activist dichotomy. Finally it offers a critical 
introspection of its shortcomings and makes suggestions for further 
research in this field.
6.2 Findings of the empirical data
Traditionally the intelligence imperative has been treated as a 
separate crisis management principle. Intelligence is a vital support 
activity throughout crisis management as its function and necessity 
have been demonstrated. This study has shown that intelligence can 
not be treated as a separate principle in isolation from the other crisis 
management principles. To treat intelligence as subordinate or as a 
stand-alone function is to debase its significance and importance as 
a fundamental and essential ingredient.
Intelligence theory holds that its function is to scan the political 
system's environment towards identifying threats and opportunities 
so that a realistic determination of objectives can be made. When 
tested against the Reagan Administration's experiences with 
terrorism in Lebanon between 1983 and 1985, this principle failed. 
The reasons for this failure are twofold. One was the breakdown in 
the producer - consumer relationship between the CIA and the White 
House. In this instance, the rejection of the Agency's analysis by key 
NSC staff individuals reinforced the traditionalist approach and the 
bureaucratic barrier that prevailed between analysts, the decision 
makers and those who were responsible for implementing policy 
initiatives. This problem was compounded by the fact that policy 
making was taking place at the wrong level in the administration - 
which was a consequence of the second reason. This was the
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Reagan Administration's incohesive and poorly managed decision 
making process, an institutional problem that prevailed during 
President Reagan's tenure. Both of these reasons can be attributed 
to the influence of individual actors, starting with President Reagan 
and then by his senior cabinet officers such as, Schultz, Weinberger, 
Casey and McFarlane. This also filtered down to lower levels in the 
administration with individuals such as Teicher, Fuller and Lt.Col 
North. Furthermore, institutional and organisational incompatibilities, 
such as the rivalry between the CIA and the NSC staff and the latter's 
supremacy over the intelligence community also contributed to the 
failure of intelligence. The result was that when the White House 
tasked the intelligence community, intelligence analysis and 
estimates were requested in support of preconceived policy initiatives 
rather than for information that was to form the basis of sound 
decision making.
This study has revealed that where existing policies demand 
support from the intelligence community and are treated as a priority, 
as demonstrated in the case of Haig and Casey's demand for an 
SNIE on the Soviet Union and international terrorism, intelligence 
tasking by the consumer tends to steer analysis on a narrow 
cognitive band that can result in its politicisation. This reveals that 
specific tasking can inhibit wider environmental scanning and lateral 
thinking. The study has demonstrated how when intelligence is used 
on a selective basis to support preconceived policy objectives, rather 
than as an instrument towards ascertaining which objectives are 
realistically feasible, the consequences are likely to precipitate a 
crisis or policy failure. This was witnessed by the Iran Affair and the 
NSC staff's failure to test or question the information and the 
assumptions that moderate elements in the Iranian government were 
capable of exercising control over Hizb'allah. This was also true with 
regard to their failure to make the change in their policy toward Iran 
known and then consequently, to gauge public opinion over this
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change in strategy. Furthermore, instead of limiting its objectives, the 
Reagan Administration made the mistake of attempting to link three 
issues to one another. In this instance they tried to improve their 
relationship with Iran, contain Soviet influence in the region and 
secure the release of the hostages, all in the same initiative. Lt. Col. 
Oliver North took this to the extreme when he linked the Iran Affair to 
the Contra operation by diverting some of the profits of the arms 
sales to fund the Contras.
Not only did the administration fail to limit its objectives, it also 
failed to perceive the objectives of its adversaries and in particular 
those of smaller states and non-state actors. This study 
demonstrated the tendency of the Reagan Administration to 
disregard and underestimate the objectives of smaller actors within 
the international system, or of those who were perceived to be 
weaker. Their error can be attributed to the Cold War ethos that 
prevailed at the time and the belief that all things not related to 
measuring and responding to Soviet capabilities and intentions were 
of lesser importance. This manifests itself during the incidents in the 
time period under review by the Reagan Administration's 
underestimation of the determination of Syria and Hizb'allah to 
remove the American presence from Lebanon. Whereas both Syria 
and Hizb'allah shared the same objectives to drive the U.S. from 
Lebanon, each had different reasons. For Syria, its objective was to 
remove western influence from Lebanon. As the leading country 
among the multi-national peacekeeping force that Syria regarded as 
a threat to its interests in Lebanon, the U.S. represented western 
influence and was Syria's principal enemy and target. For Hizb'allah, 
its war against the U.S. was a logical extension of the ideological 
struggle between America and Iran. This study is significant in that it 
demonstrates the importance of intelligence at the geo-strategic 
level. In the changing international environment where conflict 
between warring factions within states and civil wars have replaced
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the concerns of the Cold War, it is important to understand the 
motives and objectives of sub-state actors.
The principle of limiting the means employed in the pursuit of 
crisis objectives had a greater and direct significance for the 
administration than it had for America's adversaries as seen by the 
Reagan Administration's inability to use military force against the 
TWA hijackers. The Reagan Administration was not in any viable 
position to consider response options which involved the use of force 
as was demonstrated in the previous case study. Its intellectual and 
physical capabilities were simply not equipped to deal with the 
problem of responding to crises that were played out in civil war 
environments where adversaries did not share American moral 
values. This was especially true with regard to the civil war 
environment of Lebanon that encapsulated all the dimensions of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and to which the external involvement by several 
ideological foes of the U.S. were included. For example, Hizb'allah 
terrorists employed strategies which manipulated American 
sentiments and enticed the U.S. government to respond in a manner 
that would have imperilled their democratic principles and caused 
them to compromise their legitimacy. The Reagan Administration, 
moreover, failed therefore to anticipate how Hizb'allah and its patron 
states in the region used terrorism as an effective strategy against its 
foreign policy objectives in Lebanon and the complex dynamics and 
relationships that existed between that organisation, Syria and Iran. 
Hence the function of intelligence with regard to limiting the means of 
crisis response is interwoven with the principle of legitimacy.
It is also evident that with regard to terrorist type crises, tasking 
the intelligence community to provide information for prosecution 
purposes can introduce tension between it and policy makers over 
the utilisation of intelligence. Policy makers have two expectations 
with regard to intelligence support against terrorism. The first is to 
provide warnings and pre-empt attacks, while the second
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requirement is to provide evidence of culpability for the prosecution 
of the perpetrators. The crux of this problem is that while policy 
makers are concerned with using intelligence to justify their actions, 
intelligence seeks to protect its sources and methods of operation 
from disclosure. This conflict in demand places the intelligence 
community's ability to conduct strategic intelligence in jeopardy, in 
order to satisfy the policy makers' demands for intelligence to support 
tactical measures and response. Longer term interests tend to be 
sacrificed in the interest of immediate solutions.
Whereas this study has alluded to the above problem, it has also 
revealed that, for legitimacy to work, intelligence must operate on a 
more proactive level. It is the intelligence community's responsibility 
to exercise greater initiative and flexibility in searching for avenues 
that can enhance the legitimacy of the authorities when dealing with 
terrorism. Within democracies and in relation to hostage situations, 
negotiation is often the only possible solution. Where negotiation 
becomes an inevitable part of the counter terrorist strategy, 
intelligence has an important role to play in the process. This is not 
only because negotiation affords a course of action that can minimise 
violence, but is in many instances the only viable option, as the last 
case study so aptly demonstrated. Intelligence collection and 
analysis can greatly facilitate negotiation by identifying and analysing 
the ideological ethos of the adversary and to suggest issues to the 
policy makers which can be used as points of common interest as a 
manner of initiating and coaxing the adversary towards negotiations.
The case studies have revealed that the traditionalist discipline, 
which was responsible for preserving the distance between the 
producers and consumers, contributed towards creating unrealistic 
expectations of the capabilities of the intelligence organisation. This 
was demonstrated by the NSC staffs frustration over the CIA's 
inability to provide it with information pertaining to the exact location 
of the hostages in Lebanon. Cognitive and moral restraints
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notwithstanding, the intelligence community suffered from a distinct 
disadvantage of having to operate in a hostile environment that 
required significant humint in addition to techint capabilities. In 
addition to their limited humint capabilities, they failed to preserve 
and protect the limited intelligence assets that they were able to build 
up and command in Lebanon after the death of Ames and Haas, by 
failing to enforce adequate security measures to protect William 
Buckley.
The traditionalist discipline, however, is not an ideal approach in 
the management of the intelligence producer - consumer relationship. 
A fundamental reason for this argument is the barrier that this 
discipline creates that tends to inhibit mutual trust and 
communication between them. To meet their responsibilities in 
supporting the policy maker, intelligence analysts need to be experts 
in not only substantive issues of national interest, but also in the self 
interest of policy professionals by providing specialised analytical 
support. Once they have displayed their ability to provide personal 
support, policy makers will be more inclined to share their agendas 
with analysts. In establishing crisis management capabilities, 
intelligence needs to adopt an activist role in the relationship so that 
the intelligence community can learn decision makers' policy 
preferences. A more reciprocal relationship will also enable decision 
makers to gain an insight into the specific capabilities and the 
operational limitations of the intelligence community. This will enable 
them to compare the base line of the consumer and that of the 
adversary so that the common ground between adversaries, which is 
the precursor to negotiations, can be ascertained. The common 
ground of negotiations embodies three questions which ask; 'Why 
are we here?', 'What do we agree on?' and What is keeping us 
apart?'. The function of intelligence is to identify these issues and 
present them to the policy maker in the form of opportunity analysis 
that thereby empowers their crisis management capabilities.
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The study has demonstrated that in seeking legitimacy while 
simultaneously trying to deny the same to an adversary, governments 
risk losing their integrity. By claiming exclusive legitimacy, one runs 
the risk of losing moral integrity because impartial judgement is 
abandoned. This tension is inherent in negotiations with terrorist 
adversaries. Indeed governments make this crucial mistake when 
entering into negotiations with terrorists. For instance, in another 
arena, the British government's demand that the IRA surrender its 
weapons before it will be admitted to the conference table, is to deny 
that organisation the source of its strength, which it derives from the 
armed struggle. Parties who enter into negotiations seek to do so 
from a position of maximum strength. For terrorists the source of their 
power stems from their power of coercion in exploiting the publicity. 
Where incumbent authorities do not comprehend this, it is the 
responsibility of the intelligence community to point this out to them 
and to enlighten the crisis management team in the philosophy of 
terrorism and negotiation.
The role that intelligence plays in creating crisis contingency 
capabilities has also been explained. The value of readily available 
information on the capabilities and intentions of an adversary, or a 
specific subject field during a crisis, should not be underestimated. 
The significance of contingency planning is also realised in the 
contribution that it makes towards game theory. Not only does game 
theory and contingency planning help towards identifying operational 
problems, but the latter activity acts as a powerful stimulant for 
intelligence tasking in that it can identify questions for which there 
are no answers, thereby stimulating lateral thinking and producing 
possible solutions to potential problems. There is no evidence that 
the intelligence community nor the NSC staff engaged in game theory 
in order to test their assumptions or to gain an insight into the 
possible intentions of their adversaries in Lebanon. Had they done so 
they may have identified Hizb'allah's determination to force the U.S.
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out of Lebanon and their possible course of action. In this instance 
given the NSC staffs tendency to ignore the intelligence community, 
it is evident that contingency planning and game theory should be 
conducted at the decision makers' level.
However, the study has revealed that no amount of contingency 
planning can redress the problem of indecisive leadership. This was 
demonstrated by President Reagan's incoherent management style. 
Irrespective of whether intelligence is applied in accordance with 
traditionalist or activist principles, it will have little affect on crisis 
management in the absence of decisive decision making. This 
reinforces the observation that sound intelligence is no guarantor of 
sound decisions. The full potential of intelligence can only be 
realised if clear lines of authority have been established and if 
prompt and unfettered lines of communication exist. This is the least 
that is necessary to facilitate conditions conducive towards 
establishing a rapport between producers and consumers so that 
decision makers take note of intelligence. The establishment of crisis 
contingency capabilities help to identify where these problems do 
and can occur so that potential problem areas can be avoided in 
advance.
The study has revealed that communication is a multidimensional 
factor in intelligence and crisis management. It is crucial to the 
efficient flow of information between the intelligence community and 
the decision makers. The timing and the manner in which intelligence 
is conveyed is crucial to its receptiveness. For it is not so much what 
intelligence says, but the manner in which the decision maker 
responds that will determine the success of intelligence. The case 
studies demonstrated that where the traditionalist approach is 
maintained the opinions of the intelligence analysts are more prone 
to being disregarded by the decision makers. Communication 
therefore should be regarded as more than just a transport medium 
between analysts and consumers. It must embody the efforts by the
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intelligence community to foster a healthy relationship that is based 
on mutual trust between them and that maximises the receptivity of 
the decision maker to their product.
Communication is also essential between the crisis management 
team and their adversaries and is important in harnessing the support 
and co-operation of allies. Similarly, communication is necessary in 
acquiring the understanding, support and legitimacy for crisis 
response activities among the electorate. Of greater significance, 
however, is the ability to manage the content and timing of 
communications. This is not an easy task as the tension between the 
administration and the media during the TWA crisis demonstrated 
when the media announced that a deal had been worked out 
between Schultz and Peres over the release of the Atlit prisoners.
The interaction of intelligence with communication occurs on two 
levels. Of primary importance for intelligence is to avoid a situation 
where the media usurps its role as the most important source of 
information and persuasion. This occurred most prominently in the 
TWA crisis when the media not only provided on the spot information 
for the decision makers, but shaped the administration's response as 
it reacted to public expectations which were shaped by the media. 
This argument does not imply that intelligence will ever reach that 
stage where it can compete with the media as a source of real time 
information during crises. What it does imply is that the intelligence 
community must secure its position as the greater influential actor in 
the crisis decision making process. This can only be achieved if the 
intelligence community adopts a more activist approach with 
limitations.
On a tactical level intelligence must function as a support 
mechanism to the CMT in establishing communication with their 
adversaries. Prior to initiating negotiations during a hostage crisis, it 
is essential to know who among the adversaries has the authority to 
make decisions and what the motivating factors behind those
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decisions are likely to be. In relation to communications with allies, it 
is important for crisis managers to know which interests and 
objectives will influence an ally's support during the crisis. 
Understanding an ally's objectives and motives will assist towards 
planning crisis response strategies that will avoid creating 
precedents and tension between friendly states.
The function of intelligence with regard to precedents is to act as 
an institutional memory for crisis managers during those 
circumstances where the stress induced by the crisis may cause 
them to ignore or disregard existing agreements and long-term 
strategic objectives. It is the duty of intelligence analysts to preserve 
strategic and long term objectives as far as possible over tactical and 
short term solutions. However, it is necessary to maintain a healthy 
balance between entrenched mind-set and new ideas. Intelligence 
should not allow existing precedents to inhibit lateral thinking and 
from proposing 'radical' solutions to problems. This occurred when 
the Reagan Administration stuck to its policy of no negotiations with 
terrorists during the TWA as well as the Beirut hostage crises which 
inhibited them from initiating discussions with Hizb'allah's leaders 
directly. Another factor that precluded the possibility of negotiations 
between the U.S. and Hizb'allah, was the CIA's alleged involvement 
in the failed assassination attempt against Sheikh Fadlallah, the 
spiritual leader of that organisation. The key to improved lateral 
thinking by the intelligence community does not lie in the ability of its 
analysts to come up with new ideas, as much as it depends upon the 
willingness of the decision makers to listen to and accept their 
suggestions. This cannot take place in circumstances where analysis 
and policy making are separated into two independent functions. The 
producer - consumer relationship is dependent upon synthesis to 
make it work.
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6.2.1 The intelligence producer - consumer relationship:
This research has shown that it is wrong to compartmentalise 
analysis and decision making into separate and independent spheres 
of activity as advocated by the traditionalist approach. Consequently 
it has demonstrated the need for a new approach to the producer - 
consumer relationship which excludes the traditionalist methodology 
of looking at the relationship through two separate lenses. Analysis 
and decision making are mutually interdependent. The intersection of 
these two spheres is the interface between the two activities. 
Transforming this concept into tangible reality is usually achieved 
through the establishment of a national security co-ordinating 
mechanism such as, in the case of the United States, the National 
Security Council staff. In the case of the Reagan Administration and 
the Iran initiative, however, the decision making sphere operated in 
isolation of the analytical sphere with its negative consequences. It is 
essential to recognise the role of the NSC staff, particularly during 
crises and to consider the manner in which it should be organised 
and take instructions from policy makers, in future. It is the 
composition and organisation structure of this interface that provides 
the link between analysts and policy makers, that needs to be 
addressed.
Co-operation between policy makers and intelligence 
analyst-managers is essential to ensure the effective tasking of the 
intelligence community and the evaluation of intelligence products in 
context of policy objectives. This can only succeed, however, if there 
is consistency between the producer - consumer approaches at all 
levels throughout the bureaucracy. Consequently, there can be no 
place for traditionalist principles in crisis management because this 
discipline cannot be implemented with any guarantee of success. The 
activist approach arguably promotes closer interaction between 
intelligence analysts, managers and decision makers. This, however,
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is subject to a clear line of authority and the existence of coherent 
policy which must be made known and communicated throughout the 
chain of command.
In real life, however, the intelligence community is driven by the 
priorities that are set for it by decision makers and ultimately the 
President, who demand answers to immediate problems. These 
priorities tend to change as the decision maker responds from crisis 
to crisis. This places a greater demand for short term analysis rather 
than strategic estimates. The intelligence community hardly responds 
with exotic tradecraft, but rather as most other bureaucracies. The 
intelligence organisations are vast bodies controlled and steered by a 
small nuclei of individuals situated in the White House. Concerns 
expressed during meetings by these top decision makers produce 
reverberations throughout the intelligence community. In most cases 
this results in directors and managers summoning division chiefs 
who, in turn, cable station chiefs, who summons case officers, who 
mobilise assets and agents until the whole apparatus has been 
mobilised to respond to an issue that has probably long since been 
forgotten as decision makers move on to the next priority issue.
We have seen how under the Reagan Administration, the 
intelligence community adhered to and functioned according to the 
traditionalist discipline. Within this operational doctrine there was 
persistent tension. This stress had its origins in the polarisation 
between a traditionalist CIA and an activist Director of Central 
Intelligence, William Casey. At a higher level, it was amplified by the 
unique behaviour of the National Security Advisor, Robert 
McFarlane, and the National Security Council staff. In contrast to the 
intelligence community, this external group, which provides the 
intelligence producer - consumer interface, operated in accordance 
with activist principles. The NSC also functioned simultaneously as 
the crisis management mechanism. Its modus operand! created and 
sustained doctrinal and behavioural incompatibility between the
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intelligence community and the ultimate consumers, notably the 
President of the United States and his National Security Council 
members, who both institutional bodies were meant to serve.
Neither the intelligence community nor the policy makers can be 
analysed from the unidimensional perspective of two separate 
spheres of activity. The Kent-Kendall debate and the producer - 
consumer dichotomy tends to polarise the argument and simplify it 
into two definitive activities. This is misleading since the function of 
intelligence is to serve as a support mechanism to policy making and 
unless the problem is examined in terms of its full complexity, which 
includes all the producer - consumer interfaces, no accurate 
perspective will be forthcoming. In this instance, however, the NSA 
and NSC staff operated beyond their traditional norms. The NSA, 
which was supposed to act as an honest broker between the principle 
cabinet members and ensure that the President was the recipient of 
all the viewpoints of the intelligence community, acted beyond this 
brief. Robert McFarlane not only helped to present policy options, but 
he even went so far as to interpret political objectives and to 
formulate and implement policy. Under his stewardship, the NSC staff 
went beyond their responsibility of co-ordinating and assisting the 
executive in implementing policy. Instead it resorted to formulating 
policy directly and covertly. This secret approach to policy making 
effectively excluded the wider administration and the intelligence 
community from policy deliberations and reinforced traditionalist 
behaviour. Most significantly, however, their covert activity created a 
situation where the location for intelligence analysis was effectively 
transferred from the domain of the professional intelligence 
community to that of the crisis management team. These operational 
and bureaucratic abnormalities in the NSC staff caused the producer 
- consumer interface to malfunction. Instead of being the link, it 
became a self-serving body, usurping both the function of intelligence 
analyst and policy maker.
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The NSA and NSC staff were not entirely to blame, however. This 
abnormality was born out of the ambiguous and incohesive 
management style of the President and divergent and conflicting 
institutional interests of his two principle cabinet officers, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence. It created a 
leadership vacuum, which ambitious individuals such as the National 
Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, and within the NSC staff, such 
as Lt.Col. Oliver North, were quick to fill. The result that policy 
objectives were determined at the level of those who were 
responsible for its implementation instead of by the policy makers 
themselves. The reality was that the President of the United States 
and his Cabinet abdicated their responsibility.
The case studies have shown that within the producer - consumer 
relationship, individuals play a key role and their behaviour 
influences the relationship between these two institutional bodies. 
What little policy direction that existed was to be found in the 
administration's pre-cast counter terrorist principles that defined 
response parameters. This in turn, dictated the cognitive boundaries 
within which intelligence analysis was applied. The traditionalist 
doctrine exercised by the intelligence community inhibited lateral 
thinking. The result was that no re-appraisal was applied to the 
immediate problems of terrorism in context of U.S. strategic interests 
in Lebanon and elsewhere. Decision makers and analysts continued 
to think in terms of global strategic policy and failed to recognise the 
emerging trend of sub-state conflict and consider its implications for 
U.S. policy.
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6.2.2. The traditionalist versus activist dichotomy:
The traditionalist discipline militates against analysts questioning 
policy. Crisis response tends to steer intelligence tasking and 
demands for analysis to support response strategies and plans which 
are focused on the immediate. The consequence is that longer term 
strategic overview is suppressed. The traditionalist approach inhibits 
feedback to the crisis management team and the policy makers. 
Feedback is essential but breaks down when distance between the 
producer and consumer is the order of the day. This undermines 
perpetual scanning of the environment and rapid reaction to 
situational variables. It inhibits policy adjustments by the decision 
makers and the adaptation of rules of engagement or standard 
operating procedures at the executive level in response to situational 
dynamics.
In the absence of guidance, definitive policy and the influence of 
the intelligence community on the decision making process, the 
government can lose the initiative. It can find itself responding to 
external influences such as the media and public opinion. The 
demand for a forceful response to international terrorism is what 
compelled the Reagan Administration to appease a public desire for 
revenge and act against Libya. It was an effort to uphold U.S. 
credibility which increased the threshold of violence and resulted in 
another act of terrorism, i.e. the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. This 
demonstrates the risks involved when short term and popular 
sentiments are allowed to influence the policy agenda and analysis 
and the dangers involved when sensational media coverage and 
reporting tends to focus public interest on short term objectives and 
emotive ideals. With the authorities having to respond to emotional, 
rather than focusing on strategic issues, intelligence tasking detracts 
analysis from concentrating on longer term and wider issues. The 
communication of facts together with opinion tends to carry more
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weight and exert a greater influence over decision making than the 
mere conveyance and reporting of facts by the intelligence 
community. The traditionalist discipline which precludes analysis from 
voicing opinion, places the intelligence community at a disadvantage 
in relation to the media who do not refrain from making their opinion 
known. The freedom to state their point of view combined with greater 
accessibility to crisis incidents, empowers the media and enables it to 
replace the intelligence community as a primary source of raw 
intelligence and influence during crises. Although the media provides 
a vital information service to the consumer during a crisis, its 
tendency to bombard its recipients contributes to 'noise'. This can 
undermine the communication and reception of select and vital 
information by the consumer. Quantity which replaces quality and 
detailed information tends to blunten its impact and erodes the 
significance of indicators and warning.
In this instance the study has demonstrated the complexities in 
the producer - consumer relationship and just how complicated it 
becomes when elements of both the traditionalist and activist 
approaches prevail simultaneously. The activist behaviour of the NSA 
and the NSC staff complicated matters when they functioned as the 
interface between the intelligence and the decision making - 
communities. The crux of the problem was that while the intelligence 
community and the policy makers maintained a traditionalist 
relationship, their interface mechanism operated on an activist basis 
which thus proved mutually exclusive. This study therefore has 
demonstrated that not only does the traditionalist discipline of 
intelligence inhibit interaction between analysts and policy makers, 
but where both the traditionalist and the activist approaches are 
practised within one political system, that the system will malfunction.
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This situation is exacerbated and can be disastrous in the 
absence of policy direction and objectives which had not been 
defined and formulated at the appropriate senior level. The behaviour 
of the NSA and the NSC staff reveals the dangers when the activist 
approach is not adequately managed. President Reagan's 
management style and the lack of unity among his principle cabinet 
officers encouraged the activist excesses and a level of adventureism 
that exceeded legitimacy. In the absence of decisions emanating 
from the top, the NSA and the NSC staff seized the initiative. They 
formulated, distorted and then implemented policy at the exclusion of 
objective oversight.
This study has shown that the application of the intelligence cycle 
as a theoretical model towards the understanding of the function of 
intelligence is inadequate because when examined on its own it, is a 
static concept that fails to relate to any application. The intelligence 
cycle as it stands fails to illustrate the interface between intelligence 
and policy making. Towards a better understanding of this process 
and relationship, the following paradigm is offered.
6.3. Towards a new intelligence paradigm
A new model of the intelligence cycle and its processes must 
reflect the environment in which it operates or suffer the criticism that 
it is nothing more than a static concept and meaningless in the 
absence of any indication of its application to the system that it is 
designed to support. Similarly, the paradigm must also demonstrate 
extraneous factors which influence its performance and with which it 
competes in the system. In addition to demonstrating the system 
dynamics, the paradigm should also contribute towards illustrating 
where producer - consumer interaction takes place. In the following 
diagram, this area of interaction is indicated where the crisis
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management team and the intelligence cycle intersect. At this stage 
in the process, intelligence tasking and planning occurs. It is here 
that the collection of data requirements is assigned to the relevant 
collection agencies and departments. The next step in the process is 
collection where the data and information is gathered using various 
means and assets at the intelligence community's disposal. The raw 
intelligence information is then processed through the evaluation and 
interpretation stages which are essential towards analysis. The 
analysis process involves the comparison of the new data with 
existing data and judgements pertaining to the facts and their 
meaning are made. The analysis is then converted into standard 
format whereby it can be recognised as an intelligence product 
during the production phase.
The communication of intelligence is implemented when the 
products are distributed to the consumer according to their 
requirements and in accordance with the need to know principle. This 
is a responsibility that is exercised by the intelligence managers who 
should be aware of the requirements of the consumers and who must 
exercise control over access to classified intelligence in the 
protection of intelligence assets and methods. Throughout the 
process, control and co-ordination is exercised by the intelligence 
managers who ensure that the communication flow is unimpeded. 
The intelligence community is not the sole source of support input 
into the analysis and crisis response system. It competes with the 
media which is a source of real time and raw information. The media 
also act as a source of demand and support input by publishing the 
opinions of editors and experts.
Public opinion and reaction to the crisis and the authorities 
actions have an impact upon the scope and content of media reports 
and also the decision making and the intelligence analysis 
processes, where they contribute as demand inputs. Because the 
analysis and communication processes are time consuming, the
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tendency develops for the analysis function to undergo a shift from 
the domain of the intelligence cycle to the crisis response team. 
While this is reflected in the paradigm, it is not the intention to 
advocate this approach, but merely to reflect the reality of the 
process more accurately. In addition, analysis irrespective of where it 
takes place, should be influenced by the generic principles of crisis 
management. While the author acknowledges the fact that it is 
preferable to present simplistic models, this is somewhat difficult in 
this case given the numerous factors that must be shown if a true 
reflection of the interaction between intelligence, crisis management, 
the public and the media are to be represented. The proposed 
paradigm is illustrated overleaf.
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TOWARDS A NEW INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM
The Intelligence Producer - Consumer Relationship During Crises
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6.4 Self critique
Within the context of the Reagan Administration, this study 
has shown that during crises, the location of intelligence 
analysis shifted from the bureaucratic domain of the 
intelligence community to that of the NSC staff, who functioned 
as the crisis management team for the administration. While 
the study has been able to show that the traditionalist 
approach is not conducive to crisis management, it has not 
been able to determine exactly where the boundary between 
the producer and consumer should be located when adhering 
to the activist discipline. In fact it begs the question as to 
whether any boundary should exist at all? What is evident, 
however, is that for intelligence to succeed, the analyst must 
endeavour to influence the consumer to act upon the 
intelligence that is presented. This does not imply that the 
analyst must set policy, however, but simply that the analyst 
must make himself heard above everyone else.
It would be presumptuous to claim that the study of one 
administration is sufficient to resolve the producer - consumer 
dichotomy. The study has revealed that in order to solve that 
issue, more analysis across a far greater range of 
administrations and numerous political systems would have to 
be conducted. Any such endeavour would, however, fall well 
outside the limitations and scope of a single academic thesis. 
However, that was not the intended purpose of this thesis, 
which sought instead to arrive at a better understanding of the 
function of intelligence in crisis management and the factors 
which influence the producer - consumer relationship. The 
strength and significance of this thesis are to be found in the 
contribution that it makes towards a theoretical model which 
can be used as a framework for further analysis of this type.
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Furthermore, the study has revealed two key issues relating to 
further research in this field which are proposed below.
6.5 Proposals for further study
Although the emergence of sub-state actors and localised 
conflict together with the end of the Cold War have 
emphasised a de facto shift in the mission of the intelligence 
community, the dynamic nature of our environment is not a 
requirement for a systemic change in intelligence. While the 
environment should not influence the manner in which we 
consider the function of intelligence, it will certainly determine 
the way in which we collect intelligence, the targets we select 
and our methods of communication. It has always been our 
attitude towards who is responsible for policy making and what 
constitutes sound decision making from an operational and 
moral perspective, that has influenced and guided our 
approach to the function of intelligence. However, a crucial 
factor that has begun to affect the relationship between 
analysts and decision makers is information technology.
Information technology and its effects upon the 
convenience and speed of communication is a factor of 
growing significance that bears investigation in relation to the 
producer - consumer relationship. Computer processors, 
portability, expert systems, encryption and network capabilities 
are all exerting an impact upon the security of intelligence 
information and the speed with which it is being transmitted 
between intelligence analysts and the decision makers. Direct 
and interactive communication irrespective of distances 
involved between analysts and decision makers has become 
more practical and a reality. The implications of this upon the
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producer - consumer relationship is that the interface between 
analysts and policy makers, the intelligence managers, may 
become redundant. While information technology has 
introduced new problems it is nevertheless a positive 
development that not only expedites intelligence 
communication, but may also serve to eliminate politicisation 
of intelligence by bureaucrats. The situation is currently 
undergoing significant change. The military have implemented 
new information technology that facilitates the dissemination 
and more practical use of intelligence through the Joint 
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). This enables 
military commands around the world to access open source 
information and to access current intelligence via computer 
terminals and modems. The system enables them to employ 
powerful search and sorting facilities that operate on keywords 
to scan the archives of the intelligence community for pertinent 
and relevant data.
A similar capability known as INTELINK is still being 
developed by the intelligence community for policy makers and 
diplomats. This facility is being delayed, however, because of 
the larger number of consumers which is complicating the 
management of access on a 'need to know basis' and 
according to security clearance gradings. This underlines the 
significance of this study as the implications of information 
technology places greater emphasis than ever before on the 
producer - consumer relationship, as contact becomes more 
direct.
Greater insight into the producer - consumer dichotomy 
must therefore focus on the manner in which synthesis 
between the decision makers and analysts can be achieved. It 
must concentrate on capturing the policy maker's attention to 
intelligence information during the policy making process so
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that political and strategic objectives can be based on reality.
The same applies to decision making and response during 
crises. Decisions and response initiatives must reflect 
deference to the realities, constraints and expected reactions 
of the target population.
Final thoughts on the subject are that further intelligence studies 
on the producer - consumer relationship must concentrate on two 
fundamental issues. These are policy relevance and communication 
effectiveness. It is in these two fields of endeavour that this author 
would like to recommend further academic study towards promoting a 
better understanding of the producer - consumer relationship.
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Chronology of Events: 1982 -1985
June 1982
Sept 1982
April 1983 
Sept 1983
Oct 1983
Feb 1984
March 1984
May 1984 
Oct 1984
Dec 1984
Jan 1985
March 1985
Israel invades Lebanon. Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps are deployed in the Bekaa Valley.
The PLO withdraw from Beirut
Sabra and Shatilla camp massacres and the arrival 
of the multi-national peacekeeping force including 
the U.S. Marines in Beirut
Bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut
U.S.S. Virginia and John Rogers fire on Druze 
positions in Suq al Gharb
U.S. Marine Barracks and French Barracks 
destroyed by truck bombs
Frank Reiger kidnapped and 17 Al Dawa Shia 
Muslims put on trial in Kuwait for bombing U.S. 
embassy
Jeremy Levin CNN Bureau Chief and William 
Buckley CIA Chief of Station kidnapped. 17 Al 
Dawa terrorists convicted in Kuwait 
Benjamin Weir Presbyterian Minister kidnapped
Suicide truck-bomb attack on U.S. embassy in 
Beirut
Peter Kilburn librarian at AUB kidnapped and 
Kuwait airliner hijacked and flown to Teheran
Father Lawrence Jenco, Roman Catholic Priest 
kidnapped
Terry Anderson Associated Press Bureau Chief 
kidnapped
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May 1985
June 1985
July 1985
David Jacobson Director of American University 
Hospital kidnapped
William Buckley dies in captivity, Thomas 
Sutherland Dean of Agriculture at AUB is 
kidnapped and TWA Flight 847 is hijacked en 
route to Rome and foced to land finally at Beirut 
Reagan approves arms for hostages plan
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Interview Questionnaire
1. ) During the Reagan Administration's involvement in Lebanon, who 
was responsible for crisis management?
2. ) Did the Reagan Administration approach crisis management in 
accordance with a predetermined strategy and what basic principles 
were applied? Or were the response decisions initiated as the 
situation unfolded?
3. ) To what extent was the intelligence community consulted during 
these crisis incidents?
4. ) To what extent was the intelligence community consulted by the 
administration policy makers who were responsible for U.S. foreign 
policy in Lebanon?
5. ) What was the nature of the relationship between Middle East 
envoy Philip Habib and the intelligence community and between 
George Schultz and the intelligence community?
6. ) Describe the relationship between the National Security Council 
and the intelligence community and between the NSC Staff and the 
intelligence community?
7. ) Would you describe the intelligence community's relationship with 
the White House as strictly traditionalist or activist in nature?
8. ) What influence did William Casey have on the relationship with 
the intelligence community and the White House?
9. ) What influence did the National Security Advisors - in particular 
Robert McFarlane have on the intelligence producer - consumer 
relationship?
10. ) In the circumstances leading up to and subsequent to the 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies and the Marine Barracks 
in Beirut, were the decision makers, i.e. the military commanders in 
Beirut and the decision makers in Washington in possession of 
sufficient warning intelligence?
11. ) Did the above realise the determination and different political 
objectives of the state actors, i.e. Syria and Iran and of Hizb'allah 
towards the U.S. in Lebanon?
12. ) Describe the influence of the media on the decision making 
process and the Administration's response to the terrorist attacks, the 
kidnapping of William Buckley and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847?
13. ) How did President Reagan's management style influence the 
decision making process within the administration?
14. ) Were intelligence analysts or National Intelligence Officers 
included in the crisis management team/process?
15. ) In your opinion did the responsibility for intelligence analysis 
undergo a shift from the intelligence community to the domain of the 
crisis management team during these crises?
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